From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Bahrain-Iran, Climate Action, Europe-Russia, Israel-Syria, Japan-India-Africa, Myanmar-Russia, Russia-Arctic, Türkiye-Turkmenistan, US, US-Middle East
Bahrain – Iran
(Mahdi Ghuloom – Observer Research Foundation) A concrete rapprochement between Iran and Bahrain would mean the recent regional ‘détente’ with Saudi Arabia would be complete. Indeed, Bahrain is the ‘missing link’ in this rapprochement between the Gulf States and Iran. Although the attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran led Bahrain to cut ties with Iran in 2016, Bahrain-Iran relations have challenges of their own. Between 2007 and 2010, a notable figure was the ambassador of Iran to the Kingdom of Bahrain, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who served as the Foreign Minister (FM) of Iran under former President Ebrahim Raisi. In May 2024, both he and Raisi died in a helicopter crash in Iran. Abdollahian was very familiar with Bahrain, considering he was one of the few Iranian ambassadors to Bahrain who did not have to be recalled to Iran during his tenure in the Kingdom. He was also perceived to have close relations with the main opposition group at the time, Al-Wefaq, who were in parliament until 2011 before leaving the institution and starting to operate clandestinely. – Bahrain-Iran challenges and potential rapprochement during Trump 2.0
Climate Action
(Stefania Petruzzelli – Observer Research Foundation) The United States’ (US) decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2025 represents a defining moment for international climate governance, testing the resilience of multilateral efforts to coordinate the global response to the climate crisis, raising broader questions—not only about the stability of global climate governance but about the capacity of the entire multilateral system to maintain continuity and effectiveness in an increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape. Washington’s disengagement is not an isolated event; instead, it signals a deeper crisis concerning the resilience of international institutions amid national political fluctuations and the growing competition between development models. The US retreat is not merely a setback in climate policy but an indication of the structural fragility of multilateral agreements, increasingly vulnerable to the instabilities of individual states and the redefinition of global spheres of influence. The first withdrawal in 2017 had already exposed the structural weakness of a system built on voluntary commitments; today’s disengagement occurs in an even more precarious context—one where political, economic, and technological tensions converge with a reconfiguration of global power dynamics, further undermining the effectiveness of multilateralism. Unlike in 2017, however, the stakes are now higher: the global energy transition is accelerating, green industrial policies are reshaping economic priorities, and the absence of the US may have long-term ramifications for emissions targets and the credibility of the Paris Agreement. – A fractured consensus: The uncertain future of climate governance after US withdrawal
(Gyoorie Kim, Maya Lycett – Observer Research Foundation) Over the past 50 years, Asia has experienced rapid growth driven by regional leadership and innovation. Asia is home to approximately 59 percent of the global population. It is expected to account for 42 percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2040, uniquely positioning the region to champion efforts on issues of shared interest. In 2024, global carbon emissions reached a new high, with current projections indicating that the 1.5 goal under the Paris Agreement is not on the intended track and has reached a point of no return. Today, Asia has the opportunity to take the initiative as leaders in the global fight against climate change, strengthening regional and international collaboration. In India and South Korea, national climate initiatives are powerful, yet they have a few key implementation challenges. Climate action can and should be pursued at multiple levels. While the central governments in India and South Korea hold the authority to drive implementation and policy change, subnational governments have emerged as norm entrepreneurs, advocating for change and leading climate initiatives. Subnational governments have shown leadership in demanding and implementing support systems for more ambitious climate action, playing a key role in promoting and mobilising stronger climate ambition by providing localised solutions, engaging directly with communities, and fostering regional development benefits. In India and South Korea, subnational initiatives are leading the push for change, an effort that must be equally matched at the national government level to achieve the 1.5 goal. – Small states, big impact: Driving climate action through norm entrepreneurship
Europe – Russia
(Anton Moiseienko, Yuliya Ziskina – RUSI) ‘One of the great imbecilities that I discovered all through my life’, the late Yale classicist Donald Kagan once said, ‘is the quiet assumption – unquestioned, unexamined – that restraint, the failure to take action is safe; taking action is dangerous’. Kagan was speaking of the ancient Greek city states of Athens, Corinth and Corcyra; but he might as well have been passing a verdict on the sanctions policies of today’s Brussels, Paris and Berlin. In six months, the EU’s sanctions against Russia may lapse. This is a striking thought that may be new to those who do not follow EU sanctions closely. Even amidst the turmoil of the Trump administration’s abandonment of Ukraine and Europe, an unravelling of the EU’s Russia sanctions would be a catastrophic and likely irreversible development. So, what precisely is going on – and what is at stake? – The Impending Collapse of Russia Sanctions: The Cost of Inaction | Royal United Services Institute
Israel – Syria
