From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Australia-Pacific; Australia-South Korea; Azerbaijan-China; Canada; France-Germany; Iran; Japan-Central Asia; Russia; Singapore; Sub-Saharan Africa; Taiwan; Türkiye; UK; US-Middle East; US-Ukraine; Vatican
Australia-Pacific
(Isabelle Zhu-Maguire – The Interpreter) By the time the 2022 Australian election rolled around, the common wisdom was that then prime minister Scott Morrison had “stuffed up” Australia’s relationships with the Pacific Islands. Anthony Albanese pledged that a Labor government would “shore up” Australia’s position in the Pacific. In the days and weeks after the election, new Foreign Minister Penny Wong made repeated trips to the Pacific, promising the island nations that she was there to “listen”. During this 2025 election season, Pacific issues have been well outside the spotlight in key debates. But Pacific Islands are still closely following the campaign, as they see a stake in Australian elections. Few will be as brazen as Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko in saying he would personally like to see Labor win, but that doesn’t mean they won’t have opinions. – What the Pacific sees at stake in the Australian election | Lowy Institute
Australia-South Korea
(Jay Song, Kimin Eom – Australian Institute of International Affairs) 2025 is an election year for both Australia and South Korea. 3 May is when Australians share their democracy sausage; for South Korea, after the traumatic martial law declared by former President Yoon Suk Yeol and his impeachment, the nation is preparing for an early election on 3 June. – Are Conservatives Happier than Progressives? Politics and Happiness of Korean Australians – Australian Institute of International Affairs
Azerbaijan – China
(Fuad Shahbazov – The Jamestown Foundation) On April 22, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev conducted a state visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to strengthen Azerbaijan’s role as a transit hub between the PRC, Central Asia, and Europe and expand the Azerbaijan-PRC partnership to new spheres. Azerbaijan–PRC cooperation has been based on Azerbaijan’s role as a transit hub but is evolving to include cooperation in energy and key industrial sectors, such as oil and gas, metallurgy, construction materials, pharmaceuticals, and food production. Azerbaijan has devoted enormous resources to attracting PRC and Western use of the Middle Corridor, massively improving and modernizing its trade infrastructure, and optimizing cargo transportation. – Azerbaijan and the People’s Republic of China Announce Comprehensive Strategic Partnership – Jamestown
Canada
(Bruce Mabley – Australian Institute of International Affairs) The political and economic fallout in Canada following Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs in 2024–25 highlights how his actions have disrupted trade, strained US-Canada relations, and reshaped Canadian domestic politics. As a policy, the tariffs have destabilised traditional alliances, fuelled internal political upheaval, and forced Canada to reassess its economic dependence on the United States. – Canada’s ‘Chemin de Damas’ – Australian Institute of International Affairs
France-Germany
(Sébastien Maillard – Chatham House) When Friedrich Merz becomes German chancellor on 6 May, the relationship between France and Germany looks set to improve. Despite lingering efforts, France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s outgoing chancellor, Olaf Scholz, never had a good relationship and their governments remained at loggerheads on several key strategic issues. Europe’s Franco–German engine has been running on empty for too long. The engine also stalled for domestic reasons. Internal divisions in the outgoing three-party coalition often made it difficult for Germany to clarify its position. In France, the lack of any stable majority in parliament weakened the president’s grip. The country changed governments four times in 2024, puzzling its European partners. – Merz and Macron can restart Europe’s Franco–German engine | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Iran
(Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) Iran appears to be reorienting its approach to diplomatic engagement with its neighbors and the West by prioritizing the economic benefits of cooperation. While Iran’s overtures to the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China bear watching, they may signify pragmatic moves in the expectation of short-term benefit rather than deeper ideological changes in posture. Domestic political and economic pressures are more likely to force Iran to reassess its confrontational approach to relations with neighbors and global powers. A possible withdrawal of support for the Houthis is the latest significant potential outcome of Iran’s shifting stance. The following are five factors to watch for as a Tehran under duress reformulates its policies. – 5 key factors shaping Iran’s foreign policy calculus | Middle East Institute
