Today’s sources: Atlantic Council; Center for Strategic & International Studies; Chatham House; Council on Foreign Relations; Royal United Services Institute; The Jamestown Foundation; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Azerbaijan – Israel
(Aybaniz Ismayilova – The Jamestown Foundation) Azerbaijan and Israel have deepened their longstanding partnership through energy exports, arms deals, and new agreements in artificial intelligence cooperation over the last year, with Azerbaijan supplying 40–60 percent of Israel’s oil and importing up to 69 percent of its “major weapons” from Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar visited Baku in January, continuing to expand relations with Azerbaijan, which has become overt in recent years, with Azerbaijan opening a trade and tourism office in Israel in 2021 and establishing an embassy in Israel in 2023. Azerbaijan is leveraging its ties with both Israel and the United States to consolidate middle power status, including potentially positioning itself within Abraham Accords expansion efforts. – Azerbaijan–Israel Relations Represent Middle Power Consolidation – Jamestown
Caspian Sea
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) The Caspian Sea is dying, with its water level now the lowest in the last 400 years and projected to fall by another foot every year for the rest of this century—leading to a tragedy far greater than the death of the Aral Sea in Central Asia several decades ago. As the Caspian contracts, the littoral states will lose a key source of food and see their ports left landlocked and sea lanes disappear. Others who now use the Caspian, whatever they may be telling themselves, will find it far more difficult to do so. Some stakeholders are beginning to move from denial to seeking a way to save the sea, but hopes for success are slim, given that the challenges of saving the Caspian are even greater than those in the failed efforts to save the Aral. – Caspian Sea is Dying and Current Prospects for Saving It are Poor – Jamestown
China
(Jonah Reisboard – The Jamestown Foundation) A new ethnic unity law frames assimilation under a narrow definition of Chinese identity as central to achieving the principal goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): national rejuvenation. Assimilation is to be effected by eliminating non-Mandarin languages and sinicizing religion, as well as by forging a national consciousness that demands identification with the CCP, socialism, and the “Chinese [Zhonghua] nation.”. The law responds to Party theorists’ critiques of the Soviet Union’s failures and codifies their policy recommendations, such as “diluting” ethnic consciousness or “culturalizing” ethnicity. – Ethnic Unity Law Codifies ‘Chinese’ Identity – Jamestown
China/UK
(Masashi Umehara – Royal United Services Institute) Since the autumn of 2025, the UK has seen heightened attention on Chinese espionage cases with potential direct implications for national security. There was the dropped prosecution of a former parliamentary researcher over the provision of information to China. Chinese recruitment activities targeting staff within the legislature and government agencies also came to light. As a result, MI5 has issued formal warnings to the UK Parliament and these risks have become widely recognized. As highlighted in a statement by the Director-General of MI5 in October 2025, similar vigilance is required in the academic sphere, where Chinese espionage cases and other influence operations must also be carefully monitored. – Who Pays the Price for Managing China-Related Risks in UK Universities? | Royal United Services Institute
China/US
(David M. Hart, Alice c. Hill, Lindsay Iversen – Council on Foreign Relation) China’s leaders have worked intently over the past twenty years to dominate clean energy technologies, building commanding leads in solar panels, electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and other critical industries. In the new Five-Year Plan, approved in early March at the annual National People’s Congress, policymakers signaled their intent to double down on their successes and establish a lead in frontier technologies like hydrogen and fusion power. Beijing’s focus on these industries recognizes both climatic and industry trends. According to the most recent consensus report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the world is on pace to warm by nearly 3°C by the end of this century—a level of warming that could imperil food production, worsen public health, and threaten infrastructure resilience in large parts of the world. Clean energy technologies not only help mitigate these and other climate-related risks, but also improve countries’ resilience to price shocks in traditional fuels like oil and gas stemming from external crises like the ongoing conflict in Iran. That is why the International Energy Agency projects that renewable energy installations will double over the next five years, and Chinese companies are now in a prime position to capitalize on that opportunity. The contrast with the United States could hardly be more stark. The Donald Trump administration has withdrawn from major international climate commitments and uprooted its domestic investments in clean energy development to focus on fossil fuel exploration and production. The United States is now paying companies not to build renewable energy projects—an extraordinary turnaround from previous administrations, and a clear contrast to China’s approach. – China Is Planning Decades Ahead on Clean Energy. The U.S. Has Other Priorities. | Council on Foreign Relations
