Sources: ASPI The Strategist; East Asia Forum; Lowy The Interpreter; Observer Research Foundation
Artificial Intelligence
(Tom Barber – Lowy The Interpreter) On 12 June, global access to Anthropic’s new Mythos-class models – the most capable(Opens in new window) ever released – was abruptly disabled. This was in response(Opens in new window) to a White House directive to restrict access to all foreign nationals. Without a way to verify user nationality in real time, Anthropic took the models offline for everyone(Opens in new window). It was the first time(Opens in new window) export controls have been used to restrict access to AI models (as opposed to the chips or weights underpinning them). And it came only days after Trump signed an executive order requesting(Opens in new window) early government access to every frontier model before public release. An administration explicit(Opens in new window) about wanting to win the AI race has just shown how readily state-level power concentration can be exercised. This is bad news regardless of whether the United States is friend or foe. Australia’s access disappeared alongside everyone else’s, and neither the alliance nor membership of Five Eyes made any difference. As recursive self-improvement looms over the horizon(Opens in new window), and with it the prospect of artificial general intelligence (AGI), it is plausible that, by early next decade, a single data centre could be the equivalent of a country of geniuses(Opens in new window). This would translate an already decisive lead into an insurmountable one(Opens in new window), with efficiency and productivity gains multiplying across every dimension of state power. An AGI hegemon would be far more powerful than any country in history, locking in a first mover advantage, hoovering up the majority of global GDP, and relegating everyone else to bystanders. In the most extreme example, concentration of power could permanently entrench(Opens in new window) a global totalitarian regime. Not ideal. – Power, dilution and the AI chokepoint | Lowy Institute
Australia
(East Asia Forum) Australia’s major political parties are confronting a surge in support for the right-wing populist One Nation party. One Nation is trading on political anxieties about the impact of high migration levels and geopolitical shocks on cost-of-living pressures and long-standing structural economic challenges. Growing support for One Nation leader Pauline Hanson underscores the political risks associated with the difficult reforms to taxation, productivity and public investment that are necessary to sustain long-term prosperity. Although Australia’s preferential voting system limits the immediate threat to Labor, the rise of populism emphasises the need for mainstream leaders and institutions to defend multiculturalism, openness and democratic norms against increasingly influential nationalist rhetoric. – Australia’s Labor government moves to ring fence a surging populist right | East Asia Forum
(Timothy Millar – ASPI The Strategist) Australia needs to urgently reorient its national munitions manufacturing program to build interceptor drones for dealing with cheap strike drones. This is the deafeningly loud message coming from wars in Ukraine and Iran. Australia should be looking for cooperation in this area with other countries that share its strategic challenge, China’s armed forces. But first priority should go to rapid domestic mobilisation, and the place to go for policy and technical guidance is Ukraine. Warfare has changed out of sight since the munitions program, called the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO), was launched in March 2021. The rise in Ukraine of propeller-driven cruise missiles, such as the Iranian Shahed, has blown apart the always shaky economics of firing at least one multi-million-dollar rocket-propelled interceptor at each incoming strike weapon. – To beat cheap drones, Australia must make cheap interceptors – quickly | The Strategist
Cambodia – Thailand
(Wannaphong Durongkaveroj – East Asia Forum) Even after the fragile December 2025 ceasefire, the Cambodia–Thailand border conflict will continue weigh on the two interdependent economies for years to come. Cambodia’s reliance on remittances and trade with Thailand means it is likely to bear higher costs, with displaced returnees pushed into insecure work and limited access to land, housing and labour markets. For both countries, economic recovery will depend on stabilising household consumption, industrial development and a concerted effort to avoid further conflict. – The long shadow of the Cambodia–Thailand border conflict | East Asia Forum
China
(Rahul Rawat – Observer Research Foundation) China’s latest White Paper on arms control and disarmament, released in November 2025, highlights three major themes: a longstanding faith in arms control; new governance frameworks for emerging technologies; and new arms control initiatives amid the breakdown of the US-Russia-led bilateral framework. However, these commitments stand in contrast to Chinese strategic behaviour. The Chinese nuclear arsenal is undergoing an exponential rise in both qualitative and quantitative indicators, with no signs that any arrangements for its inclusion in arms reduction agreements are being made. In fact, in February 2026, the US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Thomas DiNanno, claimed that China conducted nuclear tests in 2020. What explains the disparity between nuclear modernisation and the articulated arms control approach of the PRC? The latest White Paper, after 20 years (last in 2005), reflects the PRC’s evolving perceptions in a new geopolitical environment. China’s dual-use capabilities and its nuclear modernisation plan are in ‘contradiction’ with the ideas and concepts articulated in the white paper. A ‘contradiction’ is a core philosophical principle of Chinese foreign policy that accommodates two opposing ideas in harmony to support decision-making. – Chinese Arms Control Approach: When Strategic Ambiguity Is the Weapon
(Jing Ge – East Asia Forum) US export controls are constraining China’s access to semiconductor equipment while procurement channels increasingly shift through Southeast Asia. Singapore and Malaysia are emerging as important production, servicing and logistics hubs linked to US-origin technology systems, making China’s equipment access more regionalised and compliance-sensitive. Though Chinese firms are expanding rapidly, China’s dependence on foreign technology remains significant, increasing Southeast Asia’s strategic importance in US–China semiconductor competition. – China’s chipmaking supply chain runs through Southeast Asia | East Asia Forum
Hyperscale data centers
