From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.
Today’s about: China; COP30; Ethiopia-Eritrea; EU; Eurasian Economic Union; EU-Ukraine; India; Iraq; Kenya; Quad; Russia-GCC; US; US-China; US-India; US-Venezuela
China
(Alice C. Hill and Mia Beams – Council on Foreign Relations) In September, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled China’s updated nationally determined contribution (NDC) for 2035. Under this climate action plan, which each country is committed to submitting every five years under the 2015 Paris Agreement, China pledged to start cutting total emissions from their its highest point by 2035, boost clean energy to about 30 percent of its energy use, expand wind and solar power, increase forest growth, and stay on track for climate neutrality before 2060. Given that China by far is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gasses, their its NDC was panned as weak by various commentators, including environmental groups, government negotiators, and think tanks. While Beijing’s lack of ambition highlights the challenge of generating sufficient action within the UN climate accord process, it also increases the risk that other nations will be similarly unambitious in their commitments. – China’s Latest Climate Pledges Fall Short of What’s Needed at COP30 | Council on Foreign Relations
COP30
(Observer Research Foundation) COP30 in Belém, Brazil, marks a pivotal inflection point in the climate regime—a full decade since the Paris Agreement reset the world’s climate governance architecture around nationally determined contributions (NDCs), transparency, and collective ambition. As the first Global Stocktake (GST) reveals the distance between pledges and pathways, COP30 must transition the global community from incrementalism to integrated implementation. The decade ahead will test whether nations can deliver development that is not merely low-carbon, but climate-aligned—anchored in resilience, equity, and systemic transformation. For India and the Global South, the “Implementation COP” presents both opportunity and scrutiny. Expectations will centre on operationalising the Paris Agreement’s core articles: raising ambition in the next generation of NDCs (Article 4); delivering credible adaptation frameworks and National Adaptation Plans (Article 7); strengthening transparency and accountability systems (Article 13); mobilising predictable finance and technology transfer (Articles 9–10); and defining what just transition means for emerging economies. This series, “Expectations from COP30”, will decode these negotiations across interlinked themes such as water, health, food security, transport, climate finance, energy transition, and gender. They assess what COP30 must deliver to bridge the implementation gap and restore credibility to the Paris promise. – Expectations from COP30
(Kyle Chan, Manann Donoghoe, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Samantha Gross, Caren Grown, Laura Martinez, Dafna H. Rand, and David G. Victor – Brookings) From November 10-21, the 2025 United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as the Conference of the Parties (COP30), will take place in Belém, Brazil. Below, Brookings scholars assess potential outcomes from COP30. – What will COP30 mean for climate action? | Brookings
Ethiopia – Eritrea
(The Soufan Center) Earlier this week, authorities in Ethiopia’s Afar region accused the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of launching a fresh wave of attacks into Afar from Tigray in supposed violation of a 2022 peace deal that ended Ethiopia’s brutal northern war. Although the Pretoria Agreement formally ended the fighting between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF, relations with neighboring Eritrea –– which was involved in the war but excluded from the peace agreement –– began to deteriorate. Tensions between the neighbors have escalated over the past year, particularly over Red Sea access, with Ethiopia notifying the UN Secretary-General in October that Eritrea was “actively preparing for war,” and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed warning weeks later that once war begins, “no one can stop us.”. A war in this region could disrupt maritime traffic, threaten Red Sea port infrastructure, and draw in outside powers invested in the area, while also further destabilizing a region already contending with multiple crises. – Ethiopia and Eritrea Edge Toward a Renewed War in the Horn of Africa – The Soufan Center
EU
(Guillaume Gandelin – Observer Research Foundation) Soul-searching in the European capitals has only deepened since the start of Trump’s second presidency, with European Union (EU) members now questioning whether Washington’s once-ironclad security guarantees will endure. This bewilderment when facing a potential US disengagement in the Old Continent was evidently best captured during Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Forum in February 2025. In light of the recent Munich episode, several EU member states have started to openly express their interest in France’s nuclear deterrent, which remains the EU’s only one since Brexit. This development is seen as a way to partially address Europe’s security needs, particularly by Poland and Germany. Taking up on these initiatives, President Macron spoke of a “European dimension” of France’s deterrent during an interview for a French channel in May 2025. Behind the high-pitched rhetoric, the newfound interest in a “Europeanisation” of the French deterrent is nothing if not. However fraught and sensitive the concept might be, exploring its historical, political, and operational ramifications is imperative. – France’s Nuclear Deterrent and Europe’s Shifting Security Future
