From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : ASEAN, Australia, Canada, China, China-Taiwan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indo Pacific-China-Russia, Middle East, Red Sea-Houtis, Russia, Russia-India, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine, Singapore, Syria, Timor-Leste, UAE-India, US-China, US-Indo Pacific, US-Morocco-Polisario Front, Global Trade
ASEAN
(Elizabeth Mills – WEF)
ASEAN’s ethos of cooperation and mutual respect looks set to serve as a counterpoint – and respite – to nationalist sentiments and political factiousness that have taken hold in other parts of the world.
Its focus on peace as the basis on which to develop its economies – individually and collectively – is helping to bring it swiftly into the intelligent age.
This, and other advantages, ranging from a large, young market to an embrace of the digital economy, offers a conducive environment to investors, leaders said at Davos 2025. –Will ASEAN be the world’s most attractive region in 2025? | World Economic Forum
Australia
(James Corera, Chris Taylor – ASPI The Strategist)
It didn’t receive much publicity amid summertime’s distractions, but Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke unveiled on 14 January what’s been described as the ‘first ever analysis of foreign interference and espionage threats’. It’s safer to say the first publicly released by the Australian government. It’s a step towards what we need: political leaders explaining these threats and naming the sources of these dangers. But it’s only a step, because the document still doesn’t name names. – Countering foreign interference: the government should name names | The Strategist
Canada
(Raquel Garbers – Centre for International Governance Innovation)
The global threat environment is increasingly complex and unstable, with hostile states using all instruments of national power to launch attacks on foreign governments, industries, research labs, civic groups and more. They are especially active in the economic domain, where they are using illicit, unfair and illegal economic practices to corrupt the global order that underpins stable interstate relations; weaponize economic interdependencies; and aggressively target the foreign assets and technologies essential to modern military power. In our highly integrated world and 360-degree threat environment, economic attacks are the essential first phase of full-scale war, and Canada is a high-value target. This policy brief, the first in a series as part of CIGI’s Canada at Economic War project, says securing our future against growing pressures from allies and adversaries alike requires urgently changing our outdated foreign policy mindset and resetting how we engage in the world. Developing a Canadian Defence Industrial Strategy will be a key part of defending Canada in the current threat environment. – Canada at Economic War: Setting the Scene – Centre for International Governance Innovation
China
(Kaiser Kuo – WEF)
China showcased its transition from traditional growth drivers to a new model centered on domestic consumption, advanced manufacturing, and green transformation, while emphasizing continued commitment to opening up amid geopolitical tensions.
The green transition, particularly in electric vehicles and renewable energy, emerged as a key driver, with the halls of the Congress Centre buzzing with discussions of China’s latest breakthrough in AI — the DeepSeek model.
Regional leaders, particularly from ASEAN, emphasized pragmatic engagement with both China and the United States – but geopolitical uncertainty casts a shadow. – China at Davos 2025: Continuing importance to global growth | World Economic Forum
China – Taiwan
(Aynur Kerimu – The Jamestown Foundation)
Taiwan is acting against media organizations operating in the country that are affiliated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) party-state.
In early January, Taiwan’s government revoked the operating license of the magazine Strait Herald following revelations about its influence and infiltration activities.
A sharp increase in disinformation targeting Taiwan in 2024 has prompted robust countermeasures, legislative reforms, enhanced cognitive warfare defenses, and international collaboration to combat PRC influence operations.
Calls to improve Taiwan’s national security framework, including by setting up courts dedicated to prosecuting espionage and infiltration cases, indicate how vulnerable Taiwan remains to digital and media influence operations. – Expulsion of PRC Media Outlet Reveals Scale of Taiwan’s Information Challenge – Jamestown
Democratic Republic of Congo
(Soufan Center)
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is facing a complex crisis with the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group, supported by Rwanda, and escalating activities of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP).
M23 has made significant territorial advances in North and South Kivu, and the capture of the key city of Goma on January 26 is an escalation that risks exacerbating the ongoing humanitarian crisis that has already displaced over 400 thousand people.
