From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Australia, Bangladesh-China, China, Europe-Central Asia, Myanmar, South Korea-China, Ukraine, US-Asia, US-China, US-Five Eyes
Australia
(Andrew Henderson – The Strategist) Australia’s agriculture sector and food system have prospered under a global rules-based system influenced by Western liberal values. But the assumptions, policy approaches and economic frameworks that have traditionally supported Australia’s food security are no longer fit for purpose. Australia and the Indo-Pacific now face chronic challenges: rising geopolitical tensions, geo-economic transitions, climate change, deteriorating water security and rapid technological advances. While the government is acting to improve the Australian Defence Force’s readiness for conflict in our region, we are not trying to replicate this preparedness elsewhere in a coordinated manner, including in our agriculture sector and food system. – Australia’s food security needs national-security frameworks | The Strategist
Bangladesh – China
(Anand Kumar – Manohar Parrikar Institute) The visit of Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser, Muhammad Yunus, to China from 26 March to 29 March 2025 marks a significant diplomatic shift. Traditionally, the leaders of South Asian nations—except for Pakistan—prefer to prioritise India for their first foreign visits as a gesture of goodwill and strategic alignment. However, Yunus, facing mounting domestic challenges and strained relations with India due to his perceived anti-India stance and failure to protect minorities in Bangladesh, chose to engage with China instead. – Yunus Turns to China: A Desperate Diplomatic Gamble? – MP-IDSA
(Harsh V. Pant – Observer Research Foundation) During his visit to Beijing last month, chief advisor of Bangladesh’s interim government, Mohammed Yunus positioned his country as China’s gateway to South Asia. He suggested that since India’s northeastern states are landlocked with no access to the ocean, Bangladesh is the only guardian “of the ocean in this region” and therefore “could be an extension of the Chinese economy — building, producing, and marketing goods for China and the world.” – Red flags in Dhaka’s embrace of Beijing
China
(Benjamin Hautecouverture – Fondation pour la recherche stratégique) A founding argument of China’s nuclear policy, the No-First-Use (NFU) principle has been the subject of intense debate in the global strategic community and within the institutional framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process in recent years. It has to be said that this historic pillar of Chinese nuclear thinking is still not well understood by the public in the West, or even in Russia. At the same time, there is a number of concordant indications that China’s arsenal is increasing, albeit in very opaque proportions. This article attempts to place NFU in the context of its doctrinal development to understand the role it has played in Chinese strategic nuclear thinking over the last sixty years and to assess the extent to which it is still a factor of strategic stability today. – Chinese no-first-use: a strategic signaling device, diplomatic tool, and dogmatic reality :: Note de la FRS :: Foundation for Strategic Research :: FRS
(Atul Kumar – Observer Research Foundation) China has persistently employed a strategy of belligerent operations below the threshold of war against its territorial and maritime neighbours. These range from fistfights with neighbours’ armies and minor troop engagements on land, to ramming ships against theirs in its near seas, clashing with their coast guards, or engaging in aggressive military exercises and aviation patrols. These actions are not severe enough to provoke a war, but not small enough to be ignored either. Over the years, China’s neighbours have adapted to such tactics and have become better prepared to counter them. This paper evaluates China’s ‘below the brink’ military strategy and identifies its limitations through case studies of Chinese operations against Taiwan and the Philippines in their surrounding seas. – Challenges to China’s ‘Below the Threshold’ Military Strategy in Its Near Seas
Europe – Central Asia
(Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva – The Interpreter) Central Asia is suddenly winning friends and attention. In 2023, Germany set up the “Germany – Central Asia” platform, holding its first summit in September that year in Berlin. A year later, Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited the region to attend a second summit in Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital. In March this year, the Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev visited France, where President Emmanuel Macron conferred France’s highest national award – the Legion of Honor. – What explains Europe’s interest in Central Asia | Lowy Institute
Myanmar
(Alice Wai, Fitriani – The Strategist) China’s crackdown on cyber-scam centres on the Thailand-Myanmar border may cause a shift away from Mandarin, towards English-speaking victims. Scammers also used the 28 March earthquake to scam international victims. Australia, with its proven capabilities to disrupt cybercrime networks, should support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ efforts to tackle this kind of transnational organised crime. Doing so would also help ease pressure on Australian policing and cyber capabilities, which deal with thousands of cybercrime reports each year. Myanmar’s border regions, particularly around Myawaddy, are infamous for scam compounds. Victims—often lured by fake job ads on social media—are trafficked to these sites. Upon arrival, they’re forced to hand over their IDs and mobile phones, and are then forced to engage in love scams, crypto fraud, money laundering and illegal online gambling. The United Nations estimates around 120,000 people are trapped in Myanmar alone, with another 100,000 in Cambodia and unknown numbers in Laos, the Philippines and Thailand. – Myanmar’s scam centres demand ASEAN-Australia collaboration | The Strategist
South Korea – China
