From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Australia, China, Russia, Russia-Central Asia, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond), US-China, US-Middle East, US-North Korea-Mongolia
Australia
(Naoise McDonagh – Australian Institute of International Affairs) Australia is seeking to move up the value chain in critical mineral processing as part of a geoeconomic strategy to reduce global supply dependence on China. Recent setbacks in both nickel and lithium underscore how challenging this ambition may prove to be. The country’s first lithium hydroxide plant—a joint venture between China’s Tianqi and Australia’s IGO in Kwinana, Western Australia—has halted expansion plans amid cost blowouts and technical delays. The plant’s ongoing future at current capacity is also in doubt. Albermarle has scrapped plans to quadruple its Kemerton lithium processing plant. Meanwhile, a PLS and Calix joint venture in mid-stream lithium processing that was scrapped in October 2024 is only being restarted due to a large taxpayer-funded cash injection. While a 90 percent collapse in the price of lithium since 2022 is the proximate cause of Australian woes, the willingness of the Chinese state to backstop mineral output even at below cost price levels means Beijing’s firms drive out all market-based competitors during price depressions. – More than Money: How Australia Can Help Build a Sustainable Strategic Minerals Supply Chain – Australian Institute of International Affairs
(Michael Webster – The Strategist) US President Donald Trump’s unconventional methods of conducting international relations will compel the next federal government to reassess whether the United States’ presence in the region and its security assurances provide a reliable basis for Australia’s national defence strategy. There is reason to doubt that Trump’s US would unequivocally help defend Australia in a war Australia must become more self-reliant in defence while increasingly demonstrating that it is a valuable ally to the US worth American commitment to its security. A dilemma is how to strengthen defence while minimising cost. – Think laterally: government air and shipping services can boost Australian defence | The Strategist
(Mercedes Page – The Interpreter) Governments worldwide are scrambling to make sense of a volatile new world where the only certainty is uncertainty. And Australia is no exception. Last week’s federal budget brought forward defence spending while reprioritising development funding in response to recent USAID cuts. The release of the unclassified 2024 Independent Intelligence Review the week before also underscored the scale of the challenges ahead, with more than $44 million allocated to updating Australia’s intelligence community. Yet for all these announcements, a fairly crucial element remains missing: a broader strategy to actually navigate this shifting world order. Granted, last month the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade released the Australia in the World – 2025 Snapshot, acknowledging the unprecedented changes in the world and providing an overview of Australia’s existing diplomatic and international engagement efforts. However, it fell short of outlining a strategic vision. – Australia’s foreign policy reckoning: Time for a new White Paper | Lowy Institute
China
(Andrew Forrest – The Strategist) Regional hegemons come in different shapes and sizes. Australia needs to think about what kind of hegemon China would be, and become, should it succeed in displacing the United States in Asia. It’s time to think about this awful prospect because under President Donald Trump the US’s commitment to alliances is suddenly looking shaky. And there’s also the risk that even a fully committed US could try and fail to restrain China militarily—for example, in the crucial scenario of defending Taiwan. – It’s time to imagine how China would act as regional hegemon | The Strategist
Russia
(Sergey Sukhankin – The Jamestown Foundation) The European Union’s 14th sanctions included restrictions on the transshipment of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) through EU territory to third-party countries. The sanctions related to contracts signed before June 24, 2024 came into effect on March 26. Russia’s LNG industry faces significant technological and transportation challenges due to dependence on Western technology, withdrawal of key international partners, and uncertainty surrounding alternative foreign and domestic technologies. The intensification of global LNG competition, particularly from the United States and Qatar, coupled with sanctions and lost international partnerships, jeopardizes Russia’s ability to secure future energy markets. – Russia’s Optimistic Outlook in Post-2035 LNG Strategy Faces Long-Term Challenges – Jamestown
