From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Australia-China, Australia-Rohingya, Australia-US-China, Canada-US, China, Conflict Minerals, Deep-Sea Mining and the Underwater Domain, Indonesia, Middle East, Mine Ban Treaty, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond), Syria-Lebanon, US-Carribean, US-Democratic Republic of the Congo, US-Iran, Vietnam-China-US
Australia – China
(Thomas Shugart – The Interpreter) Australians were recently given a wake-up call to China’s burgeoning blue-water naval capabilities, as a Chinese naval task force conducted multiple unannounced live-fire exercises in the seas between Australia and New Zealand, and then essentially circumnavigated the continent on their way home. While defence analysts have warned for some time about the growing reach of the Chinese military and its potential threat to Australia’s security interests, this experience nevertheless seems to have caused a fair bit of surprise and consternation. And it raises key questions: was this deployment and its exercises a real advance for the Chinese navy? What kind of challenge was it to Australia’s national security? And what should be done about it? – Awful but lawful: China’s Australia flotilla | Lowy Institute
Australia – Rohingya
(Arunn Jegan – The Interpreter) Over recent years, the Australian government has made concrete policy efforts aimed at supporting the Rohingya people in their homelands in Myanmar, in refugee camps in Bangladesh, and elsewhere in the region. And rightly so – this is the largest humanitarian crisis in our region. Efforts must now shift toward a non-partisan policy that commits the Australian government, regardless of the outcome in the upcoming election, to addressing Rohingya statelessness. Otherwise the progress made so far will be put at risk. – Beyond politics: Australia’s role in solving the Rohingya crisis | Lowy Institute
Australia – US – China
(James Corera – The Strategist) The Trump administration’s decision to impose tariffs on Australian aluminium and steel has surprised the country. This has caused some to question the logic of the Australia-United States alliance and risks legitimising China’s economic coercion. Australia must be level-headed and see the alliance as greater than the sum of its parts. It must be clear-eyed about the reasoning behind US decision-making and remain sophisticated in its responses. Australia must also focus on the real threat of economic coercion from China. – Economic security and geostrategic competition: tariffs don’t equal coercion | The Strategist
Canada – US
(Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Ryan C. Berg, Henry Ziemer – Center for Strategic and International Studies) On March 23, newly minted Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced snap elections for April 28, kicking off a contest to determine Canada’s future at a critical juncture. The election pits the incumbent Liberal Party, which has received a second wind since January in part due to tariffs and political threats from the United States, against the Conservative Party under the leadership of “Canada First” politician Pierre Poilievre. No matter the outcome, however, the next leader of Canada will inherit a tense relationship with the United States, public pressure to deliver economic gains, and an increasingly fraught global security environment that impinges upon Canada’s sovereignty. – What Elections Mean for Canada and the Future of North America
China
(Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs – Center for Strategic and International Studies) China has emerged as the undisputed leader of the global shipbuilding industry. Over 300 shipyards dot China’s seaboard, churning out more than half of the world’s commercial vessels each year. These shipyards build the merchant ships that power global trade, but many are also charged with building China’s rapidly expanding navy. Foreign companies have poured billions of dollars of revenue and transferred key technologies into these dual-use shipyards, accelerating China’s naval modernization. In underwriting the growth of China’s military and economic power, they risk marginalizing U.S. and allied competitiveness in a key industry and undermining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. – Murky Waters: Navigating the Risks of China’s Dual-Use Shipyards
(Mercedes Page – The Strategist) China is using increasingly sophisticated grey-zone tactics against subsea cables in the waters around Taiwan, using a shadow-fleet playbook that could be expanded across the Indo-Pacific. On 25 February, Taiwan’s coast guard detained the Hong Tai 58 after a subsea cable was cut in the Taiwan Strait. The vessel was registered to Togo but crewed entirely by Chinese nationals. It had Chinese characters on its hull and operated under multiple identities with conflicting markings, documentation and tracking data. In another incident in early January, the Shunxing 39—a Chinese-owned vessel flagged under both Cameroon and Tanzania—was implicated in damaging a section of the Trans-Pacific Express subsea cable, an important telecommunications link between Taiwan and the United States. – China’s shadow fleet threatens Indo-Pacific communications | The Strategist
