From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: ASEAN-US; Cambodia-China; Canada; China; Europe-Central Asia; India; India-Nepal; India-Russian Arctic; Indonesia; Kashmir-India-Pakistan; Laos-Japan; Middle East; Mozambique; Russia-Afghanistan; South Korea; US
ASEAN – US
(Severo C. Madrona, Jr. – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Donald Trump’s tariff policies have disproportionately impacted ASEAN economies, disrupting exports, deterring investment, and straining US-ASEAN trade ties. To navigate these challenges, ASEAN countries are exploring diversification, regional integration, and domestic reforms to enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability to protectionist shocks. – Trump’s Tariffs and their Impact on ASEAN: Historical Context and Future Directions – Australian Institute of International Affairs
Cambodia – China
(Chandarith Neak, Chhay Lim – The Interpreter) The recent state visit by China’s President Xi Jinping to Phnom Penh, capped by 37 new agreements and a pledge to deepen an “all-weather Cambodia-China community of shared future”, was intended to reaffirm Beijing’s centrality in Cambodia’s foreign policy. But the visit coincided with Phnom Penh’s ongoing recalibration of its external engagement – carefully balancing ties with Beijing while opening space for deeper engagement with the West. – Cambodia recalibrates its China policy, rather than realigns | Lowy Institute
Canada
(Atlantic Council) Canadians are seeing red. Prime Minister Mark Carney will form a new government in Canada after his Liberal Party secured the most seats in parliament in Monday’s election, completing a remarkable political turnaround amid a simmering confrontation with the United States. The comeback win came as Carney—after taking over for Justin Trudeau in March—clashed with US President Donald Trump over tariff policy and Trump’s calls to add Canada as the “fifty-first state.” “Our old relationship with the United States, a relationship based on steadily increasing integration, is over,” Carney declared in his victory speech. What does the Liberals’ victory mean for trade, security, and diplomacy in North America and beyond? – Experts react: What the Liberal Party’s win in Canada means for the world – Atlantic Council
China
(Fraser Howie – The Interpreter) As Donald Trump set about to single-handedly reorganise global trade and supply chain flows, only one headline seems to have given him pause. In times of market stress US Treasuries are the safe haven investment, but as markets plummeted after “Liberation Day”, bond yields initially fell as investors looked for shelter. Then, after days of chaos and confusion, government bonds too started to be sold. Treasuries were no longer the safe bet. Soon after, Trump paused most of the tariffs except on China. As treasuries sold off, and it became clearer that China was the prime villain in Trump’s trade drama, the question was asked, might China be dumping its vast US holdings? Had Beijing hit the economic nuclear red button? – China’s yuan challenge: Navigating a US dollar-dominated global economy | Lowy Institute
Europe – Central Asia
(Ayjaz Wani – Observer Research Foundation) Amid shifting geopolitical landscapes since the Russia-Ukraine war, the European Union (EU) has enhanced its engagement with the five resource-rich Central Asian countries in regional connectivity, trade, and energy. The first EU–Central Asia Summit was held in Samarkand on 3 and 4 April 2025 to lend momentum to this evolving strategic partnership. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Antonio Costa, and the leaders of the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) discussed the potential of the bilateral geopolitical, geoeconomic, and trade ties. – Charting the Future of EU-Central Asia Relations
India
(Kumail Mehdi – Australian Institute of International Affairs) India is increasingly using arms exports as a strategic tool to enhance its diplomatic influence, strengthen regional partnerships, and assert itself as a rising global power. The current government has linked defence manufacturing with foreign policy to build national capacity, counter rivals like China and Pakistan, and elevate its international standing. – India’s Defence Exports and Global Power Aspirations – Australian Institute of International Affairs
India – Nepal
(Neha Kaushal – Manohar Parrikar Institute) India conducts long-duration military exercises with several countries, but one of its most prominent joint military exercises is with Nepal. The 18th edition of the joint military exercise between India and Nepal, Surya Kiran, was conducted in Shanjhandi, situated in the Shivalik ranges of Western Nepal, from 31 December 2024 to 13 January 2025. The primary aim of the joint exercise was to enhance capabilities amongst the two armies as well as develop mutual understanding and enhance operational preparedness. The exercise signifies the strong bonds of friendship and mutual trust to address common security objectives and enhance defence cooperation. – Surya Kiran XVIII: Strengthening India–Nepal Military Cooperation – MP-IDSA
India – Russia Arctic
