From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinkig of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Africa; Arctic; China; Climate Action; Europe; Food; Jordan; Middle East; Russia; Russia-Abkhazia; Russia-Iran’s Axis of Resistance; Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine; USA; USA-China
Africa
(Malancha Chakrabarty, Lukhanyo Neer – Observer Research Foundation) In the early 2000s, Africa experienced an economic turnaround when macroeconomic stability and growth rates improved, and large and fast-growing economies like Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa became known as ‘lion economies’. At that time, there was much optimism about the prospects for the continent. That upward momentum, however, has been derailed by various factors. The first economic shock that put the brakes on high growth rates was the commodity price crash of 2015. Not too long after, in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. The pandemic had unprecedented economic consequences in Africa: real growth rates plunged to negative figures; poverty and unemployment rose; and countries fell into deep debt. The Ukraine-Russia war followed close on the heels of the pandemic and exacerbated the continent’s food insecurity and undernutrition. At present, 57.9 percent of Africa’s population (or about 868 million people) are experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity. Indeed, much of the development gains of the last two decades have been reversed and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) today seem unattainable. African countries are also suffering a disproportionate burden of the consequences of climate change despite making the least contribution to global carbon emissions. Africa’s security challenges are also plenty—more than 35 armed conflicts are ongoing, killing thousands and displacing over 40 million people so far—and these conflicts are compounding the challenges to development goals. – After the Great Fall: Revival and Restoration in Africa
Arctic
(Valerie Brown – The Jamestown Foundation) The popular image of the Arctic is as a “frozen North,” which it was for all of human history until a couple of centuries ago. In that view, intrepid explorers and scientists clatter over tundra and ice roads in dogsleds and decrepit trucks, risking everything to bring back important samples and wild tales of howling winds. But this vision is growing passé. The Arctic is warming four times as fast as the global average. While there are still plenty of extreme risks from sea ice, blizzards, and the like, from here on it will be the dangers of thawing, not freezing, that plague the Arctic. The problems people encounter will involve mosquitoes, mud, cracked roadways, flooding, buildings splitting down the middle—and disease. – A rising danger in the Arctic: Microbes unleashed by climate change – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
China
(Louis Bearn, Nick Childs – IISS) In October 2024, China brought together at sea for the first time its two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning (Type 001) and Shandong (Type 002), for ‘dual-carrier’ manoeuvres with their accompanying escort groups. Their embarked air groups also reflected a growing capability. Beijing’s latest and potentially most-capable carrier, the Fujian (Type 003), has also undertaken successive sea trials, the first of which began on 1 May 2024. Yet, notwithstanding the choreography of recent developments, questions remain over the future trajectory and operational effectiveness of China’s carrier force. – China’s aircraft carriers begin to spread their wings
Climate Action
(Alice C. Hill, Priyanka Mahat – Council on Foreign Relations) The UN climate summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, was poorly organized, fell far short of goals for climate finance, and raised doubts about the ability of the COP process to halt alarming global warming trends. – Was COP29 in Azerbaijan a Failure? | Council on Foreign Relations
Europe
(Timothy Wright – IISS) Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated European NATO members’ interest in modernising and strengthening their armed forces after nearly three decades of underinvestment. Among the many capabilities being sought, some countries have stated their interest in acquiring long-range, ground-launched conventional missiles through a joint effort known as the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA). This marks the renaissance of a capability that has mostly been absent from the arsenals of European countries since the 1990s. While ELSA has the potential to provide deterrence benefits for European states and improve NATO’s defence and deterrence posture, there are, however, several political, technical and budgetary challenges associated with a co-development that will need to be addressed if the project is to bear fruit. – Europe’s missile renaissance
Food
(Liz Goodwin, Brian Lipinski – World Resources Institute) Around one-third of all food the world produces never gets eaten — at least according to the long-accepted estimate. But the problem is likely much bigger than this. More recent data suggests up to 40% of food is lost or wasted along the value chain, exposing a major blind spot in global food systems. The consequences of this food waste, even at the lower end of the estimates, are huge. It means that an amount of land larger than China is used every year to produce food that no one will eat — especially egregious in a world where nearly 1 in 3 people face some level of food insecurity. About 45 trillion gallons of water, almost one-quarter of all water used in agriculture, is consumed in the process. And food waste is linked to about 8%-10% of the greenhouse gas emissions warming the planet. The UN has set a goal to halve food loss and waste globally by 2030. But countries and companies can’t begin to tackle the issue unless they know how much food is really lost or wasted — and where and why. – How Much Food Does the World Really Waste? | World Resources Institute
