Sources: Chatham House; IISS; RUSI; The Jamestown Foundation
Blood Gold
(Daniel Watson – IISS) The relationship between illicit gold and violent conflict is commanding increasing international attention and concern, amid high global demand for gold. The association of gold with conflicts in Sudan and the Sahel has led some to speak of ‘blood gold’, while Russia is reportedly recycling gold extracted from conflict-affected African states to finance its own war in Ukraine. The high value, portability and easy convertibility of gold to cash (and increasingly, to cryptocurrencies) make gold an ideal medium of transaction for actors engaged in illicit activity. This includes organised criminal groups, non-state armed groups, and state or military actors trying to circumvent anti-money-laundering requirements or bypass legitimate supply chains. These illicit gold economies can expand across borders, spreading instability and creating transnational networks that carry gold to major intermediary and destination markets. Illicit gold is gradually blended with legitimate gold as it moves through these networks. One way to make sense of conflicts linked to illicit gold is to place them on a spectrum, roughly divided into three segments or tiers, with the scale of conflict intensifying the further along the spectrum a country moves. At the lower end, conflicts tend to be relatively disorganised and localised, gradually becoming more organised as they move along the spectrum and draw in increasingly powerful actors. At the most extreme end, the power of these actors can only be maintained through the continued control of illicit gold, which becomes the foundation of a war economy that draws together rival actors and their allies. Understanding these dynamics can help anticipate which gold-producing countries are vulnerable to specific types of conflict, and under what circumstances. – Beyond ‘blood gold’: understanding the spectrum of illicit gold conflict
China
(Olivia Parker, Dzaky Naradichiantama – IISS) Chinese President Xi Jinping became Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Central Military Commission in November 2012, two months after the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its first ever aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. Since then, two additional carriers have been commissioned, with more planned. Aircraft-carrier development has become a highly visible and prestigious part of China’s military modernisation under Xi’s leadership. The importance of carrier aviation within the PLAN has consequently grown over this period. Over the past few years land-based aviation units have been transferred from the PLAN to the PLA Air Force in order to enable this focus, signalling the prioritised development of carrier aviation capabilities. This priority is evident in the number of new carrier aviation units and the shifting curriculum of carrier training. However, the role of pilots in the running and administration of the PLAN and the joint service remains less certain. The similarities and differences between Chinese and American perspectives on these issues offer interesting insight. The United States, as the premier carrier operator, provides a baseline against which to compare China’s current developments. – Chinese carrier aviation taking off
Global Illicit Landscape
(Cathy Haenlein – RUSI) In 2026, the global illicit landscape looks markedly different from that at the turn of the millennium. Changes in technology, geopolitics and international security have altered the conditions under which crime operates. Criminal networks remain highly adaptive and strategically agile, operating through fluid transnational networks, rapidly evolving technological infrastructure and hybrid state–criminal arrangements. The result is a threat landscape that is still only partially understood. By contrast, the conceptual foundations of our policy and operational responses were constructed in a different era. Many remain anchored in frameworks developed with the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) over 25 years ago. This came in a markedly different international moment. The near-universal ratification of the Convention reflected a world of relatively stable globalisation, multilateral optimism, and a conceptualisation of organised crime as hierarchical, territorially grounded and commodity specific. Those assumptions are increasingly strained. Today, organised crime is better understood as adaptive, networked and deeply embedded within licit trade and economic systems. Criminal actors operate across blurred boundaries between legal and illegal markets, state and non-state spheres, and physical and digital environments. They exploit not only gaps in governance but also the structural features of globalisation itself – speed, connectivity and mobility. Yet policy and enforcement architectures remain, in many cases, oriented towards a more bounded and legible world. – The Changing Face of Organised Crime | Royal United Services Institute
India
