Geostrategic magazine – 9 febbraio 2023 AM

  • Sforzo egiziano per evitare un’escalation israelo-palestinese in vista del Ramadan (JCPA, Yoni Ben Menachem). The U.S. asked Egypt to mediate between the Palestinians and Israel to prevent a security escalation ahead of the month of Ramadan. Israel rejected an Egyptian demand to stop IDF activity against the armed groups. The assessment in Israel is pessimistic, as the terrorist organizations are pushing for escalation. Egyptian Effort to Prevent Palestinian-Israeli Escalation ahead of Ramadan
  • In diretta: Il bilancio del terremoto in Turchia e Siria supera le 15.000 vittime (Middle East Eye). At least 23 million people affected as buildings levelled across Turkey’s south and Syria’s northwest. Live: Turkey-Syria earthquake death toll passes 15,000
  • La Siria nord-occidentale ha bisogno di assistenza umanitaria. Portarla sul posto deve essere una priorità (Brookings, Reva Dhingra). The 7.8-magnitude earthquake that struck the Turkish-Syrian border on Sunday evening has leveled buildings and devastated communities across southeastern Turkey and northwestern Syria. While a complete picture of casualties will not be available for weeks, the death toll has already soared past 11,000. Every hour brings news of hundreds of more deaths, even as rescuers work tirelessly to pull survivors from the rubble. Northwestern Syria needs humanitarian assistance. Getting it there must be a priority
  • Siria. Il più grande disastro che deve ancora arrivare (The Syrian Observer). Another disaster is unfolding whilst people have lost everything, and many do not have the means to provide basic needs. Syria Today – Biggest Disaster Yet to Come
  • Terzo giorno di terremoto in Siria: le speranze di salvare vite umane si affievoliscono e si chiede sostegno (The Syrian Observer). The White Helmets appealed to all humanitarian organizations and international bodies to provide material support, according to Syria TV. Third day of Syria Earthquake: Hopes for Saving Lives Dwindle, Calls for Support
  • Mekdad agli americani: la Siria ha permesso agli aiuti di entrare nelle aree controllate dai combattenti (The Syrian Observer). Mekdad asked European countries to send aid to Syria, according to Athr Press. Mekdad to Americans: Syria Allowed Aid to Enter Areas Under Control of Fighters
  • Siria. Il presidente della commissione per i negoziati: assicurato l’ingresso degli aiuti attraverso i valichi con la Turchia (The Syrian Observer). Jamous tweeted that countries and international organizations must take urgent and immediate action to help the afflicted, according to Baladi News. Chairman of the Negotiations Comittee: Entry of Aid Through Crossings with Turkey Secured
  • Le truppe dell’ONU uccidono otto civili nell’attacco a un convoglio della Repubblica Democratica del Congo (The Defense Post). UN Troops Kill Eight Civilians in DRC Convoy Attack: Governor
  • La nuova realtà della sicurezza marittima in Europa: porti cinesi, basi russe e l’ascesa della guerra sottomarina (Brookings, Geoffrey F. Gresh). The year 2022 ushered in another array of significant and diverse maritime security challenges for Europe: the sabotage of the Nordstream pipelines; the mysterious rupture of submarine fiber-optic cables near France and the United Kingdom; Russian aggression toward NATO ships; a Black Sea grain shipment deal to end a Russian naval blockade in Ukraine; and the announcement of a significant Chinese investment stake in a Hamburg terminal, one of Europe’s busiest shipping hubs. Over the past decade, China and Russia have transformed Europe’s maritime security seascape through their military basing access and port investments across maritime Europe — from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Mediterranean. Europe and NATO have made some progress toward addressing many of these challenges, but they must continue to dedicate resources and platforms to ensure the long-term security of their many maritime geoeconomic assets. Europe’s new maritime security reality: Chinese ports, Russian bases, and the rise of subsea warfare
  • Biden si rivolge agli americani in occasione del discorso sullo Stato dell’Unione (Brookings, William A. Galston). In a fighting State of the Union address, President Biden made few concessions to public skepticism about his record—and none to his political adversaries. He made it clear that he intends to run on his record and that the American people will respond favorably to it as they experience its benefits more fully. He focused on the economy and downplayed the cultural issues that have become more central to our politics over the past decade. Biden makes his case to Americans in the State of the Union
  • Le lezioni della guerra in Ucraina per incrementare la guerra elettronica degli Stati Uniti, dice il senatore Reed (Defense News, Colin Demarest). The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee wants to reimagine how the U.S. military fights, including across the electromagnetic spectrum, and is looking to Ukraine for clues. Russia-Ukraine lessons to boost US electronic warfare, Sen. Reed says
  • USA. Per prepararsi alla guerra digitale, le forze armate devono fare più esercitazioni non tradizionali (Breaking Defense, Schuyler Moore). Last month, the “Dragon Joint Operations Center” (DJOC) at Fort Bragg was packed with more than 400 people and humming with energy. Military operators, policy makers, technical experts, and industry representatives all milled around a wall of screens displaying an array of maps, live feeds, and software tools. CENTCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps had gathered the group for a large-scale exercise called “Scarlet Dragon Oasis,” which included multiple organizations from across the Department of Defense, with dozens of assets dropping live munitions. To prepare for digital warfare, the military must run more digital exercises
