Geostrategic magazine (23 November 2024)

From global think tanks

The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinkig of The Global Eye

Today’s about : Australia-China; Biodiversity-Indigenous People; Boko Haram-Chad-Sahel; China-USA; Central Asia; Climate Action; Europe; Indonesia; Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative; Iraq; Japan-USA; Middle East; Russia; Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine; Sudan; Turkiye; USA; USA-Indo Pacific; USA-Latin America; USA-South China Sea; Yemen

 

Australia – China

(Amy King – Australian Institute of International Affairs) How to describe Australia’s relationship with China is something that has vexed many of Australia’s political leaders. From Kevin Rudd’s offer that Australia might serve as China’s “zhengyou” (honest friend), to Tony Abbott’s description of the relationship as defined by “fear and greed,” to Malcolm Turnbull’s quip that China represented a “frenemy” of Australia, the labels used by these three prime ministers symbolise the difficulty we have faced in recent years in Australia in thinking about how to frame our multifaceted relationship with China. – Economics, Security, and Australia’s China Debate  – Australian Institute of International Affairs – Australian Institute of International Affairs

Biodiversity – Indigenous Peoples

(Katie Reytar, Peter Veit, Johanna von Braun – World Resources Institute) In 2022, countries reached a historic agreement to halt biodiversity loss by conserving at least 30% of land and water by 2030. This marked a critical step toward protecting the world’s precious remaining species and ecosystems. But that’s not all: The Global Biodiversity Framework, as it’s known, also explicitly calls on countries to recognize and uphold Indigenous Peoples and local communities’ rights in their conservation strategies. – Why Securing Indigenous Land Rights Protects Biodiversity | World Resources Institute

Boko Haram – Chad – Sahel

(Crisis Group) L’attaque lancée contre l’armée tchadienne par l’une des deux principales factions de Boko Haram, le JAS, le 27 octobre dernier a replacé le mouvement jihadiste sous l’attention médiatique. En compagnie de Vincent Foucher, chercheur au CNRS et ancien analyste à Crisis Group, Enrica Picco et Rinaldo Depagne analysent les raisons de cette attaque et la réponse du gouvernement tchadien. Ils examinent les divergences croissantes entre le JAS et sa concurrente l’État islamique en Afrique de l’Ouest (ISWAP). Ils évaluent les conséquences liées à un éventuel retrait tchadien de la Force Multinationale Mixte créée en 2015 avec le Cameroun, le Niger, le Nigéria et le Bénin pour lutter contre Boko Haram. Enfin, ils discutent des différences entre la présence jihadiste dans le bassin du lac Tchad et au Sahel central et évoquent les solutions innovantes mises en place par le Nigéria pour limiter l’expansion de Boko Haram dans le nord-est de la fédération. – Quel avenir pour Boko Haram dans le bassin du lac Tchad ? | Crisis Group

Central Asia

(Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Jessica Genauer – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Amid the Ukraine conflict, Central Asian states are leveraging a multi-vector foreign policy to balance historic ties with Russia and expanding partnerships with global powers. This strategic pivot highlights their resilience in navigating a complex and shifting geopolitical landscape. – Shifting Geopolitics of Central Asia: The Regional Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War – Australian Institute of International Affairs – Australian Institute of International Affairs

China – USA

(Antara Ghosal Singh – Observer Research Foundation) As Donald Trump has returned to power—a once-in-a-century political development in American history—a sense of crisis seems to have gripped China’s strategic circles. China’s official media, in its bid to boost morale, strove to play down the turn in events and encouraged staying calm. However, the overwhelming public sentiment in China about Trump 2.0 is still, “storm is coming…brace up for impact.”. Will Trump fulfil his promise of cancelling China’s “most-favoured-nation treatment,” and impose a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods to intensify China-United States (US) decoupling? How will a business-minded Trump play the Taiwan card? On the diplomatic front, can there be a “Nixon 2.0” —that is, will US-Russia reconcile and drastically deteriorate China’s security environment? Will Trump’s election success cause a right wing rebound in all of Europe? Will there be a repeat of the Cold War era “Reagan-Thatcher political alignment”? These are some of the issues being intensely discussed and debated in Chinese policy circles. – China holding its breath as Trump returns