Rwanda’s support for M23, driven by economic interests in the mineral-rich regions of eastern DRC, and the involvement of neighboring Uganda and Burundi, heightens the risk of further regional escalation.
ISCAP has leveraged the security vacuum resulting from intensified Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC)-M23 clashes to escalate attacks and reclaim territory – the group’s global jihadist ambitions indicate that regional expansion remains a tangible threat as the security situation in the DRC deteriorates further. – The Escalating Web of Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo – The Soufan Center
Indo Pacific – China – Russia
(Robert E. Hamilton – Foreign Policy Research Institute)
In late September, a US HC-103J Super Hercules spotted four foreign vessels operating about 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island, Alaska. Upon closer inspection, the patrol turned out to be Russian Border Guard and Chinese Coast Guard ships. While this marked the northernmost location at which the US military has spotted Chinese ships operating, the presence of the joint Chinese-Russian patrol fit an increasingly common pattern. This sighting was the third time in three months that the US has spotted either Chinese or Russian ships close to Alaska. In both 2022 and 2023, the US Navy sent assets to shadow joint Chinese-Russian naval patrols operating in the Aleutian Islands region.The Chinese and Russian navies have also been operating together near US partners and allies closer to their own shores, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2021, a Chinese-Russian patrol circumnavigated Japan’s main island. China’s official description of the event claimed the flotilla was focused on “maintaining international and regional strategic stability,” while Russia’s Defense Ministry said its goal was to “maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” In an understatement that certainly masked some alarm, Japan merely characterized the patrol as “unusual.”. Since then, the pace of Chinese-Russian naval patrols and exercises in the region has increased, with several in 2024 alone. One of these, Ocean 2024, involved some 90,000 troops and more than 500 ships and aircraft, according to the Kremlin, and was the largest of such exercises in 30 years. Ocean 2024 came on the heels of another joint naval patrol in the northern Pacific and another set of drills in the waters off Japan. – Setting the Stage: An Overview of Chinese and Russian Interests and Influence in the Indo-Pacific – Foreign Policy Research Institute
Middle East
(Mark Schulman – WEF)
Leaders at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2025 presented their priorities, including the prime minister of Qatar, foreign ministers of Syria, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, president of Israel and vice-president for strategic affairs of Iran.
Discussions emphasized de-escalating conflicts in the Middle East, with a focus on fostering dialogue and expanding humanitarian support.
Key updates included the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, marking a new chapter for the country, and the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza. – The Middle East: Insights and discussions from Davos 2025 | World Economic Forum
Red Sea – Houtis
(Noam Raydan, Farzin Nadimi – Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
On January 22, the Houthis released the crew of the Galaxy Leader, a car carrier that they seized in the Red Sea on November 19, 2023, as part of their wide-ranging, months-long anti-shipping campaign. The Yemeni group captured the vessel due to its Israeli links, but the twenty-five seafarers are nationals of Bulgaria, Mexico, the Philippines, Romania, and Ukraine. Their release came three days after a ceasefire was announced in the Hamas-Israel war in Gaza—a development that led the Houthis to pledge they would immediately limit any further attacks to vessels flagged as Israeli or “wholly owned by Israeli individuals or entities.” The group also claimed it would end “sanctions” (threats) against Israeli ships “upon the full implementation of all phases” in the three-phase Gaza agreement. Although freeing the multinational crew of the Galaxy Leader (IMO identification number 9237307) is quite welcome after years of persistent calls for their release, the Houthi promise to halt attacks against non-Israeli vessels has been met with doubt, and several shipping companies and insurance companies are still rightfully cautious. The Houthis have made clear they are ready to resume their military activities if the fragile Gaza truce falters, or if the U.S. and British militaries strike additional targets in the Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen. “We have our finger on the trigger,” warned leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in a televised speech on January 20. Moreover, they have repeatedly used inaccurate or outdated information to identify and target commercial ships over the past year, and this track record will ensure that the Red Sea remains a highly volatile route as long as the group controls traffic through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. – Despite the Houthi Pledge to Limit Attacks, the Red Sea Remains Highly Volatile | The Washington Institute
Russia
(Ksenia Kirillova – The Jamestown Foundation)
Moscow introduced a new accounting scheme enabling European buyers to pay for gas in rubles, circumventing U.S. sanctions and using intermediaries and currency exchanges to bypass restrictions.
