From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Climate Action; Gaza; Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond); Sudan; Syria-ISIS; US-China; US-Iran
Climate Action
(World Resources Institute) Countries agreed on a draft deal through the International Maritime Organization to place a price on the shipping industry’s emissions. The agreement, which is set to be formally adopted in October, requires ships to pay a fee based on the carbon intensity of their fuel mix and is intended to spur the transition to lower-emission fuels. The High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, of which WRI is the Secretariat, has previously shared a set of priority actions for the shipping industry’s sustainable transition. – STATEMENT: Countries Agree to Global Fee on Shipping Industry’s Emissions | World Resources Institute
Gaza
(UN News) The Israeli bombardment of Al-Ahli, a Gaza City hospital, has put even more pressure on the remaining health facilities in the occupied Palestinian territory, where the delivery of aid and movement of humanitarian workers is highly restricted by the Israeli authorities. – Thousands of Gaza patients waiting for urgent medical evacuation | UN News
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(Ksenia Kirillova – The Jamestown Foundation) The Kremlin is reportedly considering “post-war normalization” scenarios, involving the rehabilitation of public figures and return of emigrants who left at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to project internal stability amid prospects for a peace deal with Ukraine. Russia continues to enforce property confiscation laws, foreign agent designations, and restrictions on emigrants, reflecting enduring hostility toward dissent and liberalization. Concessions granted to high-profile individuals who at some point opposed Russia’s war against Ukraine are unlikely to lead to widespread amnesty for victims of political repression. – Widespread Liberalization of Russian Domestic Policy Remains Unlikely – Jamestown
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Steven Witkoff, U.S. President Donald Trump’s key negotiator, last Friday, in St. Petersburg, likely to buy himself more time before making any concessions. On Sunday, Russian missiles struck the Ukrainian city of Sumy, killing 34 people including two children. Russia appears to hope that the global focus will shift from Ukraine due to tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, but worsening economic strain, falling oil revenues, and looming sanctions may force Putin to confront growing internal pressure for a ceasefire. Russian military stagnation and ongoing Western aid to Ukraine indicate how Putin’s procrastination reflects fear of accountability rather than expectation of battlefield success. – Decision Point for Putin is Set Too Close for His Comfort – Jamestown
Sudan
(UN News) The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that 15 million boys and girls require support, up from 7.8 million at the start of 2023 – the year fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and former ally the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). UNICEF said violence by warring parties against children, hunger and disease are surging, while displacement continues to disrupt lives. This is happening as both humanitarian access and funding are shrinking and as the rainy season approaches in May. – Sudan: 15 million children require humanitarian assistance after two years of war | UN News
(UN News) More than 12.4 million people have been forced from their homes across Sudan – including over 3.3 million refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries – as two years of civil war fuel famine, disease outbreaks and the collapse of the health system. – Millions displaced, health system in ruins as Sudan war fuels famine | UN News
(UN News) As Sudan’s devastating war enters its third year, UN rights investigators are warning that its “darkest chapters” may still lie ahead, following the massacre of more than 100 people at displacement camps in Darfur over the weekend. – Sudan war: ‘Darkest chapters’ ahead as Darfur massacre claims over 100 lives | UN News
(UN News) The conflict, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is the cause of a major humanitarian crisis, not only in the country itself, but also in neighbouring States. The crisis has proven to be particularly dangerous for people who have already been driven from their homes and, according to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, thousands are fleeing the country every day. The situation within the country is dire: attacks on Sudanese displacement camps in the North Darfur region, currently the hotspot of the conflict, have resulted in multiple civilian casualties, and the UN has made an urgent call for action to prevent widespread famine. Out of a population of some 50 million, almost 25 million Sudanese face acute food insecurity, and the number is expected to grow. “With the rainy season starting soon, and flooding along key routes likely to compound access challenges, time is running out,” Stéphane Dujarric, the UN Spokesperson, warned – How is the Sudanese civil war destabilising neighbouring countries? | UN News
(Jehanne Henry – Middle East Institute) Two years on, the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and wrought terrible destruction: the capital, Khartoum, and other major cities and towns lie in ruins; an estimated 150,000 people had been killed as of January 2025; famine is spreading; and more than 12.7 million people have fled their homes, 3.8 million of them to neighboring countries. The warring sides and their allies have committed unspeakable atrocities. They have attacked scores of hospitals and markets, blocked the delivery of aid to the displaced hungry, and carried out beheadings, public executions, and rapes. International media reported the discovery of mass graves north of Khartoum, next to an apparent RSF torture center. Activists say tens of thousands are missing. In recent weeks, the SAF has made major battlefield gains, retaking Khartoum, including the symbolic presidential palace and the airport, and areas in Gezira state that it lost last year. As The Guardian observed, the routing of the RSF has brought jubilation and relief but also sadness at the scale of looting and destruction. However, the army’s gains do not mean peace is on the horizon. The RSF’s commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, vowed his forces would return to Khartoum “more powerful,” while the SAF’s commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, said “the joy of victory will not be complete until the last rebel is eliminated in the last corner of Sudan’s land.” Fighting continues in neighboring Omdurman and in the capital of North Darfur, where SAF-aligned joint forces are defending their last holdout in that region, as well as in other active hotspots. – Two years on, Sudan’s war seems further than ever from resolution. Can US involvement help peace efforts? | Middle East Institute
Syria – ISIS