Climate Action 

(Gopalika Arora – Observer Research Foundation) Nature-based solutions (NbS) harness the benefits of nature to address climate change, biodiversity loss, and land degradation while creating pathways for sustainable development. While NbS could generate substantial economic benefits, current private finance flows remain insufficient due to market and information failures. This brief makes a case for increased private investments in NbS, highlighting their cost-effectiveness and sustainability. Implementing comprehensive reforms in data sharing, financial mechanisms, and capacity building is crucial for unlocking large-scale NbS financing. – Political change in Mauritius carries regional importance – especially for India

(Chatham House) The panel discuss whether the COP29 climate summit delivered anything meaningful and what Donald Trump’s election means for combating climate change. As the world moves closer to crossing the 1.5 degree threshold, Bronwen Maddox is joined by former BBC journalist Roger Harrabin and Maria Netto, executive director of the Institute for Climate and Society in Brazil. Also with them from COP29 in Baku is Ruth Townend, senior research fellow with our Environment and Society Centre. – Independent Thinking: Has COP29 made a difference on climate change? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

Europe

(Margherita de Candia, Edoardo Bressanelli – Australian Institute of International Affairs) The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group is reshaping perceptions of the far-right in the European Parliament through strategic cooperation with mainstream parties. Despite internal divisions and nationalist challenges, its growing influence highlights the complexities of far-right politics in a transnational context. – Looking Inside the Far-Right Groups in the Parliament of the European Union – Australian Institute of International Affairs – Australian Institute of International Affairs

Indonesia

(Garima Sarkar – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Indonesia’s new Cabinet formation under President Prabowo Subianto highlights both the inclusiveness and challenges of coalition-led governance, revealing a political environment heavily influenced by elite networks and patronage in party politics. This piece explores how democratising candidate selection in parties might pave the way for a more responsive and accountable government, aligning political appointments more closely with the public interest. – President Subianto’s Cabinet Appointments: The Role of Party Politics and Candidate Selection in Indonesia – Australian Institute of International Affairs – Australian Institute of International Affairs

Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative

(Sayantan Haldar – Observer Research Foundation) Launched in 2019 at the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit in Bangkok, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) appeared to hold promise as India’s guiding framework to strengthen its role and enhance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Importantly, the announcement of the IPOI marked a continuing momentum in India’s steady engagement with the Indo-Pacific. Previously in 2018, Prime Minister Modi articulated India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific as a ‘free, open, and inclusive region’, in the pursuit of progress and prosperity. Following this, the external affairs ministry (MEA) created a separate division for the Indo-Pacific, in April 2019, integrating diplomatic focus towards the region into one wing. Later in November 2019, the launch of the IPOI seemed to be a strategic progression in cementing New Delhi’s policy outlook towards the region. – Time to reset the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative

Iraq

(Emirates Policy Center) The Shia coalition has pushed to amend the Personal Status Law since 2004, driven by identity politics and ideological goals. Past efforts failed due to internal divisions and opposition, but the Coordination Framework (CF) now wields enough power to press forward, using its conservative agenda to counter growing liberalism among Iraqi Shias. The CF faces resistance from female MPs, Kurdish, Sunni, and liberal Shia lawmakers. However, political deals, such as Sunni support in exchange for a general amnesty law, could enable the amendment’s passage despite opposition. Passing the amendment would deepen identity politics, undermine women’s and children’s rights, and risk Western sanctions. It would also further entrench Iraq’s dysfunctional political system and exacerbate societal divides. – Emirates Policy Center | Undermining Iraq’s Personal Status Law: The Persistence of Identity Politics

Japan – USA

(Matthew P. Goodman – Council on Foreign Relations) Tokyo is bracing for a sharp turn in U.S. international economic policy in the second Donald Trump administration. A week of meetings in Japan following the U.S. election revealed that the prospect of broad tariffs, forced decoupling from China, and further disruption of the global economic order has left many Japanese officials and businesspeople stoic, but clearly worried. – Japan Braces for Trump 2.0 | Council on Foreign Relations

Middle East

(Institute for the Study of War – Iran Update, November 22, 2024) Iran: Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution against Iran; Iran: A senior Iranian official threatened that Iran would withdraw from the NPT if the JCPOA signatories trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors censure resolution could set conditions for the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran; Israel: Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz approved the appointment of a new IDF Ground Forces commander. The new commander, Brigadier General Nadav Lotan, previously commanded the IDF 162nd Division.

