I dati sulla produzione globale di semiconduttori sono chiari. Ne scrive Jenny Wong-Leung per The Strategist (Seismic shifts underway in global semiconductor market as US accelerates decoupling from China). Historically, the US had the lion’s share of the global semiconductor industry (37% in 1990), but its dominance has been eroded by North Asian markets over the past three decades. In 2020, Taiwan (22%), South Korea (21%), Japan (15%) and China (15%) accounted for 73% of global semiconductor manufacturing, compared with the US’s 12%. The Semiconductor Industry Association, which represents 99% of the US semiconductor industry, projected in its 2020 report that the US share of the market would decline to 10% by 2030, while China would boost its share to nearly a quarter (24%), closely followed by Taiwan (21%) and South Korea (19%). The report emphasised the difference between the minimal amount of US government support provided to semiconductor companies compared to most Asian countries and made a series of recommendations. Semiconductor manufacturing in China, for example, is intensely supported by government policies under the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan.
Non solo per quanto riguarda i semiconduttori, una fotografia ci mostrerebbe un mondo in bilico tra interrelazione e voglia di ‘decoupling’. Il fatto è strategico perché scegliere l’una o l’altra strada implica conseguenze. Non crediamo che la strada del disaccoppiamento tra sistemi sia quella giusta, pur considerando l’importanza decisiva dell’interesse nazionale soprattutto in campi sensibili come la produzione di semiconduttori.
Creatività e complessità devono aiutare a costruire nuovi percorsi di intelligence e di diplomazia economica. Non possiamo rispondere linearmente a una questione che mette in gioco la sostenibilità politico-strategica del mondo e dei mondi.
Ciò che sta accadendo, non solo a causa della guerra in Ucraina ma in seguito alle tante crisi che si sono assommate nel corso degli ultimi trent’anni, è che la competizione nell’ambito della globalizzazione sta aumentando la megacrisi de-generativa che viviamo: urge, pertanto, immaginare una competizione cooperativa in un quadro di ‘glocalizzazione’.
English version
The data on global semiconductor production is clear. Jenny Wong-Leung writes about it for The Strategist (Seismic shifts underway in global semiconductor market as US accelerates decoupling from China). Historically, the US had the lion’s share of the global semiconductor industry (37% in 1990), but its dominance has been eroded by North Asian markets over the past three decades. In 2020, Taiwan (22%), South Korea (21%), Japan (15%) and China (15%) accounted for 73% of global semiconductor manufacturing, compared with the US’s 12%. The Semiconductor Industry Association, which represents 99% of the US semiconductor industry, projected in its 2020 report that the US share of the market would decline to 10% by 2030, while China would boost its share to nearly a quarter (24%), closely followed by Taiwan (21%) and South Korea (19%). The report emphasised the difference between the minimal amount of US government support provided to semiconductor companies compared to most Asian countries and made a series of recommendations. Semiconductor manufacturing in China, for example, is intensely supported by government policies under the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan.
Not only as far as semiconductors are concerned, a snapshot would show us a world poised between interconnectedness and the desire for ‘decoupling’. The fact is strategic because choosing one or the other path implies consequences. We do not believe that the path of decoupling between systems is the right one, even considering the decisive importance of national interest especially in sensitive fields such as semiconductor manufacturing.
Creativity and complexity must help build new paths of economic intelligence and economic diplomacy. We cannot respond linearly to a question that puts the political-strategic sustainability of the world and worlds at stake.
What is happening, not only because of the war in Ukraine but as a result of the many crises that have accumulated over the last thirty years, is that competition within the framework of globalisation is increasing the de-generational mega-crisis we are experiencing: it is therefore urgent to imagine cooperative competition within a framework of ‘glocalisation’.
