Sources: Chatham House; Council on Foreign Relations; Jamestown Foundation; Lowy The Interpreter; RUSI; Soufan Center
China
(Brandon Tran, Gerui ZhangXi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign in the military is far from over. A front-page PLA Daily commentary declared 2026 the “year of decisive battle” against graft in the ranks, and Xi’s appointment of a new disciplinary head as he rebuilds the Central Military Commission (CMC) before any other members signals that personnel investigations are his highest priority. A new round of purges appears focused on dismantling the patronage network built around the former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. The purges target groups that have been relatively insulated from anti-graft probes to date, namely the PLA Air Force and the Western Theater Command. The ongoing disappearance of Wang Haijiang, the sole remaining active PLA general known to have fought in the Sino–Vietnamese War, also underscores Xi’s preference for personal loyalty over experience and expertise. – Xi Purges Six More PLA Generals – Jamestown
China – US
(David Saultry, Minran Liu – Lowy The Interpreter) Having last month designated Taiwan and surrounding areas as “coastal waters”, China’s confidence in pursuing reunification has been on full display. The alleged inspection of 198 vessels around Taiwan and potential mapping of undersea cables, supported by Chinese law enforcement vessels, shows Beijing is not asking for permission. Pair this with President Xi Jinping’s security partnership pledge to Cambodia — and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen’s statement that his nation would resolutely support “complete national reunification” as the “international landscape evolves” — and it is clear China is shaping the region on its own terms. Beijing has settled on an identity as a peer power, entitled to shape the rules and institutions of the international order in its favour, alongside Washington or despite it. Chinese policymakers increasingly share a coherent understanding of China’s place in the world and where it is headed. That identity has been pursued aggressively long before June. Beijing has weaponised its dominance of critical minerals, restricting rare earth exports to pressure Washington and Tokyo. Its forces have rehearsed a blockade of Taiwan with live fire and exclusion zones meant to deter American intervention. Its state hackers are pre-positioned inside US water, power and communications networks. – In the face of Chinese certainty, America offers confusion | Lowy Institute
Indonesia
(Fran Witt, Ashley Siagian, Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat – Lowy The Interpreter) The architecture of international development finance is under strain. Confidence in the post-war Bretton Woods institutions has weakened across much of the developing world while geopolitical fragmentation and intensifying strategic competition have complicated access to traditional sources of capital. Against this backdrop, Indonesia’s decision(Opens in new window) to join the New Development Bank (NDB) in January 2026, accompanied by a US$1 billion capital commitment(Opens in new window) over seven years, deserves attention not merely as a financial transaction but as a strategic statement. The NDB operates on a different principle to the Bretton Woods institutions: countries must become shareholders by contributing capital before they can access financing. This membership-based model gives borrowing countries a greater stake in the institution’s governance while aligning access to capital with ownership. For Indonesia, the US$1 billion commitment is therefore not merely a fee for entry but an investment in securing long-term access to an alternative development-finance architecture. – The sovereignty hedge: Indonesia’s $1 billion bet on the New Development Bank | Lowy Institute
NATO
(Oana Lungescu – RUSI) President Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman 1,000 room palace, complete with a mosque and vibrant turquoise carpets (symbolising Turkey’s maritime power in the colour of its traditional tiles), will be the grand setting for the NATO summit on 7-8 July. NATO officials hope to make this a show of unity in a year marked by Donald Trump’s threats over Greenland, criticism of Europeans for not showing enough support for his war in Iran, and cuts to American military presence in Europe. Their aim is to repeat the success of last year’s summit in The Hague, where NATO leaders agreed to invest 5% of GDP on defence. This major pledge helped placate President Trump but also sent a strong message of deterrence to President Putin. Ankara is supposed to be about delivery, with a clear path to increased defence spending, faster defence production, and more sustainable support for Ukraine. ‘We will breathe life into the concept of NATO 3.0: a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO,’ Secretary General Mark Rutte said. He has three reasons to be cautiously optimistic. Europeans are investing record sums in defence; they are backfilling (at least on paper) most of the gaps left by the US in NATO defence plans; and all 32 allies have already agreed the summit declaration. – NATO 3.0 to Emerge at Ankara Summit Amid Fragile Unity | Royal United Services Institute
(Marion Messmer – Chatham House) The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara is not the first meeting at which the alliance’s members have had to navigate internal tensions. Recent summits involving the Trump administration have often been tense, most famously in 2018, when President Donald Trump first began to threaten to leave NATO if other allies did not increase their level of defence spending. However, tensions ahead of Ankara are at a much higher level than in previous years. This is because the Trump administration has become serious about reducing its level of involvement in European security, which has major ramifications for NATO. It is also partly a result of NATO moving to annual summits in response to the intensification of the threat level in Europe after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which has created a stage for tensions to play out publicly. NATO members will arrive in Turkey with several different points of disagreement between them. President Trump remains upset that other allies did not support the US war in Iran to the extent that he had desired. For his administration, this is an example of what they see as European security freeloading, as they believe that their action in the Middle East will benefit global security overall. President Trump has also let his disappointment over Iran turn into significant disagreements with several European leaders, including the UK’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz. All three of these leaders were relatively close with President Trump and were praised by him, but he has now publicly criticized them. With only days to go until the NATO summit, Merz has defended Germany’s defence spending record, Meloni has significantly distanced herself from Trump, and Starmer has focused on connecting with other European leaders to provide a counterbalance to the US. – Tensions between the US and Europe loom large over NATO