Russia has expanded its shadow fleet and increased its oil tanker capacity by 70 percent, helping it increase oil supplies to countries willing to buy it at prices higher than the price threshold set in the West.
Russian companies are seizing assets, resources, and businesses, including mines and factories, in occupied Ukrainian regions, with profits fueling the war and raising war crime allegations. – Russian Business Scheme to Circumvent Tariffs and Fund War – Jamestown
Russia – India
(Arvind Gupta – Vivekananda International Foundation)
The global situation is likely to become even more uncertain and complex as President Trump begins to unfold and implement his radical policies. His repeated threats during the campaign for about the imposition of tariffs on imports from China and other countries is sure to trigger unsettling trade wars. At the same time, his promise to help end the Russia-Ukraine war swiftly could provide the world with much-needed relief from endless conflicts and geopolitical tensions. These are, however, early days. The world is bracing to deal with unpredictable, dealmaker Trump. – Russia and India: The Need for a New Agenda for Cooperation | Vivekananda International Foundation
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Vladimir Socor – The Jamestown Foundation)
General Robert Brieger, chairman of the European Union’s Military Committee, proposed a UN-mandated peace-support mission to be deployed in Ukraine following a Russia-Ukraine armistice. The European Union or some of its member states would participate alongside countries from the “Global South” acceptable to Russia.
UN peace-support mandates must, as a rule, be negotiated with Russia and are subject to Russian approval in the UN Security Council. Russia has long used its veto power to either block, emasculate, or liquidate peacekeeping missions in Russia’s “near abroad.”
Ukraine’s Western partners decided in 2002 to exclude Russia from post-armistice or post-war security arrangements for Ukraine. This remains the basis for current discussions about such arrangements. A UN-mandated, Russian-influenced peace-support mission would reverse Ukraine’s Western trajectory, returning it to the pre-2022 grey zone between Russia and the West. – European Union’s Top General’s Proposal Would Return Ukraine To The Grey Zone – Jamestown
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation)
The beginning of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration highlights contrasting views of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The West views it as a non-sensical distortion that should be stopped, and Russian President Vladimir Putin views it as a confrontation with the West.
The state of Russia’s economy plays a large role in Western plans for peace, as the Trump administration proposes continuing to impose sanctions to target Russia’s oil exports while Putin downplays the dismal state of the Russian economy.
Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, Europe’s defense spending, and the People’s Republic of China’s cautious stance on its involvement in the peace process highlight the complexities of peace talks, further isolating Putin on the global stage. – Conversations on Ending the War in Ukraine Grow Louder and Emptier – Jamestown
Singapore
(Paul Teng – East Asia Forum)
Singapore’s attempt to revolutionise food security through high-tech urban farming faces challenges relating to high costs and economic viability. Even after implementing the ’30 by 30′ initiative — which aims to locally produce 30 per cent of its nutritional needs by 2030 — the city-state’s self-production levels of vegetables and seafood have dropped with disruptions to urban farming ventures, revealing a struggle between sustainable growth and the high operating expenses of indoor farms. – Urban farms take root in Singapore’s race for more food self-sufficiency | East Asia Forum
Syria
(Wladimir van Wilgenburg – Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
On January 16, Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraq-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), met with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander in chief Mazloum Abdi for the first time in a landmark conversation between two major Kurdish leaders. The two discussed efforts to promote unity among disparate Kurdish political movements in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The SDF leader also had a phone call with Kurdistan Regional Government president Nechirvan Barzani shortly thereafter, with both discussions signaling a potentially significant shift in relations between the dominant Syrian Kurdish party and the Iraqi KDP, which has long supported rival? Kurdish opposition groups in Syria. – Kurdish Unity Efforts Gain Momentum Amid Uncertain Future in Syria | The Washington Institute