Eurasian Economic Union
(Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash – Observer Research Foundation) Established in 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is the culmination of efforts undertaken to institutionalise economic regionalism in the post-Soviet space. Comprising Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, the Union is conceived as a supranational framework inspired by the European Union, designed to facilitate the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour, and to promote coordinated economic policies across member states. Over the past decade, the EAEU has undergone a transformative evolution, not only enhancing economic linkages among member countries but also attracting interest from external partners, including states, regional organisations, and transnational institutions. Nevertheless, despite strong political commitment, the Union’s effectiveness continues to be constrained by persistent geopolitical frictions and structural disparities among its members. Against this backdrop, tracing the development of neo-regionalism in Eurasia and charting its future trajectory merit continued scrutiny. – One Step Forward and Two Steps Back: The EAEU @10
EU – Ukraine
(Shairee Malhotra – Observer Research Foundation) On 29 October, a revised EU-Ukraine trade agreement came into effect. The current agreement is an updated version of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), envisaged as a key pillar of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that was negotiated in 2014 and fully implemented in 2017. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, EU trade with Ukraine has taken place under a temporary framework of “Autonomous Trade Measures” (ATMs), which remained in place from June 2022 until June 2025 to sustain Kyiv’s wartime economy. Driven by Moscow’s blockade of Kyiv’s key trading routes through the Black Sea, these measures suspended duties and quotas in favour of full trade liberalisation aimed at supporting the Ukrainian economy through preferential market access. At the end of June 2025, the EU and Ukraine agreed to review the DCTA, with the new text adopted through qualified majority in the European Council and binding for at least three years. – A Balanced and Sustainable Framework for EU-Ukraine Trade
India
(Nimisha Chadha – Observer Research Foundation) World Immunisation Day, celebrated annually on 10 November, aims to raise awareness about the importance of getting vaccinated. Earlier in the year, the World Immunisation Week’s theme for 2025, held from 24-30 April, was “Immunisation for all is humanly possible.” In this context, while India has one of the largest immunisation programmes globally, targeting pregnant women and children, efforts toward adult immunisation often fall behind. India’s immunisation programmes have been the most effective and cost-efficient health interventions for controlling the spread of diseases, disease eradication, and saving millions of lives every year among children and pregnant women. A study found that India’s Universal Immunisation Programme (UIP) for children increased weekly wages by 13.8 percent, providing long-term benefits across health and economic outcomes. This study highlights that vaccination is not just a health intervention, but an investment in human capital that yields returns through multiple pathways throughout the life course. – Investing in Lifelong Health: Adult Vaccines in India’s Public Health Agenda
Iraq
(Yerevan Saeed – Atlantic Council) Iraq approaches its sixth parliamentary election with few crises, little violence, and an elite consensus to keep the machinery of government turning. But this apparent quiet is not an indication of the country’s long-term stability. The essential features of Iraqi politics—informal decision-making that precedes formal ratification, the quota-based muhasasa that trades portfolios for loyalty, and factious security forces—remain unchanged. The November 11 election will bring some change. The vote will likely redistribute parliamentary weight and speed government formation, especially with influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr out of the fray. Yet the election will not alter the fundamentals of power in Iraq. The country’s trajectory over the next year will be determined less by the ballot results and more by how leaders answer a few important post-election questions: Who will emerge in bargaining over government ministries? Can Baghdad and Erbil codify a predictable fiscal and hydrocarbon settlement after a government is formed? And can the state find solutions to four slow-burning stressors in Iraqi society—water and climate problems, migration-aggravated tension in cities, narcotics trafficking, and the over-centralization of power in the capital? For outside partners, especially the United States, the best approach in the post-election period will be neither maximalist condition-setting nor strategic indifference. Instead, partners should exercise targeted leverage to use this moment of relative political calm to establish institutional rules. – Dispatch from Baghdad: Don’t confuse the calm around Iraq’s election with stability – Atlantic Council
