From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: China; China – Europe; China – Kurdistan Region of Iraq; China – Taiwan; China – US; Cook Islands – China; Germany; India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor; Indonesia; Libya; Middle East; Pacific; Russia; Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond); US – China; US – Iran; US – Moldova; US – South Korea; US Tariffs
China
(Conor Kennedy – The Jamestown Foundation) The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is currently implementing its 14th Five-Year Plan, which expands in part on major successes seen in the 13th Five-Year Plan. Key areas of PLAN improvement in the previous Five-Year Plan include the construction of new vessels and an improved logistical system, expansions in infrastructure, better availability of medical treatment, and more rigorous financial oversight. The PLAN views logistics as being particularly susceptible to corruption and has made cracking down on it a key policy goal. Collectively, these efforts are expected to promote force readiness and potentially attract better talent to the naval profession. – Behind the Fleet: The PLAN Reviews Logistics Development in the 13th Five-Year Plan – Jamestown
(K. Tristan Tang – The Jamestown Foundation) Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong’s absence from an important public event, one attended by all Politburo members except him, suggests that he is either seriously ill or under investigation. The latter possibility would suggest that Xi Jinping may have lost confidence in him. He Weidong is responsible for overseeing the military’s political and disciplinary affairs, but his personnel management and promotion recommendations since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 have raised significant issues. Many key generals, upon promotion, were found to have corruption problems. He Weidong came up through the Nanjing Military Region, as did recently purged senior officials Tang Yong and Miao Hua. Xi Jinping may view their rise as containing elements of factionalism and cronyism, likely contributing to a loss of trust in He Weidong. Xi’s wider distrust is evident in the removal of Li Ganjie from his role overseeing personnel for the Party and government. If He Weidong has been purged, the PLA does not have suitable candidates within its ranks to replace him. – He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit With the PLA – Jamestown
(John Fitzgerald – The Strategist) All nation states have a right to defend themselves. But do regimes enjoy an equal right to self-defence? Is the security of a particular party-in-power a fundamental right of nations? The Chinese government is asking us to answer in the affirmative. Australians need to say no. As a governing regime, the Chinese Communist Party claims many of the prerogatives of a nation state. This includes a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force—Max Weber’s classic definition of a state. As the world adjusts to the rise of China, its leaders want us to make way for the CCP’s triumphal arrival as the regime that made it all possible. This includes recognition of the party’s right to self-preservation on par with the rights of nations. – Whatever the CCP says, regimes don’t have the rights of nations | The Strategist
China – Europe
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) Beijing sees a strategic window of opportunity to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe and improve its economic and trading relationship with the European Union. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Party’s International Department have used a number of bilateral channels in the last two months to encourage European interlocutors to promote Beijing’s preferences at the European level. Some experts in the People’s Republic of China are skeptical that Beijing can successfully persuade Europe to pivot away from the United States but nevertheless view attempting to do so as a worthwhile course of action. Certain statements from senior EU officials and other EU member-state politicians indicate a willingness to entertain Beijing’s overtures. – The PRC Sees ‘Window of Opportunity’ With Europe – Jamestown
China – Kurdistan Region of Iraq
(Winthrop Rodgers, Sardar Aziz – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) As the world’s largest nation without a state of their own, Kurdish politicians in Iraq have long prioritized robust and visible relationships with foreign powers as a means to ensure the leaders and interests of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region (KRI) remain relevant amid changing geopolitical tides. For foreign governments, this welcoming atmosphere provides an opportunity to nurture the green shoots of soft power, often in the most ordinary ways. Given the longstanding role of U.S. foreign aid in the KRI, Chinese soft power efforts and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG)’s response may provide a bell weather for how other longstanding U.S. allies respond to the shift in American attitudes towards aid and its attendant soft power. – China Flexes its Soft Power in the KRI | The Washington Institute
China – Taiwan
