From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
China
(Sze-Fung Lee – The Jamestown Foundation) “Pop-up” events by People’s Republic of China (PRC) consular officials across the United States are accompanied by online propaganda campaigns on social media, as part of a gray zone approach to cognitive warfare. The events, which may contravene international and US law, are framed as “convenient” for Chinese diasporic communities, while the officials themselves are valorized as “caring” representatives of the motherland. PRC consulates, state media, and diasporic organizations use social media platforms like WeChat, Facebook, and YouTube in coordinated ways to amplify propaganda. – Part II: Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics: PRC Consulate Gray Zone ‘Pop-up’ Events in New York – Jamestown
(Arthur Ding, K. Tristan Tang – The Jamestown Foundation) Since at least the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has promoted military-industrial officials, whose presence at the vice-ministerial level has grown since the 20th Party Congress in 2022. They represent a potential emerging faction within the Chinese Communist Party. Military-industrial officials are an unusually cohesive group, as their educational background and the industrial operational models of the defense industry are likely to foster a shared identity, mutual trust, and a high degree of homogeneity within their interpersonal networks. The military-industrial group has formed a unique Chinese-style military-industrial complex within the 20th Central Committee, with officials holding key roles in resource allocation, policy planning, regulation, local coordination, and opinion transmission, allowing them to significantly control the development of the defense industry. – Xi Jinping Has Further Boosted the Military-Industrial Group of China – Jamestown
(Alicia García-Herrero – The Jamestown Foundation) Two major developments have followed the Third Plenum in July. First, a series of economic data releases indicated that the plenum had done nothing to improve the country’s short-term outlook. Second, a series of stimulus measures were announced over a two-week period, that have so far failed to reinvigorate the economy. The government is unlikely to enact the reforms necessary to support consumption due to high public debt and limited fiscal capacity, as doing so would require cutting subsidies central to the country’s industrial policy. This would contradict Xi Jinping’s focus on innovation. The People’s Bank of China may need to continue interventions in both the sovereign bond market and the stock market, though this could reduce foreign investor interest in Chinese financial markets. The government’s stimulus measures so far have largely been aimed at stabilizing asset prices rather than addressing the deeper issues of demand and overcapacity. – Stimulus Measures Expose Weakness Since Third Plenum – Jamestown
(Prahlad Kumar Singh – Centre for Air Power Studies) On September 25, China launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) carrying a dummy warhead into the Western Pacific Ocean. The official statement from China’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) carried out this test as a “routine arrangement” and “not directed against any country or target”. Chinese Defence Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang said that the launch was conducted to assess the performance of the troops’ weapons, equipment, and training levels. He said, “China always follows a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy that focuses on self-defence.”. – China’s ICBM Test: An Analysis – CAPS India
China – Myanmar
(Ophelia Yumlembam – Observer Research Foundation) On 17 September 2024, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) announced that they would no longer cooperate with the National Unity Government (NUG) in fighting against the military government. The NUG is an exiled government formed by ousted representatives following the 2021 coup. This announcement came a few weeks after Beijing urged the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to stop attacking the Junta. Since the escalation of violence in Myanmar following the launch of Operation 1027, China has been pressing both the military government and the resistance forces to secure its interests and maintain peace along the Sino-Myanmar border region, especially in the Northern Shan state. These actions highlight Beijing’s willingness to engage across party lines to safeguard its strategic and economic interests in Myanmar. – Decoding China’s multi-stakeholder strategy in Myanmar (orfonline.org)
China – Nepal – BRI
