From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: China-North Korea-US; Indonesia-South China Sea-China; Transitional Mineral Supply Chains-Organised Crime; US; US-China; US-Houthi; US-Iran; US-Middle East-Gulf; Vietnam-US
China – North Korea – US
(Markus Garlauskas, Lauren D. Gilbert, Kyoko Imai – Atlantic Council) A decade from now, the United States is very likely to face operational and strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific even more complex and difficult than those it faces today. The nuclear capabilities of China and North Korea are growing rapidly, and the risk is increasing that a conflict with one would escalate horizontally to a regional conflict involving both. By 2030, China will likely be a near peer to the United States in terms of strategic nuclear capabilities. Its amphibious, air, and strike capabilities could also dramatically improve its ability to project force to Taiwan and the surrounding region. China’s plans, intentions, and timeline for use of force against Taiwan remain topics of heated debate. However, in the next five to ten years, it is plausible that Beijing will consider conditions to be more favorable for a military resolution, even if it is not eager for a global war with the United States. In this same period, North Korea is likely to field a wider range of more precise and effective nonnuclear escalatory options, as well as a robust, mobile, tactical nuclear-missile force—backed by a far more credible capability to retaliate against the region and the continental United States with thermonuclear weapons. These capabilities will provide Pyongyang with its own reasons to consider escalating its use of force against South Korea, though its aims will likely be far more limited than Beijing’s aims for Taiwan. – A rising nuclear double-threat in East Asia: Insights from our Guardian Tiger I and II tabletop exercises – Atlantic Council
Indonesia – South China Sea – China
(Alfin Basundoro, Probo Darono Yakti – East Asia Forum) Indonesia’s reliance on legalism in its South China Sea policy is no longer sufficient against China’s growing assertiveness. To protect its maritime interests, Jakarta must pursue ‘partial multialignment’ — balancing economic ties with China and security partnerships with other regional powers. Upgrading naval and coast guard capabilities, enhancing maritime surveillance and leading regional patrol initiatives are essential to uphold ASEAN centrality and maritime stability. – Indonesia’s South China Sea policy needs more than legalism | East Asia Forum
Transitional Criminal Supply Chains – Organised Crime
(Jennifer Scotland – RUSI) The energy transition, increased defence spending and semiconductor production expansion is driving mineral demand. The International Energy Agency estimates that the market value of transition minerals, including cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, nickel and rare earths, will reach almost $800 billion by 2040, nearly double that of 2023. Geopolitical tensions, trade uncertainties and the geographic concentration of key mineral supply chains in China create a pressing need for states to establish secure supply chains in transition minerals, dubbed ‘the oil, steel and electricity of the 21st century’. The UK seeks to make supply chains more resilient to market shocks by strengthening ties with mineral-rich regions such as Latin America and supporting companies to diversify overseas investments. However, price volatility, concerns around environmental, social and governance (ESG) integrity of mineral supply chains and the competitiveness of Chinese industry pose significant challenges. Certain risks have received limited attention to date, such as the prevalence of organised crime and corruption in Latin America and the ability of organised crime groups (OCGs) and other non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to swiftly adapt to changing market conditions. The expansion of organised crime into illicit gold extraction offers a cautionary tale for government and industry actors with a stake in the clean energy transition. – Gold Rush: Organised Crime in Transition Mineral Supply Chains | Royal United Services Institute
US
(East Asia Forum) The erosion of American soft power, now accelerated by the hollowing out of foreign aid and Washington’s turn to protectionism, marks a retreat from the global influence the United States once wielded. As the US withdraws from development and redirects aid to serve short-term political interests, and China curbs its lending, global support for sustainable economic development is in decline. The collapse of USAID risks deepening global inequality and weakening American influence over time. – Parsimony and protectionism eclipse American soft power | East Asia Forum
US – China
(Zongyuan Zoe Liu – Council on Foreign Relations) The trade talks in Geneva between the United States and China yielded greater-than-expected de-escalation in the ongoing trade war, but it won’t be so easy to undo the damage this skirmish has done to U.S. trade credibility and the role of the dollar on the global stage. The two sides agreed to a point-for-point mutual reduction in their respective tariff rates for an initial period of ninety days, bringing rates down to near the same levels that prevailed before the tit-for-tat escalation. This reduction of 115 percentage points lowers the U.S. tariff rate on Chinese imports to 30 percent and 10 percent on U.S. goods flowing the other way. – Trump’s China Truce on Tariffs Comes with Cost to U.S. Credibility | Council on Foreign Relations
