Afghanistan/Pakistan
(Clara Fong – Council on Foreign Relations) On March 16, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan heated up again after Pakistan launched an air strike on a drug rehabilitation center in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. A spokesperson for the Afghan Taliban wrote on social media that at least 400 people were killed and 250 were injured. It is the deadliest attack since late February, when Afghanistan’s Taliban government struck Pakistan’s military bases near their disputed shared border. Within hours, Pakistan responded by bombing several Afghan border provinces and Kabul—the first time Islamabad has conducted an attack on Afghanistan’s urban areas. Pakistan’s defense minister later described the situation as one of “open war” with Afghanistan, undermining a fragile ceasefire that was signed in October 2025. As of March 13, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan recorded at least 75 civilians killed and 193 injured since the start of this conflict on February 26, though these figures are preliminary. The Afghan Taliban has said that it is willing to negotiate with Pakistan, but there are growing concerns that the conflict could continue to escalate, further destabilizing a region already grappling with the rippling fallout from joint U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran. – Why Are the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan in an ‘Open War’? | Council on Foreign Relations
France
(Lucie Pebay and Laurence Thomson – RUSI) Like most militaries across Europe, the French Army has been transforming itself for war. What began with Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine has accelerated with recent events. France’s military has decisively reoriented away from Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism operations towards preparing for large-scale peer or near-peer conflict, and from this there is much the British Army can learn. Supported by the Military Programming Law (LPM) 2024–2030 with a €413 billion budget, the French Army of 2024 had shifted away from being an Armée au Contact to an Armée au Combat – from an ‘Army at Contact’ to a ‘Fighting Army’. This next phase focuses on increased reactivity and readiness through organisational reforms and new capabilities. The French Army’s approach has been to initiate a series of transformation ‘cycles’ under Programme SCORPION (Synergie du COntact Renforcée par la Polyvalence et l’InfovalorisatiON). Launched in the same year as the seizure of Crimea, it has successfully delivered 723 Griffon, 296 Serval and 91 Jaguar vehicle variants into service. Conceptually it has also seen widespread adoption of a distinctly ‘French style’ approach to network-centric warfare by deploying new capabilities, advanced armoured vehicles, digitised systems and integrated battlefield management. Whilst much of the equipment only began appearing in 2021, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 hastened this cycle. – Lessons from the French Army’s Transformation Towards a Modern ‘Fighting Army’ | Royal United Services Institute
Kazakhstan
(Kate Mallinson – Chatham House) On 15 March, voters in Kazakhstan approved the most comprehensive overhaul of its constitution since its adoption in 1995 under former president Nursultan Nazarbayev. This radical revamp of 80 per cent of the constitution will lay out the future trajectory for Kazakhstan – and provide a legacy for President Kassym Zhomart Tokayev. Now in the seventh year of his presidency, he has successfully navigated a series of crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 protests and coup attempt, and the ongoing war in Ukraine. However, Tokayev has struggled to define his presidency and move away from the personalist rule of his predecessor and the political system that he established. Alongside structural change to the political system, Tokayev wishes to imprint some key themes from his presidency on the political culture of Kazakhstan. These include a strong, legalistic state focused on social stability, secularism, environmental protection and digital progress. The government claims that the new constitution will modernize and streamline the political system. But this brand of modernization, which is already in process, entails a move away from Western-led liberal economic models which emphasize privatization, deregulation and foreign investment. Instead, it will move Kazakhstan towards a more institutional, less personalist authoritarian system – similar to the political economy of its neighbour, China. Tokayev appears to admire the technocratic authoritarianism of China, where he served as counsellor to the Soviet ambassador in the late 1980s. Instead of looking west, the Tokayev administration, supported by large parts of the professional class, now looks to emulate the state-led economies of China and the Gulf. – Kazakhstan referendum: The new constitution demonstrates a diminishing interest in Western values | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Nigeria/UK
(Leena Koni Hoffmann – Chatham House) President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s state visit to the UK this week is the first by a Nigerian leader since General Ibrahim Babangida in 1989. Hosted by King Charles III, a state visit is the UK’s highest level of diplomatic visit and uses royal ceremony to signal and strengthen relations with key partners. It is being framed in Abuja as a landmark moment, showcasing the ‘unique bond’ between the two countries and inaugurating ‘a new era of cooperation’. Tinubu’s visit will provide an opportunity to further operationalize the Nigeria-UK Strategic Partnership, signed in November 2024 during Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s visit to Nigeria, and the February 2024 Enhanced Trade and Investment Partnership (ETIP). – Tinubu’s UK state visit: diplomacy alone won’t fix Nigeria’s problems | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
UK
(Dan Lomas – RUSI) In December 2025, the new Chief of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Blaise Metreweli, delivered her first public facing speech in the service’s iconic London-based headquarters. Speaking about SIS’s role in a volatile world, ‘C’ echoed her predecessors on the changing role of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in the digital age, the importance of technology and SIS’s work in combatting threats in a multipolar age. If Metreweli’s speech covered similar ground as before, there were several lines on SIS’s effects-based roles that were picked up by others. ‘At an operational level’, she said, ‘we will sharpen our edge and impact with audacity, tapping into – if you like – our historical SOE instincts’. The reference to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), Britain’s Second World War wartime sabotage and subversion organisation, led to excitement from some in the same way that Spitfires over white cliffs do. ‘Short of invoking Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain or D Day’, one commentator wrote, ‘Metreweli could scarcely have found a more evocative historical reference’. We should expect, it was suggested, SIS to go toe-to-toe with Russia’s GRU and FSB, responsible for aggressive sabotage and assassination activity. Here was ‘C’ apparently heralding a new era of swashbuckling derring-do, as opposed to the ‘risk-averse, politically correct’ atmosphere around the service. – Is the UK About to See SOE Reborn? Think Again | Royal United Services Institute
UK/EU
(Chatham House) President Alexander Stubb visited Chatham House on 17 March 2026 to discuss EU–UK relations, EU enlargement, ‘flexible integration’, Brexit and other issues. Describing a world in which Europe is squeezed between an aggressive Russia and a US in transition, he addressed the impact of Brexit and the opportunities for Europe and the UK. After outlining his personal links to the UK, President Stubb said: ‘I think Brexit was a colossal mistake… I do think it’s not only shooting yourself in the foot,’ he said, ‘but it’s like amputating your leg without a medical reason for doing it’. – Brexit was ‘a colossal mistake’, says President Stubb of Finland – but Europe should build a flexible partnership with the UK | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US
(Louise Marie Hurel, Pia Hüsch, James A. Lewis, Erica D Lonergan, Gareth Mott and Conrad Prince CB – RUSI) Earlier in March, the Trump administration finally published its National Cyber Strategy after months of suspense regarding the content and tone it would convey, globally, about the US’s ambitions in cyberspace. The announcement came at a strategic time: at the start of the second year of Trump’s presidency, after a series of demonstrations of US use of cyber capabilities in the operation to extract Maduro from Venezuela, and at the outset of the unfolding war in Iran. There is no single standard for a national cyber strategy; some can be closer to an action plan, outlining budget lines and action items; others might still be lengthy and focused on elaborate ‘pillars of action’. Unlike many ‘strategies’ so far, the US National Cyber Strategy has five pages of text and has raised both praise and critiques about its level of detail and concrete action. There is certainly no meandering when it comes to communicating ambitions in this strategy, and we have brought together a series of experts to reflect on: (i) the continuities and ruptures the NCS presents compared to its predecessors; (ii) what it means for the US’s posture on the use of offensive cyber capabilities; (iii) the role of the private sector in enabling the aspirations set out in the NCS; (iv) how realistic are the ambitions it presents on AI; and (v) what the strategy means for UK-US transatlantic relations. – Brief, Bold and Beautiful? Reactions on the US National Cyber Strategy | Royal United Services Institute