(Arpan Gelal – Observer Research Foundation) The finalisation of the ‘Implementation Plan’ for the execution of projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has remained the central component of China’s Nepal policy in the last few years. Recently, China has taken a more assertive stance to portray the success of BRI in Nepal as not a single project under BRI has been executed in its immediate neighbour. Although the negotiation on BRI projects stuck soon after signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017, the push for the BRI Implementation Plan has remained the major agenda of all high-level visits from China in recent years. – China fails to push BRI implementation plan in Nepal (orfonline.org)
China – Taiwan
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) The Joint Sword 2024–B exercises by the People’s Liberation Army were in part a tool of political intimidation to “serve as a stern warning to the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan Independence’ forces,” namely the Lai Ching-te administration. Beijing’s rhetoric is doubling down on blaming Taiwan for its own desire to resort to military action and saber-rattling. Lai used his remarks on Taiwan’s National Day to advocate for reciprocal, healthy, and orderly exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. A spokesperson for the People’s Republic of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office retorted that “there is no goodwill to speak of.”. The decision not to announce the live-fire exercises in advance, and the use of China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to assert de facto jurisdiction continues the erosion of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, with CCG making clear its view that it controls Taiwan’s waters. – Discourse Dimensions of the PLA’s Joint Sword 2024–B Drills – Jamestown
Climate Action, Human Security, and Sustainable Development
(Manann Donoghoe – Brookings) Earlier this year, we hit a milestone that should get everyone’s attention: July 2024 marked the first full 12-month period in which global temperatures averaged 1.64 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial-era temperatures. For the U.S., the temperature increase has brought a more unstable climate with frequent and increasingly compounding disasters, from hurricanes and flooding to extreme heat. While climate change is caused by greenhouse gas emissions warming the atmosphere, many of the growing impacts of climate change are social and economic. For the most vulnerable communities, these alarming impacts aren’t a future problem—they’re being felt now, and innovative policy is desperately needed to ensure that they do not undermine progress in social and racial justice. To develop effective climate adaptation policy, including targeting investments to the communities that need them most, policymakers—both lawmakers and executives—need empirical tools to understand the distribution of climate risks, vulnerability, and resilience by race, ethnicity, and place. – The climate vulnerability gap: Developing a metric to advance racial equity and more just climate investment (brookings.edu)
Egypt – China
(Ahmed Aboudouh – Chatham House) The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help. – Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
France
(Chatham House) France is facing political turmoil. The survival of Michel Barnier’s new government rests on whether he can pass a controversial budget intended to rescue the country from its huge fiscal deficit. Bronwen Maddox is joined by Sophie Pedder, the Paris bureau chief of The Economist, Shahin Vallée, a former adviser to Emmanuel Macron and Armida van Rij, the head of our Europe Programme. – Independent Thinking: How can France survive its budget crisis? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
India
(Nandan H Dawda – Observer Research Foundation) Historically, urban transport planning in India has been centred on balancing demand and supply, often overlooking the critical dimension of sustainability. Policies were predominantly oriented towards “moving vehicles rather than people,” resulting in a lack of focus on public transport (PT) systems, which could have mitigated transport-related externalities such as congestion, parking shortages, and accidents. Public transportation in Indian cities has mainly consisted of bus-based systems, including city buses and bus rapid transit systems (BRTS), as well as rail-based modes such as metro rail, suburban rail, tram networks, and shared mobility services under paratransit or Intermediate Public Transport (IPT) systems. Initiatives like public bike-sharing schemes and ride-hailing services such as Ola and Uber often complement these conventional modes of public transport. However, following the implementation of the National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) in 2006, the focus has shifted towards moving people rather than vehicles. In recent years, the Indian government has launched several initiatives, including the Smart Cities Mission, the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), and the Green Urban Transport Scheme (GUTS), all aimed at promoting and enhancing PT, among other objectives. – The need for integrated and sustainable multimodal transport systems in Indian cities (orfonline.org)
