From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Australia, China-India, Middle East, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine, Southeast Asia, US, US-Australia, US-Canada, US-North Korea-Russia, US-Panama Canal
Australia
(Martina Zapf – Lowy The Interpreter)
Armed conflict affected one in eight people across the world last year, a level not seen since the Second World War. This month, Australia has taken up a seat on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission – a UN body that supports peace in states emerging from or at risk of conflict. With the global outlook for peace no more rosy in 2025, and intergovernmental responses to conflict prone to divisions, what can Australia do with its two-year term on the peacebuilding commission? – The UN Peacebuilding Commission: What’s in it for Australia? | Lowy Institute
China – India
(Debasish Roy Chowdhury – ASPI The Strategist)
Weeks before his return to the White House, US President-elect Donald Trump issued a pointed warning to the BRICS countries. ‘Go find another sucker’, he wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social, threatening the group’s nine members with 100 percent tariffs should they attempt to challenge the dollar’s global dominance. Trump’s warning came on the heels of his campaign promise to impose a 25 percent tariff on imported goods from Canada and Mexico on his first day in office. China, the primary target of Trump’s protectionism, is expected to face an additional 10 percent tariff. While this is hardly surprising, given the escalating trade war between China and the United States, Trump has also directed his ire at India, a founding member of the BRICS and one of the US’s key allies. So far, India has managed to avoid immediate conflict by reaffirming its commitment to the dollar. But such policy uncertainties are among the many reasons why the Indian government has been quietly hedging its bets by pursuing rapprochement with China—a move that could herald a seismic geopolitical shift. – As Trump returns, Sino-Indian relations are changing | The Strategist
Middle East
(Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl – Institute for the Study of War)
Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.
West Bank: The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.”
Northern Syria: Likely Arab tribal forces have engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in several locations along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in SDF-controlled territory.
Northern Syria: Anti-SDF outlets have continued to circulate unconfirmed reports that the HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed forces to the SDF-SNA frontlines near Manbij. An HTS decision to send fighters to reinforce the SNA would represent a significant departure from current HTS efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm. – Iran Update, January 20, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan – Institute for the Study of War)
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation.
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces’ combat capabilities.
Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells. – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
Southeast Asia
(Rahman Yaacob – Lowy The Interpreter)
From 2004 to 2023, Southeast Asian countries spent more than US$42 billion on weapons. Russia was the largest arms supplier in terms of value – cornering 25% of the Southeast Asian arms market – although its share dwindled in later years. Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that in the years until 2019, Russian-made military equipment was well received by regional states. The popularity of Russian arms was shaped by the perception that its sales are less politically conditional than Western supplies, which makes them attractive to countries seeking greater independence in defence policy. – Southeast Asia’s arms suppliers, by the numbers | Lowy Institute
US
(Atlantic Council)
“A tide of change is sweeping the country.” Beneath the 180-foot-high Capitol dome on Monday, US President Donald Trump was sworn in for a second term, promising in his inaugural address and with a slew of executive orders to enact a 180-degree turn away from many of his predecessor’s policies. – What Trump’s inaugural address means for the world – Atlantic Council
(Shlomo Ben-Ami – ASPI The Strategist)
Donald Trump has often been dismissed as a hip-shooter devoid of strategic sense or policy vision. While this assessment is not entirely off base—he is certainly an agent of anarchy—it is incomplete. For better or for worse, Trump was one of the United States’ most revolutionary presidents during his first term, and that appears likely to be true of his second. – Trump the revolutionary isolationist | The Strategist
(James A. Haley – Centre for International Governance Innovation)
The re-election of Donald Trump portends significant changes. And while it is too early to say what resemblance the economic policies of a Trump 2.0 administration will bear to the inchoate pronouncements made on the campaign trail, it is clear that the global economy is about to confront serious macroeconomic challenges. Even before his inauguration, the president has threatened to impose large tariffs on Canada and Mexico, with whom the United States negotiated a renewal of the North American Free Trade Agreement under his first administration. The use of punitive tariffs by a Trump 2.0 administration would undoubtedly — though not irreparably — hurt the Canadian economy. But such a move would also harm US consumers, since, contrary to the president’s blandishments, tariffs are a de facto tax on consumption. At the same time, tariffs aimed at securing competitive advantage, implemented by a man who views trade — indeed, the world at large — as a zero-sum game, would also diminish US leadership on global affairs by eroding the credibility of US commitments to international agreements. – Trump’s Return Puts the International Order in Peril – Centre for International Governance Innovation
US – Australia
(Malcolm Davis – ASPI The Strategist)
Enhancing space cooperation between Australia and the United States should be a priority for Canberra in the second Trump administration. In defence terms, that could include strengthening collaboration between the US and Australia in space domain awareness and through collaboration on space control. Leveraging locally developed space capability through assured government support of Australia’s commercial space sector is also important, as is sovereign space launch to ensure space access, resilience and ultimately deterrence by denial in space. – Space and Australia: opportunities in the second Trump administration | The Strategist
US – Canada
(Dan Ciuriak – Centre for International Governance Innovation)
Donald Trump has stated his intent to impose 25-percent tariffs on all imports from Canada on his first day in office. Let’s consider what we did the last time Trump imposed tariffs on Canadian exports. In 2018, Trump imposed tariffs on Canadian exports of steel and aluminum under the national security provision (section 232) of the US Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Canada retaliated tit-for-tat, and the American tariffs were withdrawn under a deal that put a ceiling on increases in Canadian exports. – Tariffs Are an Own Goal: The Best Retaliation Is to Stand Fast – Centre for International Governance Innovation
US – North Korea – Russia
(Khang Vu – Lowy The Interpreter)
With Donald Trump about to return to the White House, his foreign policy team is taking shape. Trump appointed Alex Wong, who was involved in working-level talks with North Korea during Trump’s first term, to be the principal deputy national security adviser. Elbridge Colby, who advocated for an arms control deal with North Korea, has been named as undersecretary of defence. Trump also designated former US ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell to be envoy for special missions, bringing a strong background working on North Korea and also a supporter of dialogue with Pyongyang. – This time, Russia stands in the way of any US‑North Korea deal | Lowy Institute
US – – Panama Canal
(Jason Marczak – Atlantic Council)
Inaugural addresses are typically domestically oriented. And this held true for US President Donald Trump’s speech today, albeit with a notable exception: his focus on the Western Hemisphere. Coupled with the fact that several of this new administration’s high-ranking officials have significant experience in Latin America, this focus reflects the president’s prioritization of the region. Not surprisingly, the border featured just as prominently in Trump’s 2025 inaugural address as it did in 2017 when he argued on the Mall that “We’ve defended other nation’s borders while refusing to defend our own.” And Trump’s declaration of a national emergency at the southern border—a move he announced in his inaugural speech and formalized with an executive order hours later—mirrored many aspects of his February 2019 declaration. But Trump’s 2025 speech deviated from his 2017 address with the president’s emphasis on Panama. – What to know about Trump’s day-one promise to take back the Panama Canal – Atlantic Council