Today’s sources: Atlantic Council; Chatham House; Council on Foreign Relations; International Institute for Strategic Studies; Observer Research Foundation; Royal United Services Institute; The Jamestown Foundation; The Soufan Center
Artificial Intelligence
(Chatham House) International AI governance is at risk of failure. Rapid geopolitical change, institutional weakness and asymmetries between the public and private sectors appear to make cooperation on AI near impossible. Proponents of inclusive, effective and global AI governance must now confront a difficult truth: that rapid progress towards global AI governance may only become politically feasible in the event of a crisis, when the costs of inaction become too great. In this research paper, we do not claim that a crisis is desirable, but that the response to an AI crisis could lead to rapid, binding and international governance change if those involved are well prepared. Focusing investment in the right areas now will increase the chances of a productive and robust response if a crisis does come. The research paper explains the reasons for the current deadlock and recommends actions to governments, companies and international institutions on how to respond drawing on three previous crises in other sectors for examples of best practice and cautionary tales. The case studies indicate that crisis-driven governance works best when it brings technical expertise to the fore, and is based on pre-existing institutions and monitoring infrastructure. Attempts to build these elements from scratch post-crisis are likely to fail. – Breaking the deadlock on AI governance | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
China
(Zongyuan Zoe Liu – Council on Foreign Relations) Over the past three decades, Chinese private and state-owned firms have aggressively expanded overseas, building and financing factories, warehouses, logistics hubs, and industrial parks. This tracker documents 194 such projects worldwide. When this tracker is read alongside our trackers on overseas ports and airports, a fuller picture emerges of China’s growing global economic footprint. Chinese firms naturally gravitate toward places with easy access to markets, strong local demand, and infrastructure, such as ports and airports, in which Chinese entities have already invested. In other cases, industrial parks form one component of larger Chinese development packages that bundle infrastructure such as ports and railroads. Of the 194 projects tracked, 145 are operational or under construction and 16 have been canceled or suspended. The status of the remaining 33 projects is not publicly available. Private firms are responsible for most of the projects (114), followed by state-owned enterprises (72 projects) and public-private partnerships (2 projects). Ownership data was unavailable for the remaining 6 projects. – Tracking Chinese Investments in Overseas Industrial Parks | Council on Foreign Relations
Russia
(Pavel K. Baev – The Jamestown Foundation) The ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf is affecting Russia amid the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine with spikes in oil prices and a reduction of U.S. pressure on Moscow, making the timeline for a peace deal far from certain. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, Western sanctions, and underinvestment in the oil and gas industry affect Russia’s ability to capitalize on the changing gas market amid the conflict in the Gulf. Russian society continues to experience general wariness as a new round of conscription campaigns starts in April and Russia limits Internet access and shuts down Telegram. This could lead to local problems and turn into triggers of mass protest. – Putin’s War Calculus Keeps Oscillating as Spring Offensive Stumbles – Jamestown
Russia/Ukraine
(Kassie Corelli – The Jamestown Foundation) Kyiv has intensified strikes on Russian military plants and other strategic targets such as oil depots, microelectronics facilities, and energy infrastructure, highlighting Ukraine’s rapid military advancements amid Russian stagnation. Independent analysts point out that the Russian Ministry of Defense has systematically exaggerated its successes throughout the four years of the full-scale conflict against Ukraine, but has been unable to alter its wartime tactics or achieve serious results fundamentally. Moscow is trying to compensate for its miscalculations by increasing the defense budget and attempting to attract young people to the front, primarily students, exacerbating an already dire demographic crisis. – Kremlin Inadequately Responds to Increased Ukrainian Strikes – Jamestown
SDGs
