Today’s sources: Atlantic Council; The Stimson Center; The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute)
Australia
(James Tennant, James Corera, Alice Hudson and John Coyne – ASPI The Strategist) The widening conflict involving Iran is causing shipping disruptions that are threatening global fuel supplies. But this is only the latest reminder that economic vulnerability is strategic vulnerability. It reinforces that markets are now arenas of geostrategic competition. Currencies, contracts and supply chains – once treated as neutral conduits of commerce – have become instruments of state power and, increasingly, triggers of widespread economic shock. Australia’s economic model is built on openness: global trade, foreign investment and market integration. In 2024–25, China accounted for 29 percent of Australia’s total goods and services exports. In 2024, Australia’s top five export markets accounted for around 60 percent of total exports. Foreign direct investment stands at roughly 45 percent of GDP. And around 60 percent of Australian small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises rely on imports for more than half their production inputs. For a middle power such as Australia, openness is a strategic strength. But without deliberate design of Australia’s economic statecraft, it can also become a source of vulnerability. The question, then, is not whether to remain open, but how to preserve the economic openness that underpins prosperity while building the resilience needed to withstand coercion and a more unstable global order. – Fusing the arsenal: from disparate economic tools to strategic power | The Strategist
Australia/China
(John Coyne – ASPI The Strategist) Debate over China’s role in Australia’s security has become polarised, with critics retreating to a familiar refrain: China is our largest trading partner, so any security concerns are exaggerated. That argument is not just incomplete; it is strategically unserious. Yes, China is our largest trading partner. But it is also a security threat. These two things can both be true, and thinking otherwise leaves us vulnerable. In the Australian television series Utopia, Defence officials are called in to explain the threat environment but go to elaborate lengths to avoid naming China. The conversation becomes increasingly circular until they land on the need to protect Australia’s shipping routes to China – protect them from China. The humour works. Australian policy discourse often avoids acknowledging risk when it sits alongside economic dependence. – Two things can be true: China is an economic partner and a threat | The Strategist
Australia/European Union
(Bart Hogeveen – ASPI The Strategist) When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen offered Australia a security and defence partnership in early 2025, Canberra barely noticed. That wasn’t surprising. Canberra’s strategic focus had long been anchored in the Indo-Pacific, with the United States at its core and arrangements such as AUKUS dominating attention. The EU, by comparison, has often been seen as distant – important economically but secondary on security. But the world has changed fast and so did Canberra’s appreciation of the EU as a security partner. – It’s time for Australia to take EU’s defence push seriously | The Strategist
Indo Pacific/Euro Atlantic
(ASPI The Strategist) A regional network open to think tanks and universities from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – NATO’s Indo-Pacific (IP4) partner countries – is working to enhance understanding of the common security challenges facing the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. NATO Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Boris Ruge gave the keynote speech to launch the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic Hub for Shared Security Challenges on 24 February. He and the event’s panellists reflect here on the importance of cooperation between NATO and the Indo-Pacific and the need to counter disinformation through public diplomacy. – New research hub assesses shared security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic | The Strategist
Maritime Warfare
(Sean Andrews – ASPI The Strategist) The sinking by submarine attack of the Iranian frigate Dena in the Indian Ocean on 4 March is a blunt reminder that maritime war does not respect the tidy geographic boundaries favoured in policy frameworks. It also exposes a deeper problem for Australia: a navy built around a handful of exquisite ships and submarines is not structured for sustained attrition in a conflict that will not remain neatly contained. Legally, the strike also sits squarely within contemporary law‑of‑naval‑warfare doctrine. Enemy warships are lawful military objectives by their nature, location and use. Their targetability does not depend on proximity to a declared theatre of operations, nor on whether they are engaged in immediate combat. Dena’s presence in international waters inside Sri Lanka’s exclusive economic zone didn’t diminish its status as a lawful target. Even the reported issuance of warnings, unnecessary when attacking warships, did not alter the fundamentally orthodox character of the engagement. – As the US Navy just demonstrated, war at sea is global | The Strategist
