From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : China-Europe, Japan, Middle East, Moldova-Transnistria, Russia, Southeast Asia, US, US-Canada
China – Europe
(German Marshall Fund of the United States) Watching China in Europe is a monthly update from GMF’s Indo-Pacific Program. Now more than ever, the transatlantic partners need clarity and cohesion when it comes to China policy. In this monthly newsletter, Noah Barkin—a senior visiting fellow at GMF and senior advisor at Rhodium Group—provides his personal observations and analysis on the most pressing China-related developments and activities throughout Europe. – Watching China in Europe—February 2025 | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Japan
(Ai Tashiro – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Japan has experienced three major earthquakes in the past 100 years. In an era of frequent natural disasters, Japan’s unique disaster prevention park system has received renewed attention as a means of transmitting disaster memories to the next generation. – Insights from Japan’s Disaster Anniversaries on the Potential Adaptation for Disaster Prevention Parks in the Indo-Pacific – Australian Institute of International Affairs
Middle East
(Ian Dudgeon – Australian Institute of International Affairs) The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, compounded by shifting regional dynamics and US-Israeli policies, demands a reassessment of leadership and strategy. With the two-state solution under threat and rising tensions involving Iran and its proxies, the question remains whether current leaders can navigate a sustainable path to peace. – Resolution of the Palestine-Israeli Conflict: Is the US, Israeli, Iranian, and Palestinian leadership up to the Challenge? – Australian Institute of International Affairs
Moldova – Transnistria
(Laurențiu Pleșca – German Marshall Fund of the United States) For the first time in three decades Moldova holds undisputed leverage in its relationship with Transnistria. The choices made now will define the country’s future path, either solidifying its European trajectory or perpetuating its vulnerability to external pressures. – How Should Moldova Leverage EU Support for Transnistria? | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Russia
(William Alberque – Stimson Center) On November 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new nuclear doctrine governing the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Conjecture about this update had been underway for years, but for seasoned Russia watchers, it proved insignificant. Russia’s new doctrine does not necessitate any significant changes to U.S. nuclear doctrine, force posture, or plans. Rather, Russia’s doctrine aligns more closely to its observable force posture and Putin’s use of coercive nuclear threats. Instead, the United States should continue to seek to deter Russia and limit its nuclear forces, while better understanding the implication of Russia’s alliances. – An Unreal Pain: Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine Delivers Headlines, But Not Change • Stimson Center
Beyond Ukraine: Russia’s Foreign Policy Challenges in 2025
(Emily Ferris – RUSI) President Donald Trump’s inauguration and promises to end the Ukraine war have naturally trained the spotlight back on the three-year conflict. But even if a negotiated end to the war is sought, Russia has several other burgeoning security and political issues that a new US administration may have to contend with. Putin’s behaviour and key events around Trump’s inauguration threw these considerations into sharp relief. Putin’s first two acts on the day Trump was sworn in were to have a call with President Xi, and then hold a meeting with his own Security Council. Putin and Xi’s call was more than just symbolic – they went into detail about some of the cargo transport issues between Russia and China, as well as how to engage with the new US administration. For all Putin’s attempts to downplay the importance of Trump’s inauguration, his hawkish Security Council prioritised discussing the potential impact of the new US administration on Middle Eastern stability. And all of this took place against the backdrop of tightly controlled presidential elections in Belarus, where Moscow loyalist and long-serving strongman Alexander Lukashenko extended his presidency by another five years. – Beyond Ukraine: Russia’s Foreign Policy Challenges in 2025 | Royal United Services Institute
(Nicolas Bouchet, Anastasia Burakova – German Marshall Fund of the United States) The large number of pro-democracy individuals among Russians who have left Russia since 2022 raises the question of whether they can contribute from the outside to eventual political change in the country. For democracy donors to explore how to foster this potential, though, they need a great deal more information about them than is so far available. This brief presents initial data from a survey of these emigrants and highlights findings relevant to supporting these emigrants as current or potential actors working toward democratic development in Russia. – Russia’s Recent Emigrants: Mobility and Engagement | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Southeast Asia
(Su Wai Mon, Thư Nguyễn Hoàng Anh, Jonathan Gabriel Mendoza – Lowy The Interpreter)
Terrorism, human and drug trafficking, environmental crimes, and increasingly sophisticated cybersecurity risks all have a maritime dimension. Coupled with ongoing geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea, the growing complexity of maritime crimes requires more integrated and dedicated Coast Guard agencies in Southeast Asia. Coast Guard agencies in Southeast Asia have varied organisational structures, with some under different ministries such as Home Affairs, Defence, or Transport. Their roles also differ based on national needs, ranging from search and rescue to maritime law enforcement, as seen with the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), the Vietnam Coast Guard, and the Philippines Coast Guard. This variation influences the maritime security priorities of each agency, with some countries focusing on the suppression of maritime crimes at sea, while others prioritise the protection of sovereignty and sovereign rights. – Securing Southeast Asian waters: Formalising the role of the ASEAN Coast Guard Forum | Lowy Institute
US
(Penny Naas – German Marshall Fund of the United States) US President Donald Trump speaks often of his love of tariffs. For dealmakers, such as himself, the red-hot US market provides a useful economic weapon that replaces lethal military threats. Rather than providing allies with preferential access to that market, he exploits their dependency on it to extract concessions, exert his will, and deliver the results he wants. – A Risky Trade | German Marshall Fund of the United States
(Jenny Gordon – Lowy The Interpreter) Donald Trump has given Mexico and Canada a 30-day reprieve from the 25% tariffs levied on their exports (10% on oil) to the United States. The stated motivation for the US to violate the terms of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement was that Canada and Mexico needed to do more to quell the flows of fentanyl and undocumented migrants across their borders to the United States. Action by Canada, appointing a Fentanyl Czar, and Mexico, sending 10,000 troops to police the border has negotiated a delay. – Trump tariffs – madness, method, or mayhem? | Lowy Institute
(Anubhav S Goswami – Lowy The Interpreter) Donald Trump’s comeback to the White House poses a substantial challenge to the global nuclear order. His previous administration had contempt for arms control agreements. The United States’ exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty removed a vital guardrail to nuclear escalation in Europe. This move, while deemed legitimate by the US in reaction to Russian transgressions of the Treaty, considerably weakened the international framework for arms control. Moreover, the hesitance of his first administration to prolong New START, the last existing nuclear weapons limitation treaty between the US and Russia, nearly led to its rupture prior to the Biden administration obtaining a five-year extension. This reluctance originated from Trump’s insistence on including China in future arms control talks. – Trump and the global nuclear order | Lowy Institute
US – Canada
(Roland Paris – Chatham House) Canadians were shocked by the announcement at the weekend that the United States would impose a 25 per cent tariff on most imports from Canada and Mexico, just as they were astonished by Donald Trump’s earlier pledge to use ‘economic force’ to absorb Canada into the US. Trump’s last-minute decision to delay the implementation of these tariffs for 30 days brought a measure of relief. To win this reprieve, Canada expanded its existing plans to strengthen security at its own border and to combat the trade in fentanyl and money laundering. – Trump’s tariffs are delayed but they have already done long-term damage to US–Canada relations | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