Russia – Central Asia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Central Asians have long called for Russia to divert water from Siberian rivers to help them address water shortages, which are a result of rising demand and global warming. These calls have been rebuffed because Russians have feared that it would harm their country, but this is changing because global warming also means that Russia has too much water flowing through these rivers to avoid massive flooding. Russians are increasingly convinced that sending water to Central Asia will win friends, stave off geopolitical competitors, and earn Moscow money despite any such project being hugely expensive and taking years to complete. – Siberian River Diversion to Central Asia May Finally Be Coming – Jamestown
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(Vladimir Socor – The Jamestown Foundation) Moscow is drawing Washington into an incremental, conditions-tied process, instead of a quick and unconditional ceasefire in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The U.S. White House has agreed to “help” Russia mitigate certain Western sanctions—including U.S. ones—that affect Russian agricultural exports. Russia demands the removal of those sanctions and restrictions as a precondition to a ceasefire in the Black Sea theater of war against Ukraine. Given the Trump Administration’s current high priority, Moscow seeks to combine these issues into a potential package deal. Such packaging is an artificial Russian construct, inspired by the defunct Black Sea Grain Initiative of 2022 in a wholly different situation in the Black Sea. Those Western sanctions are not a Black Sea-specific issue but apply across international markets to penalize Russia’s war against Ukraine. – U.S. Preemptive Concessions Gain Nothing From Russia in Ukraine Ceasefire Talks (Part Two) – Jamestown
US – China
(Ved Shinde – The Interpreter) Asked about potential cooperation with China, Donald Trump declared: “China and the United States can together solve all of the problems of the world, if you think about it.” He wants Xi Jinping to visit the United States soon. Trump’s attempt to reach out to China flows from his domestic political proclivity. Contrary to conventional analysis, “Make America Great Again” is a very old and recurring theme of US politics. Apart from fostering Hamiltonian and McKinleyish tendencies for tariffs, Trump borrows heavily from the Jacksonian current of the American Old West. A portrait of “Old Hickory” even adorned the Oval Office during Trump’s first round in Washington. Jacksonians are deeply suspicious of established elites, emphasise a folk community with a common American destiny, and believe in the right to bear arms as core tenets of being American. Lavish consumerism and financial vivacity are also essential ingredients. Talk of the Trump bling? Jacksonians have always loved it. – A grand bargain between Trump and Xi? | Lowy Institute
US – Middle East
(Paul Salem – Middle East Institute) The first 60 days of President Donald Trump’s second term upended domestic politics and policy in the United States as well as dramatically scrambled US relations with allies and foes in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. But in the Middle East, overall American goals have not fundamentally changed. Thus, in its broad outlines, Trump’s Middle East policy is not too divergent from what Joe Biden’s had been. Their shared facets include a strong commitment to Israel’s security along with a desire to bring its recent conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon to an end; a prioritization of a tripartite deal between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel that features Saudi-Israeli normalization but would require some concessions from Israel to the Palestinians; a high valuation of US economic and technological relations with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as an end in itself as well as a way to contain China; and a strong desire to reach a negotiated deal with Iran. What emerges from this demonstrated list of objectives and his administration’s policy steps to date is that Trump is focused on realizing two transformative and valuable breakthroughs that his predecessors failed to accomplish: an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, centered on a tripartite US-Saudi-Israeli deal that would include Saudi-Israeli normalization, and an agreement between the US and Iran. Both would be historical achievements. So far, however, progress in each case has proven difficult and plodding. – The first two months of Trump 2.0 in the Middle East: Hard push for elusive breakthroughs | Middle East Institute
US – North Korea – Mongolia
(Tuvshinzaya Gantulga – The Interpreter) With Donald Trump back in the White House and North Korea’s nuclear program under Kim Jong-un continuing unchecked, another summit between the two leaders seems to be a matter of when, not if. This time, they should meet in Mongolia. The first two Trump-Kim summits produced spectacle but little substance. Singapore offered glamour in 2018 but yielded only vague commitments. Hanoi in 2019 collapsed entirely. Their third meeting on the DMZ was made for the cameras. The diplomatic window closed afterwards as Covid-19 and US domestic politics intervened. – Why Donald Trump should meet Kim Jong-un again – in Mongolia | Lowy Institute