(Atlantic Council) It’s a dramatic de-escalation. On Monday, the United States and China announced that they will temporarily reduce the tariffs the two countries have imposed on one another for ninety days. As US-Chinese trade negotiations continue, Washington will lower its tariffs on Chinese goods from 145 percent to 30 percent, while Beijing will reduce its tariffs on the United States from 125 percent to 10 percent. Global markets reacted positively to the deal reached after talks between US and Chinese officials this past weekend in Geneva. “The consensus from both delegations is that neither side wanted a decoupling,” US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said after the talks concluded. – What to make of the respite in the US-China trade war – Atlantic Council
US – Houthi
(Soufan Center) A ceasefire between the U.S. and the Houthi (Ansarallah) movement of Yemen, announced by President Trump on May 6, will not soon restore freedom of navigation through the Red Sea. The Houthis sought an end to the intensive and continuous U.S. strikes since mid-March, but U.S. acceptance of a ceasefire also demonstrates the limitations of American airpower. The truce does not commit the Houthis to halt missile and drone attacks on Israeli territory or Israel-linked shipping, causing tensions between the U.S. and Israel. The threat from the Houthis, as well as U.S. talks with their main backers in Tehran, will feature prominently in President Trump’s visit this week to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. – U.S.-Houthi Ceasefire Leaves Questions Unanswered – The Soufan Center
US – Iran
(Jonathan Panikoff – Atlantic Council) Sunday’s fourth meeting between US President Donald Trump’s Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi didn’t end with a framework agreement, as reports before the meeting indicated it could. But sufficient progress was apparently made that negotiations will continue, and the sides may have gotten closer together on key differences. That progress comes even as public comments from both sides highlight conflicting redlines, suggesting that behind closed doors, one or both sides are willing to be more flexible than they’re saying in public. It could also mean that either Iran or the United States is confident it can convince the other side to move off its current position. If Iran and the United States ultimately bridge these differences and reach a deal, how will we know if it’s a good one? – From A to F, here’s how to grade a possible nuclear deal with Iran – Atlantic Council
US – Middle East – Gulf
(Sanam Vakil – Chatham House) Eight years to the day from his memorable 2017 state visit to Saudi Arabia, US President Donald Trump is again returning to the Gulf region this week. This broader tour is designed to foster economic partnerships, defence cooperation and regional diplomacy in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha. Trump is returning to a very different Middle East. Regional approaches to urgent issues have changed: Gulf leaders have entered a new era of pragmatic diplomacy and de-escalation, asserting greater autonomy and maturity in foreign policy decisions. They ultimately seek to present themselves as strong regional partners for the US while they navigate a shifting multi-aligned world. Meanwhile, hanging over all discussions will be the war in Gaza. Any kind of significant progress on that issue looks unlikely, as Israel presses its military operations – but nothing can be entirely ruled out with a president whose sudden policy shifts have continued to surprise the region. – Trump’s Gulf trip will bring fanfare and mega deals – but meaningful regional progress looks uncertain | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Clayton Seigle – Center for Strategic & International Studies) President Trump’s two-day visit to Saudi Arabia is expected to focus on bilateral deals, including a Saudi pledge to invest $600 billion in the United States. Cooperation on arms deals and a civil nuclear program for Riyadh are said to be on the agenda. Trump and his host, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, will surely also discuss regional hot spots, including Gaza, Yemen, and Iran. – With Extra Oil, Trump Already Has His Big Saudi Win
(Paul Salem, Daniel Benaim, F. Gregory Gause, III, Karen E. Young, Brian Katulis, Alex Vatanka, Ross Harrison, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Charles Lister, Gönül Tol, Fadi Nicholas Nassar, Intissar Fakir, Jonathan M. Winer, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Iulia-Sabina Joja – Middle East Institute) This week, US President Donald Trump makes his inaugural visit to the Middle East since the start of his second term, traveling to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates on May 13-16. Amid the heightened focus on US policy toward the Middle East, MEI’s experts take stock of Trump’s trip to the Gulf, how his administration has shaped its approach to the wider region in its first several months, and how regional actors are responding to the policies coming out of Washington. – Trump travels to a Middle East in transition | Middle East Institute
Vietnam – US
(Vu Lam – East Asia Forum) The United States’ unpredictable trade policy, marked by a 90-day tariff suspension, poses major risks for export-reliant nations like Vietnam. While short-term relief followed tariff reversals, long-term stability requires strategic adjustments. Vietnam must diversify its markets, shift towards high-value industries and deepen multilateral engagements to mitigate risks. Strengthening regional ties, advancing technological sectors and pursuing economic reforms will enhance resilience and prepare Vietnam for the uncertainties of a geopolitically charged global trade environment. – Vietnam faces the fallout of US trade volatility | East Asia Forum