Russia

(Patricia Lewis – Chatham House) On 24 February 2022, in a televised speech heralding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin issued what was interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons against NATO countries should they interfere. ‘Russia will respond immediately’ he said, ‘and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history’. Then on 27 February 2022, Putin ordered Russia to move nuclear forces to a ‘special mode of combat duty’, which has a significant meaning in terms of the protocols to launch nuclear weapons from Russia. – How likely is the use of nuclear weapons by Russia? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine

(Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash – Observer Research Foundation) It has been predicted that the war in Ukraine will end once the US President-elect Donald Trump takes office because, simply put, he entered the electoral race with a promise to end ongoing wars. However, the outgoing US president, Joe Biden, who wants the US to continue arming Ukraine in its defence against Russia, has just revealed a last trick up his sleeve. On November 17, the US, along with the UK and France, approved the use of long-range missiles by Ukraine. On Tuesday, the Ukrainian forces launched strikes inside Russia using the American-made ATACMS rocket, which has a range of 300 km. – An ominous threat of escalation on the Ukraine war front

(Institute for the Study of War – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 22, 2024) Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic missile that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially inflate expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence; Russia may additionally conduct test launches of the same or similar ballistic missiles in the coming days to accomplish the same rhetorical effect; Russia has reportedly provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil and an unspecified number and type of air defense systems and missiles in return for North Korea’s provision of manpower for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine; The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office opened an investigation against another instance of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast; Russian forces recently advanced west of Svatove, south of Chasiv Yar, south of Toretsk, northeast of Vuhledar, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka; Russia continues to build its training capacity by establishing new service academies in occupied Ukraine.

Sudan

(Samir Ramzy – Emirates Policy Center) The diverse tribal map and intense competition over resources have led to increasing overlaps between tribal dynamics and the conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Most Sudanese tribes are involved in the fighting, providing fighters, logistical support and intelligence to both sides.This intersection of tribal competition and the army-RSF conflict has diminished the prospects of either party achieving a decisive military victory. While the relative military strength of both sides may prevent the likelihood of this conflict turning into an all-out civil war in the near-term, the ongoing stalemate and lack of progress toward a peaceful settlement increase the risk of such a scenario unfolding in the medium term. – Emirates Policy Center | ‘Tribalization’ of Sudan’s Conflict: Incentives, Restraints and Potential Trajectories

Turkiye

(Emirates Policy Center) Turkiye is rapidly advancing its ambition to become a regional hub for natural gas trade, leveraging its strategic geographic location and advanced infrastructure. Recent agreements have diversified its gas sources and enabled Ankara to sell gas to third parties. Ankara’s strategy emphasizes infrastructure development, including increasing the capacity of gas liquefaction plants, expanding storage facilities and signing strategic export agreements with Eastern European countries. Long-term contracts ensure stable supplies, with some deals allowing for flexibility to resell gas in European markets. Over the next decade, Turkiye expects to provide approximately 100 billion cubic meters of gas, fulfilling its commitments to East European countries. Additionally, it is pursuing closer cooperation with Egypt in the natural gas sector and exploring opportunities in Somalia through oil and gas exploration agreements in Somali territorial waters. Through this strategy, Ankara seeks to solidify its role as a regional energy hub and extend its influence across countries in Eastern and Southern Europe, currently grappling with a gas crisis due to the halt in Russian supplies. It seems that Washington does not object to this Turkish approach as long as Turkiye does not turn into a hub to resell Russian gas to evade Western sanctions. – Emirates Policy Center | Turkiye’s Natural Gas Strategy: A New Lever to Enhance International Influence

USA

(Vivek Mishra – Observer Research Foundation) With Donald Trump’s return to the White House after winning the 2024 presidential election, there is an implicit Yeatsian ‘the Second Coming’ allegory at play. The poem’s hint at the apocalypse in post-war European doom and gloom resonates strongly with the Republican narratives that catapulted Trump to a historic mandate in both the electoral college and popular vote. The narrative that this was America’s last chance to save the country and its military from ‘woke’ ideologies and the real inflation crisis may have had greater purchase with the American voter base than the Democratic party’s appeal to Trump representing a threat to American democracy. – Trump 2.0: The Second Coming

