From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Australia, Australia-Japan, Australia-US, Belarus, China, China-India, China-Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Europe, Finland, Lebanon-Israel, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond), South Caucasus, South Korea, Tigray-Ethiopia-Eritrea, US-Yemen
Australia
(Joseph Zeller – Australian Institute of International Affairs) To secure a prosperous future, Australia must address capital allocation within its economy, orienting to revitalise its domestic manufacturing industry. – The Investment Paradox: Misaligned Capital and the Case for Revitalising Australian Manufacturing – Australian Institute of International Affairs
(Richard Dunley – The Interpreter) Among the Canberra national security commentariat, it has been hard to have a conversation in the past couple of years without someone mentioning “the archipelago”. This is the space in which the Australian Army is supposed to littorally manoeuvre, and through which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will project impactfully. But where is “the archipelago”? If you look at recent Australian strategic documents, or statements by politicians or senior officers, “the archipelago” is notable for its absence. In its place are a series of other general descriptions. – Australian defence and the nebulous “archipelago” | Lowy Institute
Australia – Japan
(Rintaro Inoue – The Strategist) Japan and Australia talk of ‘collective deterrence,’ but they don’t seem to have specific objectives. The relationship needs a clearer direction. The two countries should identify how they complement each other. Each country has two standout areas: Japan has strengths in air and missile defence and in shipbuilding, whereas Australia needs help in both; and Australia has strengths in cybersecurity and its distance from China, both of which offer advantages for Japan. – Japan and Australia can fill each other’s defence gaps | The Strategist
Australia – US
(Hugh Piper – The Interpreter) Less than two months into Trump’s second coming, Australia’s worst fears for an empowered MAGA presidency are materialising quickly: the undermining of alliances, the imposition of blanket tariffs, the abandonment of Ukraine and the embrace of Russia, the degrading of liberal democracies. In response, there have been cascading calls for a major rethink of Australia’s alliance with the United States, including contingencies should Trump rebuke AUKUS. – The new transactional era: Australia’s US alliance needs review | Lowy Institute
(Saba Sinai – The Strategist) Australia’s export-oriented industries, particularly agriculture, need to diversify their markets, with a focus on Southeast Asia. This could strengthen economic security and resilience while deepening regional relationships. The Trump administration’s decision to impose tariffs on Australian steel and aluminium has caused doubts about the strength of the relationship between Australia and the United States. While the US has not yet imposed tariffs on Australian beef and other agricultural products, the current unpredictability of US trade policies means these industries could soon be on the chopping block. This would harm Australian primary producers and have significant social effects on rural communities, including in the strategically important north. – Eggs in more baskets: protecting Australian agricultural exports from US tariffs | The Strategist
Belarus
(Dmitry Bolkunets – The Jamestown Foundation) Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has secured another five-year presidential term and now seeks to secure the country’s regional and international interests, including a role in peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Lukashenka’s first visit, as per tradition, was to Russia, where he sought support from Russian President Vladimir Putin despite breaking a gentleman’s agreement not to run in the elections. Lukashenka is unable to sever Belarus’s ties with Moscow due to economic and political dependence and views the Kremlin as a safeguard against the West. Belarus has few options for diplomatic maneuver aside from seeking deals on the release of political prisoners because the People’s Republic of China (PRC) prioritizes its relationship with Moscow rather than Minsk and Lukashenka finds the West ideologically repellent. – Lukashenka Balances Internal Challenges with External Dependencies – Jamestown
China
(The Soufan Center) Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly relied on actions in the so-called “grey zone” – those that fall between the traditional binary of war and peace – to achieve its objectives and spread its influence. Grey zone tactics augment China’s more muscular approach, especially though not exclusively in the maritime and economic domains. In the South China Sea, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has strategically employed a mix of coercion, legal warfare, kinetic tactics, and narrative warfare to bolster its territorial and economic claims. The CCP’s grey zone practices have often gone hand-in-hand with information operations and cyberattacks. – The Chinese Communist Party’s Grey Zone Paradigm – The Soufan Center
China – India