(Elizabeth Heyes – Observer Research Foundation) Rising geopolitical competition over advanced technologies is reshaping how states approach the infrastructure that underpins digital power. This brief argues that hyperscale data centres, often treated as technical or commercial assets, are becoming increasingly central to geopolitical strategy, even as they face constraints in resource supply chains, physical infrastructure, and data governance regimes. To examine how these factors interact, the brief employs a three-part analytical framework focused on the geographies of resources, infrastructure, and data. It assesses how these dimensions influence where hyperscale capacity can be developed and the extent to which states can secure access to advanced compute amidst heightened global geopolitical competition. – The Geography and Geopolitics of Hyperscale
India
(Hitesh Vaidya, Vijaya Venkataraman – Observer Research Foundation) The future of India’s climate will be determined by its cities. From heatwaves and floods to water stress, cities across the country are already experiencing the impact of climate events. By 2036, India’s urban population is set to exceed 600 million; cities must manage unprecedented population growth while strengthening climate resilience. This brief argues that India’s urban climate challenge has moved beyond pilots, plans, and isolated projects. A decisive shift is underway, from treating climate action as a sectoral or environmental concern to an imperative of urban development and governance. Drawing on national policy frameworks and city-level experiences across mitigation, adaptation, and resilience, this brief examines how Indian cities are beginning to integrate climate risk into land-use planning, infrastructural investment, municipal finance, and institutional systems. It highlights emerging pathways for mainstreaming climate action through risk-informed planning, integrated urban systems, outcome-based governance, and scaled urban climate finance. – Mainstreaming Climate Action in Urban India
(Arya Roy Bardhan, Soumya Bhowmick – Observer Research Foundation) Artificial Intelligence (AI) is reshaping global enterprise operations, the task composition of white-collar work, and the geography of high-value services. This report examines what that shift means for India’s Global Capability Centres (GCCs), which have evolved from cost-driven back offices into strategic hubs for technology, innovation, and AI deployment. It argues that, while AI will increase the strategic importance of mature GCCs due to the ongoing need for human oversight, India’s ability to capitalise on this will depend on closing structural gaps and will ultimately result in a highly productive, specialised, yet less labour-intensive workforce. A scenario exercise for 2024-2030 suggests that AI-related displacement from an optimistic 4.5 million employee baseline could range from roughly 40,000 jobs in a conservative linear-adoption case to around 150,000 jobs in an aggressive front-loaded case. The policy challenge is to build the skilling, governance, geographic, and monitoring systems needed to convert a narrow high-skill opportunity into broader economic gains. – Capability in the Age of AI: India’s GCCs and the Future of White-Collar Work
India – Myanmar
(Sreeparna Banerjee – Observer Research Foundation) For most of the five years since Myanmar’s military seized power in February 2021, India’s approach to its eastern neighbour could be summarised in a single word: continuity. New Delhi continued to engage the junta as the functional authority in Naypyidaw, continued to push its connectivity projects, and continued to calibrate its public statements carefully enough to avoid either endorsing the coup or antagonising the generals. It was a policy built for a transitional moment—designed to hold India’s position while the dust settled. The dust has not settled. The moment that crystallised this most sharply is not a battlefield reversal or a diplomatic rupture, but something more mundane in appearance: a state visit. The arrival of Myanmar’s newly inaugurated President U Min Aung Hlaing in New Delhi in May-June 2026—his first foreign trip since assuming office and the joint statement that followed his 1 June talks with Prime Minister Modi mark a point of inflexion. This is not because the visit transformed the relationship, but because it made visible a strategic reality that India can no longer defer confronting: the old policy framework is no longer adequate to the ground it is meant to cover. – Beyond Naypyidaw: India’s Myanmar Policy at a Strategic Crossroads
India – South Korea
(Abhishek Sharma – Observer Research Foundation) As India advances its shipbuilding goals under Maritime India Vision 2030 and Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047, it will face structural, operational, and functional challenges. While some challenges can be addressed by the government, others will require greater efforts to resolve. However, given the strategic nature of the shipbuilding industry, it is important to anticipate and plan. South Korea offers a useful case study that India can learn from and prepare accordingly. Key considerations and lessons emerge as the shipbuilding industry enters the development stage and transitions to the maturation stage. – Beyond Capacity: The South Korean Playbook for India’s Shipbuilding Push
Iraq
(Vivek Mishra, Surya Prakash Noutiyal – Observer Research Foundation) On 14 May this year, Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was sworn in after parliament approved the majority of his cabinet ministers. The new government entered office amid severe regional turmoil, with the rivalry between the United States (US) and Iran at its peak, further deepening Iraq’s vulnerability by turning its territory into a strategic arena for external power competition. Iraq is among the countries in the region targeted by both the US and Iran in the ongoing US–Iran war. The Trump administration’s shift from its first-term policy of maximum pressure on Iran to a policy of open confrontation in its second term has had serious implications for Iraq’s political stability. – Iraq’s Sovereignty Test: A New Government Between Washington and Tehran
Thailand
(Apoorba Banerjee – East Asia Forum) Thailand’s Land Bridge project aims to create an alternative trade corridor across the Malay Peninsula, but its commercial viability remains uncertain due to high costs, logistical inefficiencies, environmental concerns, local opposition and strong competition from established regional ports. Its real significance lies in providing Bangkok with greater strategic relevance and bargaining power as Southeast Asian states seek to reduce dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints and adapt to a more fragmented global trading system. – Bypassing Malacca is a bridge too far for Thailand’s ports project | East Asia Forum
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