  • USA. Un memorandum descrive gli sforzi per aumentare la produzione di armi inviate all’Ucraina (Defense One, Marcus Weisgerber). A Pentagon memo details steps to boost production of specialized air defenses, long-range missiles, and rockets whose stocks have dwindled as they are used in Ukraine—amid other behind-the-scenes steps being taken by defense officials, policymakers, and companies to ensure the U.S. military is adequately armed if the country gets directly involved in a conflict. Memo Details Effort to Boost Production of Weapons Sent to Ukraine
  • Starlink di Space X: per l’Ucraina ma non come arma (Breaking Defense, Theresa Hitchens). The Ukraine military’s use of SpaceX’s Starlink internet communications service as a weapon system in its war with Russia was something the company neither foresaw or agreed to, SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell said today. SpaceX didn’t intend that Starlink be ‘weaponized’ by Ukraine: Shotwell
  • USA. Logistica di base all’estero in un crocevia tra Medio Oriente, Africa subsahariana e Oceano Indiano occidentale (Brookings, Jason Wolff). The United States has declared that the post-Cold War era is over and that competition among today’s major world powers will shape what comes next. Overseas basing logistics at a crossroads in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and the western Indian Ocean
  • USA. Competizione strategica per le basi nell’Africa subsahariana (Brookings, Dawn C. Murphy). Compared to other regions, sub-Saharan Africa is not a high strategic priority for China, Russia, or the United States. Most of the vital interests of these powers are in Asia, Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and the Middle East. That said, in recent years, U.S. concerns about Chinese and Russian basing in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have grown, largely owing to the two countries’ increased desire to project power and influence globally. Strategic competition for overseas basing in sub-Saharan Africa
  • USA. Ordine internazionale e competizione tra grandi potenze: lezioni dall’Asia centrale (Brookings, Alexander Cooley). Renewed strategic competition among the great powers is challenging and transforming the U.S.-led liberal international order. International ordering and great power competition: Lessons from Central Asia
  • USA. Competizione geostrategica e basi in Asia orientale e nella prima catena insulare (Brookings, Michael E. O’Hanlon and Andrew Yeo). Under the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) now enfolds East Asia within the broader regional framework of the Indo-Pacific. Geostrategic competition and overseas basing in East Asia and the First Island Chain
  • USA. Temperature in aumento: la lotta per le basi e l’accesso nelle isole del Pacifico (Brookings, Bruce Jones). The Pacific island clusters of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia share a geopolitical reality: they lie in the main space that separates the world’s two biggest powers. The United States has retained an arc of territories and bases across the northern reaches of Oceania, though it has at times neglected the underlying relationships that support this access.  Temperatures rising: The struggle for bases and access in the Pacific Islands
  • USA. Competizione geostrategica per le basi militari nella regione dell’Oceano Indiano (Brookings, Isaac B. Kardon). Military basing and access across the Indian Ocean region (IOR) is an important – and asymmetric – object of strategic competition in the contemporary international security environment.  Geostrategic competition for military basing in the Indian Ocean region
  • USA. Competizione strategica e basi in Europa centrale e orientale (Brookings, Emily J. Holland). After the end of the Cold War, the United States slowly shifted its focus away from guaranteeing European security to countering the rise of China. In the 1990s, the United States steadily reduced the number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe. Russia also withdrew large numbers of troops, retaining only some legacy bases in former Soviet states. Strategic competition and basing in Central and Eastern Europe
  • USA. Competizione tra grandi potenze e basi nell’Artico (Brookings, Jeremy Greenwood).  The Arctic remains a sphere of geopolitical competition between the great powers, making basing arrangements a natural part of their strategic planning. With rising global temperatures increasing access to the Arctic Ocean and its natural resources, the United States, Russia, and China all desire guaranteed freedom of movement and protection of their sovereign rights and interests. In addition to investments at home, the United States and other great powers in the Arctic will need to build strategic partnerships that enable beneficial agreements and access rights to bases, particularly for dual-use and civil-military operations. Great power competition and overseas basing in the Arctic
  • Come hanno votato i Paesi asiatici sull’Ucraina alle Nazioni Unite (The Interpreter, Stéphanie Fillion). On 26 February last year, a few days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations issued a statement expressing “concern’’ over the “evolving situation” – a stance that caused great dismay among the many countries hoping for a stronger international condemnation of Russia’s actions. With caution and tact: How Asian countries voted on Ukraine at the UN
  • Cosa prevede il 2023 per la Marina russa? (The Jamestown Foundation, John C. K. Daly). On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation” against Ukraine, a brutal conflict that has highlighted the Russian military’s shortcomings in excruciating detail. What Does 2023 Portend for the Russian Navy?
