Europe
(Agon Maliqi – Atlantic Council) EU policymakers have proposed adopting a two-tier membership system: New members would gain some benefits of membership but lack veto power in key votes. The two-tier EU proposals risk undermining the credibility of the accession process and stalling the momentum for reforms in candidate countries. The two-tier system could also be exploited by embattled Western Balkans leaders seeking to avoid having to make the rule-of-law reforms required for full membership. – Has the EU found a ‘magic bullet’ to its enlargement conundrum or a new distraction? – Atlantic Council
Russia – Ukraine
(William B. Taylor – Atlantic Council) In Kyiv and Odesa, Ukrainian officials and soldiers express determination and cautious optimism, citing battlefield gains and the importance of continued US and European support. US President Donald Trump has significant leverage to pressure Russia to end the war through increased military support for Ukraine and economic pressure targeting Russia’s oil revenues. European countries, too, play an important role, as they are developing a multinational security force for Ukraine and expanding financial aid to Kyiv. – When the Iran operation is finished, Trump should prioritize ending the war in Ukraine – Atlantic Council
War in Middle East/Gulf, and beyond
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) The military conflict in Iran is having a major impact on the countries of the former Soviet space, creating new winners and losers and thereby transforming the relationships these states have with each other and with the rest of the world. This transformation is not because of direct attacks on these countries or other military moves but because the conflict has closed Iran as a transit corridor, boosted oil prices, and forced these countries to take sides. Some of these consequences will end when the conflict does, and others are likely to continue long into the future. As a result, many of the countries in the former Soviet space are currently discussing how they can continue to benefit from the conflict or mitigate their losses. – Conflict in Iran Creating New Winners and Losers Across Former Soviet Space – Jamestown
(Kateryna Bondar – CSIS) The first week of Iran’s retaliation campaign during Operation Epic Fury demonstrates that drones are no longer auxiliary strike systems but central instruments of modern air campaigns. Their ability to generate sustained pressure at relatively low cost allows actors to impose economic, psychological, and operational strain on adversaries while preserving higher-end missile assets for select targets. The effectiveness of such campaigns lies not only in the drones themselves but in the broader ecosystem that enables their large-scale employment—production capacity, operational doctrine, targeting architecture, and integration with other strike systems. The Middle East crisis escalated in early March 2026 after coordinated U.S.-Israeli strikes under Operation Epic Fury killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior commanders. Iran responded with a large-scale retaliatory campaign primarily targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Despite damage to parts of its command and control structure, Tehran has rapidly generated sustained strikes using a layered architecture combining drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles against military installations, energy infrastructure, and economic centers. Data from the first week of the campaign (March 1–9) reveals several operational trends, particularly in the use of unmanned systems. Drawing on official reporting from regional ministries of defense and open-source intelligence, this analysis assesses the scale and role of drones in Iran’s retaliation strategy and identifies capability gaps that militaries, including the U.S. military, may need to address as these operational models evolve. – Unpacking Iran’s Drone Campaign in the Gulf: Early Lessons for Future Drone Warfare
(Charles A. Kupchan – Council on Foreign Relations) American public and U.S. allies? These are important questions, but they are overshadowed by the more urgent issue of strategic aims. Can Washington translate its military campaign against Iran into a desirable political outcome? The way this war ends will ultimately determine whether Trump’s decision to attack Iran goes down in history as a rash act of folly or a courageous strategic success. Trump has two options. The less risky option is to refrain from dismantling the regime and instead aim to put in place the Islamic Republic 2.0. The institutional skeleton of the regime would remain intact, but its top leaders—a good number of whom are already dead—would be replaced by a less ideological and more pragmatic cadre. Governed by moderates and the military establishment, this new regime would be defanged through strict constraints on its nuclear program, missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies. This approach has already been dubbed the “Venezuela model”—decapitation followed by coercing the remaining government into submission. – Tame, Don’t Topple, the Islamic Republic | Council on Foreign Relations
(The Soufan Center) U.S. pressure, collective defense commitments, and concerns about energy prices and future refugee flows are increasingly drawing European states into the war with Iran. Europe’s role so far has been almost exclusively defensive, pushing back against U.S. demands to use European military bases for offensive action against Iran. The conflict is testing Europe’s long pursued goal of strategic autonomy, forcing it to balance its own interests against alignment with the U.S. Iranian strikes on Gulf states have raised doubts about the protective value of U.S. military bases, a development that may influence European thinking about defense. – The Iran War Serves as a Stress Test for European Strategic Autonomy – The Soufan Center
(Khalid Azim – Atlantic Council) In response to the joint US and Israeli attack on Iran, financial markets have so far reacted in a relatively orderly and measured way. Risk, as measured by volatility, has increased across asset classes. However, we have not seen dramatic dislocations in core financial markets, rates, credit, and foreign exchange. Energy markets, however, have reacted more strongly. Natural gas prices have spiked, reflecting the physical disruption and impairment of certain Gulf-based processing facilities. Oil prices briefly crossed the psychological threshold of one hundred dollars per barrel, while shipping in and out of the Strait of Hormuz slowed dramatically. Monday’s comments by President Donald Trump suggesting that the conflict may be nearing an endpoint subsequently brought oil prices back near ninety dollars per barrel, underscoring how sensitive energy markets are to perceptions about the duration of the conflict. Predicting market movements in moments like this is extraordinarily difficult, and it would be unwise to offer precise forecasts. Instead, two variables deserve particular attention. – How to understand the Iran war market swings: A geopolitical put option – Atlantic Council
(Allison Minor – Atlantic Council) One week into the Iran war, the Houthis have not yet come to Iran’s defense but have warned in official communications that their “fingers are on the trigger.” The Houthis’ apparent reticence has been a surprise for those who view them as simply an Iranian proxy or a trigger-happy militia. Both of these descriptors are reductive—the Houthis are a highly adaptive group with both grand regional goals and unresolved domestic objectives. Getting involved in the Iran war will not yield the same domestic and international benefits for the Houthis that attacking Israel and Red Sea shipping during the Gaza war did, and fighting in the Iran conflict could pose greater risks. The Houthis’ involvement in the Gaza war elevated them on the international stage and allowed them to capitalize on broad support among Yemenis for Palestinians at a time when their population was growing restless. But Yemenis are much more reticent about supporting Iran—a state with ample resources that many Yemenis see as yet another foreign power meddling in their country. On top of this, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the current war means that Houthi involvement could disrupt the Saudi-Houthi détente that has been in place since 2022, potentially plunging Yemen back into an active war with Riyadh. If the Houthis do decide to insert themselves into the Iran war, it could be because they have decided that détente is no longer in their interests. Therefore, Houthi involvement in the Iran war could reignite the Yemen war after four years of relative calm, with significant implications for Yemen and the region. – Will the Houthis join the Iran war? – Atlantic Council