Japan – Central Asia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Japan, the fifth largest economy in the world, is making new moves to gain access to natural resources and industries in Central Asia, sparking tension with Moscow and Beijing. The Japanese government views recent Central Asian agreements on borders as opening a new era in which Japanese companies seek to gain access to Central Asia’s natural resources. Since those agreements were signed, the Japanese government has stepped up diplomatic contacts with Central Asian governments in pursuit of expanded economic ties, but Japan’s effort may be limited by Russian and Chinese reactions to its moves. – Japan Seeking to Expand Its Economic Footprint in Central Asia – Jamestown
Russia
(Tom Keatinge – RUSI) Discussions about Russia’s shadow fleet dominate the G7 sanctions community as the country’s oil continues to flow and vessels are suspected of systematically damaging critical undersea cable infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and elsewhere. The focus on the latter increasingly obscures the original intention behind targeting Russia’s oil export infrastructure, namely mounting a concerted effort to restrict Russia’s primary source of revenue for funding its illegal war of aggression in Ukraine. The success – or otherwise – of the G7’s efforts to reduce Russia ability to raise revenue via the sale of oil is continuously debated. On the face of it, although the market price for Urals oil has declined from a peak of close to $100 in 2022 to $65 today, Russia has generally maintained its pre-invasion volume of exports, albeit those sales are no longer made in G7 countries, with increased sales to India and China compensating. Western policymakers would argue their restrictions mean it is costing Russia more to export oil to these countries, thus reducing profitability and funds available for financing the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. The KSE Institute calculates that in the period from March 2022 – January 2025, Russia has foregone an estimated $142 billion of oil export revenue. – Tapped Out: It is Time to Revisit Oil Sanctions on Russia | Royal United Services Institute
Singapore
(Quah Say Jye – The Interpreter) The Singaporean General Election has been called for 3 May, where the People’s Action Party (PAP), in power since 1959, seeks to inaugurate the new “Fourth Generation” (4G) leadership under newly appointed Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. The election, however, takes place amidst the Trumpian turbocharging of trade politics that goes straight to the very core of Singaporean economic identity. By threatening a contraction of global trade, the tariffs strike at the heart of the Singaporean economy, an entrepôt nation-state with trade figures about three times its GDP. The PAP has sought to position its campaign around this issue that presents genuinely existential stakes. But much of the public, saddled with immediate economic challenges, may not afford it the same weight. – Singapore election: All about the lived economy | Lowy Institute
Sub-Saharan Africa
(Soufan Center) For the fourth year in a row, the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa—a semi-arid region stretching from the Sahel desert in North Africa to the more humid savannas of the south—has been the most lethal theater in terms of deaths stemming from terrorism. Just last weekend, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) announced that it had killed more than 70 soldiers in raids conducted on two military posts in northern Benin, which would be the most significant attack in terms of lethality in that country in more than a decade. If Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) links up with Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), it will help both groups operationally, extending the jihadists’ reach from the Sahel to the Lake Chad Basin. In the Horn of Africa, both the Islamic State- Somalia Province (IS-Somalia) and al-Qaeda’s Somali branch, al-Shabaab, continue to destabilize the region and remain important cogs in the broader global jihadist universe. – Sub-Saharan Africa Remains an Epicenter of Violent Jihadist Terrorism – The Soufan Center
Taiwan
(Langdon Kelly – RUSI) Unlike most Taiwanese Lunar New Years, which traditionally commence with quiet family gatherings, in 2025 the Year of the Snake started with nationwide mobilisation as citizens took to the streets. They began gathering signatures for petitions to recall as many as 50 lawmakers from a total 111 seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY)in a fight for the survival of the island’s democracy. The ‘Recall War’, led by Robert Tsao – a chip billionaire who forsook retirement abroad and moved back to Taiwan, staking his personal fortune to establish the paramilitary Kuma Academy whose sworn aim is to prevent the ‘Hong Kong-isation of Taiwan’ – is the latest battle in the silent war for Taiwan’s future. – Lawfare and Subversion in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan | Royal United Services Institute
