From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinkig of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Australia; Australia-China; China-India; China-India-USA; Critical Minerals-Human Rights; India; India-Nigeria; Indonesia; Iran; Japan-Russia; Morocco-USA; Philippines-USA; Russia-Arctic; Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine; SDGs; Space Governance; USA; USA-Africa; USA-China; USA-Indian Ocean; USA-Japan; USA-Middle East
Australia
(Jennifer Parker – ASPI The Strategist) The maritime domain is increasingly contested. From attacks on shipping and undersea cables in Europe to grey zone threats in the South China Sea, risks to maritime security are mounting. China’s use of maritime militias and reports last week of a China-flagged tanker breaking subsea cables highlight the blurred lines between civil and military threats. With the third-largest exclusive economic zone in the world, Australia must ask itself the question: is our maritime security architecture ready to deal with the increased threats? – Australia needs a coastguard to meet modern maritime threats | The Strategist
Australia – China
(Justin Bassi, Tilla Hoja – ASPI The Strategist) Senate estimates earlier this month heard the remarkable revelation that Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke has had to take ‘precautions’ based on warnings from his own department to protect himself and the nation’s sensitive information from Burke’s own Chinese-made electric car. The risks with such cars, according to Home Affairs officials, might include having data collected from the owner’s phone if it were connected to the car, voice calls eavesdropped on, image collection from the car’s external cameras and geolocation tracking—meaning that if Burke drove to a sensitive government location the car’s manufacturer would be able to see. – Chinese electric vehicles are a rolling security threat | The Strategist
China – India
(Kartik Bommakanti – Observer Research Foundation) With India and China reaching a limited agreement on the disengagement from and patrolling of the Depsang Bulge and Demchok areas in eastern Ladakh, there is widespread jubilation in some quarters. The celebration of this breakthrough announced on 21 October 2024, should be tempered by the reality that there is still a significant amount of disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction of forces to be completed by New Delhi and Beijing. Pending further negotiations, under the latest agreement, the following friction points were left out—Galwan Valley (PP 14), Pangong Tso (North and South Banks), Gogra (PP 17A) and Hotsprings (PP 15). These four areas are currently under buffer zones that prohibit patrolling, meaning the status quo ante, has not been restored completely. Meanwhile, with Depsang and Demchok, India and China have agreed to “coordinated patrolling,” which one analyst described as an “innovation.” This is misleading and deceptive because it is not an innovation, but a restriction on patrolling. There are three patrolling restrictions under the latest agreement. – India-China border agreement: A case for military buildup
China – India – USA
(Daniel Balazs – Lowy The Interpreter) Donald Trump’s upcoming engagement with China and India will be one of the key determinants of Asian affairs. While Beijing and New Delhi are emerging great powers, their bilateral ties are not immune to Washington’s geopolitical calculations. US strategic support to India and the enhancement of defence cooperation exacerbated a major downturn of Sino‑Indian ties after the 2020 Galwan conflict. Nevertheless, a recent breakthrough on border affairs and shared economic imperatives suggest that China-India relations will be more robust against US strategic interference in the years to come. – China-India ties to be more resilient in the Trump 2.0 era | Lowy Institute
Critical Minerals – Human Rights
(Fiona David, Shannon Hobbs – Lowy The Interpreter) Against the backdrop of reporting on global climate negotiations, the jargon and acronyms are coming thick and fast. Some media outlets have even created jargon buster guides. One of the expressions that has been gaining currency is “just transition”. But what does a just transition actually mean? According to the ILO, it’s about “greening the economy in a way that is as fair and inclusive as possible to everyone concerned, creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind.” Central to this approach is the commitment to protecting human rights. The first Just Transition Work Program (JTWP) – which promotes pathways that achieve the decarbonisation goals set out in the Paris Agreement fairly and equitably – was only established in 2022 at COP27. – Critical minerals and the case for human rights in the just transition | Lowy Institute
India