(Tai-yuan Yang, K. Tristan Tang – The Jamestown Foundation) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operations against Taiwan on April 1–2 consisted of multiple drills that had limited interconnection, distinguishing them from exercises that tend to be more complex and confrontational. Recent training reforms have meant that drills now tend to involve more cross-service coordination and are likely to match the scale of military exercises. The “Strait Thunder-2025A” drill is evidence of this trend, as its scale is comparable to past “Joint Sword” exercises. “Strait Thunder-2025A” exhibited a new focus on chokepoint control with the emergence of a dual-layer “Cabbage Strategy,” in which an inner circle of maritime militia, coast guard, and naval forces surrounds Taiwan while a separate outer circle harrasses foreign military forces. The name of the drill, “Strait Thunder-2025A,” suggests that the PLA is likely to conduct additional such drills this year. It also hints that future exercises could exceed the scale of previous Joint Sword military exercises. – ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ Drill Implies Future Increase in PLA Pressure on Taiwan – Jamestown
China – US
(Jackson Smith, Cristina Garafola – The Jamestown Foundation) Space industry experts within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have observed and drawn lessons from the United States’s use of space as a warfighting domain since the 1990s. These experts tend to characterize the deployment of proliferated low earth orbit (pLEO) constellations, such as the privately-owned Starlink constellation, as an application of the Department of Defense’s resilient space concept. The PLA views Starlink as challenging its core operational concept of multi-domain precision warfare due to the decentralized nature of pLEO constellations. It attributes many unconfirmed, hyperbolic capabilities to Starlink, which contributes to the belief that Starlink is creating a strategic imbalance between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in space. The PRC has begun developing its own comparable megaconstellation, Project SatNet, which PLA analysts see as enabling similar capabilities to Starlink and which they also envision as countering Starlink. – PLA Perceptions of and Reactions to U.S. Military Activities in Low Earth Orbit – Jamestown
(Xing Jiaying – East Asia Forum) In 2025, China is better prepared to counter renewed tariffs from Trump’s second administration compared to the 2018 US–China trade war. This increased preparedness is shaped by past trade war experiences and Beijing’s perception of Washington’s China policy and Trump’s negotiation style. While China possesses a broad range of economic measures at its disposal, including sanctions and export controls, its responses so far have remained restrained in both scale and intensity. This well-prepared yet restrained response results from adaptation and rational calculation, reflecting China’s delicate balancing act — projecting strength and improving its bargaining position while not overplaying its hand in great power competition. – Beijing’s expanding policy tools aim to trump US tariffs | East Asia Forum
Cook Islands – China
(James Chin – East Asia Forum) The Cook Islands’ deepening economic ties with China are reshaping regional dynamics, challenging Australia and New Zealand’s traditional influence. While Chinese investments offer financial gains for the Cook Islands, they also risk creating long-term dependencies that could shift its political orientation. Australia and New Zealand face difficulties in countering China’s presence due to domestic challenges and outdated engagement strategies. To remain influential, Australia and New Zealand must adapt by fostering partnerships based on respect for local autonomy, development and shared interests. – Cook Islands–China deals make waves in the Pacific | East Asia Forum
Germany
(Jackson Janes – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Coalition building is difficult in most parliamentary systems given the number of people involved in reaching a consensus among parties. That the talks to put together a new government in Berlin have successfully concluded in just over six weeks underscores the urgency that the negotiators from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Chrisian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) know is required to confront challenges ahead. The need for moving from intentions as outlined in the 144 pages of the coalition agreement to implementation will be the measure of success in the domestic and international political arenas. – Speed is of the Essence | German Marshall Fund of the United States
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor
(Kristina Kausch – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Indian President Narendra Modi has been busy. Between February and April, he visited his counterparts in the United States, the UAE, Italy, and France. Saudi Arabia is coming up. The thread through all of these visits is Modi’s push for a revamp of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the large-scale generational infrastructure project connecting Asia to Europe and the United States via the Middle East. Touted as a potential counterweight to China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), the multi-nodal connectivity project was announced with great fanfare by the signatories at the 2023 G20 summit in Delhi. But it was stalled only months later by the outbreak of war in the Middle East, one of the project’s central hubs. – IMEC’s Comeback | German Marshall Fund of the United States
