Gradually, and Then Suddenly: The Decline and Fall of ODNI

(Michael Feinberg, Julia Curlee – Lawfare) The intelligence community has had a trying few weeks. On June 21, the Washington Post reported that Tulsi Gabbard, the most recent director of national intelligence (DNI), might have been taking political marching orders throughout her entire career from someone often described as a cult leader. A few days after this story broke, the paper provided the receipts and highlighted specific incidents where her speeches and commentary seemed to be based on memoranda provided to her by mysterious third parties. Prior to the publication of the Post’s stories, Gabbard had already resigned from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), for familial reasons, and President Trump, via a Truth Social posting, named Bill Pulte to act in her stead. Pulte, an individual with zero experience in any and all fields related to the ODNI’s responsibilities, most recently served as the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. In that capacity, he became most known for finding supposed mortgage fraud in innocuous loan documents, much the same way Don Quixote could see a lumbering giant in a harmless windmill. This tendency to extrapolate and publicize conspiracies without foundations, in a steadier era, might disqualify someone from a role requiring the rigorous analysis of facts, particularly when the nation’s ability to project force upon the world stage, navigate international relations, and formulate the nation’s domestic security policies are at stake. The reaction across the political spectrum, including from elements of the president’s own party, was unusually frank. Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-S.D.) said the country does “not need a weaponized” DNI. Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), the vice chair of the intelligence committee, said Pulte was picked because the White House believes he will “provide the narrative it wants, not the intelligence we need”, while Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) called Pulte a “partisan thug” with no experience in intelligence. One can debate whether the current state of the U.S. intelligence community most resembles a tragedy or a farce, but history is certainly repeating itself. The abuses and missteps of the FBI and CIA in the first decades of the Cold War led to a spate of hearings and reforms in the 1970s, which substantially limited the operational latitude of both agencies. A little under 30 years later, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, much ink was spilled arguing that the earlier reforms might have been too constricting, and another massive reform liberalized intelligence authorities and added a coordinating department at the top of the community in the form of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. But now, two decades hence, the ODNI appears to be acting in a manner similar to the FBI and CIA’s modus operandi before the very first round of reforms. For anyone acquainted with the workings of the intelligence community, as well as a familiarity with the stakes of its decisions, the ODNI’s limited effectiveness is not surprising, and the political constraints hamstringing its influence are, in many ways, the fault of its prior directors. But it still maintains access to an astounding amount of both raw and finished intelligence, and its statutory authorities are vague enough that it can still chip away at the concept of an apolitical national security state. – Gradually, and Then Suddenly: The Decline and Fall of ODNI | Lawfare