(DR P V Ramana – Vivekananda International Foundation) Naxalites of the Communist Party of Maoist [CPI (Maoist)], Maoists in short, seem to be resurfacing in Karnataka. The killing in an encounter of Vikram Gowda, on November 18, 2024, in Eedu village, Karkala taluk of Udupi district, further confirms this emerging trend. Gowda had multiple extortion and criminal cases registered against him. During the encounter, the ANF personnel recovered a .9 mm calibre gun from his possession. He was one of the most wanted Maoist leaders from Karnataka against whom 61 cases were registered in Karnataka and another 19 in Kerala. Gowda carried a cumulative reward of Rs 25 lakh in Karnataka and Kerala. – Maoists Resurface in Karnataka | Vivekananda International Foundation
India – Nigeria
(Ruchita Beri – Vivekananda International Foundation) Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Abuja on 16-17 November, 2024 enhances India’s relations with Nigeria, a key country in the African continent, in the political, economic and security spheres. In recent years, India has stepped up its engagement with the African region. The main mantra of Prime Minister Modi’s engagement with Africa is that it will be guided by African priorities. In his words, “it will be on terms that will be comfortable for you…that will liberate your potential and not constrain your future.” – Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Nigeria Enhances Partnership | Vivekananda International Foundation
Indonesia
(Tiza Mafira, Khalifa Akbar – Lowy The Interpreter) The 2022 G20 Summit marked a turning point for Indonesia’s energy transition with the signing of an agreement to explore the early retirement of Cirebon-1 coal-fired power plant. The 660-megawatt Cirebon-1 is historic for being the first coal-fired power plant in Indonesia owned by an independent power producer, Cirebon Electric Power (CEP). The agreement signing was therefore celebrated on a global stage as it signalled Indonesia’s first decisive move towards phasing out its reliance on coal. A year later at COP28, a follow-up agreement was signed in which the Asian Development Bank (ADB), CEP, Indonesian Investment Authority (INA), and state-owned electricity company PLN conditionally committed to shortening the power purchase agreement of Cirebon-1, terminating its electricity supply by December 2035, six-and-a-half years ahead of its original closure month of July 2042. – Cutting coal power: Indonesia’s test case for turning a climate pledge into reality | Lowy Institute
Iran
(Michael Eisenstadt – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Four decades after launching a nuclear weapons program—at a moment when the regime’s conventional deterrence has been weakened by Israeli blows to its proxies, air defenses, and missile production capabilities—Iran may finally be on the verge of building a bomb. Such a decision would require tradeoffs that could affect the security, survivability, and credibility of a nascent arsenal. Iran would thus be compelled to assess related priorities when deciding whether to “go small” with a minimum deterrent force, “go big” with an arsenal befitting a regime with grandiose ambitions, or chart a middle course. In this comprehensive Policy Focus, military analyst Michael Eisenstadt examines Iran’s nuclear choices regarding weapons, force posture, and strategy, and their implications for the region if the Islamic Republic does get the bomb. He then offers recommendations for how the United States and its allies could shape the regime’s nuclear decisionmaking in order to bolster deterrence and regional stability. – If Iran Gets the Bomb: Weapons, Force Posture, Strategy | The Washington Institute
(The Soufan Center) Iran’s advancing nuclear program is likely to factor prominently in Trump’s Iran policy, which is expected to try to pressure Iran on a broad range of fronts. Iran sought unsuccessfully during the past month to defuse tensions over its nuclear program and has reacted sharply to the IAEA censure of Tehran for non-cooperation. Hardline Iranian leaders argue for developing a working nuclear weapon as a solution to the strategic setbacks Iran has experienced from Israel’s intensified military campaign against it and its regional allies. Some Iranian leaders envision a comprehensive revised nuclear agreement with the Trump administration, but Trump officials will likely demand concessions that Iran’s regime finds unacceptable. – Iran Nuclear Program Returns to the Fore as Trump Returns to Office – The Soufan Center
Japan – Russia
(Prerna Gandhi – Vivekananda International Foundation) The Russia-Ukraine conflict has markedly altered the state of relations between Japan and Russia. Though many analysts see the start date of the conflict with annexation of Crimea in 2014, it was only with the Russian special military operation in February 2022, that Japan-Russia relations took a serious nosedive. – The Impact of Ukraine Conflict on Japan-Russia Relations | Vivekananda International Foundation
Morocco – USA
(Rama Yade – Atlantic Council) African leaders in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, and beyond quickly congratulated Trump following his election victory, but more broadly, they could take a wait-and-see approach on the new administration. Nevertheless, there is one African country in particular whose position in Washington and globally could be strengthened by the new Trump presidency. Morocco is one of the United States’ oldest allies, having been among the first to recognize the independence of the young nation in 1777 when Sultan Mohammed III opened Morocco’s ports to US ships. – Why Morocco could see its importance to Washington rise during Trump 2.0 – Atlantic Council