(Gabriel R. Sanchez – Brookings) Latino males have been the most discussed sub-group of the electorate among many that shifted toward Trump in 2024. Despite making up a relatively small number of voters across key battleground states (including only 6% of eligible voters in Georgia), the majority of the blame for Democrats’ rough performance in 2024 has been directed at Latinos, specifically Latino men. In this post, I dig into the data to provide some perspective on the potential factors that led more Latino men to vote for Trump in 2024 than in the last election. While President-elect Trump increased his support among Latino men this cycle, he did not get the majority of this sub-group in 2024. Support for Trump was highest among Latino men under 40 at 48%, 20% of whom were first time voters in 2024. Trump’s performance was driven by the salience of the economy to Latino men and Trump’s misinformation-fueled campaign that falsely blamed immigrants for the economic challenges many Latino men are facing. – A deep dive into the 2024 Latino male electorate

USA – Indo Pacific

(Sayantan Haldar- Observer Research Foundation) The United States elections have come to a close, with Donald Trump emerging as the winner of the White House race. World-over, speculation is rife about the shifts in global geopolitics that the new Trump administration will likely usher in. Donald Trump’s previous stint in Washington as the 45th President of the United States (between 2017-2021) is helpful for analysts in drawing clues about the priorities and interests of his incoming administration. However, the state of the world has changed dramatically since Trump’s previous term in office and is likely to be reflected in his government’s actions going forward. While it is natural that the incoming administration will change how the US continues to engage with the world, in the Indo-Pacific context, the shifts are likely to be nuanced. On the economic front, the intensification of a contest against China may be on the horizon. In many ways, this will shape Washington’s security outlook in the Indo-Pacific. – Trump 2.0 and the Indo-Pacific: Balancing economic and security imperatives

USA – Latin America

(Carlos Solar – RUSI) Too little, too late. President Joe Biden’s trip to meet regional and world leaders in Peru and Brazil for the APEC and G20 meetings brought to a close his relationship with Latin America, leaving many with a sour taste. Local and foreign outlets and commentators suggested that the US had failed to obtain any major wins over the last four years in a region that has seen humanitarian and political crises from Haiti to Venezuela, and that it had been unable to stop China’s economic inroads or the spread of Russian disinformation regarding the invasion of Ukraine. Most vividly, Biden has felt the heat on homeland security due to concerns over migration and rampant insecurity at the southern border. – Can Trump’s State and Defence Nominees Reset Relations with Latin America? | Royal United Services Institute

USA – South China Sea

(Ganesh Sahathevan – Australian Institute of International Affairs) The Trump campaign war cry “we will drill, baby, drill” could lead to a resurgence of oil and gas (O&G) exploration and production in the South China Sea when (and not if) President-elect Donald Trump removes obstacles to O&G production currently in place in the United States. It may also add to the existing commercial bulwark the United States and its allies in the region already possess to deter China’s attempts to seek hegemony over the South China Sea. – “Drill Baby Drill”: Implications of Donald Trump’s 2nd Presidency for the US in the South China Sea – Australian Institute of International Affairs – Australian Institute of International Affairs

Yemen

(Brian Carter – Institute for the Study of War) The Houthis now pose a strategic threat with global implications for the United States and its allies. The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Iran from strengthening the Houthis’ military capabilities since 2015. The Houthis have grown from a small, militia in Yemen’s northern mountains into a major strategic threat with ties to multiple US adversaries. The US has sought to “avoid escalation” in response to dramatic Houthi escalations since October 2023 by taking a series of reactive half-measures that have failed to accomplish decisive effects or materially degrade Houthi military capabilities. The Houthis are undeterred and have collected significant insight into the operation of US defenses against their attack systems of all varieties. The Houthis will almost certainly exploit this insight to improve the efficacy of their attacks and provide it to other US adversaries. Continued Houthi operations in the Middle East in the meantime will continue to deflect US efforts to prioritize the Indo-Pacific, as they have already done for over a year. – The Cost of Inaction in Yemen | Institute for the Study of War

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