Indonesia
(Mohd. Yunus – The Interpreter) Indonesia recently decided to involve military forces in forest protection, focusing on Sumatra and Kalimantan, where illegal palm oil plantations and mining activities have caused vast environmental destruction. Like the use of armed rangers using “shoot-to-kill“ policies against suspected poachers in Africa, Indonesia’s actions fuel the growing debate over militarised conservation and its many ethical and legal dilemmas. The challenge presents around the world. In Brazil’s Amazon region, for example, military forces have been mobilised to crack down on illegal logging and mining, sometimes leading to violent confrontations with local communities. Militarised conservation has led to severe social consequences and human rights abuses, often harming the very communities it aims to protect. Reports have documented extrajudicial killings, violent evictions, and wrongful arrests of indigenous peoples and local populations who depend on forests for their livelihoods. – From park rangers to armed guards: Indonesia takes a risky approach to forest protection | Lowy Institute
(Gatra Priyandita, Christian Guntur Lebang – The Strategist) The Indonesian military has a new role in cybersecurity but, worryingly, no clear doctrine on what to do with it nor safeguards against human rights abuses. Assignment of cyber responsibility to the military is part of controversial amendments to the Armed Forces Law which the parliament passed in March and which significantly broadened the armed forces’ role in civilian governance. The government says these amendments are crucial for strengthening Indonesia’s capabilities in information operations, with the military playing a pivotal role in safeguarding national interests in cyberspace. Military officials have also said the military’s cyber capabilities will not be used to police digital spaces or restrict freedom of expression. They point to the establishment of the Singaporean armed forces’ cyber force in 2022 as a precedent and to cyber operations in the Russia-Ukraine war as developments the amendments aim to address. – Indonesia’s cyber soldiers: armed without a compass | The Strategist
Libya
(The Soufan Center) Libyan authorities recently ordered ten international aid organizations to suspend their operations and close offices in the country, accusing them of providing humanitarian assistance to help resettle African migrants in “a plot” to change the demographic composition of Libyan society. The statement reflects similar incendiary comments from Tunisian President Kais Saied in 2023, echoing the white supremacist “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory. Libya remains a key transit point for refugees and migrants attempting to reach Europe, with those intercepted in the Mediterranean often subjected to numerous human rights violations and abuses in Libyan detention centers. Italy, under far-right Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, has become a central enforcer of Europe’s increasingly securitized migration policies, prioritizing political gain over human rights concerns and signaling a broader European Union (EU) shift towards normalizing hardline approaches to migration. – As Aid Groups are Expelled, Libya Remains a Key Player on Migration – The Soufan Center
Middle East
(Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, Conor Warren, Brian Carter – Institute for the Study of War)
Nuclear Negotiations with Iran: Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions.
Iranian Negotiation Calculus: Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people. Khamenei agreed to these negotiations as a means to preserve regime stability rather than solely a desire to improve his economy.
Iranian Red Lines in Negotiations: An IRGC-affiliated outlet reported that Iran will emphasize its red lines—no threats, no excessive demands, and no discussion of its defense sector—and signal readiness for “continued negotiations” if the United States acts in good faith during negotiations.
Iran in Iraq: Saudi outlet Asharq al Awsat reported on April 10 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in late 2024 to prepare to defend unidentified Iranian interests if negotiations with the United States “falter.” Iran also deployed a “small Iranian team” to ensure Iraqi militias respond as directed, illustrating the degree of coordination between Iran and its proxies and partners in Iraq.
Syrian Government and Security Forces: An armed group in Daraa Province has only nominally integrated into government security forces and continues to pursue its parochial interests, which demonstrates the political challenges Damascus faces as it attempts to exert its control over Syria’s armed groups. Recent violence in Daraa Province and other reports also demonstrate the mixed reliability of the General Security Service, the Syrian transitional government’s gendarmerie.