(Pooja Pandey – Observer Research Foundation) In the past decade, the appeal for integrating technology into education has seen a meteoric rise. The Education Technology (Ed-Tech) sector in India received its golden ticket during the COVID pandemic which endorsed its legitimacy and pervasiveness. The necessity of Ed-Tech services, along with their rapid growth and volume of adoption during the pandemic, led in some cases to a reduced focus on quality parameters, legal framework, and fair-trade requirements. This, in turn, had impacts on children’s rights and well-being. The integration of Ed-Tech in mainstream education continues to gain interest, which is also recognised, prioritised and actively promoted by the National Education Policy (NEP 2020) (Sections 23 and 24). This is, however, predominantly from the standpoints of service delivery, curriculum, pedagogy, innovations, and impacts. Worryingly, one of the primary beneficiaries of Ed-Tech viz the children, continues to be the least discussed in Ed-Tech linked discourse, inter alia, the normative aspects and impacts of Ed-Tech relating to children’s right to privacy, agency, and developmental rights. – Ed-Tech in India: The quest for child privacy and well-being (orfonline.org)
(Arjun Prakash Iyer, Shwetabh Singh Rajput – Centre for Air Power Studies) The Himalayas, Earth’s tallest mountain range, hold strategic importance in South Asian history and geopolitics. It has served as a natural boundary between the Indian subcontinent and the Central Asian region and was also part of the Silk Route. During the colonial era, it became a focal point of boundary politics in the ‘Great Game’. The complexity and significance of the princely state of Kashmir drastically increased with India’s independence and the partition of India in 1947. Kashmir, a princely state with a Muslim majority and a Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, sought to remain independent but had to face the Pakistani tribal militias a few weeks after independence in 1947 as Pakistan sought to annex Jammu and Kashmir. This led to India’s involvement and, eventually, a UN-moderated ceasefire, resulting in divided control. Since then, Pakistan has used the Kashmir ‘debacle’ to challenge India’s sovereignty through various conflicts and guerrilla tactics. After the 1971 war, Pakistan shifted to covert warfare and attempted to claim territory through illegal means, as its political and military leadership realised that the country could not fight India in conventional, symmetric warfare. – Swing Wing Heroes of the Himalayas: Story of the MiG-23s and MiG-27s Defending the Northern Borders of India – CAPS India
India – Canada
(Harsh V. Pant – Observer Research Foundation) India-Canada relations have deteriorated to unprecedented levels, fueled by accusations and retaliations over the killing of Khalistani terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s handling of Sikh separatism and his political motives have worsened bilateral ties, leading to a severe trust deficit. – Strategic Myopia: The Trudeau factor in India-Canada Ties (orfonline.org)
India – Maldives
(Amb JK Tripathi – Vivekananda International Foundation) The President of Maldives Mohammed Muizzu, accompanied by his wife, landed at New Delhi on Sunday,6th October on a four-day state visit on the invitation of his Indian counterpart. This was his first state visit to India after he won the election in January this year riding on the “India out” campaign. Breaking the tradition of making first visit to India after assumption of office by Maldivian presidents, Muizzu instead chose to visit Turkey followed by China. – Maldives and India: Better Late Than Never | Vivekananda International Foundation (vifindia.org)
India – Pakistan
(Harsh V. Pant – Observer Research Foundation) After generating days of excitement in the media, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit finally concluded with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar making a quick visit to Islamabad. For all the speculation about India and Pakistan, in the end, what the 23rd meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) of the SCO will likely be remembered for is perhaps Jaishankar’s sunglasses. In this age of intense social media scrutiny, a small clip, now viral, of Jaishankar sporting his sunglasses in style became symbolic of India’s confidence in dealing with Pakistan. Hilarious though this might seem, all that is left of Pakistan in Indian foreign policy imagination today is decoding our diplomats’ style and body language. But, of course, in sending Jaishankar to Islamabad for the SCO summit, New Delhi was also sending out a message about keeping its engagement with its SCO partners intact. Last year, when Bilawal Bhutto Zardari visited Goa to participate in the SCO meeting, he became the first Pakistani foreign minister to visit India since 2011. And now, Jaishankar was the first Indian foreign minister to visit Pakistan in around a decade. These visits though were largely inconsequential in the wider scheme of bilateral ties between the two neighbours. – Jaishankar Makes It Clear: Pakistan Is Now Just A Sideshow For India (orfonline.org)