(Bipandeep Sharma – Manohar Parrikar Institute) The International Energy Agency (IEA) in a recent assessment has highlighted that India’s demands for Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) are set to reach 103 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually, by the end of this decade. Rapid infrastructure expansion, increase in domestic manufacturing and production, clear government policy guidelines and an expected easing in the global gas markets have been highlighted as some of the key reasons that could account for the increased demand for natural gas. India’s limited domestic gas production capabilities and its projected rising future demands of LNG necessitates not only increase in gas supplies from its traditional suppliers, but also to seek new and secure long-term alternatives. Projects in the Russian Arctic offer India strategic alternatives for the consistent supply of LNG. – Russia’s Arctic LNG: A Potential Alternative for India’s Energy Security – MP-IDSA
Indonesia
(Jascha Ramba Santoso – The Strategist) Huawei dominates Indonesia’s telecommunication network infrastructure. It won over Indonesia mainly through cost competitiveness and by generating favour through capacity-building programs and strategic relationships with the government, and telecommunication operators. But Huawei’s dominance poses risks. It constrains Indonesia’s digital sovereignty and limits its strategic autonomy. To remain in control, Indonesia must take the issue of dependence seriously and incorporate strategic considerations in telecommunications decision-making. – Indonesia is hooked on Huawei | The Strategist
Kashmir – India – Pakistan
(Ayjaz Wani – Observer Research Foundation) On 25 April 2025, the Mirwaiz of Kashmir denounced the Pahalgam terror attack from the pulpit of the Jamia Masjid during the Friday sermon, previously associated with Pakistan-backed separatism and which instigated the near-daily pre-2019 stone-pelting incidents across all major towns across the Kashmir Valley. He condemned the massacre of tourists by terrorists based on their religion, highlighting a fundamental transformation in the Valley’s stance on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Other religious leaders across Kashmir condemned the attack as well, as the entire region witnessed widespread protests, candlelight vigils, and anger against the Pakistan-perpetrated terror incident. Identifying a silver lining in these challenging times proves difficult; however, there is one: for the first time in 35 years, the Kashmir Valley is experiencing a complete shutdown in protest against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Although such public solidarity may not address all issues, it holds substantial significance–consider the fortunate survivors of the Pahalgam massacre who received aid from local Kashmiris to escape danger. – Shifting Tide in Kashmir’s Perception of Cross-Border Terrorism
(Kajari Kamal – Observer Research Foundation) The terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), killing and severely injuring many civilian tourists, serves as the most recent reminder of the perpetual threat posed by India’s ‘natural enemy’. This threat is compounded by local support that Pakistan-backed terrorism has managed to garner across the border. Among the Pahalgam attackers, two of the six men are allegedly local Kashmiris. Addressing both the external and internal enemy needs nuance and calibration—perhaps, following the template of a reasoned and sophisticated approach which the ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, Kautilya’s Arthashastra, expounds. Kautilya can teach many lessons to India for its long-drawn problem of Pakistan and terrorism in Kashmir. Themes such as duties of kingship (Rajadharma), decision-making based on sound intelligence and analysis (Anvikshiki), welfare and security of the people (Yogakshema), just use of force (Dandaniti), employment of four methods of politics (Upayas), and the six measures of foreign policy (Sadgunyas), among others, can help contextualise the problem holistically. This essay will particularly discuss the nature of the enemy and the associated challenge of internal security. – India-Pakistan Tensions After Pahalgam: A Kautilyan Perspective
(Nishant Sirohi – Observer Research Foundation) In the aftermath of the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack on civilians in Pahalgam, the Indian government announced that the Indus Water Treaty, 1960 (IWT) would be held in “abeyance” with immediate effect. The key water-sharing treaty will remain suspended “until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.”. The IWT has been one of the most resilient political agreements between India and Pakistan, surviving multiple wars and extended periods of hostility. However, India’s move to place the treaty in ‘abeyance’ marks a serious escalation, as it breaks from a long-standing tradition of insulating water-sharing cooperation from broader political and military tensions. Yet, this is not a retreat from international law—it is a strategic legal statecraft. The language of ‘abeyance’ is deliberate. India has neither withdrawn from the treaty nor altered river flows, but paused procedural cooperation—using law, not water, for leverage. This is legal diplomacy, where restraint amplifies impact. India’s unprecedented move has ignited several complex legal questions. This article focuses on two key issues: firstly, whether holding a treaty ‘in abeyance’ recognised in international law; secondly, whether ‘abeyance’ can be justified as a countermeasure against wrongful acts. These questions form the basis of this article’s analysis. – Indus Treaty in “Abeyance”: A Strategic Pause, Not a Legal Breach