Philippines – USA
(Richard Javad Heydarian – Lowy The Interpreter) The impending return of the notoriously unpredictable Donald Trump to the White House has, quite predictably, refocused minds across major Asian capitals. On the surface, Manila has been generally upbeat about the direction of bilateral relations, since, as Philippine Ambassador to Washington Jose “Babe” Romualdez told me earlier this year, there is robust bipartisan support for expanded strategic cooperation between the two century-old allies regardless of who occupies the White House. If anything, the Southeast Asian nation expects even greater military aid from the United States under a second Trump presidency: top Republican strategists – from Trump’s former national security adviser (Robert O’Brien) to his incoming secretary of state (Marco Rubio) – have identified the Philippines as a vital “frontline ally” in an intensified great power competition with China. – Weak link or “frontline ally”? Where the Philippines will fit into Trump’s rivalry with China | Lowy Institute
Russia – Arctic
(Sergey Sukhankin – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia remains the dominant player in the Arctic icebreaker sector, but this advantage may face challenges in the coming decade due to the collaborative ICE Pact involving the United States, Canada, and Finland. For Russia, icebreakers are essential for accessing Arctic resources, critical to its economy and survival as a great power. In contrast, Western countries view Arctic initiatives more as geopolitical prestige projects. If the ICE Pact progresses, Russia might respond by deepening cooperation with non-Western actors, potentially creating an alternative Arctic alliance with BRICS countries. This shift could benefit China, enhancing its role and presence in the Arctic. – Russia Prioritizes Icebreakers in Scramble for Arctic (Part Two) – Jamestown
(Sergey Sukhankin – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia announced the new Project 22220 Chukotka nuclear icebreaker in early November, which is part of a new generation of icebreakers crucial for transforming the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic into a globally competitive transportation artery. Moscow sees the Arctic as a key geopolitical battleground, prioritizing natural resource access and security. Its advanced icebreakers enable year-round navigation, positioning Russia to challenge traditional trade routes like the Suez Canal. Russia’s recent icebreaker innovation reflects significant technological progress, bolstering its Arctic infrastructure and defense readiness. The integration of advanced weaponry and multifunctional designs in military icebreakers enables Russia to assert control and respond flexibly to Arctic challenges. – Russia Prioritizes Icebreakers in Scramble for Arctic (Part One) – Jamestown
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation) As Russia’s war in Ukraine passes the 1,000-day mark, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy has turned to escalatory steps aimed at undermining Ukraine’s will to resist and weakening Western resolve to confront Russian aggression. The change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine, deployment of North Korean troops, and strike using the intermediate-range ballistic missile “Oreshnik” gave Putin the illusion of gaining control in the war. The Kremlin is betting on the Western coalition to bend a peace deal in Russia’s favor, but that potential deal is now undercut by Putin’s demonstrated desire to subjugate a defiant Ukraine and split the West. – Putin’s ‘Three Escalations’ Affect Prospect of Peace in Ukraine – Jamestown
(Harsh V. Pant, Kartik Bommakanti – Observer Research Foundation) With the Biden administration giving the green light for Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russian territory, the war between Russia and Ukraine is poised to intensify. Washington has permitted Kyiv to use the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles which have a range of 300 kilometres (km). Paired to this approval is another shift in Washington’s decision to supply anti-personnel mines as part of new military assistance worth nearly $300 million. – The escalation matrix in Ukraine
SDGs
(Homi Kharas, John W. McArthur – Brookings) Any reader of the daily news could be forgiven for thinking the world is in decline. Amid so many conflicts and societal strains, the United Nations regularly warns that only 17% of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—the economic, social, and environmental targets all countries set in 2015—are on track to be met by 2030, as agreed, leading many to wonder whether such goals still serve any purpose. But rather than succumb to pessimism, we would do better to examine where the world is making sound progress, where it seems stuck on autopilot, and where things are indeed moving backwards or approaching a tipping point for the worse. – How is the world really doing on the SDGs?
