From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: Americas; China-Myanmar; Europe-China; Gulf of Guinea; Russia; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; US; US-Gulf; US-Pacific
Americas
(Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Jessie Hu – Center for Strategic & International Studies) In a Wall Street Journal op-ed in January, Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that an America First foreign policy is impossible without an Americas-first approach, announcing that the United States would refocus on the Western Hemisphere. He emphasized that securing U.S. borders and reversing migratory flows required working with countries of origin to deter migration and accept the return of their citizens. Those who cooperated would be rewarded; those who did not would face consequences. The secretary signaled a shift in U.S. regional policy: With cuts to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State programs in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the United States would no longer rely on development aid to secure cooperation on migration and narcotics control but instead pursue its goals through stronger trade ties aimed at building greater economic security via private sector partnerships. These changes had their origins in the first Trump administration, when Mauricio Claver-Carone, then deputy assistant to the president and senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council, authored the Americas Crece (Americas Grow) strategy, which envisioned a whole-of-government approach to support economic development in LAC by catalyzing private sector investment in energy and infrastructure projects in order to foster economic growth. That strategy relied on U.S. capital to support investors and business deals, including in Panama, El Salvador, and Ecuador. As the United States rethinks how it catalyzes private sector investment around the world, reauthorizing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is critical to advancing key industries vital to U.S. economic security. The DFC remains the best tool the United States has to deploy market-based solutions to address global challenges—challenges that, if left unresolved, pose risks to U.S. security and create openings for great power rivals to fill the void. As the DFC reauthorization looms, policymakers should rethink how to unlock its full potential as a tool for economic security and to outcompete China. – An Americas First Case for Reauthorizing the Development Finance Corporation
China – Myanmar
(Austin Lord – Stimson Center) In early July, a sudden transboundary flood originating in China’s Gyirong County surged into Nepal’s Rasuwa District, killing at least 11 people and leaving 17 missing. The flood damaged critical infrastructure, halted trade along the busy Nepal-China trade corridor, and caused significant impacts over 100-kilometers downstream, including damaging hydropower projects, disrupting electricity production, and eroding agricultural lands. Post-event analysis revealed that the disaster was caused not by rainfall, but by the rapid drainage of a supraglacial lake atop the Purepa Glacier, which had rapidly expanded in recent months – a reminder of the complex and cascading risks as the Himalayan cryosphere melts. In the aftermath, new efforts to monitor these supraglacial lakes and others, as well as other multi-hazard risks in this borderland region, can offer scientific insights and help improve risk evaluation and disaster preparedness across the Himalaya and beyond. – Investigating an Emerging Climate Hazard: Transboundary Glacial Floods on the China-Nepal Border • Stimson Center
Europe – China
(Atlantic Council) European Union leaders are traveling to Beijing for a summit on Thursday marking fifty years of EU-China diplomatic ties. But the mood ahead of the golden anniversary is more steely than celebratory. The two sides are at odds on a range of issues from trade to human rights, and expectations are low for a breakthrough. Even scheduling the event was a challenge, as it was planned for Brussels, until Chinese President Xi Jinping declined the invitation. It was then moved to Beijing and shortened from two days to one. All of this has happened as the Trump administration continues its aggressive trade approach toward both powers. – What the EU and China want from the summit that neither seems to want – Atlantic Council
Gulf of Guinea
(Maisie Pigeon – Atlantic Council) Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) remains a critical security and development concern, despite recent declines in reported incidents. Stretching from Senegal to Angola, the Gulf of Guinea is one of the world’s most strategically significant maritime regions, serving as a vital corridor for international shipping, hosting major oil and gas export routes, and supporting regional commerce and livelihoods for millions in coastal communities. Coordinated international and regional efforts—such as the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security, the regional cooperative and information-sharing agreement to combat piracy and maritime crime in West and Central Africa—have contributed to enhanced maritime governance and a drop in piracy attacks. Nevertheless, the underlying drivers of maritime crime persist, including weak law enforcement, high youth unemployment, and limited economic opportunities in the coastal zone. – Atlantic piracy, current threats, and maritime governance in the Gulf of Guinea – Atlantic Council
Russia
(Denis Mikhailov – The Jamestown Foundation) Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, harsh sanctions, growing awareness among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states of Russian intelligence tactics, and enhanced counterintelligence operations have made the Kremlin’s traditional information-gathering methods nearly impossible. Following widespread expulsions of Russian diplomats from NATO countries in 2022, Russian intelligence agencies shifted from traditional espionage featuring trained agents under diplomatic cover to more diffuse recruitment of vulnerable groups. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) are preying on socially, economically, and legally marginalized groups, including Ukrainian refugees and Russian migrants, for intelligence gathering and sabotage. These recruits are often unaware they are part of Russian operations and receive no support from the Kremlin when arrested. Russian intelligence operations in countries such as Poland and Czechia focus less on traditional intelligence collection and more on generating panic, undermining social cohesion, and weakening NATO’s support for Ukraine by exploiting local fears and divisions. – Russian Intelligence Recruits Refugees and Migrants in NATO Countries for Espionage – Jamestown