(Ajay Bisaria – Observer Research Foundation) A lush meadow in Pahalgam was soaked in innocent blood this week, marking the most painful terrorist blow to India since 2008. As investigators confirmed Pakistan’s role in the massacre, 22/4 became another grim reminder that its western neighbour remains India’s primary adversary. Strategic neglect is not an option. Pahalgam (2025) has joined a dismal calendar of 21st century tragedies: Chettisinghpura (2000), the Parliament attack (2001), Kaluchak (2002), Mumbai (2008), Uri (2016), and Pulwama (2019), each a shocking act of violence, designed to provoke and destabilise. India’s punitive strikes in Uri and Balakot did establish a new security paradigm. Coupled with the revocation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status in 2019, the expectation was that India had set up credible deterrence against cross-border terror, triggering a peace dividend that would allow a political process to heal Kashmir. That fragile peace did hold—for a while. But Pahalgam 2025 now raises a sobering question: Has the deterrence eroded, or were deeper structural shifts at play? – From Pulwama to Pahalgam: Is the Kashmir Peace Dividend Over?
(Arzan Tarapore – The Interpreter) The condolence messages were immediate and unqualified. Hours and days after the horrific 22 April attack at Pahalgam in India – where terrorists based and trained in Pakistan, according to Indian police, targeted Hindu men and killed 26 – world leaders rushed to offer sympathy and support to India. Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said “we stand with India,” a sentiment also shared by US President Donald Trump. They did not call for Indian restraint – instead, they offered their unqualified support. But what form of support could partners such as Australia and the United States provide? The United States obviously has the most to offer. It could use some of its formidable intelligence capabilities to help hunt for the attack perpetrators and their networks, support Indian military operations, or warn of counter-attacks. It also has a wider suite of policy levers, including economic coercion, to extract Pakistani concessions on its backing of terrorists. Australia’s potential support is necessarily more modest and indirect. But it does have interests in upholding regional security and cultivating a deeper security partnership with India. The developing post-Pahalgam crisis offers Australia an opportunity to demonstrate its seriousness on both counts – for example by assuming greater responsibility for maritime surveillance in the Indian Ocean. – Kashmir and what’s next after the Pahalgam attack: How India’s partners could help in this crisis | Lowy Institute
Laos – Japan
(Simran Walia – Manohar Parrikar Institute) Laos and Japan have developed a deep and multifaceted relationship. Both countries signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in January 2025. The upgrade reflects the rapidly improving bilateral ties between Japan and Laos, especially in the areas of economics and people-to-people ties. Previously in 2015, a ‘strategic partnership’ was signed to strengthen sociocultural, economic and security connections. – Laos and Japan: A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership – MP-IDSA
Middle East
(Soufan Center) Talks on a Gaza ceasefire continued on Saturday, but neither Hamas nor Israel is moving off their entrenched positions. Gaza civilians as well as Palestinian leaders in the West Bank increasingly blame Hamas for prolonging the war and adding to the destruction and civilian suffering in Gaza. Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid for Gaza is straining Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s relations with U.S. President Donald Trump. Netanyahu rejects a return of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) to governing Gaza, hindering the formulation of a postwar governance and security plan for the enclave. – Gaza Settlement Remains Elusive – The Soufan Center
Mozambique
(Gurjit Singh – Observer Research Foundation) Mozambique stands at a pivotal moment, caught in a web of political instability, authoritarian tendencies, economic disparity, and a persistent insurgency. The 2024 elections highlighted the country’s fragile democratic trajectory, marked by accusations of fraud, widespread protests, and a harsh state crackdown. Straddling the line between autocracy and democracy, Mozambique faces mounting pressure, within both domestic and international realms, without a clear path forward. – Mozambique at a Crossroads: Political Crisis, Economic Strain, and the Fight for Stability
Russia – Afghanistan
(Aleksei Zakharov – Observer Research Foundation) On 17 April 2025, the Russian Supreme Court suspended the terrorist status of the Taliban, ending over two decades of the grouping being outlawed on Russian territory. This was followed by the decision to upgrade Afghanistan’s diplomatic mission in Moscow to the ambassador level, announced by the presidential envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, during his Kabul visit on 23 April 2025. For Moscow, these are largely symbolic decisions, while for the Taliban, it marks another step towards emerging from international isolation. As Russia’s moves appear to be a political concession to the Taliban, it is not entirely clear what its main drivers are and what Moscow expects from Kabul in return. – Delisting the Taliban: What’s Driving Moscow’s New Afghanistan Policy?
