Geostrategic magazine (3-4 July 2024)

COMPLEX RESEARCH LABORATORY

The Global Eye

Daily from global think tanks and open sources

(the analyzes here recalled do not necessarily correspond to the geostrategic thinking of The Global Eye)

Africa

(Liam Karr – Institute for the Study of War) Nigeria. Boko Haram almost certainly conducted its first suicide attack since 2020, highlighting its ongoing resurgence in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram has also strengthened its territorial control, finances, and manpower over the past year. The attack may aim to inspire surrendered or defected Boko Haram fighters to remobilize – Burkina Faso. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is carrying out increasingly deadly attacks on civilians across Burkina Faso, likely to consolidate its support zones. JNIM has increasingly targeted civilians since the current Burkinabe junta came into power and decided to militarize and mobilize civilians against JNIM. The rising toll of JNIM offensives is undermining support for the already-embattled Burkinabe junta, heightening the risk of a coup, which is preoccupying security forces and creating additional opportunities for insurgents – Somalia. The ongoing transition of military bases from African Union (AU) forces to Somali forces is creating opportunities for al Shabaab to exploit security gaps to attack AU and Somali forces. Al Shabaab recently conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack targeting one of these bases in central Somalia. The attack demonstrates both the threat to these bases and the growing security challenges the Somali Federal Government faces in central Somalia in 2024

Africa File, July 3, 2024: Boko Haram Resurgence; JNIM Onslaught in Burkina Faso; al Shabaab Exploits AU Withdrawal | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Australia

(Andrew Horton – ASPI The Strategist) The advent of the AUKUS partnership heralds a transformative era in Australia’s strategic posture and scientific landscape, propelling us into the vanguard of cutting-edge research and development. However, this newfound prominence also exposes a critical vulnerability: the susceptibility of our academic institutions to foreign espionage and intellectual property theft, a menace that threatens to undermine our economic prosperity and strategic autonomy.

Safeguarding Australia’s sensitive academic research | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

(Malcolm Davis – ASPI The Strategist) With the prospect of increasing human activity on and around the Moon in coming decades, there is growing defence interest in monitoring activity and operating in new regions of the space domain. Australia needs a policy discussion to evaluate how it can play a broader role beyond the orbit of geostationary satellites, a volume of space known as xGEO.

Space operations in the deep black of xGEO | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)

China – Cuba

(Matthew P. Funaiole, Aidan Powers-Riggs, Brian Hart, Henry Ziemer, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Ryan C. Berg, and Christopher Hernandez-Roy – CSIS) China’s ambitions to expand its global intelligence-gathering capabilities have drawn it to the doorstep of the United States. In a striking revelation last year, Biden administration officials disclosed that China has access to multiple spy facilities in Cuba. While China’s activities on the island remain shrouded in secrecy, satellite imagery analyzed by CSIS provides the latest and most comprehensive assessment of where China is most likely operating.

Secret Signals: Decoding China’s Intelligence Activities in Cuba (csis.org)

China – Taiwan

(Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats – Institute for the Study of War) The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office downplayed the risk that the PRC will prosecute ordinary Taiwanese citizens after the PRC released legal guidelines that threaten advocates of Taiwanese independence with criminal penalties up to the death penalty. Chinese Coast Guard ships boarded a Taiwanese fishing boat for illegally fishing in PRC waters and escorted it to a naval port in Fujian province on July 2. PRC officials and media framed the ongoing RIMPAC exercises as provoking “bloc confrontation” in the Asia-Pacific and attempting to intimidate the PRC in support of Taiwan. The Philippines stated that the PRC interfered in the rescue of Philippine fishermen whose boat exploded near Scarborough Shoal. The PRC framed the role of the CCG positively to portray itself as the legitimate authority in the waters near the shoal. The PRC accused the Philippines of “undermining peace and stability” by resupplying a Philippine Coast Guard vessel “illegally stationed” on Sabina Shoal.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 3, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

European Union – China

(IFRI) The concept of “de-risking” has become a significant focus for the European Union (EU) in managing its relations with China since first proposed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in March 2023. However, the interpretation and policy responses to de-risking vary across Europe, reflecting diverse national perspectives.