Space Governance
(Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan – ASPI The Strategist) To solve the ongoing difficulties in framing new rules for space governance, states must revitalise existing measures and consider them in international space policy debates. In particular, they should look at The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). The HCoC commits states to openness and transparency in space activities, helps codify responsible behaviours and, in doing so, constrains irresponsible ones. – Greater transparency will enhance space governance | The Strategist
USA
(Adie Tomer, Ben Swedberg – Brookings) With the 2024 election in the books, the country is rapidly preparing for what a second Donald Trump presidency means for a lengthy list of high-profile policy issues. Headlines have focused on areas with clear differences between President Joe Biden and President-elect Trump, including tariffs, immigration, and Ukraine—but all the prognostication about areas of disagreement can obscure just how many issues demand continuity across administrations. That’s shaping up to be the case with the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), or the so-called “bipartisan infrastructure law.” – What the Trump administration might mean for the future of the bipartisan infrastructure law
(Kartik Bommakanti, Rahul Rawat – Observer Research Foundation) Donald Trump’s surprising yet decisive victory for a second non-consecutive presidential term will usher in some key changes in United States defence policy, or rather, will continue the policies during his first term as President. Three key areas that will receive considerable attention under the defence policy of Trump 2.0 will be American alliances, “America First” and fewer restrictions on US forces’ battlefield tactics. Yet, the challenges which face the second Trump administration will be considerable. – US defence policy under Trump 2.0
(Jhanvi Tripathi – Observer Research Foundation) Donald Trump being elected the 47th President of the United States has rightly sent psephologists back to the drawing board. The fact that he has returned with such a large mandate is a strong marker of growing discontent and an indictment of American foreign policy that comes at the cost of domestic concerns, which has been the Republican platform’s focus this election cycle. The stock market’s surge seen at Trump’s return suggests that this is an area of policy where his administration tends to have the greatest clarity. ‘America First’ is as straightforward as one can get as an indication of what’s to come. It is the age-old rule that investor confidence is prompted by policy certainty, whether pro-market or otherwise. For months now, President Trump has been very clear that he intends to increase tariffs by 20 percent across the board, with an additional 60 percent for China. Besides some modest attempts at negotiating rapprochement with trade partners, the Biden years did not dramatically reverse any of Trump’s trade decisions. The predicted inflationary effects of the tariffs from Trump 1.0 never materialised to a startling extent. The tariffs continued and were sometimes increased during the Biden presidency. – Trade in the time of Trump 2.0
(Manoj Joshi – Observer Research Foundation) Donald Trump’s victory will lead to major changes in almost all policy areas in the United States, from tariffs and immigration to the Ukraine war. How they will be prioritised is another matter. Characteristically, Trump also appears to grapple with personal challenges, including a strong inclination to address perceived or actual slights and instances of perceived persecution. The coming Trump era could well be the most unpredictable and disruptive in our times. His appointments indicate that he intends to fulfil his election pledges, especially on immigration. Beyond policy and personal foibles, the US elections hold immense significance. Till now, the first Trump presidency has often been viewed as an aberration and the Biden term as the norm. Now, however, it is the latter which seems to be a discontinuity. The second Trump term, which has been an all-round victory for the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) forces, will now be the norm for the US in the near future. – What lies ahead: Understanding Trump’s return to power
(Ronan Mainprize – RUSI) Few presidents have had such troubled relations with the US intelligence community (IC) as Donald Trump. His first administration was peppered with fiery tweets, stinging op-eds, and a very public fiasco in Helsinki, where he appeared to side with Vladimir Putin against his own intelligence analysts. Returning to the White House in 2025, Trump 2.0 promises a renewed age of discord and dysfunction; and it has perhaps already begun with his nominations for Director of the CIA (D/CIA) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The announcement that John Ratcliffe had been tapped for Langley’s top job was mildly alarming. Though he has had some previous experience in the IC, Ratcliffe spent much of that time focused on attacking the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, any concern about his nomination was quickly overshadowed by the news that the president-elect had chosen Tulsi Gabbard – an IC neophyte and notorious advocate of Russian disinformation – for DNI. With a vengeful Trump at the helm once again, both of these nominations will present difficult challenges to US intelligence at a crucial moment in its history. – Donald Trump’s New Spymasters | Royal United Services Institute