Kenya
(Pranoy Jainendran – Observer Research Foundation) The 2022 Kenyan general elections marked a new phase in electoral dynamics. It was the first recorded instance in which artificial intelligence (AI) tools were deployed at a national level in Africa to safeguard against targeted polarisation during electoral processes. The national initiative, led by the Maintaining Peace through Early Warning, Monitoring and Analysis Consortium (MAPEMA), introduced the global community to the application of AI technologies in safeguarding electoral integrity and ethically monitoring public sentiment throughout the election period. This was done by ensuring healthy communication with voters and protecting them against targeted polarisation through social media platforms. The planning and implementation of the system employed in Kenya represented a significant advancement in the integration of AI within political frameworks. Nonetheless, the experience also highlighted critical areas requiring further analysis to ensure the security and integrity of elections as AI tools become increasingly common in the political landscape. This article examines the fundamental tenets demonstrated by the Kenyan initiative that merit replication in future undertakings in other electoral processes. It also analyses its relevance for India. – AI and Electoral Integrity: Insights from Kenya’s 2022 Elections
Quad
(Lakshmy Ramakrishnan – Observer Research Foundation) Biotechnology is a critical and emerging technology with wide-ranging applications in human medicine, biodefence, nutrition, and the use of bio-based materials. This positions it as a key driver of geopolitical influence and a pillar of global health security, where innovations shape disease surveillance and enable the development of medical countermeasures. Recognising biotechnology as an upcoming frontier in technology competition, the Quad countries—the United States, Australia, India, and Japan—have taken steps to integrate it into their national strategies. Given the need to balance technological sovereignty with cooperation amid growing geopolitical uncertainties, the Quad can serve as a platform for aligning national capabilities in biotechnology and advancing allied health solutions. This paper explores the platform’s evolving role in promoting health security in the Indo-Pacific and identifies areas for collaboration in biotechnology research and development. – Quad Cooperation in Biotechnology: A New Frontier for Health Security in the Indo-Pacific
Russia – GCC
(Lillian Aronson – Observer Research Foundation) Russia–GCC relations are strengthening. Last month’s Russia–GCC Strategic Dialogue and the launch of scheduled direct flights between Saudi Arabia and Moscow are just two recent examples of this growing engagement. Strengthening the relationship is mutually beneficial: Russia needs partners since it remains cut off from the West, and the Gulf states seek multi-alignment in the changing global order. Yet the partnership is best understood as one of pragmatic, issue-based cooperation rather than strategic alignment, with a legacy rooted in the Cold War. – Russia–GCC Relations Revisited: Limits and New Opportunities
US
(Clayton Swope and Kari A. Bingen – CSIS) In a speech on November 7, 2025, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced new measures to accelerate the fielding of new technology and advanced capabilities—complementing plans announced in August 2025 to transform the military requirements process. Among the many important structural and policy changes he outlined, one stood out: forthcoming guidance on how the Pentagon intends to provide “stable, clear, and consistent demand signals for industry to invest and scale production of lethal capabilities.” Persistent uncertainty in long-term defense spending levels, fluctuations in demand, and perennial priority shifts have long deterred business partners from making early capital commitments. At the heart of this challenge is trust—the Pentagon should want to instill in industry partners that it will ultimately buy what it says it will. If industry does not have confidence that the military will stick to its budget plans, it will hesitate to make the capital expenditures (capex) and private investments desired by Pentagon leaders. In short, the Pentagon needs to be a better customer. – If the Pentagon Wants More Speed and Scale, It Should Be a Better Customer