Russia
(Natalya Kovaleva – Chatham House) Across Russia, partial internet shutdowns have persisted for months, disrupting everything from cashless payments and bank transfers to taxi apps and digital courier services. But since early March, mobile internet blackouts have also hit central Moscow and St Petersburg, forcing locals to turn to landlines, pagers and paper maps. The true reasons behind the blackouts are unclear. Officially, authorities cite security concerns, likely due to Kyiv’s use of mobile-guided drones to strike targets deep inside Russia. Targeted shutdowns were previously confined to regions bordering Ukraine and areas near strategic military bases across the country. The fact they are now happening in Russia’s key centres of wealth and power shows that the war is increasingly affecting the everyday lives of ordinary Russians previously distanced from it. But the outages are likely about more than security concerns. The blackouts also align with recent legal amendments on ‘centralized management’ of the internet, which empower the state tech regulator, Roskomnadzor, to assume full control over Russia’s internet and public communication infrastructure. – Moscow internet blackouts: the Kremlin tightens its grip on Russia’s digital space | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Anna J. Davis – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia is preparing for the 2026 NPT Review Conference by warning against “politicized” agendas that could challenge its nuclear posture and constrain its freedom of action. The Kremlin is appearing concerned about new cooperation among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly as France is to boost its nuclear arsenal and extend nuclear deterrence arrangements in Europe. Russian officials are attempting to shift responsibility for their own nuclear behavior onto Western states while struggling to manage their approach to Iran and escalating nuclear intimidation narratives toward Ukraine and NATO. – Russia Concerned About Upcoming NPT Review – Jamestown
Russia/NATO
(Emily Ferris – Royal United Services Institute) This paper provides a critical analysis of Russia’s escalating sabotage operations targeting NATO civilian infrastructure and logistics in Europe since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It examines the strategic aims behind these attacks, their evolution, and the vulnerabilities they expose in NATO’s transport and supply chains. The research highlights the need for NATO to address these weaknesses to ensure its preparedness for future conflicts, particularly on its Eastern flank. – Russian Sabotage of NATO Infrastructure: Identifying Alliance Vulnerabilities | Royal United Services Institute
Russia’s War on Ukraine
(Joyce Hakmeh, Harriet Moynihan, Nayana Prakash – Chatham House) In Russia’s war on Ukraine, ‘cyber proxies’ – non-state actors ranging from criminal groups and hacktivists to private entities – have carried out disruptive cyberattacks and other hostile acts against Ukraine and its allies. Russian or pro-Russian proxies operate with varying degrees of state direction and sponsorship. Some proxies have been linked with intelligence services like the GRU, others are sponsored at arm’s length or quietly tolerated by the authorities, while others still are incidentally or opportunistically aligned with Kremlin agendas. Because the identity of these groups is often opaque and their composition fluid, cyber proxy activity is difficult to combat. The use of proxies provides Russia with plausible deniability, complicates attribution of cyberattacks and other hostile operations, and helps insulate the Russian state and individual actors from sanctions. This paper proposes options that states anywhere can use to counter cyber proxies. We explore how proxies work, map the Russian cyber proxy ecosystem, and consider how international and domestic law can be leveraged to bring cyber proxies – whether of Russian or indeed other origin – to account. We consider accountability through the prism of ‘disruption’ and ‘cost imposition’, which together establish deterrence. And we argue that the West’s tactical responses to hostile cyber proxy activity need to be replaced by a strategic approach that integrates ‘core levers’, ‘amplifiers’ and long-term ‘enabling’ policies. – Holding state-sponsored hackers and other cyber proxies to account | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Syria
(Haid Haid – Chatham House) Syria’s transitional authorities have achieved notable foreign policy gains. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government has restored diplomatic ties, eased sanctions and insulated the country from the military spillover of the ongoing war in Iran. Yet recent events expose the limits of this outward-facing stabilization strategy. On 19 March, Israeli forces carried out an airstrike on government forces in Sweida, following clashes between government forces and Druze factions – demonstrating how Syria’s unresolved internal conflicts can still draw in external actors. Rather than addressing the root causes of the Sweida conflict through a domestic process, the authorities have sought to resolve them through deals brokered with other countries. At its most effective, this approach can contain escalation. But it leaves the underlying tensions intact. Without a credible national process to address internal divisions, Syria’s transition will remain fragile, and vulnerable to repeated external intervention. – Syria’s successful foreign policy masks a deeper risk | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