  • Erevan e i separatisti del Karabakh divisi sul ruolo della Russia nella sicurezza regionale (The Jamestown Foundation, Vasif Huseynov). On January 23, the Council of the European Union agreed to establish a civilian monitoring mission in Armenia’s border areas to “ensure an environment conducive to normalization efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan” (Consilium.europa.eu, January 23). This is the second mission that the EU has dispatched to the area after the termination of the previous two-month mission on December 19, 2022, which was agreed to at the EU-mediated summit of Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Prague on October 6, 2022. Unlike the previous one, the new mission is envisaged to include a larger group of personnel, with around 100 staff members (compared to 40 in the earlier mission) who will be deployed for an initial term of two years (Eeas.europe.eu, January 23). Yerevan and Karabakh Separatists Divided Over Russia’s Regional Security Role
  • Cosa si può fare per rallentare la deriva orientale della Bielorussia? (The Jamestown Foundation, Grigory Ioffe). On January 22, Belarusians identifying as pro-Western (as opposed to those who identify as Russo-centric) celebrated the 160th anniversary of the so-called Kastus Kalinowski uprising on Belarusian soil. Thus, Belarusian émigrés organized a performance in front of the Russian embassy in Warsaw in commemoration. The performance involved improvised gallows and a scarecrow—after all Kalinowski himself was executed in Wilno (present-day Vilnius) on March 22, 1864 (Malanka, January 24). What Can Be Done to Slow Down Belarus’s Eastern Drift?
  • Russia-Ucraina, evoluzione della guerra, 8 febbraio 2023 (ISW,  Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark). Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2023
  • Iran, evoluzione della crisi, 8 febbraio 2023 (ISW, Annika Ganzeveld, Zachary Coles, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick and Frederick W. Kagan).  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Aleppo City, Syria on February 8. Iran Update, February 8, 2023
  • La base industriale indiana della difesa (The Strategist, ). New Delhi faces severe challenges to diversify its defence inventory in the wake of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Even as a storied, reliable Russian defence partner, India sees a diminished Russian relationship in its future. In the past 20 years, India has been slowly unravelling itself from its Russian defence connections through weapons trade with other nations. However, its momentum towards diluting its heavy Russian military inventory ignores still-needed reforms to its defence industrial base. Still short on promise: India’s defence industrial base
  • Il CBAM crea un’opportunità decisiva per l’Indonesia (East Asia Forum, Novia Xu and Nadya Daulay). The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is the manifestation of the European Union’s (EU) ambitions to lead in global climate policy and the reduction of carbon leakage. Though the design of CBAM is acclaimed as fully compliant with international trade regulations, concerns over its impacts persist, especially for developing countries like Indonesia. CBAM creates key opportunity for Indonesia
  • La Corea del Nord svela un numero “record” di missili intercontinentali durante la parata militare (The Defense Post). North Korea Unveils ‘Record’ Number of ICBMs at Military Parade
  • Un barlume di speranza per la Corea del Nord nel 2023 (East Asia Forum,  Jamie Reilly). For the people of North Korea, 2022 was another difficult year. But as 2023 dawns, glimmers of hope are emerging as the country’s foreign trade with China and Russia begins to resume. A glimmer of hope for North Korea in 2023
  • Australia e Indonesia possono guidare una risposta alla crisi dei rifugiati nella regione (The Interpreter, Andrew Hudson). A rare ministerial meeting of the Bali Process in Adelaide on Friday is an opportunity for engagement, collaboration and leadership on a matter of urgent regional concern – the fate of one million people seeking freedom and protection from deadly violence. Australia and Indonesia can lead a response to refugee crisis in the region
  • L’impegno australiano per i sottomarini (The Strategist, ). In March, the government is expected to announce its plans to implement the ambitious proposal for an Australian force of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) that is at the heart of the AUKUS agreement. Understanding Australia’s submarine commitment
  • Definire le priorità spaziali dell’Australia (The Strategist, ). Australia is an Indo-Pacific country with a democratic ethos. Its role in shaping the discourse on strategic policy—in areas such as representative governance structures, the rules-based international order and responsible space development—is well documented. Australia is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with three major democratic, space-faring nations (India, Japan and the US) that is aimed at ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific. Setting Australia’s space priorities
  • Verso una politica per il software open-source come infrastruttura (Atlantic Council, Stewart Scott, Sara Ann Brackett, Trey Herr, Maia Hamin with the Open Source Policy Network). High-profile security incidents involving open-source software (OSS) have brought the ubiquity of OSS and the unique challenges its communities face to the attention of policymakers in the United States, EU, and beyond. Avoiding the success trap: Toward policy for open-source software as infrastructure
Marco Emanuele
Marco Emanuele è appassionato di cultura della complessità, cultura della tecnologia e relazioni internazionali. Approfondisce il pensiero di Hannah Arendt, Edgar Morin, Raimon Panikkar. Marco ha insegnato Evoluzione della Democrazia e Totalitarismi, è l’editor di The Global Eye e scrive per The Science of Where Magazine. Marco Emanuele is passionate about complexity culture, technology culture and international relations. He delves into the thought of Hannah Arendt, Edgar Morin, Raimon Panikkar. He has taught Evolution of Democracy and Totalitarianisms. Marco is editor of The Global Eye and writes for The Science of Where Magazine.

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