(Neeraj Singh Manhas – Australian Institute of International Affairs) China’s 2025 defence budget increased by 7.2%, totalling $245 billion, continuing military modernisation under Xi Jinping. Over the past decade, spending has doubled, focusing on advanced tech. This escalates challenges for India in border security and regional balance. – How Does China’s Rising Defence Budget Affect India? – Australian Institute of International Affairs
China – Myanmar
(Su Mon Thant – The Interpreter) In recent months, the China-Myanmar border has erupted into chaos as clashes between Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – and ethnic armed organisations such as the Kachin Independence Army and the Three Brotherhood Alliance intensify. Towns including Pangwa near the Chinese border have fallen to the junta’s opponents, sending refugees fleeing towards China. Beijing responded by closing border crossings such as Tengchong’s Dian Tan. – China’s tightrope walk: Mediating in Myanmar | Lowy Institute
Democratic Republic of Congo
(Michelle Gavin – Council on Foreign Relations) The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is getting worse. In January, even before the Rwanda-backed M23 seized Goma and Bukavu, and before the collapse of much of the humanitarian aid delivery system, less than 13 percent of the eleven million people in need in the DRC were getting assistance. Now, the downward spiral for civilians is accelerating. The International Rescue Committee has cited a “catastrophic deterioration in health service and humanitarian conditions” in eastern Congo, including an alarming uptick in cholera as desperate Congolese find themselves without basic sanitation. – What’s Next for the Democratic Republic of Congo? | Council on Foreign Relations
Europe
(Kajsa Ollongren, Armida van Rij – Chatham House) With the second presidency of Donald Trump, European governments have been forced to urgently rethink their security and defence policies. Seismic shifts are underway, with long-held beliefs about debt brakes and fiscal rules being questioned: The German Bundestag approved a previously unimaginable reform of the country’s debt-brake to enable more spending on defence on 18 March. A shift towards a ‘Europe-alone’ perspective is taking place, from both EU and non-EU European countries, with steps being taken to recalibrate Europe to become a global power that can defend itself without US support. – The EU must enable its defence industry to boost capabilities and reduce dependence on US systems | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Finland
(Matti Pesu, Tomas Wallenius – RUSI) The air in Helsinki is heavy with irony. Finnish attitudes towards NATO changed abruptly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Just two months after the start of the invasion, almost 80% of the public had come around to support NATO membership. When Finland entered the Alliance on 4th April 2023, parts of the political establishment hailed this as the end point of the country’s long trek to join the West, finally making Finland a full member of a security community of like-minded liberal democracies. – Two Years in NATO, Finland is Searching for a Plan B | Royal United Services Institute
Lebanon – Israel
(The Soufan Center) Lebanon and Israel, which do not have diplomatic relations, will soon convene to try to demarcate their land border and resolve other outstanding disputes. Lebanese leaders and U.S. officials are downplaying speculation among Israeli elites that the border discussions, if successful, might produce a normalization of Lebanon-Israel relations. Lebanon’s agreement to the border talks confirms Hezbollah has been significantly weakened, but it can still block dramatic improvement in Israel-Lebanon relations. Lebanese leaders assess that settling the Israel-Lebanon border would remove Lebanese Hezbollah’s justification for fielding an armed militia outside government control. – Lebanon and Israel Try Moving from Warfare to Conflict Resolution – The Soufan Center
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(John Lough – Chatham House) The meagre results of yesterday’s 90-minute phone call between President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin speak volumes. The announcement of a 30-day ceasefire on energy infrastructure, which Trump claimed as an accomplishment, is a reheated old initiative. It was discussed by Moscow and Kyiv before last summer’s Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk Region. By giving little ground, Putin has signalled that he is ready to dance a long, slow tango with Trump while the Russian army continues its battlefield advances. His strategy is clear: to use ceasefire negotiations as a tool to accelerate victory, setting conditions that will later become part of a final agreement. – Putin’s negotiation strategy is predictable: move slowly, keep Trump interested, and reset expectations | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
South Caucasus