(Erin D. Dumbacher, Michael C. Horowitz, and Lauren Kahn – Council on Foreign Relations) U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced “a war of bureaucratic attrition” in a speech on Friday afternoon. The target of his address was the Pentagon’s perennially-criticized process for buying and fielding military capabilities. The first weapon in this bureaucratic war is a memo reportedly titled “Transforming the Warfighting Acquisition System to Accelerate Fielding of Capabilities,” based on an early draft the media acquired last week, which directs a sweeping set of reforms across the Pentagon’s entire acquisition system—such as the requirements for new military capabilities and how they are put on contract, tested, and fielded. The goal is to get the U.S. military new capabilities faster and foster a more competitive defense marketplace, where newer defense companies—such as Anduril and Palantir—as well as start-ups, can flourish alongside traditional defense primes like Lockheed Martin and Boeing. These proposed reforms are long overdue and, generally, reflect bipartisan consensus that the Pentagon’s baroque and antiquated approach to acquiring military technologies should be overhauled. – Time to Accept Risk in Defense Acquisitions | Council on Foreign Relations
US – China
(Harsh V. Pant, Kalpit A Mankikar – Observer Research Foundation) One of the most awaited interactions between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump took place on October 30 on the sidelines of the APEC summit in South Korea and has signalled a thaw in relations. Washington has indicated that it will lower tariffs on Chinese goods by 10 per cent, and put off its “50 per cent rule” that put Chinese subsidiaries on a restricted-exports list. An investigation into Chinese shipping sector and new docking fees has also been kept in abeyance for a year. There are indications, too, that curbs on export of some chips could also be done away with. In turn, Beijing has pledged to purchase more American soybean, and has also agreed to delay the introduction of its latest round of rare earth export controls though earlier restrictions on the critical minerals that have upended global trade remain. – The G-2 Challenge Remerges
US – India
(Harsh V. Pant, Kartik Bommakanti – Observer Research Foundation) President Donald Trump’s order to the Pentagon to resume nuclear testing following a hiatus of over 30 years should not come as a surprise. Even before the latest announcement, the United States was already in the midst of modernising its nuclear forces, going back at least to the Obama administration. This shift in policy on nuclear testing is as much a product of the changes in the global nuclear landscape as it is about the quality, safety, reliability, and performance of the American atomic arsenal. Globally, there are existing or designated nuclear weapons states (NWS), which are either refining their existing weapon designs or developing new ones. There are also four outlier non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), which are not members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Iran is a threshold state in that it is capable of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Trump’s decision to resume testing is driven by geopolitical realities. – US Nuclear Testing and India’s Options
(Kartik Bommakanti – Observer Research Foundation) The United States President Donald Trump ordered the US military to resume nuclear testing. Albeit a surprise in some quarters, the announcement appears consistent with the policies of Trump’s first administration. Indeed, the first Trump Administration dabbled momentarily with resuming testing. Among the explicitly stated reasons for the resumption in nuclear testing lies Washington’s need to sustain and maintain the reliability and performance of the American nuclear arsenal. US Vice President J.D. Vance said while observing, “It is an important part of American national security to make sure that this nuclear arsenal we have actually functions properly, and that’s part of a testing regime.” Although Washington has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992, concerns surrounding reliability appear far-fetched given its advanced capabilities in computer-simulated testing, hydro-nuclear testing, and sub-critical testing in laboratory-enabled environments. These tests are significantly derived from test data accumulated from over 1,000 “hot” nuclear tests the US conducted until 1992. – America Resumes Nuclear Testing: Implications for India
US – Venezuela
(Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park – CSIS) The United States and Venezuela teeter on the brink of war. The imminent arrival of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier strike group (CSG) may bring matters to a head. These charts and tables show where the situation stands now—the array of U.S. firepower and the U.S.-Venezuelan military balance—how it reached this point through an intensified counterdrug campaign and expanded naval presence, how a conflict might unfold, and what a U.S. victory could look like. – Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind the Developing Conflict
