From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinkig of The Global Eye
Afghanistan – India
(Kabir Taneja – Observer Research Foundation) The recent flurry of reports on India coming close to allowing Taliban-appointed representatives to take up key diplomatic posts in Delhi and Mumbai highlights a major policy shift, pushed through by the prevailing political realities in Kabul. Taliban officials were in New Delhi recently for a multilateral event hosted by India’s telecom regulator. The Taliban is here to stay for now, and for the neighbourhood, ignoring them long-term is unrealistic. They have made a relatively successful push to seek out political recognition across the board. From China to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a number of States have accepted appointments by the Taliban’s interim government in a more open form. Others have baulked and allowed some access to the regime accompanied by a slew of checks and balances. Reasons vary from distance and fatigue in the West to an unfolding big-power competition. Geopolitical crevasses have offered the Taliban ample opportunities to engage globally, and they have done reasonably well. – Political reality of Taliban marks presence in Delhi
China – Taiwan
(Institute for the Study of War – China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 21, 2024)
- ROC President Lai Ching-te may plan to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December.
- The PRC released the captain of a Taiwanese fishing vessel whom it had detained since July following a visit by Taiwanese officials from Penghu County.
- Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in areas that it has previously been noncommittal about cooperating in.
- The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC’s second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China’s power projection capability into the Pacific.
- Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to discuss AI safety despite previously withholding nuclear talks to punish the US for supporting Taiwan.
- The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.
- The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement.
- Anonymous European Union diplomats said that the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia.
Europe – NATO
(Hans Binnendijk, Timo S. Koster – Atlantic Council) President-elect Donald Trump will likely return to office skeptical about NATO’s value and Europe’s contribution to its own security. Officials who worked directly with Trump in his first term are convinced that he has no qualms about reducing or even ending the United States’ commitment to the Alliance. But Trump will again be a transactional president who wants to demonstrate strength. With the proper initiatives, European allies can save the Alliance. These allies should start by focusing the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague on Europe’s strategic responsibilities, agreeing on ways that Europe can remove some of the United States’ defense burden. – How Europe can save NATO – Atlantic Council
Iran
(Raz Zimmt – INSS) Regional developments are posing challenges to Iran and the pro-Iranian axis it leads, raising doubts about the effectiveness of the main elements of its deterrence against its enemies. These elements include Iran’s use of “proxies,” its strategic military capabilities (missiles and drones), and its nuclear program. Recent months have revealed shortcomings in Iran’s security concept, which could lead to different approaches among the Iranian leadership. This may result in limited adjustments or a more strategic shift, especially concerning its nuclear doctrine. Iran is expected to reassess its security concept at a critical juncture, as it faces escalating conflict with Israel, an ongoing regional military campaign, and the approaching end of the era of Supreme Leader Khamenei. – Toward Possible Changes in Iran’s Security Concept | INSS
Jordan – USA
(Neil Quilliam – Chatham House) Although the re-election of Donald Trump was always a strong possibility, his success at the polls must have sent shockwaves through Jordan’s political establishment. Most world leaders have made positive statements about the upcoming Trump presidency in a bid to hedge against unexpected US policy movements – and Jordan is no different. The government’s official position is that US–Jordan relations are multidimensional, multifaceted, highly institutionalized and will therefore remain strong. But the return of Trump does not bode well for Jordan given his indifference towards the kingdom the first time around. Jordan has three key reasons to be concerned. – The return of Donald Trump is bad news for Jordan | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Middle East
(Institute for the Study of War – Iran Update, November 21, 2024)
- Iran: The IAEA Board of Governors approved a censure resolution against Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with international nuclear inspectors. This resolution could lead to the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran. Iran responded to the resolution by ordering the activation of recently installed advanced centrifuges at its nuclear facilities.
- Lebanon: Lebanon reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported that one of the main sticking points is whether Israel will retain the right to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire.
- Gaza Strip: A senior Israeli security source told Israeli military correspondents that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the Gaza Strip. The source added that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even without a guarantee of a permanent ceasefire, which has been a continuous Hamas demand throughout talks.
- Yemen: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the Houthis increasingly view themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate. This characterization is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East.