Truth and Reconciliation in Syria: President Ahmed al Shara extended the mandate of a commission to investigate violence on the Syrian coast by three more months. The success of the commission will be determined by the government’s ability to prosecute the perpetrators of the violence, regardless of their sect. The commission has reported that unspecified groups are intimidating Western Syrian residents. This intimidation indicates that either insurgents retain significant influence in the countryside or the Sunni groups responsible for sectarian violence have continued to intimidate civilians.
US Deployments in the Middle East: The US military deployed a Patriot battalion from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East. An open-source analyst also published satellite imagery of two US-flagged oil tankers at Diego Garcia Island on April 10.
Iran Update, April 11, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
Pacific
(Blake Johnson, Adam Ziogas – The Strategist) The Pacific Response Group (PRG), a new disaster coordination organisation, has operated through its first high-risk weather season. But as representatives from each Pacific military leave Brisbane to return to their home countries for the winter, there is still plenty of work to do. The PRG should focus on two key priorities. Firstly, it should engage all members of the Pacific Islands Forum to highlight how the PRG can benefit them as it grows and expands. Secondly, it should consult with regional partners and organisations on the development of operating frameworks to facilitate the group’s deployment. – The Pacific Response Group is making pleasing progress but needs more buy-in | The Strategist
Russia
(Denis Mikhailov – The Jamestown Foundation) The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has evolved from a traditional security agency into a political repression tool, prioritizing control of dissent rather than addressing actual security threats. The FSB controls key Russian state institutions—including the police, judiciary, and prosecutors—creating a security infrastructure where almost all arms of law enforcement operate under its direct authority. Legislation and military censorship laws have armed the FSB with sweeping powers to target critics of Russia’s war against Ukraine, enabling politically motivated prosecutions under the guise of national security. Surveillance technologies, covert intimidation, and blackmail are used extensively against opposition leaders and journalists, illustrating the regime’s effort to suppress civic engagement and erode public trust. Targeted violence and suspected state-sponsored assassinations of opposition figures indicate systematic use of lethal force, echoing Cold War-era KGB tactics in today’s Russia. – Russia’s FSB and Law Enforcement Tactics Suppress Opposition – Jamestown
(Kateryna Stepanenko – Institute for The Study of War) Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned former 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Commander Major General Ivan Popov to command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine — a demotion and effectively a death sentence — after Popov publicly appealed to Putin for his reinstatement to active military duty. Popov’s lawyer, Sergey Buynovsky, announced on April 9 that Popov, who has been under arrest since May 2024, signed a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and will return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending criminal trial. A Russian security official later revealed to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 9 that Popov will assume command of an unspecified “Storm Z” penal detachment operating in Ukraine. Such an assignment is effectively a death sentence because the Russian military command primarily uses “Storm Z” penal detachments in suicidal frontal assaults. Popov’s assignment to command such a unit after having commanded a field army is a punishment and a severe demotion rather than a return to his military career. The Kremlin ”reinstated” Popov after he published an open letter to Putin on March 20, 2025, accusing the Russian military court of subjecting him to “unfounded prosecution” and unwarranted dismissal from the Russian Armed Forces. Popov appealed to Putin as his “most important commander” to “sort out the situation” and reinstate him in active military service, claiming that he is a “faithful soldier” for whom “the army is the whole meaning of life.” Popov also pledged loyalty to the Russian military and claimed that Putin is his “moral guide and role model.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on March 21, 2025, that Putin had been notified of the letter at the time, and Russian state media outlets later framed Popov’s reported return to the frontlines as Putin’s response to the appeal. Peskov refused to comment on Popov’s intent to return to the battlefield as of April 10. – The Kremlin Sentenced a Popular Russian General to Lead a Penal Assault Detachment in Ukraine | Institute for the Study of War
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Anna Harvey, Frederick W. Kagan – Institute for Study of War)
Ukraine’s European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11.
US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.
Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia’s unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace settlement.
Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in Ukraine.
Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will prioritize in Spring and Summer 2024. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia’s large-scale and long-term investments in Russia’s navy and naval strategic nuclear forces.
Russian forces recently executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian opposition media provided additional details regarding Russia’s efforts to recruit Chinese citizens to serve in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
US – China
(Atlantic Council) The bottom has fallen out of US-China trade ties. The world’s two largest economies have imposed massive tariffs on each other that will sharply curtail trade between the two sides. While the disruption will undoubtedly have across-the-board effects on global supply chains, if it is sustained, two markets will be directly and immediately impacted: soybeans and lithium-ion storage batteries. Though a major and sustained trade spat between Beijing and Washington would undoubtedly inflict major damage on the global economy, it could also provide limited, discrete opportunities for other actors. For example, Brazil could increase exports of soybeans to the People’s Republic of China, while Taiwan and South Korea could find it economically useful and politically convenient to ramp up purchases of US soybeans. Meanwhile, the US battery-storage sector faces profound uncertainty due to the tariffs, but it could emerge stronger over the long term. Imposing large tariffs on China carries undeniable risks—and any decoupling of the two massive economies will bring pain, especially in the short term. Yet the crisis also presents opportunities to draw the United States and its allies and partners closer on discrete issues, even as broader, US-driven uncertainty continues to persist. – Want to understand the US-China trade war? Start with soybeans and batteries. – Atlantic Council
US – Iran
(Michael Froman – Council on Foreign Relations) During a week in which the volatility of markets mirrored the fluctuations in the president’s tariff policy, one might expect this to be a piece about trade. I’m sure there’ll be many more opportunities to address those issues, but I thought we could all use a break from 24/7 tariff discussions. I know I could. This weekend, the United States and Iran are set to hold their first talks on Tehran’s nuclear program since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House. In 2018, Trump withdrew from the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, which the Barack Obama administration struck with Iran—in partnership with China, the European Union (EU), France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia—because he believed it to be “a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made.” Last month, Axios reported that Trump gave the Islamic Republic a two-month deadline to reach a new agreement to restrict their nuclear program: “If they don’t make a deal, there will be bombing…bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.” – Deal or No Deal (Iran, Not Tariffs) | Council on Foreign Relations
(Daniel B. Shapiro – Atlantic Council) US President Donald Trump has worked quickly to overcome Iranian resistance to nuclear talks, now set to launch in Oman on April 12. Trump has been clear in his desire to resolve the issue diplomatically and avoid war in the Middle East. But he and his team surely know that within a relatively short time, he is likely to face the decision point on whether or not to pursue a military strike. The timing, need, and opportunity may never be more compelling. And, arguably, a military option is more feasible now than at any time in recent decades. Trump has set a sixty-day target to reach a deal. The Iranians will be adept at extending that timeline. But if negotiations peter out and the looming reimposition of sanctions—the snapback—occurs, with an Iranian response, Washington will reach a crisis. For Trump, that will be the point of decision over escalation. – The Iran nuclear talks are Trump’s decisive moment on military strikes – Atlantic Council
(Jonathan Campbell-James – The Interpreter) The United States chose veteran Emirati diplomat Anwar Gargash to deliver President Donald Trump’s message offering direct talks to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reinforcing an open message to Iran that Trump would much rather pursue negotiations than military options. Gargash flew to Tehran to deliver the letter on 12 March, meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Reflecting splits within the senior Iranian leadership, local media were at first reluctant to admit that the letter had been passed on to its intended recipient. But its contents appear, as intended, to have kicked off a dialogue process, even if the Iranians have insisted that the dialogue should be via Oman. Negotiations between US Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff and Araghchi are scheduled to start in Muscat on Saturday, 12 April. – Why Oman? Explaining the choice of venue for US-Iran talks | Lowy Institute
US – Moldova
