Today’s sources: ASPI The Strategist; Crisis Group; Lowy The Interpreter; Royal United Services Institute; The Soufan Center; The Washington Institute
Australia/US
(John Coyne – ASPI The Strategist) Commentators often inaccurately describe the frameworks governing US military presence in Australia. Debate frequently centres on sovereignty, with claims that deeper US access or infrastructure investment risks eroding Australian control. That framing overlooks the structured planning and approval architecture that governs how activities occur and Australia’s control within those arrangements. US defence planners increasingly look to northern Australia, yet few outside defence circles understand how that activity is coordinated. US posture development in Australia operates within a layered system combining bilateral defence cooperation arrangements with specific initiatives, such as the Force Posture Initiatives. – It’s in our hands: US military presence in Australia makes us stronger | The Strategist
Complex Scenarios
(Kyle McCurdy – ASPI The Strategist) Rising geopolitical uncertainty and complexity demand new approaches to strategic planning, risk management and scenario planning. Traditional methods are becoming less useful for government agencies, organisations and businesses as trends become less reliable indicators of disruptive changes. It’s no longer enough to rely on forward projection of trends as this doesn’t anticipate shocks, which are increasingly common. Instead, forecasters should consider wildcard scenarios: high impact, low-probability events, also called ‘black swan’ or ‘long tail’ events. By analysing more extreme scenarios, organisations can better prepare for dramatic changes and become more resilient. Traditional forecasting approaches to scenario generation are based on inductive reasoning, which starts with specific observations and draws a general conclusion. They involve examining political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental trends; considering major uncertainties; and generating the ubiquitous two-by-two matrix of near-term possible worlds. Forecasters then examine how the decision or strategy reflects across these scenarios. Governments, academics and analysts in large corporations still use these techniques as this method is most useful for examining long-term trends (10 to 20 years out). – Wildcard scenarios: planning for the unpredictable | The Strategist
Geopolitics & Geoeconomy
(Colin Reed and Lewis Sage-Passant – RUSI) Beginning during the global pandemic, accelerating after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and intensifying during the recent Middle East conflict, geopolitics has become a prime concern for business. According to the McKinsey Global Survey on economic conditions, business leaders have identified geopolitical instability as the primary risk to growth in every quarterly survey since March 2022 – with 59% of respondents citing it in the most recent edition, ahead of trade policy changes, inflation and domestic political conflict. These concerns have been made tangible in recent weeks, as data centres, commercial air transit hubs, office buildings, energy production facilities, ports and luxury hotels have been hit by drones and missiles. Yet this heightened awareness has not translated into institutional competence. Analysis of Western non-financial firms shows that in seven of nine major industries, multinationals now trail their domestically focused competitors on profitability – and in six of those nine, the gap has widened since the pandemic. Corporations have learned to worry about geopolitics; they have not learned how to navigate it. The gap between recognition and capability has become especially acute for global multinationals, as firms seek to de-risk not just from US-China divergence, but increasingly from US-EU splits. The ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs of 2025, US sanctions over the EU’s Digital Services Act and Washington’s attempt to obtain Greenland have fundamentally reconfigured a commercial relationship that served as the foundational assumption of Western business strategy for decades. Corporate leadership struggles with this challenge because senior management mostly comprises individuals who built their careers during an extraordinary period when geopolitics rarely intruded upon commerce. That era has concluded, yet many firms remain institutionally unprepared because they have lost the geopolitical muscle necessary to respond. – Corporations Must Re-learn How to be Geopolitical Actors | Royal United Services Institute
Indonesia
(Hilman Palaon – Lowy The Interpreter) Amid the economic fallout from the Iran war, Indonesia has managed what most countries have struggled to do: keep domestic fuel prices steady during one of the worst oil shocks in years. Subsidised petrol (mid-grade, RON 90) remains capped at US$0.60 per litre, while subsidised diesel (a blend of fossil fuel and palm oil-based biodiesel) stays at US$0.40, even as Brent crude surpasses US$118. At its core, Indonesia prioritises energy security, maintains reserves and ensures reliable domestic supply. Subsidies and compensation shield household purchasing power from global price swings, with the state budget acting as a shock absorber. Untuk rakyat (“for the people”) is not mere rhetoric. In a country where 60% of households rely on motorcycles, and where diesel powers trucks, fishing boats and generators that sustain rural livelihoods, price stability is tangible in ways that abstract fiscal ratios are not. – Indonesia believes in cheap fuel | Lowy Institute
Japan