Russia – Central Asia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Facing increasing Russian hostility to Central Asian immigrants, Central Asian countries are instead encouraging their nationals to go to other Asian countries to ensure transfer payments and prevent domestic explosions. These moves are negatively impacting the Russian economy and forcing Moscow to seek migrant workers from other countries, such as India and Zimbabwe, who are much less culturally and linguistically attuned to Russia than Central Asian workers. These new migrant workers are also significantly reducing the influence of the Russian language in their respective regions and of Moscow on the local government’s policies. – Central Asian Countries Sending Migrant Workers to Asia Over Russia – Jamestown
Russia’s War on Ukraine
(Institute for the Study of War – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2024)
- Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21.
- Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities – a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine.
- Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical.
- Neither the Oreshnik ballistic missile strike nor Putin’s November 21 statement represent a significant inflection in Russian strike capabilities or likeliness to use a nuclear weapon.
- The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its full commitment to use the prospect of “negotiations” with Ukraine and the West to pursue nothing short of the total destruction of the Ukrainian state despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to posture himself as amenable to peace negotiations.
- North Korean troops are reportedly training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units.
- North Korea’s ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast southeast of Sudzha.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Vuhledar. Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna, southeast of Chasiv Yar, in Toretsk, southeast of Kurakhove, northeast of Vuhledar, and likely advanced northeast of Velyka Novosilka.
- The Russian State Duma adopted a three-year federal budget with record defense expenditures from 2025-2027.
(Pavel Luzin – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) against Ukraine for the first time on November 21, targeting the city of Dnipro and Ukraine’s military-industrial complex in retaliation for Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied long-range weapons against Russian territory. Russia’s strike against Ukraine, coinciding with updates to its nuclear doctrine, reflects Moscow’s desperation to regain psychological leverage amid diminishing nuclear deterrence credibility. Moscow seeks to intimidate NATO and test Western unity through escalation, but its strained military capacity and risk of retaliation may undermine this strategy, leading to further isolation and potential backlash. – Russian Attack on Ukraine Becomes Another Attempt at Intimidation – Jamestown
Sahel
(Institute for the Study of War) Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are expanding rapidly in West Africa’s Sahel region, taking advantage of long-running grievances and state incapacity. The predominant groups are Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), which is an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP), previously known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Salafi-jihadi activity first spiked in the Sahel when AQIM and local partners co-opted a rebellion in northern Mali and attempted to establish an emirate. A French-led intervention rolled back this initial takeover, but Salafi-jihadi groups have continued to proliferate and expand in the past decade, particularly throughout central Mali and Burkina Faso. JNIM and ISGS have also begun to operate in the border regions of the Gulf of Guinea states in recent years. – Africa File, November 2024: Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel | Institute for the Study of War
Taiwan – USA – Europe
(Sidharth Kaushal, Juliana Suess – RUSI) There is an emergent policy consensus within the US that the period from 2027 to the early 2030s represents one of acute danger for Taiwan. This view was captured by former Commander US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who predicted that an invasion of Taiwan by China is possible by 2027, a view echoed by other senior figures. If the US must commit substantial forces to deterrence or defence in the Indo- Pacific, this will have significant second-order effects within Europe. By the end of this decade, the partial reconstitution of Russian forces is likely, as is the growth of Russian capacity with respect to capabilities, such as nuclear submarines, which have not been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine. – The Impact of a Taiwan Strait Crisis on European Defence | Royal United Services Institute
Ukraine
(John C.K. Daly – The Jamestown Foundation) Ukraine is reviving its Soviet-era missile expertise to develop modern capabilities, reducing reliance on Western technology and circumventing restrictions on imported weapons while boosting defense self-sufficiency. The relaxation of Western restrictions, particularly the US decision to allow limited use of long-range missile systems such as ATACMS, marks a pivotal moment in Ukraine’s ability to counter Russian aggression. Ukraine’s intensification of missile production and deployment could provoke a broader arms race, underscoring the strategic importance of missiles as tools for deterrence and long-range precision strikes in modern warfare. – Ukraine Bolsters Missile Production to Increase Defense Independence – Jamestown