South Korea
(Andrew Yeo, Evans J.R. Revere, Hanna Foreman – Brookings) On April 4, 2025, South Korea’s Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol, dismissing Yoon from office and ending a tumultuous period after his short-lived martial law declaration. With a snap presidential election set for June 3, South Korean voters have a crucial choice to make amid an unpredictable geopolitical environment, a flagging economy, deep political polarization, and the return of U.S. President Donald Trump. Senior Research Assistant Hanna Foreman met with Andrew Yeo, senior fellow and SK-Korea Foundation chair in Korea studies, and Evans J.R. Revere, nonresident senior fellow, to review the situation in Seoul. – Will South Korean democracy pass its next test?
US
(Tara Watson, Jonathon Zars – Brookings) April 30 marks 100 days since President Trump took office for the second time. In a short span, the administration has shifted nearly every aspect of immigration policy in the anti-immigrant direction: furthering the 2024 decline in humanitarian and unauthorized flows, constricting regular immigration pathways, boosting enforcement, and making life harder for immigrants living in the U.S. The effort is seemingly aimed at reducing the number of immigrants in the U.S. overall, regardless of legal status or criminal history, and increasing fear and uncertainty among those who remain. The actions have been marked by disregard for process. Here we take a look at the major developments. – 100 Days of immigration under the second Trump administration
(Jongsun Kim – Atlantic Council) On April 7, US President Donald Trump and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made clear their ambitions: a one-trillion-dollar budget by fiscal year (FY) 2026 to fund a modern, agile, and globally competitive military. This is an ambitious goal, but if current funding trends hold, that future is far from guaranteed. Despite ongoing threats and bold declarations from the White House and the Pentagon, defense modernization is being squeezed by flat budgets, rising personnel costs, and a Congress that for more than a quarter century has failed to deliver predictable, on-time annual appropriations, which are essential for sustained military investment. Look at what happened as recently as last month. In early March, Congress passed the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, a stopgap measure that locks the Pentagon into last year’s funding levels with only a modest $6.1 billion—or 0.7 percent—increase in defense funding, bringing the total to $892.5 billion. However, after accounting for inflation and rising personnel costs, this amounts to a cut in real terms. The total also falls more than $2.5 billion short of the Biden administration’s earlier $895.2 billion request for FY 2025. Trump and Hegseth have floated a one-trillion-dollar topline for FY 2026, with congressional Republicans backing projections that hit that mark by 2031. But projections alone won’t modernize the force. The longer Congress relies on continuing resolutions, the further the Pentagon is likely to drift from the trillion-dollar goal. – To fund US military modernization, Congress needs to pass on-time annual defense budgets – Atlantic Council
(Amrita Narlikar – Observer Research Foundation) During his election campaign last year, Donald J. Trump was unequivocal in expressing his love for tariffs: in an election rally, he declared, “I always say that ‘tariffs’ is the most beautiful word to me in the dictionary”. That the new administration was serious about using tariffs to address a range of perceived and real ills was clear as early as 20th January 2025 with the release of the Presidential Memorandum on “America First Trade Policy.” Rapid fire moves have followed since then, with tariffs being slapped on friends and foes, bracketed with exemptions, escalated, selectively paused, and more. Target states have responded to the roller-coaster ride in different ways: some with recriminations and retaliations, others with stoic disapproval but no counter-measures, and some with pre-emptive tariff cuts and positive negotiation offers. – Three beautiful consequences of Trump’s tariff game