Timor-Leste
(Damien Kingsbury – East Asia Forum)
Despite recognising a potential financial disaster, Timor-Leste’s government passed a 2025 budget that accelerates the country’s rush towards a fiscal cliff instead of mitigating it. The economy relies heavily on an unsustainable withdrawal rate from the Petroleum Fund which is on track for depletion. Economic salvation hangs on the development of the Greater Sunrise natural gas field, yet the project remains stagnant through 2024 amid disputes over processing location and other concerns including high rates of absolute poverty and food insecurity. – Timor-Leste’s financial cliff draws closer in 2025 | East Asia Forum
UAE – India
(Kartik Bommakanti, Prateek Tripathi – Observer Research Foundation)
As states that face serious strategic threats within their region and extended neighbourhood, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India have shared objectives when it comes to tackling these challenges. Consequently, they also have a common aim of developing their respective domestic defence industries. Shared strategic challenges and the need for greater self-reliance, as well as a quest for developing exportable military capabilities, make the UAE-India defence-industrial cooperation both a necessity and an opportunity. The two sides have engaged in high-level official interactions, as well as those between industry players, and among policy research institutions. – Forging Synergy: UAE –India Defence Industrial Cooperation
US – China
(Antara Ghosal Singh – Observer Research Foundation)
For China, the beginning of Trump 2.0 has brought some interesting surprises. Be it during his first term in office or during the 2024 election campaign, US President Donald Trump has maintained a tough stance vis-a-vis China. However, after being elected, in the run-up to his inauguration on January 20, he did not mention China much. Instead, he ramped up his attacks on other countries like Canada, Greenland, and Panama. Counterintuitively, Trump has been making certain goodwill gestures, from inviting Chinese President Xi Jinping to his inauguration ceremony to providing a high-level reception to China’s special representative and Vice President Han Zheng through US Vice President JD Vance. Zheng also met representatives of the US business community, including Tesla CEO and Trump’s “first buddy” Elon Musk. – Chinese chatter on Trump 2.0 – Goodwill gesture or strategic flattery?
US – Indo Pacific
(Harsh V. Pant, Pratnashree Basu – Observer Research Foundation)
The inauguration of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States marks an unparalleled comeback in American political history. It also signals a vital moment in global geopolitics, particularly for the Indo-Pacific region. During his first term, Mr. Trump redefined U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific. As he embarks on his second term, expectations of a more assertive U.S. security posture and strengthened alliances are high. The presence of the foreign ministers from India, Japan, and Australia — America’s key Quad partners — at the inauguration underscores the strategic importance of this grouping in Mr. Trump’s foreign policy vision. With the Indo-Pacific being central to U.S.’s strategic priorities, Trump 2.0 signals a renewed focus on deepening defence, economic, and technological cooperation with ‘like-minded’ nations to address persisting and emerging challenges, while ensuring regional stability. – An enduring commitment to the Indo-Pacific
US – Morocco – Polisario Front
(Hugh Lovatt – CIDOB)
As it happened in his first presidential tenure, Donald Trump’s return to the White House could have an impact in the latent conflict between Morocco and the Western Sahara’s pro-independence Polisario Front that goes back to 1975. Since the end of the cease-fire in 2020, tensions have mounted in the region but a UN-led negotiated deal is still possible. However, it would require effective pressure from the US and the European Union to encourage Morocco and the Polisario to compromise. – Can Trump make a deal on Western Sahara?
Global Trade
(Tim Stekkinger, Kimberley Botwright – WEF)
Tariffs and economic fragmentation are reshaping global trade.
Technology is revolutionizing trade through digital solutions such as artificial intelligence and blockchain.
Amid geopolitical shifts, new alliances are forming. – 8 things we learned on trade this week in Davos | World Economic Forum
