Geostrategic magazine (march 4, 2024)

LABORATORIO DI RICERCA COMPLESSA / COMPLEX RESEARCH LABORATORY

The Global Eye

Daily from global think tanks and open sources

(the analyzes here recalled do not necessarily correspond to the geostrategic thinking of The Global Eye)

Australia

(Richard Dunley – Lowy The Interpreter) The government’s response to the independent review of Australia’s surface combatant fleet is ambitious. When combined with the AUKUS agreement to obtain nuclear-powered submarines, it is the most significant peacetime build-up of military force in Australia’s history, and would firmly establish the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) among the leading second tier navies, alongside France and Britain. The timing is also ambitious – the plan relies on Australia acquiring ships at an unprecedented pace.

After ambition, implementation: How Australia builds its new navy | Lowy Institute

Australia – ASEAN

(Daniel Flitton – Lowy The Interpreter) Melbourne has rolled out a blue carpet, not red. It’s a fitting colour for the assembly of Southeast Asian leaders expected to march along and shake the hand of the host, Australia’s Anthony Albanese, as the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit gets under way.

Melbourne gets a taste of the ASEAN way | Lowy Institute

Australia – India

(Bharath Reddy and Saurabh Todi – ASPI The Strategist) The deployment of population-scale digital public infrastructure (DPI) is gaining traction worldwide and is acknowledged as a necessary and cost-effective intervention to fast-track sustainable development. The G20 also endorsed the ‘Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure’, a voluntary plan for the development, deployment, and governance of DPI. India has developed state-of-the-art DPI for various purposes, and Australia is the biggest development partner for Pacific Island countries.

India-Australia collaboration on digital public infrastructure in the Pacific | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

Australia – Japan

(East Asia Forum) Australia and Japan’s ‘hard security’ minilateralism focuses on countering China but lacks appeal for developing nations. By contrast, China uses multi-layered minilateralism (security, networked, economic, informal) to advance geoeconomic and governance priorities, offering development assistance and building broader relationships. To compete, Australia and Japan should expand their minilateral agenda beyond security, focusing on economics and governance to offer developing nations a compelling alternative.

How Australia and Japan can boost minilateralism to counter Chinese influence | East Asia Forum

Climate Action

(Rhea Srivastava – Observer Research Foundation) The imperative for climate action has become undeniable as the world witnesses record-breaking annual global temperatures and catastrophic climate hazards. Addressing climate change involves two fundamental pathways: mitigation to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions causing global warming, and adaptation to moderate the harm from climate change effects.

Adapting cities to climate realities (orfonline.org)

European Union 

(Swati Prabhu – Observer Research Foundation) Giving shape to its Green Deal announced in 2019, the European Union (EU) released the Fit for 55 package—a set of proposals and updated legislations to reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by at least 55 percent by 2030—in October last year. Advocating values of democracy, rules-based order, human rights, peace and stability, the EU’s external action is fundamentally influenced by the economic and political clout that it enjoys in different geographies, prominently in Africa, Asia, and the Americas

The Green Deal and dealing with partners: EU in dire straits? (orfonline.org)

European Union – China

(Shairee Malhotra, Ankita Dutta – Observer Research Foundation) Europe’s relationship with China has transformed in recent years, with Chinese behaviour and actions now increasingly at odds with European values and interests. As Europe adjusts to new global realities amid a full-fledged war, the European Union (EU) and its member states are recalibrating their strategies and relationships with China. This paper aims to decipher these evolutions by assessing the EU approach and those of certain key European nations that have released security strategies that include sections on China. Given China’s status as a critical trade partner for many European countries, striking a balance between economic interests and security risks is a common thread that underpins most country-specific approaches to China, with many taking their cue from and being embedded within the broader EU framework.

Between Rhetoric and Strategy: Analysing Evolving European Approaches Towards China (orfonline.org)

India

(Biswajit Dhar – East Asia Forum) India’s economy grew substantially in 2023, with estimates showing a 7.3 per cent expansion due to high levels of capital formation. Yet, private sector response was disappointing and disinvestment increased almost 29 per cent. To sustain economic growth, the forthcoming Indian government must tackle rising inflation, economic challenges, such as the slowing growth of the agriculture and allied sectors, a drop in foreign direct investment and a lower trade account.

India’s GDP growth masks economic challenges | East Asia Forum

India – China

(Harsh V Pant, Kalpit A Mankikar – Observer Research Foundation) At the 2024 iteration of Raisina Dialogue, Asia’s premier conference on geopolitics, China featured prominently in the discussions, given that there has been a tense standoff at the border between the Indian and Chinese armies for nearly four years.

Is turbulent the new normal in Sino-Indian relations? (orfonline.org)

Quad

(Bharat Sharma – Lowy The Interpreter) Last month, the US House of Representatives passed Strengthening the Quad Act with an overwhelming majority, indicating the critical role the Quad will play in American efforts to engage with the Indo-Pacific. Along with India, Australia and Japan, the four-country grouping has pledged ongoing cooperation.

What binds the Quad | Lowy Institute

Russia

(Alexander Clackson – Lowy The Interpreter) In his state of the nation speech last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western support for Ukraine risks triggering a global war. Echoing his rhetoric from the start of the conflict, Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons should there be any escalation in Western support for Ukraine, including the deployment of Western troops as suggested earlier in the week by French President Emmanuel Macron. Although Macron’s statement was rebuffed by NATO allies, the prospect of Russian soldiers engaging directly with NATO troops seems to have unsettled the Kremlin.

Why is Putin again threatening a nuclear war? | Lowy Institute

South Korea

(Bill Paterson – ASPI The Strategist) In December 2021 the then president of the Republic of Korea, Moon Jae-in, made a largely unexpected working visit to Australia, at the end of his term, and at unusually short notice. Media speculation was that the visit was all about China, given that both Australia and Korea had been subjected by China to costly economic coercion measures, and China’s aggressive actions continued to provoke concern in both countries.

South Korea’s demand for critical minerals | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

Taiwan – ASEAN

(Orson Tan – East Asia Forum) The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Lai Ching-te won the party a third consecutive presidential victory in Taiwan’s 2024 elections. But the victory was soured by the DPP losing its majority in the Legislative Yuan. For ASEAN members states and Taiwan’s neighbours, the DPP’s presidential win and legislature loss was the ideal scenario because it could defuse tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Lai might have to curb his pro-independence stance and advocate for the status quo in order to secure a legislative majority.

ASEAN sighs with relief after Taiwan’s election | East Asia Forum

Timor-Leste

(Rui Feijo – East Asia Forum) In Timor-Leste, incumbent president Francisco ‘Lu-Olo’ Guterres and the Fretilin party were defeated in both the 2022 presidential and 2023 parliamentary elections, marking a return to the conventions established during the state’s independence. The election results see figures acting above the political fray by not muddling their democratic responsibility with partisan motives — such as charismatic leaders Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta. But the potential for generational change towards new party leadership is emerging.

Timor-Leste hits the democratic reset button | East Asia Forum

 

The Science of Where Magazine (Direttore: Emilio Albertario)

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