National Perspectives on Europe’s De-risking from China | IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales

India 

(Ved Shinde – Lowy The Interpreter) Indian foreign policy is playing at a consistent tempo. Just four days after being sworn in for a third term last month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Italy attending the outreach session of the G7 summit, reinforcing chummy ties with its partners in the West.

Why Modi will go to Moscow | Lowy Institute

India – UAE

(Dinesh N Joshi, Prithvi Gupta – Observer Research Foundation) On 23 June 2024, Indian Foreign Minister Dr S Jaishankar visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and held wide-ranging talks with his Emirati counterpart, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The visit, within two weeks of Dr Jaishankar’s reappointment as the Indian EAM, signifies the importance of UAE in India’s foreign policy matrix. In the past four years, the bilateral partners also crossed several significant milestones such as the commencement of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) cooperation, the 2022 Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CEPA), trade settlement in bilateral currencies and the addition of the UAE debit/credit card on India’s Rupay stack among others.

CEPA and the IMEC: Future-proofing India-UAE economic ties (orfonline.org)

International Order

(Melanie W. Sisson – Brookings) These are profoundly uncertain times for the trans-Atlantic relationship. There is uncertainty about why Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine in February 2022, and about whether there was anything that could have been done to dissuade him from doing so. There is uncertainty about who is in and who is out of the long-term security architecture of Europe (The United States? Russia? Both?). And there is uncertainty about how the war in Ukraine and the global response to it affects the future of the post-World War II international order: The ideas that wars of choice are not tolerated, and that multilateral institutions and international law are useful impediments to them.

Russia, Ukraine, America, and the end of imagination | Brookings

Mediterranean, Middle East, and the Gulf

(Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl – Institute for the Study of War) Iran: Iran held its final debate before the upcoming presidential runoff election. Ultraconservative Saeed Jalili continued to downplay the importance of nuclear negotiations with the West. Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian tried to garner support from hardliners – Lebanon: Israeli forces killed the commander responsible for Lebanese Hezbollah operations in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah has sustained almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023, despite the IDF killing Hezbollah commanders throughout the war – Gaza Strip: Qatar sent Hamas a revised ceasefire proposal for the Gaza Strip. Hamas has reviewed the proposal and sent its response to Israel. This comes after Hamas essentially rejected the most recent US-backed ceasefire proposal – Syria: Iranian-backed militias have moved advanced weapons into Syria and established a drone assembly site in eastern Syria, according to Syrian opposition media.

Iran Update, July 3, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) An Israeli airstrike killed four Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members in Nur Shams, near the West Bank city of Tulkarm, on July 2. “An IDF [Israel Defense Forces] aircraft struck a terrorist cell in the area of Nur Shams while they planted an explosive device,” the Israeli military stated. A military source told The Times of Israel that the cell was being monitored and was struck when it began positioning a roadside bomb.

Four Palestinian Islamic Jihad Operatives Killed Planting Explosives in the West Bank (fdd.org)

(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Iran’s acting foreign minister threatened Israel with “a hell of no return” in Lebanon if the current conflict with its Hezbollah proxy escalates into an “all-out war,” Iran’s state news agency IRNA reported on July 3. “In Lebanon, the resistance has played a role as a vigorous actor that created deterrence both in the international field and in the field of diplomacy,” Ali Bagheri Kani said, referring to Hezbollah. Lebanon will be “definitely a hell with no return for the Zionists” in the event of a new war, he added. Speaking to reporters, Bagheri Kani praised Hezbollah for having played “a key role in the war equation that has created a deterrent power in the region.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister Threatens Israel With ‘Hell’ if War with Hezbollah Escalates (fdd.org)