Indonesia – China
(Arrizal Jaknanihan – East Asia Forum) Indonesia’s plan to impose tariffs on a range of Chinese products in response to alleged industrial overcapacity could harm the country’s economy, decreasing the competitiveness of its exports, increasing production costs and consumer prices and risking retaliation from China. A better approach for economic security could lie in utilising multilateral trade agreements and institutions, maintaining economic openness and learning from Australia’s handling of China’s sanctions. – Less is more for Indonesia’s tariffs on China | East Asia Forum
Japan
(Ayumi Teraoka – East Asia Forum) Former Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida deepened his predecessors’ foreign policy shifts, with Japan becoming an increasingly active — and assertive — regional actor. This strategic reorientation continued even in the wake of a collapse in Kishida’s public support following Shinzo Abe’s assassination. Indeed, Kishida’s ability to continue Abe’s foreign policy shifts is a testament to Japan’s political ‘stickiness’ — it took decades for Japan to change its strategic posture, but now that it has shifted it will be difficult to reverse and will likely accelerate further under the new leadership. – Japan’s enduring defence pivot under Kishida | East Asia Forum
(Masayoshi Honma – East Asia Forum) Japan faced a rice shortage in the summer of 2024, exposing flaws in its food security policy. Despite declining consumption, small shocks caused market disruption. The government refused to release stockpiles, prioritising producer interests over consumer needs. This reflects political considerations, with upcoming elections influencing policy decisions. The crisis highlights the need for a more balanced approach to food security, emphasising both physical stockpiles and effective public communication. Japan must reassess its agricultural policies to ensure long-term food security and market stability. – Japan’s rice crisis shows the price of faulty food security policy | East Asia Forum
Mexico
(Saurabh Mishra – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Claudia Sheinbaum was sworn in as the first woman President of Mexico on 1 October 2024. Sheinbaum was the Mayor of Mexico City prior to her election as president. She succeeds Andrés Manuel López Obrador, popularly known as AMLO, whose approval ratings has never been less than 60 per cent.1 Both Obrador and Sheinbaum belong to the democratic left-wing Morena Party that was founded and nurtured by AMLO. Obrador had to demit office due to Mexico’s constitutional limit on presidential terms. – Claudia Sheinbaum as First Woman President of Mexico: Promises and Challenges | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (idsa.in)
Middle East
(Amjad Iraqi – Chatham House) After a year of being hunted as one of the most wanted men in the Middle East, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by Israeli forces on 17 October, in the city of Rafah in the Gaza Strip. Hailing from Khan Younis refugee camp, Sinwar was imprisoned in Israel in 1989 for the abduction and killing of two Israeli soldiers. He was freed alongside 1,000 other prisoners during a major 2011 exchange, gradually building a notorious reputation as an intelligent and ruthless political figure. – The killing of Yahya Sinwar won’t change the course of the Gaza war | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Steven A. Cook – Council on Foreign Relations) Despite some raised expectations, the killing in Gaza of formidable Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is not likely to hasten a formal cease-fire, nor end Israeli efforts to eliminate the group responsible for the October 7, 2023, attacks. – Sinwar’s Death Does Not Mean Breakthrough in Israel-Hamas War | Council on Foreign Relations (cfr.org)
(Nathan Sachs – Brookings) The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Rafah is potentially a watershed moment in the year-long and extremely bloody war he sparked on October 7, 2023. It is unlike the deaths of any other Hamas leader in the past year. While Ismail Haniyeh was the official political head of Hamas, living a lavish life in Doha, it was Sinwar who was in charge on the ground in the Gaza Strip, where the organization’s governing and military power was concentrated. It was Sinwar who decided to launch the war, only informing Haniyeh shortly before the attack. When Haniyeh negotiated over cease-fires, he would wait for a final word from Sinwar, in his shelters beneath the Gaza Strip. While Mohammed al Masri (“Deif”) and Marwan Issa were the commanders of Hamas’s military wing, they worked in close coordination with Sinwar. – The death of Sinwar and a moment of opportunity (brookings.edu)
Mozambique – India