(Tristan Eng – The Jamestown Foundation) India has made use of legal measures—such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 (UAPA)—to disrupt Maoist insurgent networks, target financing, and criminalize association with banned groups. The legal framework also incentivizes surrenders by offering a rehabilitation structure that can fast-track trials or withdraw prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. These measures remain controversial despite degrading the Maoist threat, drawing criticism for infringing on civil liberties, targeting peaceful activists, and deploying surrendered Maoists into armed combat roles. – The Legal Machinery Behind India’s Campaign Against Maoist Insurgents – Jamestown
Iranian Kurds – US – Iran
(Wladimir van Wilgenburg – The Jamestown Foundation) Iran has continued to launch drone and missile attacks against exiled Iranian Kurdish militants based in Iraqi Kurdistan following the U.S.–Iranian ceasefire signed on April 8. Tehran is heavily pressuring Iraqi Kurdish authorities to either expel these militant groups or hand over their leaders. A permanent U.S.–Iranian agreement lacking specific protections for Kurds would likely leave these militants highly vulnerable to severe Iranian retaliation and forced removal. – Iranian Kurds to Face More Pressure If U.S.–Iran Deal Reached – Jamestown
IS – Sahel – Nigeria
(Jacob Zenn – The Jamestown Foundation) Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) recently claimed its first attacks in northwestern Nigeria, reportedly killing nineteen security personnel in Sokoto and Kebbi states. This expansion reflects converging regional conflict theaters and an escalating rivalry with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), as both groups exploit weak border controls and local networks such as Lakurawa. Northwestern Nigeria is now officially part of Islamic State’s (IS) Sahelian operational strategy, serving as a valuable propaganda tool despite increasing U.S. counter-insurgency involvement in the country. – IS-Sahel’s Nigeria Claims Signal a New Jihadist Frontier – Jamestown
Russia – Europe
(Charlie Edwards, Rex Fox O’Loughlin, Louis Bearn – IISS) Between August 2024 and February 2026, Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were flown in the airspace of a dozen NATO member states and Ireland, forcing repeated closures of major commercial aviation hubs, disrupting military operations and penetrating the perimeters of some of Europe’s most sensitive defence installations – among them nuclear-sharing sites hosting American B61-12 gravity bombs and France’s ballistic-missile submarine base at Île Longue. This report assesses it is highly likely that the Kremlin conducted a UAV campaign over Europe. We assess it is likely that Russian-linked vessels and the ‘shadow fleet’ were used as launch/recovery platforms for UAVs as part of the Kremlin’s wider unconventional war on Europe. The UAV campaign (largely in the latter part of 2025) operated with substantial impunity across European airspace – representing both a series of tactical successes for the Kremlin and a strategic failure of allied air defence. The Kremlin’s success rests on a basic strategic insight: Europe’s air-defence architecture was designed to detect and defeat conventional air threats operating in a recognisable battlespace. It was not built for, by comparison, relatively low-cost UAVs and deniable incursions with the aim of exposing gaps in detection, decision-making and legal authority – all while remaining below the threshold of a collective allied response. Our argument is not that every reported sighting was Russian-directed, or that every reported sighting involved a UAV, but that the aggregate pattern of UAV sightings cannot be adequately explained by misidentification, hobbyist activity or opportunistic harassment alone. Attribution remains a key challenge for European governments, and none have, to date, publicly attributed a UAV sighting to Russia or gone as far as to describe a coordinated Russian UAV campaign over Western and Northern Europe. One reason, European officials have suggested to us as part of our research, is that the relevant governments focused on the national response rather than connecting the dots across Europe. – Russia’s UAV Campaign Over Europe
Russia – Ramzan Kadyrov – Islamic World
(Joe Morley-Davies – RUSI) Election campaigns for the head of Russia’s Chechen Republic and members of the regional parliament officially began on June 23 2026, with the official vote being held in September. The result is a foregone conclusion: Ramzan Kadyrov, current Head of Chechnya and self-proclaimed ‘Putin’s foot soldier’, will almost certainly be re-elected; Putin has already given his assent. However, Kadyrov is no longer the long-term asset he once was, as he is in ill-health. Diagnoses vary from kidney failure to pancreatic necrosis, and are accompanied by a steady flow of reports detailing near fatal health incidents. None of these are confirmed, but from photographs, conspicuous prolonged absences from public appearances, and an apparent urgency in appointing members of his immediate family and wider clan to positions of power, it is clear that he is suffering from a debilitating illness. Kadyrov’s death will have significant implications for Kremlin security policy at home, with Chechnya having always been one of Russia’s most restive provinces. It will also have effects abroad. Earlier research from the Royal United Services Institute, and this author at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, suggests that Kadyrov plays a dual role in the Kremlin’s influence operations abroad, especially in the Islamic world. This article will build on the importance of the Islamic world to the Kremlin, Kadyrov’s role in the Kremlin’s wider influence operations, what impact his death may have, and how the Kremlin’s operations may develop in the aftermath, rather than focusing on the impact in Chechnya. – Ramzan Kadyrov: The Kremlin’s Messenger to the Islamic World | Royal United Services Institute
