The Global Eye is in partnership with SIOI – Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale
ASEAN – Myanmar
(Morgan Michaels – IISS) On 12 July 2026, the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met informally in Bangkok with their new Myanmar counterpart, Tin Maung Swe, marking an arguable deviation from the bloc’s standing prohibition on Naypyidaw’s representation at the senior political level. The meeting was first proposed by Thailand as a form of ‘calibrated re-engagement’. This term appears to suggest a process in which ASEAN offers incremental re-engagement with Myanmar’s foreign minister (or even president) in exchange for ‘demonstrable progress’ towards implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) – the group’s diplomatic road map for addressing the post-coup crisis in Myanmar. First agreed in April 2021, the 5PC calls for a cessation of hostilities, inclusive dialogue and access for humanitarian aid, among other points. Yet statements from Myanmar’s parliament, and more recently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have made clear Naypyidaw’s enduring rejection of the 5PC. With some ASEAN members unwilling to move forward until Naypyidaw complies, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Theresa Lazaro conceded in mid-July that Myanmar’s full political re-invitation to ASEAN remains a long way off. – On Myanmar, ASEAN should brace for the long road ahead
Europe – Space Security
(IISS) Russia has been jamming GPS signals across the Baltic region, conducting proximity operations against European satellites in orbit, and, according to European officials, intercepting communications from German military assets in space. It has demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability and is now suspected of developing a nuclear weapon designed to be placed in orbit, which if detonated in low Earth orbit could render it unusable for a year. Against that backdrop, this episode examines how European governments are racing to build independent military space capabilities, where the critical gaps remain, and what it will cost to close them. It also addresses how international law applies to an increasingly contested space environment, including the legal risks of drawing commercial satellites into military operations, the arms control implications of the US Golden Dome missile defence programme, and why launch capacity, rather than the satellites themselves, may be the single most important investment Europe can make. – Space Security: Threats, Capabilities and Europe’s Path Forward
Iceland – Europe
(Atlantic Council) Could Iceland be the next European Union member? Ahead of an important referendum in Iceland on restarting accession talks with the currently twenty-seven-member bloc, Atlantic Council experts answer four pressing questions about this weekend’s referendum and its potential implications for Europe’s future. – What Iceland’s referendum means for the EU’s future – Atlantic Council
South Korea – AI and Military
(Lami Kim – IISS) South Korea is rapidly incorporating physical artificial intelligence (AI) into its armed forces to modernise its capabilities and address a growing shortage of military personnel. Seoul enjoys several advantages that could enable it to become a global leader in this field. It has high capacity for large-scale manufacturing, a growing start-up sector rooted in an advanced scientific and technological base, strengths across the broader physical-AI ecosystem, and enjoys a leading position in the use of robotics in civilian manufacturing. Its domestic access to critical components of uninhabited ground vehicles and robotics also creates opportunities to help European and US firms reduce their dependence on Chinese suppliers. – South Korea’s push for military applications of physical AI
US – Canada
(Brad W. Setser – Council on Foreign Relations) Trade talks between the United States and Canada collapsed last week, clearing the way for the Trump administration to impose new tariffs on Canadian goods. President Donald Trump laid out the administration’s next move on Monday, August 24, writing on social media that tariffs on Canadian cars, trucks, automotive parts, and steel would rise to 50 percent on January 1, 2027. He accused Canada of “ripping off” the United States for years and said companies could avoid the levies by producing their goods in the United States. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has since said his country would match U.S. tariffs “dollar for dollar,” with retaliatory levies placed on U.S. steel, dairy, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp and paper products, electronics, and other goods beginning on September 8. The Trump administration is imposing the tariffs on Canada using Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The White House says this dormant tariff authority permits the president to act by proclamation and override the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), negotiated during the first Trump administration. CFR’s Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow Brad W. Setser, who served as a senior advisor to the U.S. trade representative from 2021 to 2022, explains what the breakdown between the United States and Canada could cost both countries and why other U.S. trading partners will be paying attention. – The Real Cost of the U.S.-Canada Trade Breakdown | Council on Foreign Relations
US – China – Export-control policy on tech trade
(Chris Clague – IISS) At a chip conference in Shanghai at the end of May 2026, Huawei revealed that it had developed a new approach, called LogicFolding, which could allow it to make advanced semiconductors without the extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) machines manufactured by ASML in the Netherlands. China has not been able to purchase EUV machines since 2019, when United States President Donald Trump’s first administration requested the Dutch government block ASML from selling the machines to China. The machines, along with a host of other parts and equipment, now officially fall under the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR), which extends US export controls to products made outside the US if they contain US hardware, software or intellectual property. Enforcement of FDPR has not always been sufficient, however. In June, the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) wrote to Anthropic informing the artificial intelligence (AI) company that the government was imposing export controls on its latest models, Fable 5 and Mythos 5. Shortly after, a Chinese AI start-up, Z.ai, released an AI model that is cheaper to use than the Anthropic models and is supposedly nearly as powerful. In October 2025, Jensen Huang, founder and CEO of chip firm Nvidia, asserted at a conference that China was mere ‘nanoseconds’ behind the US in chip development. That may have been a slight exaggeration for effect, but others have since echoed his claim not only for chips but across a range of AI-related technologies. In light of these announcements, it is worth taking a brief look at the history of US export-control policy on tech trade with China. – Are US export controls on tech failing?
War in Iran
(Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran – Council on Foreign Relations) This week marks six months since the outbreak of military conflict between the United States and Iran. This on-again, off-again, on-again conflagration has severely disrupted exports of oil, liquefied natural gas, and other vital commodities through the Strait of Hormuz. With more than two billion barrels of oil shipments already disrupted already this year, the International Energy Agency (IEA) calls this the “largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market”. But that is not the biggest story here. Adjusted for inflation, benchmark petroleum prices remain well below the peaks seen during past global crises. Unlike the energy disruptions caused by the Arab oil embargo (1973–74) and the Iranian Revolution (1978–79), both of which whacked growth and triggered inflation, today’s trouble in the Middle East has hardly slowed things down. The International Monetary Fund has trimmed its outlook only modestly, now predicting 3 percent growth for the global economy this year and even higher next year—a forecast that assumes no major escalation in the war. – Crude Calculations: Why the Iran War Hasn’t Yet Caused an Oil Shock | Council on Foreign Relations
(Council on Foreign Relations) On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel attacked Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and targeting the country’s nuclear and military infrastructure. A Pakistan-mediated ceasefire and June memorandum of understanding halted large-scale fighting, but both sides have since traded strikes over alleged violations. Six months on, CFR experts weigh in on what the war means for the United States and the region, and what to look for moving forward. – The Iran War at Six Months: A Region—and Its Relationship With the U.S.—Transformed | Council on Foreign Relations