USA – Africa
(Samir Bhattacharya, Observer Research Foundation) As Donald Trump prepares to begin his second term on 20 January 2025, there is growing speculation about his likely ‘Africa policy’. During his first term, Trump largely neglected Africa and even made some derogatory comments about the continent. He has never visited Africa and has shown little interest in expanding United States (US) military operations there. While he has refrained from intervening in the internal affairs of African nations, it is clear that Africa has not been a key priority for his administration. Trump’s second term seeks to strengthen his “America First” foreign policy stance, which focuses on pragmatic, investment-driven strategies centred on American interests. This approach may bode well for African nations. – Trump’s transactional pragmatism may auger well for Africa
USA – China
(Atul Kumar, Kalpit A Mankikar – Observer Research Foundation) After Donald Trump’s victory in the United States elections this month, cooperation has become the mantra in Beijing. In his congratulatory message, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised that, throughout their bilateral history, China and the United States have suffered from confrontation but benefitted from cooperation. He stressed that both nations must find the correct way to get along in this new era. Xi’s statement exhibited a mix of apprehension and a veiled warning that if China and the US fail to get along, all of humanity will suffer. His concerns are well founded. The US Government is increasingly recognising that its win-win relationship with China has simply helped Beijing win twice. – Christmas for China hawks: Measuring Trump’s stance on China
USA – Indian Ocean
(Vivek Mishra – Observer Research Foundation) The United States is recalibrating its strategy in the Indian Ocean, driven by the region’s rapidly evolving geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. The US approach has moved from unilateral dominance to a more collaborative strategy that emphasises shared leadership through a technology-driven security paradigm. This paradigm supports a rule-based order where regional stakeholders are empowered to adopt more significant roles. The foundational agreements between the US and India reflect this strategic shift, highlighting a partnership that prioritises regional stability over traditional power projection. The rise of minilateral frameworks such as the Quad have also become central to the US strategy. – Dominance, Competition, and Adaptation: The US Quest for a Strategic Trifecta in the Indian Ocean
USA – Japan
(Pratnashree Basu, Tripti Neb – Observer Research Foundation) Historically noted to be a strategically essential partnership, ties between Tokyo and Washington have weathered several notable geopolitical shifts. The Republican party candidate and former president Donald Trump’s return to the White House on a significant mandate raises questions and speculations over what the relationship between the United States and Japan (a key ally in the Indo-Pacific) might look like in the forthcoming presidential term. Trump’s ‘America First’ approach during his first term brought forth trade imbalances, transactional diplomacy and defence burden-sharing, leading to both challenges and opportunities for Japan. Japan’s snap elections on 27 October failed to provide the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with a majority for the first time in over a decade, highlighting shifts in the country’s domestic politics. In an international landscape that is growing increasingly complex with China’s military assertiveness and North Korea’s unpredictability, the US-Japan alliance can hope for a renewed emphasis on trade, technology and security, even as shared strategic interests underscore the partnership’s future. – What Trump 2.0 could mean for Tokyo?
USA – Middle East
(Kabir Taneja – Observer Research Foundation) Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 American presidential elections is being seen as good news by many in the Middle East. The war in Gaza has continued unabated, and its spillover into Lebanon along with increased Israeli military actions in Syria and also as far as Yemen, have expanded fears of a region-wide conflagration. The expectation is that Trump will push various parties to cease hostilities while simultaneously taking a harder stance against Iran. – Trump 2.0, unpredictability, and a Middle East on edge