Conflict Minerals
(Emma Saunders, Lisa Toremark – Chatham House) Conflict minerals are minerals that are high in demand, which makes them valuable to conflict actors to extract and sell to fund armed groups. The profits made from selling these minerals are then used to buy weapons and levy political influence, exacerbating widespread corruption. The conflict minerals concept first emerged in the 1990s, largely because of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola, which were fuelled by conflict diamonds. – Conflict minerals and wars over natural resources | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Deep-Sea Mining and the Underwater Domain
(Darshana M. Baruah – IISS) On 15 February 2025 China and Cook Islands signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in which they agreed to collaborate to research and potentially extract the latter’s seabed critical minerals. While it signals Beijing’s growing interest in the South Pacific (and Pacific Islands states’ expanding options for international partnership), the MoU is also the latest example of a broader trend: states’ growing interest in deep-sea mining and the commercial potential of the underwater domain. Developments in deep-sea mining are important because they are likely to play a part in establishing precedents (in terms of norms and legal frameworks) for undersea commercial activities more broadly. Moreover, these developments will have military implications – especially in terms of the possible ‘dual-use’ nature of some activities related to seabed exploration. And while at present deep-sea mining is viewed primarily in terms of its potential environmental impact, states could benefit from treating it as a foreign-policy issue and recognising its significance for national security. – Uncharted territory: deep-sea mining and the underwater domain
Indonesia
(Gilang Kembara – The Strategist) When it comes to fleet modernisation program, the Indonesian navy seems to be biting off more than it can chew. It is not even clear why the navy is taking the bite. The news that it wants to buy the Italian navy’s decommissioned aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi came as a surprise. Operating such a ship with helicopters is a big enough challenge in itself, but now we hear from media reports that the navy also wants to operate Harrier fighters from it. – Indonesia wants an aircraft carrier. No one knows why | The Strategist
Middle East
(Daniel Serwer – Middle East Institute) Iran is accumulating enough near-weapons-grade enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon within weeks or months, not years. President Donald Trump, having withdrawn the United States in 2018 from the nuclear deal that would have postponed that possibility, is now appealing for negotiations with Tehran. South Koreans are debating whether to get their own nuclear weapons because the American nuclear umbrella is no longer a sure thing. The new German chancellor is looking to France and the United Kingdom for nuclear protection. In the Middle East, the nuclear question does not concern only Iran. Israel already has an unacknowledged nuclear arsenal. Both Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have said they will seek to equal Iranian nuclear capabilities. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said his country should be like Germany, a great power without nuclear weapons. But would Egypt continue to exercise restraint if Turkey or Saudi Arabia goes nuclear? Five nuclear-armed and unfriendly countries in an area the size of the American lower 48 states is a real possibility during the next decade, or much sooner. – A nuclear Middle East is not a secure Middle East | Middle East Institute
Mine Ban Treaty
(Rachel Stohl – Stimson Center) Last week, the foreign ministers of four European countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland – announced their intention to leave the Mine Ban Treaty. The rationale for the four European countries is to have all the tools at their disposal to prevent and counter potential Russian aggression. Met with widespread criticism and outrage, the announcement reflects an unfortunate erosion of the 30-year global norm to ban the use of anti-personnel landmines. The Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention was adopted in 1997 and currently has 165 Member States. The treaty prohibits the stockpiling, production, transfer, and use of anti-personnel landmines in all circumstances as well as assistance with these prohibited acts. Over the past three decades, the treaty has had a measurable impact on reducing civilian injuries and deaths from landmines, catalyzing demining efforts that have restored thousands of acres of land to productive civilian use, and providing assistance to those harmed by these indiscriminate weapons. – Undermining A Landmark Landmine Convention • Stimson Center