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine aimed to reassert dominance over the former Soviet space, but Ukraine’s resistance and sustained Western support have instead weakened Moscow’s influence in the region. Moscow’s war against Ukraine has led the former Soviet republics to pursue more independent foreign policies as they seek to protect themselves from possible Russian aggression and international isolation. Any future effort by Moscow to use military force in other post-Soviet states to reverse this process would likely be counterproductive and could potentially bleed this division back into the Russian Federation itself. – Putin’s War Against Ukraine Diminishing Moscow’s Dominance of Former Soviet Space – Jamestown
Turkmenistan
(Evgeny Gurin – The Jamestown Foundation) Turkmen migrants are facing increased restrictions on their freedom of movement, with countries such as Türkiye and Russia assisting the Turkmen government in cracking down on Turkmen citizens outside the country. Ashgabat has made moving abroad increasingly difficult for its citizens by arbitrarily removing passengers from flights, instituting new visa restrictions, and imposing financial difficulties. Turkmenistan appears to be indifferent to the U.S. ban on Turkmen citizens, announced in June, despite initial criticism from Ashgabat, instead signaling a deepening pattern of control that extends far beyond its borders. – Turkmenistan Escalates Crackdown on Citizens Looking to Emigrate Abroad – Jamestown
Ukraine
(Andrew D’Anieri – Atlantic Council) Ukraine’s first anti-government protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion took place on July 22 as thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to express anger and dismay over what critics see as a campaign to strip the country’s anti-corruption agencies of their independence. For more than a decade, Ukrainians have been fighting a two-front war against Russian aggression and high-level domestic political corruption. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy promised “victory over corruption” after his 2019 election and has become a worldwide symbol of freedom since the full-scale Russian war began in 2022. So his administration’s moves this week to gut independent anti-corruption agencies are puzzling, to say the least. On July 21, law enforcement agencies raided the offices of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and declared investigations into fifteen NABU employees, allegedly as part of an ongoing effort to prosecute traffic violations. This sort of harassment on obscure charges has plagued other investigative agencies and individuals, but rarely was it used against institutions like NABU, which was created in 2014 as an independent body to tackle high-level government corruption. While NABU has had its problems, Ukrainian and Western experts widely acknowledge it as one of the country’s most important post-Maidan reform projects. – Ukraine rocked by first wartime protests amid attacks on anti-corruption agencies – Atlantic Council
US
(Alice C. Hill – Council on Foreign Relations) Flash floods in Texas Hill Country killed at least 130 people earlier this month, while New Mexico, New York, and New Jersey experienced flooded transit systems, blocked roads, and even swept away homes in the past several weeks. The United States has seen intense rainfalls this summer—at least four that are thought to have a roughly 0.1 percent chance of happening in a given year. As temperatures rise, the atmosphere can hold more water vapor: for every 1°F of warming, the air can hold 4 percent more moisture. This added moisture can make rain fall heavier and faster, leading to increased flooding. – Cuts to Early Warning Systems Are Leaving the U.S. Unprepared for Summer Floods | Council on Foreign Relations
US – Gulf
(Ferial Saeed – Stimson Center) Facing domestic barriers to building data centers—regulatory bottlenecks, energy and capital constraints, and public resistance—the second Trump administration has embraced a strategy of “strategic diffusion,” lifting chip export controls to allow U.S. technology firms to partner with Gulf allies in building these facilities. This approach aims to extend American AI dominance and stall China’s momentum by binding Gulf states—namely the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—to the U.S. AI ecosystem through proprietary platforms that limit interoperability. Geopolitical consequences of this pivot include the elevation of Gulf powers as strategic partners, the potential relative decline of Asia in American strategic thinking, and the rise of digital infrastructure as a new foundation of global power. Risks include the creation of future AI competition from the Gulf, partnerships with illiberal regimes, and that U.S. coercive use of these partnerships could alienate other states and push them toward China. – America’s AI Pivot to the Gulf • Stimson Center
US – Pacific
(Charles Edel, Kathryn Paik, and John Augé – Center for Strategic & International Studies) For the last decade, the United States has maintained that it is a “Pacific power,” and multiple administrations have affirmed the importance of the vast Pacific Islands region to U.S. national security. Increased engagement with the Pacific, which began under the first Trump administration, has broad bipartisan support as a security priority. As the first 100 days of the second Trump administration drew to an end, rhetoric coming out of the administration echoed this trend, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visiting Guam and Hawaii on his first trip to the Indo-Pacific, during which he stressed the critical nature of Pacific U.S. territories at the “tip of America’s spear” of deterrence. However, Pacific leaders have consistently stated that they look to actions, and not just words, as proof of a nation’s commitments. Here, recent cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the pausing of U.S. foreign assistance, enacting tariffs on small and vulnerable island economies, and deprioritizing climate change—the top priority for the region—have had a decidedly negative impact. Regardless of U.S. intent, the perception across the Pacific of the United States as a disinterested and mercurial partner undercuts the country’s ability to build meaningful and lasting partnerships in the Pacific and simultaneously opens space for China to displace U.S. influence and presence in this critical region. In a region that has quietly become a stage for great power competition, this perception of U.S. disinterest not only opens new entry points for Beijing’s influence but also puts wind in the sails of a new narrative: that it is China, not the United States, that is the committed partner and protector of global rules and norms. While it is too soon to understand the full implications of the United States’ recent actions, early signs in the Pacific suggest that the trajectory is counter to U.S. interests. Reversing this trend will require quick action, sincere engagement, and creative diplomacy. – Shifting Tides: The National Security Implications of the United States’ Pacific Drawdown