(Vali Kaleji – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the wide-ranging Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on January 17 to boost bilateral relations for further progress in areas including opposition to NATO expansion, the North-South Corridor, and the 3+3 format. Moscow and Tehran, however, also hold diverging interests in the South Caucasus, including differences in the region’s energy and transport sectors. Russia has not supported Iran’s railway and gas pipeline construction projects in Armenia, which would diminish Moscow’s influence in the country, despite Tehran and Moscow’s cooperation in building the Rasht-Astara railway to connect to the Republic of Azerbaijan. If Moscow and Tehran do not resolve these conflicts of interest to form an aligned approach as they have in Syria and Central Asia, their relationship in the South Caucasus will remain unaligned. – Russia and Iran Manage Diverging Interests in South Caucasus – Jamestown
(Callum Fraser – RUSI) News of a draft peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a positive note during a tumultuous period for European security. This deal sets up the opportunity to bring an end to over four decades of conflict. However, tensions remain high and trust low. It is unclear whether the draft agreement sets up an enduring peace, or if remaining gaps will fracture this delicate balance. The wider implications of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalisation should not be underestimated. A successful peace deal would open up economic and diplomatic opportunities for the entire region, particularly in the energy and transportation sectors. The new ‘realist’ reality emerging within the South Caucasus will necessitate external actors adapt their policy towards the region while Europe seems set to struggle to retain its remaining influence. Peace is not guaranteed and will require significant support. – Peace Prospects in the South Caucasus | Royal United Services Institute
South Korea
(Gabriela Bernal – The Interpreter) The month of March consistently marks a period of heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea escalates military provocations in direct response to the annual US-South Korea joint military exercises. While Pyongyang has long characterised such drills as rehearsals for invasion, they serve dual purposes for Seoul. Beyond maintaining essential defensive readiness against North Korean threats, these exercises play a crucial role in achieving a major South Korean strategic objective: reclaiming wartime operational control, or OPCON as it is commonly known, of its own military forces from the United States. – Command and sovereignty: Who controls South Korea’s military in wartime? | Lowy Institute
Tigray – Ethiopia – Eritrea
(The Soufan Center) Civilians are fleeing Ethiopia’s northernmost state of Tigray amid fears of renewed conflict, as both Eritrean and Ethiopian forces escalate their military presence along the border. Ethiopia’s push to secure Red Sea access combined with a power struggle within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), bolstered by Eritrean interventions, is pushing the countries closer to full-scale conflict. Failures in the implementation of key provisions of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement – which saw an end to the 2020 – 2022 Tigray War – has deepened divisions between the two countries. Ethiopia’s domestic turmoil, Eritrea’s strategic calculations, and external geopolitical interests make the Horn of Africa a flashpoint for escalating conflict — one with potentially disastrous consequences for the region and beyond. – Renewed Tensions in Tigray Risk Escalating into a Broader Conflict – The Soufan Center
(Abel Abate Demissie – Chatham House) The threat of war is looming over the Horn of Africa once again, with observers warning of a return to fighting in Tigray, which could also lead to conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia’s ambition to secure access to the Red Sea via ports it lost to Eritrea in the 1990s, alongside Eritrea’s continued interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs, have led to a dramatic deterioration of the relationship between the countries over the past two years. The mobilization of troops along both sides of their shared border highlights the seriousness of the situation. With the rules-based international order under significant strain, Ethiopia – the world’s most populous landlocked country, with over 120 million people but no coastline – may consider this an opportune moment to be more assertive in its efforts to break out of its ‘geographical prison’. – Tensions in Tigray could spark war between Ethiopia and Eritrea – disaster must be avoided | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Yemen
(Jacob Ware, Amir Asmar – Atlantic Council) On 15 March, US President Donald Trump announced a series of strikes on targets associated with the Yemeni Islamist group Ansar Allah—led by the Houthi family—in the most significant military operation of his second term so far. The strikes may be only the start of a campaign against the Houthis. They follow one of the less publicized moves from Trump’s first week back in office, when he re-designated Yemen’s Ansar Allah as a “foreign terrorist organization”(FTO) over its Gaza war-related attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. “The Houthis’ activities threaten the security of American civilians and personnel in the Middle East, the safety of our closest regional partners, and the stability of global maritime trade,” the White House order said. –Trump’s military cudgel in Yemen will not achieve US regional objectives – Atlantic Council