(Charles Lister – Middle East Institute) For much of the past two decades, the Islamic State (ISIS) has enjoyed favorable conditions in Syria, but since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, dynamics have changed. With Assad’s departure, ISIS lost its long-standing and vitally important safe haven in Syria’s central desert and its most significant driver for recruitment. The results — so far — have been dramatic. In 2024, ISIS was resurgent in Syria, conducting an average of 59 attacks per month, but since Assad’s departure on Dec. 8, 2024, its operational tempo has fallen by 80% — to just 12 attacks per month, on average. Even more significantly, the deadliness of ISIS’s attacks has plunged by 97% — from an average of 63 killed per month under Assad in 2024 to just 2 per month since then. There are several reasons for this dramatic change, all of which relate to new dynamics that came into play when Assad’s regime fell. These changes will prove fleeting, however, if Syria’s ne(Charles Lister – Middle East Institute) For much of the past two decades, the Islamic State (ISIS) has enjoyed favorable conditions in Syria, but since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, dynamics have changed. With Assad’s departure, ISIS lost its long-standing and vitally important safe haven in Syria’s central desert and its most significant driver for recruitment. The results — so far — have been dramatic. In 2024, ISIS was resurgent in Syria, conducting an average of 59 attacw reality is not managed well. Ultimately, ISIS’s durable defeat will come about only if Syria’s transition succeeds — with the formation of a government that represents all of the country’s rich diversity; with an economy that is given air to breathe through sanctions relief, substantial investment, infrastructure rehabilitation, and reconstruction; and with the gradual demobilization of a society over-militarized by nearly 14 years of brutal civil conflict. If these key facets of Syria’s post-war recovery fail to develop, the ingredients for a renewed ISIS resurgence will return once again. Four months into Syria’s extraordinarily fragile transition, there are already signs that ISIS may be on a road to recovery yet again. – ISIS is on the ropes in Syria. A successful transition in Damascus could deliver a knockout blow | Middle East Institute
US – China
(Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, Thomas Howell – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The U.S. government and those of its allies have imposed and progressively tightened controls on the export of semiconductor technology, devices, and tools to China in an effort to maintain U.S. leadership in this critical sector. China has responded with an all-out effort to stimulate domestic chip innovation capabilities and eliminate dependency on foreign sources. The outcome of the chip innovation race will determine which country leads in the development and application of AI, with major strategic and economic security implications. Preventing China from acquiring the most advanced chip technology makes sense from a national security perspective, but export restrictions alone cannot substitute for comprehensive industrial and research policy measures necessary to ensure U.S. leadership in semiconductor design, production, and infrastructure. Moreover, the imposition of export controls has resulted in China doubling down on its existing deeply subsidized development efforts that could well produce breakthrough technologies capable of leapfrogging the current state of the art, potentially destabilizing the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem. – The Limits of Chip Export Controls in Meeting the China Challenge
(Gracelin Baskaran, Meredith Schwartz – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On April 4, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed export restrictions on seven rare earth elements (REEs) and magnets used in the defense, energy, and automotive sectors in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff increases on Chinese products. The new restrictions apply to 7 of 17 REEs—samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium—and requires companies to secure special export licenses to export the minerals and magnets. – The Consequences of China’s New Rare Earths Export Restrictions
(Philip Luck – Center for Strategic & International Studies) As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) retaliates to U.S. tariffs, it has not stopped at imposing its own taxes on imports of American products, which now stand at 125 percent for all U.S. goods. The PRC has also tightened export controls on seven additional critical minerals, added 28 U.S. companies to the export control list and 17 to the unreliable entity list, and instituted licensing requirements for seven additional critical minerals. At China’s export control work conference, China’s Ministry of Commerce indicated that they would “improv[e] the modern national export control system . . . by improving laws and regulations, strengthening management of listed items, enhancing licensing law enforcement, increasing multilateral and bilateral export control dialogues and exchanges, and promoting compliance.”. These actions are not simply short-term responses to U.S. efforts to strain the Chinese economy. Instead, they are a part of a larger shift in both U.S. and PRC policy toward using restrictions on exports as a tool of weaponized economic interdependence. – The Hidden Risk of Rising U.S.-PRC Tensions: Export Control Symbiosis
US – Iran
(The Soufan Center) Talks on Saturday between the U.S. and Iran resulted in agreement to develop a framework for a new nuclear accord, but did not engage extensively on the wide gaps in their positions. U.S. officials continue to insist any new agreement include limits to Iran’s ballistic missile programs and regional operations, and Iranian leaders are demanding extensive sanctions relief. In order to build confidence with his Iranian counterparts and lower regional tensions, chief U.S. negotiator Steven Witkoff sidestepped the Trump team’s demand for full dismantlement of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Following the meeting, members of Trump’s national security team reinforced Trump’s threat that failure to reach agreement will necessitate military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. – U.S.-Iran Talks Pass Their First Test – The Soufan Center
(Ray Takeyh – Council on Foreign Relations) The indirect talks between the United States and Iran in Oman have achieved their foremost objective: more diplomacy. After U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in 2018, the two countries’ relations grew even colder. This weekend’s meeting was the first face-to-face meeting since the U.S. withdrew seven years ago. Leaders agreed the talks were “constructive” and decided to hold another round on April 19. This next round will also be held in Oman and will again be indirect, with the Omani foreign minister shuttling between the U.S. and Iranian delegations. – Where the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks Are Headed | Council on Foreign Relations