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(Atlantic Council) A sea change? On Tuesday, the White House announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a cease-fire on the Black Sea and to hammer out the details of a pause on attacking each other’s energy infrastructure. This deal marks the next step in US President Donald Trump’s fast-moving efforts to bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, following his call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 18. However, notable differences between the US and Russian readouts of the talks—especially with Russia saying the cease-fire will not begin until certain US sanctions are lifted—may indicate choppy waters ahead. – Experts react: What to know about the US-led Black Sea cease-fire deal with Russia and Ukraine – Atlantic Council
Syria – Lebanon
(Nicholas Blanford – Atlantic Council) Qasr, northern Bekaa Valley, Lebanon—Glimpses of everyday life contrasted with scenes of debris and battle damage in this ramshackle village in the northern Bekaa Valley. Local residents hurried up and down the street, purchasing food to break their daily Ramadan fast with the evening iftar meal. On one side of the street, watching the passersby were two members of the powerful Jaafar clan, dressed in black fatigues and standing beside a pickup truck containing automatic rifles, ammunition webbing, and a PKC light machine gun. – Dispatch from Bekaa: Inside the sectarian skirmishes on the Syria-Lebanon border – Atlantic Council
US – Carribean
(Wazim Mowla – Atlantic Council) US Secretary of State Marco Rubio will make his first major trip to the Caribbean this week, starting in Jamaica on Wednesday before heading to Guyana and Suriname. In February, Rubio’s first trip abroad as secretary of state saw him stop in the Dominican Republic at the end of his tour through nearby Central America. But his visit this week, which is focused on the Caribbean, is a chance to see how the second Trump administration is approaching this important but too-often-overlooked region. – The US needs to build a new Caribbean policy. Rubio’s trip to the region can be the first step. – Atlantic Council
US – Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Gracelin Baskaran – Center for Strategic and International Studies) The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one of the world’s most resource-rich countries, and in 2024, it attracted the largest volume of mineral exploration investment in Africa. Enhancing U.S.-DRC cooperation is critical to counterbalance China’s dominance. The United States has historically underinvested in commercial diplomacy in the DRC, while China has established control over key mines through state-backed financing and infrastructure-for-resources deals. This brief answers two questions: First, how can the U.S. government utilize its resources to maximize impact in this sector? And second, what reforms can the DRC government implement to attract investment? Building the bilateral minerals partnership will require a suite of bilateral diplomatic, financial, and legislative reforms. – Building Critical Minerals Cooperation Between the United States and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
US – Iran
(The Soufan Center) Trump is employing military action against Iran’s allies, and threatening strikes on Iran itself, to induce Iranian leaders to agree to new talks on limiting Iran’s nuclear program. Trump is balancing his intent to avoid sparking a new Middle East war with pressure from some of his aides and from Israel to immediately halt Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s refusal to discuss limitations on its missile and drone programs or its support for regional armed factions, and its demands for extensive sanctions relief, will further complicate U.S.-Iran negotiations. Trump is seeking to use his renewed engagement with Russian President Vladimir Putin to increase pressure on Iran to begin talks. – Trump Threatens Iran to Secure New Talks – The Soufan Center
Vietnam – China – US
(Roland Rajah, Ahmed Albayrak – The Interpreter) Vietnam was one of the biggest beneficiaries of the tariffs imposed by Donald Trump during his first term. This time, Vietnam could be among the biggest casualties. Trump’s first term tariffs on China saw America’s trading relationships shift dramatically towards other countries, especially Vietnam and Mexico. America’s trade deficit with Vietnam skyrocketed, reaching US$123 billion last year – three-times its 2018 level. It’s not just the big trade imbalance. Vietnam is also seen as a major source of indirect Chinese exports to America. That includes pure tariff evasion through the rerouting of Chinese goods via Vietnamese ports but more significantly the heavy use of Chinese parts and components within Vietnam’s exports to the United States. The Economist magazine cites Vietnam as the key example of how both Trump and Biden have failed to cut underlying trade ties with China. The apparent smoking gun is the high correlation in recent years between Vietnam’s booming exports to America and its surging imports from China. – Made in Vietnam or a backdoor for Chinese exports? | Lowy Institute