summit | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(The Soufan Center) As leaders descend upon Ankara for the 2026 NATO Summit, several points of friction between NATO members have raised serious questions about what this year’s gathering will achieve. As popular terminology in Washington shifts away from “burden-sharing” and increasingly towards “burden-shifting,” European NATO allies are acutely aware of expectations from the U.S. to not only increase their defense spending, but to work towards a truly independent defense architecture. As NATO allies gird themselves for U.S. military drawdowns across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East many leaders are seeking clarity from Washington over the next two days — specifics on what the pullback will look like, where it will occur, and on what timeline, so they can plan how to fill the resulting gaps and build up the capabilities. Ankara is also positioned to play an important mediating role in the widening transatlantic rift, European nations recognize they must tap into Türkiye’s military capabilities as they reduce their reliance on the U.S., something they have resisted in the past. – NATO Heads to Ankara with Its Unity in Question – The Soufan Center
Russia – Ukraine
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia compressed its schedule of mass missile attacks, launching major strikes on Kyiv on July 2 and July 7 after stockpiling weapons during May and June. The campaign comes as Russia faces record casualties, declining public support, worsening economic conditions, and strong European resolve to expand military aid for Ukraine. Despite Kyiv’s vulnerability to ballistic missiles, Russia has not dramatically increased their use because Ukrainian strikes have disrupted missile production and supply chains. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s much-publicized Oreshnik missile has also failed to become a regular operational weapon. The Kremlin paired the July attacks with exaggerated battlefield claims and messaging aimed at the July North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, portraying the strikes as retaliation while falsely touting the capture of Kostyantynivka. – Putin Intensifies Missile Attacks Against Kyiv Ahead of NATO Summit – Jamestown
UK
(Peter Watkins – Chatham House) The UK Government’s Defence Investment Plan (DIP) was finally published last week to predictably mixed reviews from the British media and commentariat. It is the outcome of a tortuous process begun with the launch of a ‘first-of-its-kind’, externally-led Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in mid-July 2024 – one that was dogged from the start by an unclear budgetary envelope. The DIP does not set a visible trajectory towards achieving the government’s commitment to spend 3 per cent of GDP on defence in the next Parliament or to meet the 2025 NATO Hague Summit’s agreement to spend 3.5 per cent of GDP on core defence by 2035. And even for the remaining years of this Parliament, the plan appears to contain a £1.2 billion per year funding shortfall. That money will need to be found. Protracted deliberations between the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Treasury and No 10 over the size and shape of the future defence programme are nothing new. But this time they were uniquely public and theatrical – watched with concern not only by observers in the UK but among key allies and partners. The government should ensure that such a conceptually flawed process is also the last-of-its-kind. – Will NATO be convinced by the UK Defence Investment Plan? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Roli Asthana – Chatham House) Foreign policy in Britain is often discussed as if it were a distant theatre, detached from the everyday realities of people’s lives. Yet the past decade has shown repeatedly that global shocks land first and hardest in the towns that have the least insulation from volatility. Energy price spikes, supply chain disruptions, geopolitical tensions and investment flows reverberate through UK towns like Leigh and Wigan, Motherwell and Port Talbot, long before they appear in Westminster briefings. Andy Burnham, newly elected as MP for Makerfield, steps back onto the national stage after nearly a decade as a metro mayor – and as the UK Labour Party’s near-certain choice to replace Keir Starmer as UK prime minister. Burnham describes his politics – shaped by the lived experience of Greater Manchester’s towns – as ‘Manchesterism’: an attempt to deliver ‘good growth in every British postcode’, nurtured ‘from the bottom up’, using ‘public intervention where necessary’ – driven by higher ambition for UK regions and towns. This outlook, core to his local election success, also offers a distinctive way of thinking about Britain’s international posture: an approach that I describe as ‘International Manchesterism’. That is, a place rooted internationalism that treats global forces as inseparable from local outcomes. International Manchesterism begins with the recognition that global shocks are experienced locally. The manufacturing clusters of north-west England, and other UK regions, have felt the real world consequences of supply chain fragility more acutely than the financial districts of London. When international energy markets convulse, households in older housing stock across Wigan and Leigh face disproportionate hardship. And when geopolitical tensions disrupt investment flows, regeneration projects in Greater Manchester stall. – Burnham should use a ‘Makerfield Test’ to ground UK foreign policy in real places | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Iran
(The Soufan Center) The U.S.-Iran peace process is stalled as both sides battle for strategic leverage, setting the stage for a “no war, no peace” mutually hurting stalemate. Iran is insisting on U.S. acquiescence to its control over the Strait of Hormuz and substantial sanctions relief before offering nuclear concessions, frustrating the U.S. from achieving the central goals of the war effort. The Trump team is attempting to empower Iran’s moderate leaders by offering full sanctions relief and global investment in exchange for abandoning the core tenets of the regime’s revolutionary ideology. The regime is using the week-long funeral ceremonies for the slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei to showcase its resilience, but his son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, remains unseen, clouding Western assessments of Iranian decision-making. – Minefields Obstruct the Road to U.S.-Iran Peace – The Soufan Center
US – Ukraine
(Jonathan Masters, Will Merrow – Council on Foreign Relations) After Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine became by far the top recipient of U.S. foreign aid, marking the first time a European country held the top spot since the Marshall Plan directed vast sums to rebuild the continent after World War II. Yet, U.S. commitment to Ukraine has been called into question under the second Trump administration and there has been no significant aid legislation since 2024. – Here’s How Much Aid the United States Has Sent Ukraine | Council on Foreign Relations
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