US
(Shannon K. O’Neil – Council on Foreign Relations) The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy proclaims that “the United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere” and promises to deny foreign powers a strategic role there. China has the most significant footprint to dislodge, and initial skirmishes have already started. But for the US to expel its great power rival, it must provide an alternative to the economic, financial, and technological roles China increasingly plays. If the so-called Donroe Doctrine is to succeed, it needs to mobilize companies and deals, not just gunboats and pressure. For decades the US was the dominant outside investor, trading partner and commercial lender to Latin America, and US companies thrived across the region’s markets. – The Donroe Doctrine Leans on Sticks But Needs Carrots | Council on Foreign Relations
US/Zambia
(Mishal Khan – Chatham House) Western aid for health and development is undergoing two major changes. First, it is shrinking drastically. G7 countries are reducing aid by 28 per cent in 2026 compared to 2024, the biggest drop in aid since the G7 was formed in 1975. In percentage terms, the UK has slashed its aid more than any G7 country – even the US. Although US aid cuts have drawn the most media attention, US Congress has stepped in to reduce some of the proposed cuts. Second, aid is becoming more explicitly conditional on national interests, such as supporting economic growth, tackling immigration or reducing the influence of geopolitical rivals like China. The most blatant deal-making has come from the US. A current and striking example is Zambia, where the US is reportedly considering withdrawing funding for life-saving malaria, tuberculosis and HIV programmes, from as early as May 2026, to pressure the Zambian government to sign the Zambia–US Health Deal. – US pressure on Zambia shows that Western aid has become nakedly transactional | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Nilza Amaral – Chatham House) The US-Israeli war with Iran has amplified long-standing concerns over the adoption of AI-supported targeting in warfare. These concerns came to the fore in the aftermath of the 28 February strike on Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ school in Minab, southern Iran, which Iran says killed at least 168 people, most of whom were schoolchildren. The Trump administration initially blamed Iran for the strike, though it did not provide any evidence. The US says it is now investigating the bombing. The Washington Post has reported that the school was on a US target list. US Senate Democrats have written to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth seeking information about the attack, including clarification on any use of AI in target selection. So far there has been no confirmation of whether or not AI was used in planning or executing the strike on the school. Admiral Brad Cooper, the US commander leading the war in Iran, has confirmed the use of ‘a variety of advanced AI tools’ to sift through large amounts of data in the conflict, without naming any tools in particular. He said these tools allowed leaders to make ‘smarter decisions faster than the enemy can react’ and sped up processes from taking hours or days to seconds. Admiral Cooper also stated that: ‘Humans will always make final decisions on what to shoot and what not to shoot, and when to shoot.’ – The Iran war highlights the creeping use of AI in warfare | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Chatham House) One month on from the start of the US and Israeli war on Iran, governments worldwide are trying to assess the scale of its long-term impact on the global economy and political system. Much will depend on how long the conflict continues, and how long Iran blocks fuel exports and other cargo vessels from passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The White House and Iran have sent conflicting signals about whether negotiations are under way, even as thousands of US troops head to the Middle East. And even if President Trump secures a ceasefire with Iran, it is unclear if US and Israel are aligned on their visions for an end game. Our panel assesses whether the world is headed for a 1973-style shock to the global economic system, pushing up inflation and cutting growth. And how Europe, Russia, China, and other nations will deal with a crisis that has disrupted energy flows and supply chains. Joining regular host Bronwen Maddox are David Lubin, senior research fellow in Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance Programme, and Grégoire Roos, director of our Europe and Russia and Eurasia programmes. – Iran war: regional shock or global crisis? Independent Thinking podcast | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Mona Yacoubian – Center for Strategic & International Studies) As the war with Iran nears its one-month mark on March 28, complex escalation dynamics continue to drive the conflict. Iran’s escalation strategy centers on unrestrained retaliation in response to U.S. and Israeli strikes. This strategy reflects a distinct departure from Tehran’s previous practices of a more measured reaction to U.S. and Israeli military operations. – Visualizing Iran’s Escalation Strategy
(Atlantic Council) One month ago, US and Israeli forces launched a military campaign against the Iranian regime that has had profound, globe-spanning consequences ever since—from energy markets to the global economy, and from the Gulf and broader Middle East to Romania, Sri Lanka, Russia, and China. – Ten lessons from the first month of the Iran war – Atlantic Council