Jordan
(Burcu Ozcelik – RUSI) On 24 November a gunman opened fire on a police patrol near the Israeli embassy in Amman, injuring three Jordanian security officers. The assailant, who was killed, was reported to have a criminal record for drug trafficking. While the motives behind the attack are unclear, it serves as a reminder of the multiple threats that Jordan faces amid the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. A second Trump administration may embolden Israeli settlers in the West Bank, complicating Amman’s fragile balancing act. Meanwhile, the kingdom’s borders with Iraq and Syria remain volatile. Jordan may be more in the crosshairs now than ever before. – Why Jordan’s Role as a ‘Buffer State’ is being Tested | Royal United Services Institute
Middle East
(Ameer al-Kaabi, Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) On November 18, 2024, the Israeli minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Saar, sent a letter to the current rotating president of the UN Security Council expressing concern over increased attacks by Iran-backed militias in Iraq targeting Israel. In his letter, Saar held the Iraqi government responsible for those attacks and emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself if the Iraqi state was unwilling or unable to control armed groups launching drones and cruise missiles at Israel. – Iraqi Militias Downscaling Their Anti-Israel Actions | The Washington Institute
(Robert S. Ford – Middle East Institute) There is no quick path to limiting or reducing Iranian influence in Iraq. Tehran will react fiercely to American efforts to destroy the militias and zero-out its influence, and it would have multiple avenues to escalate through the porous 900-mile-long border between the two countries. Moreover, domestic Iraqi reaction, especially among elements of the Shi’a population, would be reticent at best and hostile at worst to intensified American military actions. Nor should it be an American goal to stoke a civil war among Iraq’s Shi’a that would give Iran new access points. Washington needs to recognize that some elements of Iraq’s relationship with Iran are, in fact, stabilizing. Until there are readily available substitutes, Iraqi imports of natural gas and electricity from Iran are important to public welfare and stability, as anyone who has experienced summer heat in Iraq should understand. Heavy traffic from Iranian religious pilgrims is important to the economies of key cities such as Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. The American goal must not be the elimination of Iranian influence in Iraq but rather helping Iraqis ensure Iran’s proxies do not solidify a permanent state within a state. Fortunately, Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a Arabs, and Kurds, are reluctant to accept Iranian hegemony. Even Iraqi Shi’a Islamists would rather play the United States against Iran to boost their own immediate interests. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis, including the leadership, do not want to be in the middle of a US-Iran conflict. Pressure from various Iraqi communities, including the Shi’a religious leadership and government officials, on the militias to stand down against Israel shows there are elements with whom the Americans can work. – US success in Iraq means being a more reliable partner than Iran | Middle East Institute
(Atlantic Council) Piece by piece, they’re working toward peace. On Tuesday, US President Joe Biden announced that Israel and Lebanon have agreed to a ceasefire, which is set to begin before dawn on Wednesday. It comes nearly fourteen months after Hezbollah followed Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel with its own rocket strikes the next day. Since then, Israel has steadily weakened the Iran-backed Lebanese terrorist group, including by killing its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in September. – Experts react: Israel and Lebanon have struck a ceasefire deal. Is the Israel-Hezbollah war really over? – Atlantic Council
(The Soufan Center) Attacks on Israel by Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq are threatening to draw the Iraqi state directly into the regional conflict between Israel and Iran and its Axis of Resistance partners. U.S. officials are hoping to avoid a “worst-case scenario” in which two allies, Iraq and Israel, are directly at odds. Iran is considering using Iraqi militia groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah, which are armed by and beholden to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF), to attack Israel on Iran’s behalf. U.S. officials are pressing the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani to rein in Iran-aligned Iraqi militia organizations. – Militias Draw Iraq into the Regional Storm – The Soufan Center
Russia
(Alexander Taranov – The Jamestown Foundation) The Kremlin formally approved a new nuclear doctrine on November 19, following the West’s authorization for Ukraine to utilize its deep strike capabilities on Russian territory. The revised document is directed at Western powers and aims to address the potential escalation of military cooperation with Kyiv. It considers scenarios involving the use of long-range weapons against Russia and the possible deployment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops to Ukraine. The Kremlin deliberately lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, reflecting Russia’s intimidation strategy to spread fear of nuclear escalation among Ukraine’s Western partners and transition to offensive nuclear deterrence. – Russia Updates Nuclear Doctrine, Lowering Threshold for Use of Nuclear Weapons (Part Two) – Jamestown
