China – Batanes Islands
(Hsi-Ting Pai – The Strategist) Now China is going after the Batanes Islands, a strategically crucial Philippine territory in the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan. An assertion by a group of scholars in June that the Batanes belong to China is a familiar opening move in Beijing’s territorial narrative-building playbook. Their declaration was followed by contrived media amplification to test foreign reactions, which also usually happens. If Beijing deems the timing right, it may eventually move to official foreign ministry statements to solidify a previously non-existent territorial claim. The ultimate goal is not necessarily the physical seizure of the islands. For the moment, the manufactured claim may serve only as a flexible diplomatic and legal pressure point to advance immediate objectives: disrupting Japan–Philippines maritime boundary talks and escalating cognitive warfare against Taiwan. – A new claim on the Batanes, from an old Chinese playbook | The Strategist
Europe – Australia – Immigration
(Lisa Martin) Years ago, over curries at an embassy dinner, a charismatic Indian ambassador recounted some of his ripsnorting nicknames for fellow diplomats. The Europeans, in particular the Scandinavians, he dubbed the “Axis of Good” because of smug human rights lectures delivered from high moral pedestals. Those days might be numbered as European nations seek to borrow from Australia’s offshore immigration detention example and establish so-called return hubs in third countries for people with rejected asylum-seeker claims. Rwanda and Uganda are in talks to host the centres. (A previous Denmark–Rwanda deal stalled.) Austrian media is reporting that Uganda could initially accommodate up to 10,000 migrants. Uzbekistan is another country reportedly in the mix. On Friday, Denmark hosted immigration ministers from Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Greece for talks, as a dozen demonstrators with megaphones and signs protested outside the Danish parliament. “We expect to be ready to send the first foreigners to a partner country by the end of next year,” Danish immigration minister Morten Bødskov said, adding he hopes the first deal can be struck around New Year. – Europe borrows Australia’s asylum script – outsourcing rights | Lowy Institute
Indonesia
(Jessica C. Liao, Lucas Myers – The Interpreter) Long before assuming the presidency, Prabowo Subianto cultivated a reputation as a champion of a more assertive, muscular Indonesian posture on the world stage. Standing on the stage to deliver his inauguration address before the People’s Consultative Assembly in Jakarta in October 2024, he reaffirmed his commitment to Indonesia’s traditional “free and active” foreign policy, vowing to elevate the nation’s standing while resisting being pressured or pushed around by stronger states. Indonesia, Prabowo declared, would chart its own course on its own terms. Nearly two years into his presidency, the “active” dimension of Prabowo’s posture is undeniable, bordering on what some describe as diplomatically “hyperactive”. Since taking office in late 2024, he has visited nearly 30 countries, rivalling the travel volume of his predecessor, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, over nearly a decade in power. Eager to project Jakarta as a leading powerbroker, Prabowo has touted himself as an aspiring mediator in conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza to Iran, steered Indonesia into BRICS membership, and maintained a constant presence across multilateral summits. Yet, looking past the diplomatic theatre and headline-grabbing summits reveals an uncomfortable reality: Indonesia’s foreign policy may be more active, but it is increasingly constrained where it matters most: its relationship with Beijing. Confronted by mounting domestic economic strains, Jakarta has steadily lost room to manoeuvre to an assertive China that provides critical capital while demanding deference on its own terms. Missteps in foreign policy have raised questions about Jakarta’s ability to maintain its non-alignment posture. While Indonesia continues to profess its bebasaktif doctrine, successful hedging demands two vital assets Jakarta currently lacks: a disciplined resistance to external dependence and precise diplomatic signalling. Without them, growing concessions to Beijing threaten to hollow out Indonesia’s treasured strategic independence. – Under Prabowo, Indonesia is more active than ever – but less free | Lowy Institute
Pacific Islands Forum
(John Hennessey-Niland – The Strategist) The focus for this year’s annual gathering of Pacific leaders and partners was always going to be about China. With the 55th annual meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) taking place last week in Palau, one of only 12 nations in the world that recognise Taiwan, there was always going to be the potential for mischief by China. As the leaders meeting came only a short time after a Chinese missile test in the Pacific, everyone was waiting to see the final communique or if there would even be one. China certainly tried every trick in the book to disrupt the meeting and to discredit the host Palau and its president, Surangel Whipps Jr. – Postcard from PIF: Hardly divided, leaders took a stand on China test | The Strategist
Vietnam
(Thang Nam Do – Lowy The Interpreter) Vietnam wants to become a strong maritime nation. Its new strategy makes clear that getting there will require more than ports and ships. It will also require institutions capable of deciding who can use an increasingly crowded sea, where, and on what terms. Resolution 20, adopted in July 2026, marks an important shift in how Vietnam thinks about the sea. It calls for a move from exploiting marine resources towards modern marine governance, and from sector-by-sector management towards integrated governance of national marine space. Institutional reform is identified as a strategic breakthrough, together with science, technology, and high-quality human resources. The economic stakes are considerable. With over 3,200 kilometres of coastline, Vietnam’s economic geography is already heavily maritime. Resolution 20 sets an ambitious target: for coastal provinces and cities to account for more than 70% of national GDP by 2030. The strategy also aims for 6–10 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2030. But every turbine raises questions about access to marine space, interactions with fishing and shipping, transmission infrastructure, environmental impacts, and coastal communities. These competing claims are not hypothetical: Vietnam exported a record US$11.3 billion of seafood in 2025, while preparing for a potentially large offshore wind industry. Investment alone cannot resolve these trade-offs. The resolution acknowledges institutional challenges. Marine governance has not kept pace with development. Responsibilities overlap, inter-sectoral and inter-regional coordination remains weak, and marine science and human resources do not yet meet development needs. – Vietnam’s blue economy needs more than ports and ships | Lowy Institute
The Global Eye is in partnership with SIOI – Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale
