From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Brazil; Canada; China; China-Pakistan; Europe; Global Trade; Space; Tanzania-Uganda; US; Warfare-Nuclear Installations
Brazil
(RUSI) But what are Brazil’s international cyber security priorities? And does its approach to cyber statecraft align with its foreign policy? Louise Marie-Hurel, Research Fellow in the Cyber and Tech team at RUSI, joins Jamie MacColl, Senior Research Fellow, Cyber and Tech, to answer these questions. – Cyber Statecraft: How Brazil Uses Cyber Tools to Its Advantage | Royal United Services Institute
Canada
(Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Ryan C. Berg, Henry Ziemer – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On March 23, newly minted Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced snap elections for April 28, kicking off a contest to determine Canada’s future at a critical juncture. The election pits the incumbent Liberal Party, which has received a second wind since January in part due to tariffs and political threats from the United States, against the Conservative Party under the leadership of “Canada First” politician Pierre Poilievre. No matter the outcome, however, the next leader of Canada will inherit a tense relationship with the United States, public pressure to deliver economic gains, and an increasingly fraught global security environment that impinges upon Canada’s sovereignty. – What Elections Mean for Canada and the Future of North America
(Atlantic Council) Highly active bot-like X accounts are amplifying political content in a spam-like manner ahead of the Canadian federal election, frequently replying to posts from federal parties and their leaders. The targeting is not limited to official accounts, but also extends to political accounts and pundits. Researchers and academic studies have warned of the presence and influence of bots and bot-like accounts on X, highlighting their use for platform manipulation, spam, and overall detrimental impact on online discourse, especially during elections. Notably, X’s platform integrity and authenticity rules list content spam and engagement spam as inauthentic behavior that “disrupts people’s experience.” – Bot-like activity targets Canadian political parties and their leaders ahead of election – DFRLab
China
(Alex Colville – The Jamestown Foundation) The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not just envision its “AI+ initiative” as bolstering the national economy but aiding its plans for modernizing its social stability system. DeepSeek has been designed, thanks to regulations, in a way that makes it a perfect tool to support the “public opinion guidance” system that aligns the public with state policy through propaganda. Any adoption of DeepSeek’s model overseas has the potential to spread the PRC’s domestic social governance system abroad. – DeepSeek: A Tool Tuned for Social Governance – Jamestown
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) The Propaganda Department’s top books from 2024 highlight those by Xi Jinping, as well as ones focused on military themes, Party history, and China’s place in the world. This official book list has virtually no overlap with similar lists on platforms like Douban or WeChat, and minimal interest in the list indicates that citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) largely ignore the Beijing’s attempts to shape national culture. RC citizens’ reading preferences from the last decade heavily skew toward foreign books, and in 2024 focused on feminist and socially progressive literature, as well as works that reflect social malaise in the country. The Party’s inability to prevent the Chinese people’s openness so-called “Western values” could be an indicator of its future success in preventing Western influence in emerging large language models, which are trained primarily on Western source material. – Nobody Cares About the Party’s Recommended Readings – Jamestown
(John Costello – The Jamestown Foundation) Cyber operations will be involved in the opening stages of any conflict that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is involved in. This makes the Cyberspace Force an essential bellwether as to what conflicts Beijing anticipates and what conflicts it is tacitly preparing for. The Cyberspace Force demonstrates the depth of reform and centralization the People’s Liberation Army is willing to achieve to advance its operational capabilities. Beijing now possesses a truly global intelligence apparatus less stymied by parochial and bureaucratic interests. The Cyberspace Force has structured its principal operationally focused infrastructure into five regional “Technical Reconnaissance Bases,” Corps Leader-grade organizations that are generally correspond to military theaters. The Cyberspace Operations Base, which now oversees the PRC’s offensive cyber forces, is likely a critical factor in the significant increase in the technical sophistication, maturity, and operational discipline seen by PLA cyber operations over the last ten years. – The Cyberspace Force: A Bellwether for Conflict – Jamestown
China – Pakistan
(Soufan Center) China and Pakistan have been strategic partners since the early 2000s, but the relationship between Islamabad and Beijing has further deepened under President Xi Jinping’s tenure, to an “all-weather friendship” with deepened cooperation in several areas, including trade and economics, defense, and security. The relationship is not without its problems, especially related to the volatile security situation in Pakistan that impacts the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — China’s pet project in South Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative. Following a string of deadly attacks perpetrated by violent extremists in Pakistan, reports suggest Beijing has increased its pressure on Islamabad to ramp up counterterrorism efforts and beef up security initiatives to protect PRC interests in the country. The PRC’s growing security footprint in the country has implications not only for the geopolitics of the region, but also the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China – China’s Growing Security Footprint in Pakistan – The Soufan Center
Europe
(Calvin Bailey, Graeme Downie – RUSI) Europe is in a tight spot. With Russian aggression testing the Continent’s security resolve and the trade turbulence of recent weeks shaking its foundations, the need for bold, unified action has never been greater. Yet, across European capitals, governments are scrutinising their balance sheets. Despite serious willingness to increase defence spending, often by adjusting fiscal rules, Europe faces a tough financial balancing act. Rising healthcare costs, housing crises, and populations frustrated by years of stagnation add to governments’ mounting pressures. Compounding this is Europe’s fragmented procurement system, which drives up costs and limits efficiency by placing national interests over collective European solutions. It is in these circumstances that the Defence, Security & Resilience Bank, a World Bank-style financial vehicle, could revolutionise how Europe funds its defence. When UK and EU leaders meet in London next month, they will face a familiar dilemma: How can Europe defend itself without breaking the bank? This may just be the answer. – How can Europe Fund its Defence without Breaking the Bank? | Royal United Services Institute
Global Trade
(Michael Froman – Council on Foreign Relations) Tariffs and the bleak prospects for global trade dominated discussions at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Spring Meetings this week in Washington, DC. – It All Comes Down to Trade | Council on Foreign Relations
Space
(Clayton Swope, Kari A. Bingen, Makena Young, Kendra LaFave – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Welcome to the 2025 Space Threat Assessment by the Aerospace Security Project. This resource for policymakers and the public leverages open-source information to assess key developments in foreign counterspace weapons. Drawing on eight years of collected data and analyses, this report describes trends in the development, testing, and use of counterspace weapons and enables readers to develop a deeper understanding of threats to U.S. national security interests in space. Since the publication of the 2024 Space Threat Assessment, it may seem at first glance like there have been few headline-grabbing counterspace developments. But a closer look reveals that the past year has been anything but uneventful. Rather than entirely new developments, the past year mostly witnessed a continuation of the worrisome trends discussed in prior reports, notably widespread jamming and spoofing of GPS signals in and around conflict zones, including near and in Russia and throughout the Middle East. Chinese and Russian satellites in both low Earth orbit and geostationary Earth orbit continue to display more and more advanced maneuvering capabilities, demonstrating operator proficiency and tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be used for space warfighting and alarming U.S. and allied officials. No information publicly surfaced revealing how close Russia might be to launching a nuclear anti-satellite capability, though the United States and its international partners remain concerned that Russia could decide to deploy such a weapon. – Space Threat Assessment 2025
Tanzania – Uganda
(Ray Hartley, Greg Mills – RUSI) The arrest on 9 April of Tundu Lissu, the Tanzanian opposition leader, and the subsequent banning of his party, Chadema, from elections for the next five years is the latest in a series of authoritarian shifts in East Africa. In October last year, veteran political activist Kizza Besigye was abducted in Kenya and smuggled into Uganda, where a military court charged him with treason. He is still on trial and has been denied bail. This exposes the false nature of democracy in these countries, where leaders and parties have held on to power for decades. It shows that Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan, supposedly a reformer, is just another dictator, preferring control rather than accepting open competition between ideas. It confirms Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s status as the leader of Africa’s Big Men (and now, one woman). – Tanzania and Uganda: Time for a Little Less Carrot and More Stick? | Royal United Services Institute
US
(Gracelin Baskaran, Meredith Schwartz – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On Thursday, April 24, President Donald Trump revealed his latest executive order (EO) aimed at securing critical mineral supply chains and countering China’s dominance in the industry. “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources” directs the Department of Commerce, in coordination with a number of executive agencies, to pursue the exploration and exploitation of deep-sea resources both within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and areas beyond national jurisdiction. For decades, the United States has remained on the sidelines of the deep-sea mining debate as an international body has governed the world’s richest seabed resources. The Trump administration has unequivocally signaled this will no longer be the case. The emphasis on U.S. leadership in the deep-sea mining arena demonstrates the administration’s commitment to an all-of-the-above approach to securing critical mineral supply chains. Nevertheless, this shift in deep-sea mining policy carries major implications for U.S. maritime security and the U.S.-China competition for critical resources. – Trump’s Deep-Sea Mining Executive Order: The Race for Critical Minerals Enters Uncharted Waters
(Matt Pearl, Alexander Klimburg – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Since the emergence of the commercial internet in the United States in the 1990s, we have experienced many transformations, including the explosion in e-commerce, the rise of social media, and the development of cloud computing. During that time, we have also experienced remarkably consistent trends when it comes to cybersecurity: The volume, diversity, and sophistication of attacks have increased, as have resultant costs borne by individuals, businesses, and governments. In response, for many of those years, governments largely focused on cyber defense and coordination, including strengthening defensive capabilities, cyber diplomacy and international cooperation, cybercrime laws and enforcement, public-private sector partnerships, and cybersecurity awareness and education. These efforts are necessary and laudable, but they have also proved to be insufficient. In that context, the United States announced in recent years that it would engage in offensive cyberoperations, and more recently, it is—along with several of our allies and partners—considering vastly expanding such efforts. As the U.S. government decides how to go on offense, this Back & Forth issue will address whether Congress and the administration should authorize some form of “hack back,” or, in other words, allow nongovernment entities to engage in offensive hacking in response to being hacked. – Back & Forth 4: Should the United States Adopt a “Hack-Back” Cyber Strategy?
Warfare – Nuclear Installations
(Darya Dolzikova – RUSI) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities has highlighted the threat that militaries can pose to nuclear installations. This paper aims to understand the operational and strategic logic of why states may use military force against nuclear installations, as well as the consequences, and identify approaches for reducing related risks. – Nuclear Facilities as Targets of Military Attack | Royal United Services Institute