(Grégoire Roos – Chatham House) ‘Speed is necessary, and haste is harmful,’ said Russian Marshal Prince Alexander Suvorov in The Science of Victory (1765). That captures a tension that has remained embedded in Russian strategic culture: how to combine long-term endurance with timely opportunism. Russia is often portrayed as a ponderous bear. But in practice, it frequently resembles a more calculating predator – patient, adaptive, and inclined to strike when the cost-benefit ratio turns decisively in its favour. Those instincts are clearly visible in Moscow’s conduct since the outbreak of the Iran war. Rather than committing decisively or remaining aloof, Russia has calibrated its engagement to extract advantage while limiting its exposure – mindful of the risks of pushing Washington too far. – Spectator, beneficiary, player: Russia’s strategy in the Iran war, from oil to drones | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
(Thomas Graham – Council on Foreign Relations) Russia has emerged as an early beneficiary of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, aided by higher oil revenues, rising demand for other products it produces like fertilizers, and the prospect of air defense resources for Ukraine being diverted to the Middle East. It may take some time for these benefits to help Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine, where a new Russian offensive appears to be underway. In the meantime, U.S.-led diplomatic efforts on ending the war in Ukraine are stalled and the U.S. assault on Iran, a Russian military partner, adds to growing unease among Russian elites about the Donald Trump administration. – The Iran War Is a Boon for Russia. Putin Should Still Worry. | Council on Foreign Relations
(Farzin Nadimi – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) On March 24, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced the appointment of Gen. Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), succeeding the influential Ali Larijani, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike on March 17. Then, on March 25, the media outlet al-Hadath reported an apparent Israel Defense Forces announcement indicating that it had targeted Zolghadr in an airstrike, but his status remains unconfirmed as of this writing. Whether or not he is still alive, Zolghadr’s mere appointment at this moment of crisis shows how the Islamic Republic adapts under stress. Instead of choosing a diplomat, a so-called technocrat, or a public-facing political operator, the regime opted for an old Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hand whose career has straddled asymmetric warfare, internal security, institutional coordination, and coercive state management. In practical terms, the move suggests the Islamic regime is tightening its core decisionmaking structure around a figure associated less with flexibility than with system preservation through discipline, control, and hard-power coordination. – Zolghadr at the Top of Iranian Security | The Washington Institute
(Ghaith al-Omari – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) The Iran war has both exposed and widened a longstanding division between Hamas officials aligned with Iran and those aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. While the two camps diverge regarding regional orientation, neither can be considered “moderate,” given their shared endorsement of terrorism and ultimate goal of destroying Israel. Yet the current weakening of the Iran enthusiasts will inevitably boost Qatar and Turkey, which have backed the Brotherhood side, thus empowering the United States to urge these two countries to exert more pressure on Hamas. However it responds to recent shifts, Washington must be careful not to inadvertently strengthen Hamas by offering political incentives, particularly through direct engagement with the terrorist group. Any direct U.S. engagement with Hamas should still be conditioned on the latter’s full implementation of the Trump administration’s 20-point plan as well as adherence to the international standards articulated in the 2006 “Quartet” principles—namely, a commitment to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. – With the Iran War, Hamas Tilts Toward the Brotherhood | The Washington Institute
Women
(Emma Ulvin, Noël James – Council on Foreign Relations) This year, at the UN’s largest annual gathering on women’s rights, the 70th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW70), world leaders, academics, and policymakers convened to address the priority theme: “Ensuring and strengthening access to justice for all women and girls, including by promoting inclusive and equitable legal systems, eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices, and addressing structural barriers.” The meetings drew on the UN secretary-general’s report which revealed that no country has yet realized full legal equality between women and men. During the session, delegates negotiated how to address persistent issues facing women and girls: discriminatory legal frameworks and practices, systemic inequalities, and socioeconomic barriers to accessing justice. The final outcomes document, the Agreed Conclusions, which is traditionally adopted by consensus, was instead adopted by the Commission and by the Member States by a recorded vote of thirty-seven to one. – Justice for Women and Girls: An Assessment of the 70th UN Commission on the Status of Women | Council on Foreign Relations