USA
(Harsh V. Pant, Vivek Mishra – Observer Research Foundation) The recent U.S. presidential election defied expectations, delivering results that will shape American politics in unpredictable ways. For only the second time in US history, a president won non-consecutive terms in office. Despite widespread predictions of a contentious transition, the handover from President Biden to President Trump was remarkably smooth. This election did more than simply return Trump to office; it also gave the Republican Party control over both chambers of Congress, completing a “trifecta” of control across the executive and legislative branches. With this majority, Trump has moved quickly to form his cabinet, signalling his commitment to an assertive, and in some ways, radical policy direction. His cabinet picks have both reassured his base and stirred fresh controversy among Democrats and even some Republicans. – Team Trump: There’s Method To This Madness
USA – China
(Scott Kennedy – CSIS) The U.S.-China Global Economic Order (GEO) Dialogue, now in its ninth year, focuses on strengthening dialogue and fostering cooperation around the three pillars of the Bretton Woods system: international trade, finance, and development. The purpose of the dialogue is to provide a platform for in-depth discussions among a small number of subject-matter experts. Through repeated exchanges and consultations with policymakers, the dialogue provides an opportunity to raise sensitive topics, test assumptions, analyze challenging problems, and explore potential solutions. Although the discussions are the main “deliverable” of the GEO Dialogue, the project has previously published reports in 2017, 2019, and 2021. The primary value of these reports were their collective call to adopt imaginative policies to resolve difficult problems. The current volume adopts the same posture but with one difference. Whereas the dialogue sessions were the foundation for previous volumes, with a portion of the participants picking up the pen to write wholly formed commentaries, this volume comprises brief notes drafted in advance of the session, held in May 2024 in Washington, D.C., and then lightly revised afterward. Participants offer tentative yet provocative solutions to the policy community in four topical groups: economic competition, economic security, finance, and decarbonization and development. – Managing U.S.-China Tensions over the Global Economic Order
USA – Iran
(Farzin Nadimi, James E. Shepard – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Amid serious escalation in the Middle East, the United States should more clearly frame its recent deployment of B-2 and B-52 bombers to the region as a warning to Iran—and reinforce this with more posturing, messaging, and accelerated deployment of deep penetrators. – How the B-2 Can Help Reinforce U.S. Messaging to Iran | The Washington Institute
(Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) As Donald Trump prepares to return to the White House, the main question in Tehran is not so much what the incoming American president will do about Iran. Rather, it is about whether Tehran should negotiate with him. Numerous Iranian officials, including former senior diplomats, are making the case that Tehran should not forget it has agency and should signal to Trump that Iran is willing to negotiate. According to this view, Trump’s strong mandate following the Nov. 5 elections in the United States gives him latitude to cut a deal with Iran — and one that could be mutually advantageous. It remains to be seen whether such calls will shape Tehran’s posture following Trump’s inauguration. – Khamenei’s American reality check | Middle East Institute
USA – Koreas
(Edward Howell – Chatham House) Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Donald Trump’s first administration was the president’s personal summitry with North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. Trump’s unpredictable leadership style means that another such meeting cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, substantial outcomes, such as nuclear concessions from Pyongyang, look to be unlikely. Over the past four years, North Korea’s appetite for talks with the US and South Korea has waned considerably. – Any new Trump–Kim summit risks another no deal. The US must nurture old alliances to contain North Korea | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Rachel Minyoung Lee, Jenny Town – Stimson Center) The incoming Trump administration will face an emboldened North Korea with vastly different terms for nuclear negotiations, and a South Korea harboring deep concerns about US views on alliances and North Korea. Considering the significantly changed strategic environment in the region, the new administration is advised to reassess what the United States ultimately wants from its relationship with Pyongyang beyond denuclearization and to balance those goals with its defense commitments to South Korea, coordinating any new approach closely with Seoul. – Move Past the Nuclear Impasse on the Korean Peninsula • Stimson Center
USA – Russia
(Atlantic Council) The vise is tightening. The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on Russia’s Gazprombank—which Russia uses to pay soldiers, among other things—as part of a barrage of economic measures targeting its war effort. The announcement comes as the Biden administration has fast-tracked aid to Ukraine and loosened its restrictions on how Ukraine responds to Russia’s war of aggression. – Five questions (and expert answers) about major new US sanctions on Russia’s Gazprombank – Atlantic Council