(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Hezbollah’s deputy leader on July 2 hedged on the question of whether the Iran-backed terrorist organization would stop attacking Israel if the war in Gaza war winds down without a formal truce. Speaking to the Associated Press, Naim Kassem said that if “there is a ceasefire in Gaza, we will stop without any discussion … If the war stops, this [Hezbollah’s] military support will no longer exist.” However, he emphasized that if “what happens in Gaza is a mix between ceasefire and no ceasefire, war and no war, we can’t answer [how we would react] now, because we don’t know its shape, its results, its impacts.” He continued: “Israel can decide what it wants — limited war, total war, partial war … But it should expect that our response and our resistance will not be within a ceiling and rules of engagement set by Israel. … If Israel wages the war, it means it doesn’t control its extent or who enters into it.”

Hezbollah Deputy Leader Hedges on Gaza-For-Lebanon Tradeoff (fdd.org)

(Mohammed Sinan Siyech – Observer Research Foundation) After nearly eight months since the 7 October attacks and a concerted military retaliation by Israel thereafter, many regional developments have taken place. Over the last week, alarm bells have been ringing in Washington D.C. over the possibility of an actual war taking place between Israel and Hezbollah based in Lebanon.

A potential Hezbollah-Israel war: Rationale and implications (orfonline.org)

(Sabine Ameer – Observer Research Foundation) In 2018, a year after the fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pledged US$50 million to fund heritage reconstruction in Mosul, which according to the Director-General of UNESCO, has been the largest cooperation to rebuild cultural heritage in the history of Iraq. A few years later, in 2021, the UAE announced that it would invest US$3 billion in aid as part of its larger post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In December 2023, UAE expressed its intention to reconstruct Gaza after the Israel-Hamas war, provided a US-backed two-state plan was brought to the table. More recently, on 4 June 2024, the Emirati leader held a formal meeting with the Taliban, indicating its desire to also contribute towards stabilisation and development in Afghanistan. From Mosul to Gaza and Kabul, Abu Dhabi’s strategic advances have caught much media attention. Security strategists label UAE’s humanitarian and international development efforts as part of the grand geopolitical ambitions of the once small state, a form of its “nation branding” in the international arena. Set against the backdrop of its humanitarian initiatives across different case settings, this article unpacks UAE’s evolving role as a key actor in the geopolitical landscape of the Gulf–and the world.

UAE’s evolving role as a key actor in the Middle East and beyond (orfonline.org)

Mexico

(Hector Torres – CIGI) Claudia Sheinbaum’s landslide victory in the recent Mexican presidential election owes much to her promises to deepen incumbent Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s welfare programs. Yet she will also be inheriting a fiscal imbalance equivalent to 5.9 percent of Mexico’s GDP, the highest since 1988.

Mexico’s New President: A Dilemma for the IMF and a Risk for Latin America – Centre for International Governance Innovation (cigionline.org)

NATO

(Sean Monaghan, Sissy Martinez, Andrea Leonard Palazzi, and Otto Svendsen – CSIS) Next week, on July 9–11, the leaders of NATO will gather in Washington, D.C., for a historic summit, 75 years on since the alliance’s founding in 1949. The meeting comes at a perilous time in NATO’s history, with the alliance facing a war in Europe amid several global crises.

What Will Happen at NATO’s Washington Summit? (csis.org)

Russia – North Korea

(Brookings) On June 19, 2024, during a visit to Pyongyang, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a mutual defense pledge with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un. In the Q&A below, Hanna Foreman engages with Brookings scholars Angela Stent and Andrew Yeo to get their different perspectives on the Kim-Putin summit.