(Adam Bartley and Tom Saxton – ASPI The Strategies) Japan is going full steam in expanding its military use of uncrewed autonomous platforms and countering China’s. One policy has got this effort underway, and three more due this year will give a better idea of the shape of the effort. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s landslide 8 February victory has reshaped Japan’s domestic politics and put the Ministry of Defense on notice for significant reform and development. Speaking on the lessons of Ukraine late last year, Takaichi called for the need to ‘fundamentally revise’ the national defence strategy and begin preparing for ‘new forms of warfare’ produced by autonomous weapons systems. – Japan is pushing hard on autonomous weapons | The Strategist
Nuclear Security
(Sitara Noor – Lowy The Interpreter) Ten years have passed since the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process came to an end in March 2016 in Washington DC. Initiated by US President Barack Obama in 2010, the biennial process convened four summits that drew much needed attention to evolving nuclear security risks. Attended by over 50 states and various international organisations, the NSS process resulted in some innovative commitments and proposals enshrined in summit communiqués, work plans and voluntary commitments in the form of gift baskets by the participating states to strengthen global nuclear security measures. One notable contribution of the NSS process was a change of pace from what had been a slow, incremental development of nuclear security measures. This was possible because heads of states engaged directly with the issues. The talks also maintained a practical focus to avoid becoming entangled in complex issues that would impede any progress, such as addressing nuclear weapons and military stockpiles security. While nuclear security momentum at the leadership level has waned considerably since the fourth summit in March 2016 in Washington DC, the NSS process helped sustain the work beyond its conclusion, directing the mandates for international organisations such as the IAEA. – Ten years after the Nuclear Security Summits, what now? | Lowy Institute
Sudan
(Crisis Group) In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard is joined by Crisis Group’s Sudan expert Shewit Woldemichael and Horn of Africa director Alan Boswell to discuss where Sudan’s war stands as it approaches its fourth year. They examine shifts along the front lines as Sudan’s de facto partition under the two main warring parties, the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, is becoming increasingly entrenched. They speak about how the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran is affecting dynamics in Sudan. They also discuss the coherence of the two sides, their rival political projects and the role of outside backing in sustaining the war. They unpack the mounting risks of regional spillover, the state of efforts to broker peace, what might break the stalemate in those talks and the devastating toll three years of war have taken on Sudan. – After Three Years of War in Sudan, What Hope for a Ceasefire? | International Crisis Group
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Simon Henderson – The Washington Institute) It may be premature to discuss the end of the US-Israel war with Iran, but it is not too early to consider how the fighting is reshaping political and commercial relationships between the Arab Gulf states and Washington. Before February 28, when the US and Israel assassinated supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and much of Iran’s top leadership, the Gulf—along with much of the global economy—was thriving. Now, despite efforts to stay out of the mire, GCC states have become targets for Iranian aggression, and their business models are under strain. Those models—built on providing an attractive commercial environment for foreign capital, with first-class infrastructure and a relatively liberal social climate—were underpinned by Gulf governments recycling petrodollars into global markets as well as by domestic investment. This dynamic was not lost on US President Donald Trump. – War with Iran Tests Gulf-US Economic Model | The Washington Institute
(The Soufan Center) Thousands of civilians have been killed, and millions have been displaced since the start of the war in Iran. Strikes on civilian infrastructure in Iran, Israel, the Gulf countries, and Lebanon do not just represent collateral damage but, at times, a deliberate strategy of imposing unbearably high costs on the adversary. The environmental impact of the war in Iran, including black rain pouring over Tehran, will long outlast hostilities and has direct downstream effects on human health, food systems, and water resources. The staggering humanitarian impact of the war in Iran comes at a time of record low global humanitarian spending. – The Human Dimension of the Iran War: The Intolerable Plight of Civilians – The Soufan Center
(Mick Ryan – Lowy The Interpreter) On Easter Sunday, the President of the United States formally announced that his military would destroy Iranian power plants and bridges on Tuesday unless Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz. The post was signed with his full name and title. It was, by any reasonable definition, a declaration of intent to conduct a specific category of military strike against civilian infrastructure on a specific day. At a press conference on 6 April, Trump doubled down on these threats, while also offering deluded statements about Iranian communications being intercepted saying “please keep bombing”. The potential legal and ethical problems are grave. The US Department of Defense Law of War Manual permits strikes on power grids and bridges when they make an effective contribution to enemy military action and when the military advantage outweighs civilian harm. But it also requires that the advantage be military, not political. Threatening to destroy a country’s power supply to force a diplomatic concession is not a military advantage under any honest reading of that standard. – Trump’s “Bridge and Power Day” is damning for America | Lowy Institute