(Ranjit Kumar Dhawan – Manohar Parrikar Institute) The unexpected and sudden declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk Yeol on 3 December 2024, and his subsequent impeachment by the National Assembly not only highlighted the intense political rivalry in South Korea, but also triggered anti-China sentiment in the country. Notably, South Korean politics is deeply fragmented between the two major ideological groups—‘conservatives’ or rightists, and ‘progressives’ or leftists. The suspicion about Chinese interference in the South Korean political system is stated to be more prominent among the conservatives in South Korea. According to some conservative leaders, the Chinese government has been fuelling the ideological divide in South Korea by supporting the progressives. Although President Yoon Suk Yeol belongs to the conservative ideology, the anti-China sentiment had flared even under the progressive administrations. For example, during the progressive administration of President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), China’s historical claims over the ancient Goguryeo kingdom caused massive anti-China protests in South Korea. On the other hand, the conservative Park Geun-hye administration (2013–2017) had a pro-China foreign policy and it showed more contempt towards Japan. In recent years, South Korea–China maritime disputes, and China’s claims on Korean national symbols and cultural assets have strained the relationship between Seoul and Beijing. However, the present rise in anti-China feeling among the South Koreans appears to be more complex. – The Politics of Anti-China Sentiment in South Korea – MP-IDSA
Ukraine
(Mark Edele – The Interpreter) After three years of war, Ukraine faces new challenges in the era of strategic chaos marked by Trump 2.0. What are its choices? – A new theory of victory: How Ukraine can fortify and prosper in the age of Trump | Lowy Institute
US – Asia
(East Asia Forum) Donald Trump’s imposition of a tariff wall around the US economy is a major blow to global economic integration, as the United States moves towards economic decoupling from the Asia-Pacific region. The disruptive effects of the tariffs are compounded by the fact that it still remains uncertain whether they are open to bargaining, and if their implementation is even legal in the first place. For Asia, bilateral deals or retaliation against the US are tempting but would be disastrous – the best approach is to mobilise existing mechanisms like RCEP to coordinate a regional response that defends open trade. – The US spins out of control, into an economic world of its own | East Asia Forum
(David Uren – The Strategist) How will the US assault on trade affect geopolitical relations within Asia? Will nations turn to China and seek protection by trading with each other? The happy snaps a week ago of the trade ministers of China, Japan and South Korea shaking each other’s hands over progress on a trilateral trade pact suggested that possibility. The three, from nations with deep historic antipathy towards each other, said an agreement would create ‘a predicable trade and investment environment’, and they promised to speed negotiations. – In trade, nothing can replace the US consumer. Still, Asian countries look to each other | The Strategist
US – China
(Shi Youwei – FULCRUM) Tesla’s recent introduction of Full Self-Driving (FSD) vehicles in China has reignited Internet debates about the future of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Some said this technology fell short of expectations, while others complained about higher prices compared to Chinese competitors. The backlash from Chinese consumers against Tesla underscores a stark lesson: even global AV leaders cannot seamlessly export data-driven models. Chinese EV brands have established domestic reputations for affordable and reliable autonomous driving services. Yet models trained exclusively on Chinese data and regulations remain untested in overseas markets. Chinese and American EV giants are now venturing into the Southeast Asian market as the region becomes a testing ground for competing autonomous driving versions. – Autonomous Driving and Southeast Asia: Will it Hit the Road? | FULCRUM
(Mark Beeson – The Interpreter) One potentially revealing way of thinking about the respective strengths and weaknesses of the American and Chinese approaches to politics and economics is to consider the performance of their car industries. For better or worse, the car is the “machine that changed the world”. Its manufacture remains a pivotal industry, not least for the well-paid blue collar jobs it generates. And the production of electric vehicles (EVs) is an especially consequential measure of both the technological prowess and the ability of different political systems to foster “national champions” through targeted industry policies. – Electrifying geopolitics: Tesla vs BYD | Lowy Institute
US – Five Eyes
(Daniel Flitton – The Interpreter) The media typically only has enough space to focus on one big story at a time. Trump’s tariffs are dominating now. Last week it was “Signal-gate”, after a journalist was added to a White House-led group chat for attacks in Yemen. Before that, the dressing down of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office. It’s not that other issues are ignored, exactly. Just that important developments can slide past outside the limelight. Such is the case with a lower-profile controversy related to US intelligence in recent weeks. Mishandling classified material is one thing. The apparent politicisation of intelligence analysis by the Trump administration is far more worrying, a point that should truly alarm America’s allies. The Washington Post’s David Ignatius picked up on the evidence in a recent column. Just as the Signal-gate story broke, the public version of the annual US threat assessment was released. This report carries the list of impending dangers that intelligence agencies assess to be most pressing. These documents can often suffer from a box-ticking quality and usually only warrant a background story in the media cycle. But what is so striking about the version this year is when it is laid side-by-side with the report that came before. – Five Eyes alert: Trump is skewing intelligence to suit his priorities | Lowy Institute