Syria – IS Defections
(Uran Botobekov – The Jamestown Foundation) Mounting pressure from Syria’s new authorities, limited prospects for citizenship, fears of deportation, and growing ideological tensions may drive some Central Asian and North Caucasus jihadists to relocate to Afghanistan. Moscow has warned that this relocation could strengthen al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) networks, posing a growing security threat to Russia and Central Asia. An ISKP strengthened by relocated Idlib militants could intensify suicide attacks against the Taliban, Central Asian states, and U.S. interests while further radicalizing Central Asian migrant communities in Europe and the United States, potentially facilitating external attack plots. – Syria’s Jihadist Crackdown Could Lead to Islamic State Defections – Jamestown
UK
(Robin Potter – Chatham House) Keir Starmer has released the long-awaited Defence Investment Plan (DIP), which sets out the UK’s military spending plans, ahead of the NATO summit next week. The DIP also contains a commitment to a ‘national conversation campaign on defence and security’. However, this plan for a ‘national conversation’ was already adopted by Starmer’s government in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2025. The conversation was to focus on the rationale for investing more in defence, the role of the public in support of national security and resilience, and countering misinformation. The review recommended it take the form of a ‘two-year series of public outreach events across the UK, explaining current threats and future trends’. This has not yet happened. Meanwhile, intelligence services have warned that Russian sabotage, hostile reconnaissance, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns are increasingly directed at the UK, a country viewed as ‘enemy number one’ and a ‘soft target’. The first step in countering these ‘hybrid’ attacks targeting the UK’s political stability is for a new prime minister to inform the public and build a societal response. – Will the UK’s next prime minister finally have a ‘national conversation’ on defence? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US
(Isabella Wilkinson – Chatham House) On Tuesday, the United States Department of Commerce removed restrictions on two of Anthropic’s new advanced AI models that have prompted security concerns: Mythos 5 and Fable 5. This is a major change in the way the US controls frontier AI and comes after recurring flip-flopping on the issue. The move, described in a letter by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik to Anthropic, lifts the export control directive issued by the Trump administration less than three weeks ago. That 12 June directive banned non-US nationals from accessing the two models. This ban included foreign employees at US companies and cyber defenders from international partners. In response, Anthropic suspended access to Mythos and Fable for all users a day later. The administration then partially changed its approach. On 26 June, Anthropic said the US government had allowed it to release Mythos 5 but had reserved access to the model to only a select group of ‘trusted’ big companies and agencies: all of them, unsurprisingly, from the US. Now, Anthropic says it is coordinating with the government to expand Mythos access to a broader group including international partners. As of 1 July, Fable 5 – which Anthropic says has stronger safeguards than Mythos 5 – is available to public users globally. – The US government’s latest U-turn on Anthropic’s Mythos sends mixed signals on AI governance | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Chatham House) The United States marks its 250th birthday at a moment of intense division and international uncertainty. At home, President Donald Trump is aggressively remodelling America’s governance around expanded White House power and burning through firewalls intended to prevent presidential overreach and self-enrichment. Internationally, his capricious mix of transactional diplomacy, coercive tariffs and naked hard power has left American allies shell-shocked – and opened the door for China to spread its influence. Former US ambassador to Qatar Tim Davis discusses the future of the United States in the world – and whether, for ordinary citizens, the American dream still exists. – USA at 250: Soft power, hard power and the future of the American dream | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
In partnership with