Taiwan
(Ray Ming-Tse Lu – The Strategist) A flag stopped at a stadium gate can tell you more about geopolitical pressure than many an official communique. At a Women’s Asian Cup soccer match in Sydney this month, Taiwanese supporters say flags and banners were turned away, while former Taiwan men’s coach Chen Kuei-jen was escorted from the stands after leading chants of ‘Taiwan’ rather than ‘Chinese Taipei’. Organisers say the matter is being investigated. But even before that process runs its course, the episode has already exposed something worth noticing. Pressure related to Taiwan does not stay neatly in the Taiwan Strait. It travels. Sometimes it appears not in warships or official communiques, but in the mundane decisions of people managing venues, enforcing rules and trying to avoid trouble. – When ‘Taiwan’ becomes a problem in an Australian stadium | The Strategist
United States/Artificial Intelligence
(Tess deBlanc-Knowles – Atlantic Council) The recent public disagreements between an AI company and the US military speaks to a broader breakdown in trust among tech firms, the government, and the public. Americans’ skepticism of AI is high, driven by concerns over safety, job losses, environmental impact, and misuse. The White House has promoted AI development for economic and national security reasons, but it faces growing political resistance and public pushback over regulation and risks. – The Anthropic standoff reveals a larger crisis of trust over AI – Atlantic Council
United States/European Union/Critical Materials
(Ivana Damjanovic – ASPI The Strategist) The United States and the European Union are both working to reduce their dependence on China for critical minerals, but they’re taking markedly different approaches. As both powers pursue critical-mineral independence through different means, the EU may struggle to keep up with the US’s more assertive policy. This matters to Australia as a trading partner of both those economies. Critical-mineral reserves are geographically concentrated, as is the capacity to refine and process them. China controls more than 90 percent of global processed supply of key energy minerals. More worryingly, the EU still sources all of its heavy rare-earth elements from China. These elements are the building blocks of advanced manufacturing, including fifth generation weapons systems and advanced industrial componentry. – EU and US critical-minerals strategies: same goal, different methods | The Strategist
War in Iran/Middle East/Gulf and beyond
(Kimberly Donovan and Emily Ezratty – Atlantic Council) China, Russia, and Iran have developed an “Axis of Evasion” that includes integrated supply chains to circumvent Western sanctions. Through these supply chains of dual-use technology, Iran is able to develop drones, navigation systems, and other military capabilities. The US should press China on its support of these supply chains, and it should take additional steps to disrupt transshipment hubs and other intermediaries. – From drones to rocket fuel, China and Russia are helping Iran through supply chains – Atlantic Council
(The Soufan Center) Islamabad has reportedly been relaying messages between Washington and Tehran, including a 15-point U.S. proposal, that Tehran has reportedly responded to with its own major conditions. Iranian officials have vocalized their distrust in these negotiations, while assassinations of top officials — many of whom were pragmatists — has only hardened the regime and sidelined political leadership in favor of the IRGC. Pakistan — especially its military leadership — has become a top intermediary between the U.S. and Iran, while Türkiye has sought to de-escalate and urge restraint in countries hit by Iranian retaliatory strikes. Washington believes that the IRGC leadership must be looking for an offramp, while the hardline IRGC regime is likely preparing the ground for a potential U.S. ground operation. – Smoke and Mirrors? The Major Players Involved in The Iran Negotiation Discussions – The Soufan Center
(The Soufan Center) The recent appointments of several key Iran-Iraq war-era Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders to high-profile positions demonstrate that the U.S.- killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i has fueled a tilt toward hardline figures who insist on major U.S. concessions for ending the war. U.S. intelligence agencies assess that Khamene’i’s replacement, his son Mojtaba, is severely injured and that IRGC commanders and powerful civilian leaders are ruling in his name. U.S. leaders assess that Majles (parliament) Speaker Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, whose background spans the IRGC and civilian domestic governing institutions, is well-positioned to negotiate and deliver on any agreements with the United States. With pragmatists such as elected President Masoud Pezeshkian largely powerless, hardline leaders assess that Iran’s continued defiance and an expanded target set for retaliatory attacks will position Iran to deter any future U.S. or Israeli offensive. – Iran’s Power Structure Adapts to War – The Soufan Center