(Soumya Bhowmick – Observer Research Foundation) In 2015, all United Nations Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, an ambitious blueprint designed to foster peace and prosperity for people and the planet. At its core are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a universal call to action to eradicate extreme poverty, reduce inequalities, and combat climate change by balancing economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection. As the United Nations proudly dubbed the 2020s the “Decade of Action” to accelerate progress toward these interconnected targets, the global community seems to have taken the mandate quite literally by trading climate summits for active battlefields and poverty alleviation for artillery procurement. While this irony is stark, the underlying reality is a systemic global regression. The 2030 Agenda relies heavily on multilateral cooperation, stable trade networks, and predictable financing. Recent geopolitical volatility has disrupted all three, shifting the world’s focus from human development to immediate military security. When a nation’s basic survival is severely underfunded, the redirection of global capital toward conflict guarantees a measurable retreat, rendering foundational targets like SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 4 (Quality Education), and SDG 13 (Climate Action) the ultimate casualties of a fractured world order. – The Irony of Action: How Global Volatility is Regressing the 2030 Agenda
South Asia
(Monali Zeya Hazra – Observer Research Foundation) A regionally integrated grid is central to South Asia’s clean energy transition. Cross-border electricity trade (CBET) in the Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal (BBIN) subregion has nearly tripled from 7.8 TWh in 2013 to 21 TWh in 2024, yet remains far below its potential. An integrated grid can harness the region’s diverse clean energy resources, lower system costs, enhance energy security, and support decarbonisation. Recent milestones, including Nepal–Bangladesh trilateral trade via India and market-based trading, signal a shift toward deeper cooperation. However, challenges persist, including limited transmission interconnections, high investment requirements, evolving institutional frameworks, and geopolitical risks. This brief traces the evolution of CBET in South Asia and outlines a pathway to unlock its full potential. – South Asia’s Integrated Grid and Clean Energy Transition
US – Africa
(Samir Bhattacharya – Observer Research Foundation) The trajectory of the United States’ Africa policy under Donald Trump increasingly reflects a shift from pragmatic engagement to a narrower, more extractive form of transactionalism. While US engagement on the continent has traditionally balanced strategic interests with developmental and humanitarian commitments, recent policy directions suggest a willingness to instrumentalise aid and diplomacy in pursuit of resource access. A striking illustration of this shift is the evolving US approach toward Zambia. A draft State Department memo reveals that Washington has considered leveraging life-saving health assistance as a bargaining tool to secure preferential access to Zambia’s critical mineral resources. This marks a significant departure from the long-standing ethos underpinning initiatives such as the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which has historically symbolised US humanitarian leadership and helped expand its soft power. For over two decades, PEPFAR has played a transformative role in Zambia’s public health landscape. Millions rely on daily HIV treatment, alongside tuberculosis and malaria interventions supported by US funding. At its peak, the programme helped reverse a devastating epidemic that once claimed tens of thousands of lives annually. Yet under the current policy recalibration, this humanitarian legacy risks being sidelined by strategic bargaining. The proposal to significantly cut assistance signals a readiness to use health security as a bargaining chip. – Health for Minerals: The Extractive Turn in US Africa Policy
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Daniel Salisbury – International Institute for Strategic Studies) Iran’s nuclear programme has featured repeatedly in stated rationales from the United States for recent US–Israel-led military operations against the country. Beginning in late February 2026, the US military has repeatedly struck Iranian targets, killing the country’s political leadership as well as destroying Iran’s missile capability, navy and other military forces. The latest campaign takes place after the Twelve-Day War in 2025, in which Israel struck military and nuclear targets, and the US struck three key nuclear sites – Natanz, Fordow and Esfahan – in Operation Midnight Hammer. The following eight months saw limited Iranian efforts to reconstitute its programme, suggesting some degree of military success in rolling back Iran’s capabilities. However, the use of force to counter nuclear proliferation is not a new phenomenon. History shows a range of risks in kinetic approaches and suggests that the Iranian nuclear question will likely remain unresolved in the longer term. – The risks of kinetic counter-proliferation
(Sheikh Nawaf bin Mubarak Al-Thani – RUSI) There is a stubborn assumption in parts of Washington and Europe that the Gulf Arab states quietly want this war to continue until Iran is badly weakened. That reading is too neat, too lazy, and in Qatar’s case, plainly wrong. Qatar does not want this war to continue. That much is clear from its public posture, its diplomacy and the logic of its national interests. Beyond Qatar, the picture across the GCC is not perfectly homogeneous, and it would be unserious to pretend otherwise. These are different states, with different threat perceptions and different strategic habits. Oman is not Bahrain. Qatar is not the UAE. Saudi Arabia carries its own long memory of direct attacks and proxy escalation. Even so, if one steps back and looks at the public statements, the economic realities and the conduct of most GCC governments, the broad direction is unmistakable: this is not a region pushing for a prolonged war with Iran. It is a region trying to limit the damage. – The Gulf Does Not Want This War to Continue | Royal United Services Institute