Türkiye
(Middle East Institute) The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu has sparked the largest wave of public protests in Turkey in over a decade, signaling a potential turning point in the country’s political trajectory. As the opposition rallies support and President Erdoğan intensifies his crackdown, what lies ahead for Turkish democracy, the Kurdish peace process, and the broader political landscape? MEI Senior Fellow Gonul Tol joins host Alistair Taylor to unpack the growing unrest, the strategic stakes for Erdoğan’s ruling coalition, and the mobilization of a new generation of political activists. – Turkey at a Crossroads: Protests, Crackdowns, and the Future of Democracy | Middle East Institute
UK
(Olivia O’Sullivan – Chatham House) The UK’s Parliament recently passed emergency legislation to allow the government to take control of the steelworks at Scunthorpe. This intervention was partly focused on protecting jobs and the local economy, but the underlying rationale was in line with a growing trend among governments to see economic and national security as intertwined. The decision to intervene was framed in terms of steel’s role in the UK’s defence industry, infrastructure resilience, and broader sovereign economic capability. Scunthorpe is the last UK site able to produce high-quality virgin steel, which is important for transport infrastructure, military equipment, and other types of defence production. – The UK’s last-minute takeover of British Steel exposes its reactive approach to economic security | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US – Middle East
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) President Donald Trump reached the 100-day mark in his second term this week seeing a sharp drop in his domestic political standing. His approval rating at this point in his presidency is the lowest of any other president in at least the last seven decades, and it comes less than two weeks before Trump embarks on a key Middle East trip. The decline in Trump’s support is mostly due to the growing dissatisfaction with some of his policy moves, particularly tariffs and rising prices, as some signs emerge of rifts inside his own Republican party. With more than 1,350 days left in office, the second Trump administration faces a long road ahead and will have many opportunities to adapt its approach. – Trump’s domestic political support craters at the 100-day mark before his Middle East trip | Middle East Institute
US – Ukraine
(Gracelin Baskaran, Meredith Schwartz – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On Wednesday, April 30, 2025, the United States and Ukraine signed a long-awaited deal to establish a joint investment fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine. The fund will be capitalized, in part, by revenues from future natural resource extraction. The newly signed agreement is a positive step in U.S.-Ukraine relations following contentious meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While more favorable to Ukraine than earlier iterations, the deal’s effectiveness hinges on long-term peace and stable investment conditions. Key barriers include outdated geological surveys, degraded energy infrastructure, and unresolved security risks. The agreement reflects the Trump administration’s transactional approach to mineral diplomacy and may serve as a template for similar deals, such as the emerging U.S.–Democratic Republic of the Congo cooperation framework. – What to Know About the Signed U.S.-Ukraine Minerals Deal
(Heidi Crebo-Rediker – Council on Foreign Relations) The United States signed an energy and critical minerals agreement with Ukraine on Wednesday. It establishes a joint investment fund between the two countries that both said will be used to aid Ukraine’s economic recovery after Russia’s invasion. In the deal’s announcement, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said it showed Russia that President Donald Trump and his administration is “committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.” The president pursued “this partnership between the American people and the Ukrainian people to show both sides’ commitment to lasting peace and prosperity in Ukraine,” the secretary added. – What’s the Deal with Trump’s Ukraine Mineral Agreement? | Council on Foreign Relations
Vatican
(Matthew Newman – Australian Institute of International Affairs) As the College of Cardinals prepare for the conclave to replace Pope Francis, the geopolitical implications of their decision cannot be underestimated. In an era of escalating global tensions and internal Church challenges, the next pontiff must be both a spiritual leader and a statesman capable of shaping a vision for peace and ethical global governance. – The Geopolitical Stakes of the Next Conclave – Australian Institute of International Affairs