(Elias Yousif, Rachel Stohl – Stimson Center) Amidst a period of hard-fought transformation, Moldova is on a nascent but promising path toward security, economic development, and democratization. But despite recent progress, there remain significant headwinds. At an especially pivotal moment, stronger, more deeply ingrained cooperation with the United States has the potential to sustain and expand on Moldova’s early successes. Based on two expert roundtables, a public event, desk research, and supplementary consultations, this white paper presents initial insights on building a stronger architecture for the U.S.-Moldova partnership. The paper covers three overarching partnership areas – defense and security, development and foreign investment, and democratization and political resilience. For each, the paper summarizes the current landscape, draws on insights from experts, and suggests next steps for both Washington and Chișinău. – The Future of the U.S.-Moldova Partnership • Stimson Center
US – South Korea
(J. James Kim – Stimson Center) The United States faces a critical challenge in modernizing its naval fleet to counter China’s rapidly expanding maritime dominance. With China’s shipbuilding capacity dwarfing that of the United States, South Korea emerges as a promising partner to address this gap. As one of the world’s top shipbuilders, South Korea offers advanced technology, efficiency, and scale that could revitalize the US shipbuilding industry. A partnership could not only strengthen US-South Korea security ties but also create economic opportunities for both nations. However, significant barriers remain. US regulatory hurdles and national security concerns complicate collaboration. Overcoming these challenges through policy change and innovative industrial cooperation could unlock a win-win solution—boosting US naval readiness while ensuring South Korea remains competitive against China. – Waypoints and Course Adjustments Towards Naval Shipbuilding Cooperation with South Korea • Stimson Center
US Tariffs
(Hung Tran – Atlantic Council) The imposition of US tariffs and retaliatory tariffs by some trading partners, combined with a ninety-day pause of most “reciprocal” tariffs by US President Donald Trump, have led to extreme financial market volatility in recent days. While the equity market gyrations have occurred in relatively orderly market conditions so far, some recent developments have signaled that selling pressure may have spread to other markets—particularly US Treasury securities and short-term US dollar funding. To understand the financial stability impacts of the current market turmoil, it is important to monitor the pressure on these markets, which are crucial for the smooth functioning of the global financial system. Left unaddressed, these strains could trigger a freezing up of financial markets, raising the risk of a serious financial crisis. – To understand the impact of Trump’s tariff war, watch the bond market and the Fed—not just the stock market – Atlantic Council
(Navin Girishankar, Andrea Leonard Palazzi – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The Trump administration’s 90-day pause on “Liberation Day” reciprocal tariffs – meant to revive declining U.S. manufacturing jobs – offers a window of opportunity for U.S. policymakers to focus on the enduring source of U.S. economic advantage: technology innovation. – Can Tariffs Revive U.S. Manufacturing Jobs?
(Michael Pezzullo – The Strategist) The world is trying to make sense of the Trump tariffs. Is there a grand design and strategy, or is it all instinct and improvisation? But much more important is the question of what will now happen, as new possibilities emerge from the shock effect of the tariff announcements and from subsequent moves and counter-moves. For many, the United States is behaving erratically and imprudently, not least by lashing out at its allies and partners and by confusing financial markets. It’s risking its credibility by engaging in what appear to be irrational and self-harming actions that have already generated systemic financial shocks. Confidence in US leadership and economic rationality is being shaken. – Reset Pax Americana: the West needs a grand accord | The Strategist
(Penny Naas – German Marshall Fund of the United States) US President Donald Trump posted on social media on April 9 that he would be suspending certain tariffs for 90 days. Markets soared. The higher tariffs (known as the “reciprocal” tariffs) went into effect just 13 hours before the president’s announcement, which covered the 57 countries that have trade deficits with the United States. At the same time, however, Trump upped tariffs on China to 125% while leaving the rate for the rest of the world at 10%. Goods from Canada and Mexico that are not North American-made under the provisions of the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA) are also subject to 25% levies, while sectoral tariffs on steel, iron, aluminum, and autos are at 25%. If a product contains more than 20% US content by value, the tariffs are assessed only on non-US content. – A Pause in the Battle | German Marshall Fund of the United States