(David Schenker – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) In early November, a billboard appeared in Tel Aviv congratulating President-elect Trump and asking him to help “make Israel great again.” Lately, and in unexpected places, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems determined to make Israel “greater” again, as implied when its forces seized large swaths of Syrian territory after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Although security imperatives may justify certain aspects of this incursion, the scope of Israel’s foray is provocative at minimum, and could wind up destabilizing the frontier for the long term. – Avoiding an Israel-Syria Showdown (Part 1): The Risks of “Occupation” | The Washington Institute
Japan – India – Africa
(Abhishek Mishra, Simran Walia – Manohar Parrikar Institute) The fourth Japan–India–Africa Business Forum, which took place in Tokyo on 26 February 2025, explored opportunities to collaborate in supporting Africa’s sustainable economic growth and development. The forum was initiated in 2007 as a platform for enhancing business and economic ties between Japan, India and African countries. The forum aims to foster stronger trade relations, investment and business cooperation among these three regions, focusing on infrastructure development, industrial cooperation and capacity-building in Africa, with Japan and India playing a key role in driving these initiatives. – Japan–India–Africa Business Forum: A Collaborative Path to Sustainable Growth – MP-IDSA
Myanmar – Russia
(Umang Bhansali – Vivekananda International Foundation) Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC) of Myanmar, Min Aung Hlain conducted ‘an official goodwill visit’ to Russia, accompanied by other members of SAC and senior officials of Myanmar. On March 4, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks at Kremlin with the Chairman of SAC, Min Aung Hlain. The fourth visit conducted by Min Aung Hlain, since he seized power in 2021, deepened the diplomatic and strategic partnership between the two nations. The recent visit marked the first official meeting between the Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC) and the Russian President, although the two leaders had previously met on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September 2022. – Myanmar – Russia Partnership: Deepening Strategic Ties | Vivekananda International Foundation
Russia – Arctic
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Moscow has declared that Oslo strengthening its defenses on Svalbard is a violation of the Svalbard Treaty, implying that Russia views itself as a defender of that treaty and could take military action to defend it. Nikolai Patrushev, a hardline Kremlin aide close to Putin, has supported this response and declared that the West is threatening Russia across the north, believing Moscow must act now to defend its national interests. Russia’s own approach, however, has had one of its senior participants in talks with the United States to persuade that now is not the time for a “cold war” in the Arctic but rather for a comprehensive “deal.” – Moscow Warns Oslo on Svalbard but Suggests ‘Deal’ with United States on Arctic – Jamestown
Türkiye – Turkmenistan
(Fuad Shahbazov – The Jamestown Foundation) In mid-February, Türkiye and Turkmenistan signed an agreement facilitating the flow of natural gas through Iran, a step to enhance Türkiye’s energy security and diversify its supply. Iran’s technical issues in infrastructure and the increased chances of U.S. sanctions bring risks of supply disruptions, as has occurred in the past. Türkiye aims to establish itself as a key energy trade hub and create additional export routes, while Turkmenistan can export more gas through new routes, particularly to Europe. – Türkiye-Turkmenistan Gas Deal Opens Possibilities for New Routes – Jamestown
US
(Zuzanna Gwadera – IISS) The foundation of nuclear deterrence is as much about credibility as it is certainty. The United States has provided this credibility through extended deterrence to its allies for three-quarters of a century, but this guarantee now faces creeping uncertainty. Only weeks into his second term, President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to defence and security relations has begun to erode decades of assurance. NATO has long sheltered under US extended deterrence, while Washington has also provided Australia, Japan and South Korea with its nuclear umbrella. But any perceived weakening in the strength of the US guarantee could risk long-standing nuclear weapons non-proliferation norms. – US allies question extended deterrence guarantees, but have few options
US – Middle East
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) President Donald Trump’s administration dialed up its use of military power in the Middle East this past week just as it took more steps to dismantle American institutions central to advancing peace and stability through diplomacy. In the span of a few short days, the United States conducted attacks against the Houthis in Yemen, backed Israel’s military strikes in Gaza, and took steps to dismantle the US Institute of Peace, one of several important soft power institutions that Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has targeted in its nearly two months in office. The aggressive strategic communications of the Trump administration’s foreign policy team continued to send mixed messages, toggling between threatening adversaries with more war and attempting to find pathways to peace in the Middle East and Ukraine. These somewhat contradictory moves are not the cause of renewed conflict or tensions in the Middle East — correlation does not mean causation. But the emerging dissonance and imbalance in Trump 2.0’s overall national security approach does not bode well for the Middle East today, which sits on the precipice of greater conflict in the weeks ahead. – Trump’s recast of US power risks undercutting Middle East stability | Middle East Institute