What happens after the Kim-Putin summit? | Brookings

Russia – Ukraine

(Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and George Barros – Institute for the Study of War) Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and is forming several new brigades, but delayed and insufficient Western weapons deliveries will likely prevent Ukraine from equipping all these new brigades. Timely and appropriate Western security assistance continues to be crucial determinant of when and at what scale Ukrainian forces can contest the battlefield initiative and conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations in the future. Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging existing Eurasian-focused and Russian-led international organizations as the cornerstone for his new proposed alternative “Eurasian security architecture.”. Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against Russian naval infrastructure in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 3 and reportedly damaged energy infrastructure during an aerial drone strike on Belgorod Oblast on the night of July 1. Unspecified People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russian companies are reportedly working together to develop a drone similar to the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition for Russia to use in Ukraine. Russian forces recently advanced within easternmost Chasiv Yar, in the Toretsk direction, and near Avdiivka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk, near Kreminna, and southeast of Chasiv Yar. The Kremlin continues efforts to position Russian veterans who have fought in Ukraine in official roles in Russian domestic politics.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Russia – Vietnam 

(Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash, Premesha Saha – Observer Research Foundation) After creating ripples across the Asia-Pacific in the aftermath of Russia signing the Comprehensive Strategic Treaty with North Korea, Putin visited Vietnam on 20 June 2024, after a gap of seven years. A lot has changed since then: a war in Ukraine and the Western sanctions have led to Southeast Asia gaining a new emphasis in Russian foreign policy, as reflected in the Russian Concept of Foreign Policy 2023, where a significant emphasis was laid on increasing economic, security and humanitarian cooperation with ASEAN member states. Hence, it is important to assess the implications of the visit not only from the point of view of understanding bilateral relations but also to understand what it means for the Southeast Asian region.

Seeking support from Asia: Putin’s visit to Vietnam (orfonline.org)

UK 

(Ashraf Nehal – Observer Research Foundation) As the United Kingdom (UK) approaches its general election on 4 July 2024, the Labour Party appears poised for victory, rallying behind the slogan “It’s time for change”. Against this backdrop of potential political transformation, the role and representation of Indian-origin members of the Parliament (MPs) continue to significantly shape the nation’s legislative landscape. The increasing presence of Indian-origin politicians in the UK Parliament reflects both rising political engagement and the broader success of British Indians. Data supports this: Indian households lead in high-income brackets, with 42 percent earning £1,000+ weekly in 2015-2018. While comprising 3.1 percent of the UK population, they contribute over 6 percent to GDP, indicating significant economic and potential political influence.

Indian-origin representation in UK politics: A 2024 election perspective (orfonline.org)

UK – India

(Harsh V. Pant, Shairee Malhotra – Observer Research Foundation) On July 4, British citizens will head to the polls to vote in an early general election. The Labour Party is poised to win, replacing the Conservative party that has ruled Britain since 2010. A change in government after 14 years will have implications for British foreign policy, including the UK’s relations with India.

India-UK ties amid British political flux (orfonline.org)

USA

(Gabriel R. Sanchez – Brookings) Although overshadowed in the national political discourse by discussions about the importance of the economy, immigration, or abortion, voters have expressed that health care continues to be one of their highest priorities. In fact, a May 2024 poll by Pew found that health care was the third-highest issue priority for voters, garnering a robust 57% from respondents.

Health care costs are a top concern for voters in the 2024 election | Brookings

(Catherine Wallace and Owen Gow – Atlantic Council) As the United States enters what has been one of its hottest months of the year, the Biden administration on Tuesday took a significant step in protecting an estimated thirty-six million workers nationwide from extreme heat. This long-awaited move—for workers, companies, and advocates alike—was paired with the announcement of new research from the US Environmental Protection Agency and new investment through the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Building Resilience Infrastructure and Communities program.

Feeling the heat? Biden’s proposed protections for workers are a welcome start. – Atlantic Council

USA – China

(Max Meizlish, Anthony Ruggiero – Foundation for Defense of Democracies) The Treasury Department sanctioned key money launderers on Monday linked to Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, targeting a growing national security concern: China’s underground banking network. This action, in conjunction with recent Department of Justice (DOJ) indictments of the sanctioned individuals, underscores the critical role of illicit financial flows in fueling the U.S. fentanyl crisis, which is the leading cause of death for Americans ages 18-45.

Treasury Highlights Role of Chinese Underground Banking in U.S. Fentanyl Crisis (fdd.org)

Latest articles

Related articles