( Abhishek Mishra – Manohar Parrikar Institute) On 9 October 2024, Mozambicans voted in the country’s presidential elections in which the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), is expected to maintain its grip on power since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975. The incumbent President Filipe Nyusi is stepping down after two terms and the party’s candidate—Daniel Chapo—is expected to replace him. His main opponents are Ossufo Momade of the largest opposition party the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), Lutero Simango from the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), and Venancio Mondlane, an independent candidate who has a strong base among young Mozambicans. The principal issues for the electorate include poverty, youth unemployment, government corruption and the challenge of addressing insurgency and restoring stability in Cabo Delgado province. – Mozambique’s Presidential Elections and Implications for India’s Energy Security | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (idsa.in)
Pakistan – Middle East
(Mohammed Sinan Siyech, Ambar Khawaja – Observer Research Foundation) The ongoing war between Israel and Palestine has prompted several reactions internationally. However, one actor’s involvement has been under-researched within the most contemporary analysis of the conflict. Pakistan, as the second-largest Muslim state and the only Muslim nuclear power, holds immense significance globally. Given its geostrategic location, linking the Middle East and South Asia, it is essential to assess how the country perceives its role amid the escalating Middle East crisis. – Reflecting on Pakistan’s response to the Israel–Palestine conflict (orfonline.org)
Quad – ASEAN
(Angeline Tan, Ava Kalinauskas – East Asia Forum) Since its revival in 2017, the Quad — comprising Australia, India, Japan and the United States — has faced criticism, particularly in Southeast Asia, due to being perceived as an anti-China coalition. To enhance its relevance, the Quad must redefine its identity beyond major power rivalry and prove its effectiveness in providing public goods, a goal hampered by the underwhelming outcomes of initiatives like its vaccine diplomacy. While recent surveys show growing ASEAN support for the Quad, scepticism remains, particularly among countries with closer ties to China. To build trust and cooperation, the Quad should establish a track two dialogue, fostering collaboration on shared priorities like climate change and infrastructure development. By demonstrating its commitment to ASEAN’s centrality and addressing local needs, the Quad can shift perceptions from rivalry to partnership, ultimately strengthening regional stability. – Track two dialogue is key to unlocking Quad–ASEAN cooperation | East Asia Forum
Russia’s War on Ukraine
(Vladimir Socor – The Jamestown Foundation) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has unveiled his Victory Plan to stave off incremental defeat under Russian assault. The plan calls for offsetting the war’s imbalance with a surge of Western military assistance. Some major parts of the plan are in classified annexes to the published chapters. Three chapters cover Ukraine’s wartime requirements; another proposes a massive program to develop Ukraine’s mineral resources; and the fifth visualizes Ukraine’s pivotal role in Europe’s security architecture. Kyiv emphasizes its readiness to negotiate an “end to the war,” but only from a position of strength. The plan reflects Kyiv’s concern that its membership prospects could become an object of tradeoffs in eventual negotiations with Russia. – Ukraine’s Victory Plan: Last Chance for West to Reverse Trajectory of Defeat – Jamestown
Russia – Türkiye
(Fuad Shahbazov – The Jamestown Foundation) Trade between Russia and Türkiye has dropped significantly in 2024 due to Western sanctions, indicating a weakening economic partnership as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to isolate it from global partners. Ankara is increasingly aligning with Western powers, as evidenced by the postponement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visits to Ankara. This is straining Turkish-Russian relations. Türkiye remains a key importer of Russian energy, despite improving ties with the West, with a notable increase in fuel imports and its participation in re-exporting Russian oil products to Europe. – Türkiye-Russia Trade Declines Amid Western Sanctions – Jamestown
South China Sea
(Evan A. Laksmana – IISS) Breaking the cycle of military incidents between the Philippines and China in disputed waters requires a diplomatic reassessment on the domestic, bilateral and regional levels. – Diplomatic decoupling in the South China Sea (iiss.org)
Southeast Asia
(Sin Lu Tan – IISS) Feeling the effects of US–China competition on their green-transition efforts, Southeast Asian states will need to achieve a balance of partners through different domestic, bilateral and multilateral arrangements. – Beyond US–China rivalries? Southeast Asia’s diverse green partnerships (iiss.org)