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia has more icebreakers than any other country but far fewer than it needs to ensure passage in the Eastern portions of the Northern Sea Route critical to its trade with China as well as to ensure that the Russian navy can continue to dominate the North. Moscow has announced an ambitious icebreaker construction program, but both longstanding problems in Russian shipyards and Western sanctions make it unlikely to achieve its much-ballyhooed goals. As a result, some Russian navy ships in the north are now forced to drift at night to avoid running into ice or aground in inadequately mapped portions of the Northern Sea Route, opening the way for China to take the upper hand. – Russia Lacks Icebreakers Its Arctic Fleet Needs to Function in Eastern Arctic – Jamestown
Russia – Abkhazia
(Giorgi Menabde – The Jamestown Foundation) Abkhaz President Aslan Bzhania resigned on November 19 following protests and pressure from the opposition. This follows a history of leadership changes in Abkhazia driven by mass protests and political unrest. The Kremlin’s financial control and strategic demands dominate Abkhazia’s politics as local unrest grows over Moscow-backed policies such as the “property agreement,” which exempts Russian investors from property taxes, further tightening Russia’s grip on the region. Georgia and its allies’ limited influence in Abkhazia leaves the region isolated and increasingly vulnerable to Russian pressure and influence. – Protests Push Abkhazia’s President Out for Fourth Time – Jamestown
Russia – Iran’s Axis of Resistance
(Emil Avdaliani – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia has expanded its ties with groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, leveraging its relationship with Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” to increase geopolitical influence through military and security cooperation, including supplying weapons and conducting diplomatic engagements. Moscow is not pursuing an overarching peace but aims to strengthen its position as a pro-Arab power and counterbalance the United States. This includes positioning itself as a mediator and criticizing US failures in the region to attract allies. Russia is leveraging militia ties to pressure global and regional players, distract from its war in Ukraine, and bolster its influence, using these connections to shape favorable Middle Eastern power dynamics and counter Western adversaries. – Russia Increases Ties with Iran’s Axis of Resistance – Jamestown
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Peter Dickinson – Atlantic Council) This month marks the twentieth anniversary of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. When protests over a rigged presidential election first erupted in downtown Kyiv on November 22, 2004, few observers could have imagined that they were witnessing the opening act in a geopolitical drama that would eventually lead to the largest European conflict since World War II. And yet there can be little doubt that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to crush Ukraine first began to take shape two decades ago as he watched the Ukrainian people defy their own authoritarian rulers and demand a democratic future. – Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution – Atlantic Council
(Caitlin Welsh, Joseph Glauber, Emma Dodd – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Russia’s recent attacks on Greater Odesa port infrastructure and grain-carrying vessels in the Black Sea marked the most intense attacks on Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure in over a year. In September, according to the United Nations, Russian attacks damaged grain infrastructure and six civilian vessels in Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Russian ballistic missiles then struck foreign-flagged ships on October 6, October 7, October 9, and October 14, also damaging a grain warehouse and other port infrastructure with the October 14 strike. Four of the ships hit in October were carrying agricultural commodities, including vegetable oil for the UN World Food Programme (WFP) in Gaza, as well as corn and grain shipments for Egypt, Italy, and Southern Africa, according to statements by the Ukrainian and UK governments. – Russia’s Renewed Attacks on Ukraine’s Grain Infrastructure: Why Now? What Next?
USA
(Andrew Chatzky, Anshu Siripurapu, Noah Berman – Council on Foreign Relations) Tariffs are a form of tax applied on imports from other countries. Economists say the costs are largely passed on to consumers. Countries have used them to protect domestic industries, such as agriculture and renewable energy, as well as to retaliate against other states’ unfair trade practices. U.S. President Trump wielded tariffs more than any recent American president, particularly against China. President Biden has largely left these levies in place while imposing his own. – What Are Tariffs? | Council on Foreign Relations
USA – China
(Manoj Joshi – Observer Research Foundation) Beginning in 2017, the first Trump Administration steered United States – China relations from engagement to competition. Thereafter, Biden largely built on this policy, while giving indications of moving towards a phase of “competitive co-existence”. Under Biden, the US sought to reassure China that it was adopting a strategy of “de-risking” and not “de-coupling,” and its goal was to adopt a technology export regime that would also serve the needs of American security. This brief aims to flesh out the Biden Administration’s approach to China, which serves as the backdrop to the policy of the incoming Trump presidency. At the time of writing this brief, Trump was signalling, based on appointments to relevant positions in his administration, likely substantive changes in American policy towards China. – From Engagement to Competitive Co-Existence: The U.S. and its China Challenge