(Inu Manak, Allison J. Smith – Council on Foreign Relations) In his second term, President Donald Trump has set out to fundamentally restructure U.S. trade policy. On April 2, 2025, he announced sweeping tariffs on nearly all U.S. trading partners in what he branded Liberation Day. When markets reacted negatively, he backtracked on implementing those tariffs, and instead threatened to reimpose tariffs on countries that failed to secure a trade deal with the United States within ninety days. The move kicked off a scramble among U.S. trading partners to negotiate deals. Even though only two preliminary deals were reached by the ninety-day deadline, Trump did not ratchet up tariffs. Instead, he modified many of the Liberation Day tariffs to lower rates on July 31, 2025, noting progress in trade negotiations. Many of those modified rates were enshrined in subsequent deals. Although Trump may have hoped to rewrite U.S. trade policy with a single executive order, the reality has been much more complicated. In fact, even though a higher overall baseline tariff is in place, the specifics of trade relations with the rest of the world are slowly being adjusted, one deal at a time. To push those deals along, Trump created additional exemptions in September 2025, Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners, which cover items such as aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, natural resources unavailable in the United States, and some agricultural products. On November 14, 2025, Trump took further action to exempt certain agricultural products from reciprocal tariffs due to growing concerns over affordability. Therefore, despite high average tariff rates, the actual rate that is applied is much lower, and varies considerably by country. This tracker breaks down the content of the deals to date. We include only those deals that have a written text to analyze. Most are so-called framework agreements that outline areas for future negotiation, while implementing a temporary tariff truce. Those agreements are eventually expected to become finalized reciprocal trade deals, which more closely resemble traditional U.S. trade agreements. Unlike those traditional agreements, Trump’s reciprocal trade deals exclude any role for Congress. Furthermore, all agreements include language that suggests room for constant modification and quick termination. The message is clear: a trade agreement no longer guarantees predictability in trade relations with the United States. The frameworks and agreements mix both traditional features of U.S. trade policy and novel elements. – Tracking Trump’s Trade Deals | Council on Foreign Relations
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(David Butter – Chatham House) For the oil and gas exporters in the Gulf, the US-Israeli war with Iran has already exacted a heavy toll through lost revenue. Matters could get even worse if major installations are seriously damaged. Regional energy importers, meanwhile, are facing stresses from higher fuel costs and losses of foreign currency earnings, which will push up inflation and aggravate socio-economic tensions. It is striking that amid the crisis, while its economy is being badly damaged by the war, Iran is still exporting oil to China using the Strait of Hormuz – even as it closes the passage to Gulf countries’ shipping. It’s possible the US is refraining from attacking Iranian traffic in hopes of preserving the infrastructure that any new Iranian regime would depend upon. Gulf Arab states’ fear of further escalation, and Trump’s wariness of antagonizing China prior to a planned summit later this month, may also be playing a part. – The Iran war is exacting a heavy toll on Gulf oil and gas exporters – and creating risk and opportunity in North Africa | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Michael Stephens – RUSI) The new Gulf War launched by Israel and the United States against Iran represents the most serious strategic shift in the Gulf since Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990. It is a before and after moment that will likely be as significant a turning point for the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine did for Europe in 2022. Although the war has (to date) resulted in only limited casualties and material damage in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, its political and economic effects on the region are significant, and it would be a mistake to expect that things will simply return to normal once the hostilities are over. Even if the war were to last only a few more days or weeks, its impacts will fundamentally reshape the national strategic considerations of the GCC countries, including the way they will interact with allies, partners and adversaries around the world, and how they will engage with the international system. – The Gulf’s Zeitenwende Moment | Royal United Services Institute
(Council on Foreign Relations) The economic consequences of the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran are coming into sharper focus as the conflict enters its third week. As the fallout expands beyond the Middle East and ripples through the global economy, markets and supply chains are being increasingly reshaped by the drones and missiles buzzing over the Gulf—and the United States has few options to de-escalate the conflict. The Strait of Hormuz, which is critical to the oil and gas industry, is at the center of this disruption. But it’s not just energy markets that depend on the strait. Fertilizer and high-tech supply chains are also negatively affected, widening the crisis further. If the war develops into a protracted conflict, these issues could become lasting structural shocks to the world economy. Six CFR fellows analyze the geoeconomic fallout of the war so far and assess the challenges that could lie ahead. – How the Iran War Ignited a Geoeconomic Firestorm | Council on Foreign Relations