(The Soufan Center) A buildup of U.S. combat forces in the region has fueled speculation that President Trump is planning to undertake ground operations against Iran. U.S. officials deny that a decision to undertake ground action has been made, asserting the deployments provide leverage in settlement talks with Iran and expand the options available if talks fail. The most likely goal of a ground attack, if ordered, is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to unfettered energy and commercial shipping traffic by seizing Iranian and Iran-controlled islands in the waterway. Any U.S. ground incursion onto Iranian soil would expand the war significantly, produce U.S casualties, and potentially embroil the United States in a long-term conflict with Iran’s regime. – U.S. Combat Force Buildup Sets the Stage for Potential Ground Offensive in Iran – The Soufan Center
(Max Boot – Council on Foreign Relations) It has become common for major conflicts to become proxy wars, with outside powers intervening to help their friends and hurt their foes. The Soviet Union, for example, supplied North Korea and North Vietnam in wars against the United States. The United States returned the favor by supplying the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s in their war against the Red Army. The Iran war is no different. Both Russia and Ukraine are trying to use the Middle East conflict, which pits Israel and the United States against Iran, to their own advantage. – The Iran Conflict Is Becoming a Russia-Ukraine Proxy War | Council on Foreign Relations
(Alisha Chhangani – Atlantic Council) To make cross-border payments despite US sanctions, Iran has built a system of workarounds that includes banks, intermediaries, shadow networks, and cryptocurrency. China is the top purchaser of Iranian oil, and transactions are increasingly settled in yuan via indirect channels, limiting exposure to US financial oversight. Emerging infrastructure such as CIPS and experimental CBDC platforms could support or expand non-dollar settlement, though direct Iran-linked usage remains opaque. – Inside Tehran’s toll booth – Atlantic Council
(Georgia Cole – Chatham House) The US-Israeli war with Iran is taking place as the global non-proliferation regime is already under significant strain. New START, the last bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia, expired in February with nothing to replace it. China is currently expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. France has announced an expansion of its nuclear programme and closer cooperation with European partners. Public opinion in several non-nuclear states such as Turkey, Poland and South Korea seems to be shifting towards support for developing domestic nuclear capabilities, as the lessons of the Cold War and the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons fade from living memory. This comes amid rising doubts over Washington’s ability to uphold its extended deterrence and security commitments to allies. In particular, the US’s reported redeployment of part of its THAAD missile defence systems from South Korea to the Middle East may be cause for concern among US allies in East Asia. The strains on the non-proliferation regime predate the Iran war and the reported THAAD redeployment. But they risk fracturing the regime at precisely the moment when the international community can least afford it. – The Iran war risks triggering a new wave of nuclear proliferation | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Rahul Rawat – Observer Research Foundation) The ongoing US-Israel-led military operation against Iran has expanded significantly both in terms of the scope of battlefield operations and strategic objectives of the war. What began as a short-term, decisive, high-intensity operation by the Trump administration has now lasted for three weeks. The conflict has observed the use of a diverse set of military capabilities, predominantly modern technology, adding a degree of sophistication to conventional military power. However, military power is an aspect of military strategy characterised by an interplay of means, ways, and ends. To secure the ends, it is important to get both means (capabilities) and ways (organised application) right. The Iran war shows that the ‘way of war’ is critical for determining and subsequently framing the engagement in relation to the nature of the adversary. The US military’s Operation Epic Fury and Iran’s subsequent response demonstrate that technological superiority alone does not guarantee strategic victory. But how states organise capabilities and employ military power as a subset of military strategy helps determine decisive victory (beyond the battlefield). – Beyond Technology: The ‘Way of War’ in the Iran Conflict
