Afghanistan – Pakistan
(Clara Fong – Council on Foreign Relations) On February 26, Afghanistan’s Taliban government launched an attack on Pakistan’s military bases near their disputed shared border. The regime claims this was in retaliation for Pakistan’s strikes on Afghan military bases several days before. Within hours, Pakistan responded by bombing several Afghan border provinces and the capital, Kabul—the first time Pakistan has conducted an attack on Afghanistan’s urban areas. Pakistan’s defense minister later described the situation as one of “open war” with Afghanistan. The cross-border attacks mark the latest and most significant escalation between the two countries since they agreed to a fragile ceasefire in October 2025 after a previous border conflict that lasted over a week. As of March 2, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has recorded at least 146 civilian casualties in Afghanistan, including 42 dead and 104 injured, though these figures are preliminary. The Afghan Taliban has said that it is willing to negotiate with Pakistan, but there are growing concerns that the conflict could continue to escalate, further destabilizing a region already grappling with the rippling fallout from joint U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran. – Why Are the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan in an ‘Open War’? | Council on Foreign Relations
Iran and beyond
(The Washington Institute) Washington Institute fellows assess how Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraq’s Hashd, and other Iranian proxies and allies are responding to the war, as well as how the Trump administration and partner governments might counter the risk of terrorist attacks given Tehran’s long track record of foreign plots. – The Wartime Role of Iran’s “Axis”: Countering Proxy and Terrorist Threats | The Washington Institute
(Patrick Clawson, Farzin Nadimi – The Washington Institute) This week, the New York Times and other media reported that Iranian authorities are leaning toward naming Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his late father as Supreme Leader, with the Assembly of Experts potentially confirming that choice during ongoing online meetings. Any such decision would be fraught with uncertainty under the present circumstances—the assembly has been forced to meet remotely because its offices in Tehran and Qom were bombed, while Israel’s defense minister has declared that any new Supreme Leader “will be an unequivocal target for elimination,” warning that the military has been instructed “to prepare and act by all means to carry out the mission.” Israel has shown its willingness to take out enemy leaders and their replacements in quick succession (see Hezbollah circa September 2024). Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic may set prudence aside, expediting the process rather than waiting for the end of the conflict before announcing a new leader. Whatever the case, it is well worth assessing just what kind of Supreme Leader the younger Khamenei might be if he manages to secure that position and stay alive. – What Kind of Supreme Leader Would Mojtaba Khamenei Be? | The Washington Institute
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute) The United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran on February 28, decapitating the Islamic Republic’s leadership — but this did not eliminate a government that has terrorized its own people and the region for decades. The Iranian regime’s brutality and capacity to regenerate its own power structures — along with its ballistic missiles, drones, and network of terrorist partners — could easily cause this war to metastasize and spread. In less than a week, the spillover from the initial attack has directly impacted at least 15 countries, with the economic and geopolitical ripples already affecting much of the world. By attacking Iran without clear objectives or an exit strategy, the US and Israel turned what was the greatest strategic and chronic threat to regional security into an unpredictable set of imminent dangers generated by a regime increasingly in collapse. A fundamental task for US national security is to prevent this conflict from becoming a vortex that increasingly pulls in other powers, in the same way that the Syrian civil war did in the 2010s. This is one potential consequence of the Iranian regime’s counterstrikes in multiple directions. – How to prevent the Iran war from becoming a vortex that draws in more countries – Middle East Institute
(Middle East Institute) Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Fadi Nicholas Nassar to discuss Hizballah’s role in the escalating conflict in the Middle East and the implications for Lebanon. A day after the United States and Israel launched a joint military campaign against Iran, Tehran’s Lebanese proxy fired missiles at northern Israeli territory. Israel responded swiftly and forcefully, and Lebanon’s government and population now fear the Iranian-backed militia is dragging the country back into war. The conversation explores the broader repercussions of Hizballah’s actions against the backdrop of a widening war in Iran and Lebanon’s quickly evolving political climate. Nassar also outlines recommendations for how Lebanon can move forward as a sovereign and effective state. – Lebanon on the Brink: Hizballah, Iran, and the War’s Spillover – Middle East Institute
(Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park – CSIS) As Operation Epic Fury—the U.S. military campaign against Iran—entered its sixth day on March 5, both President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth indicated that the conflict could continue for weeks. Members of Congress, the media, and the public are increasingly asking about the cost of this operation, with a wide range of estimates now being circulated. The first 100 hours (H+100) of the operation are estimated to cost $3.7 billion, or $891.4 million each day. Some of these costs are already budgeted, but most ($3.5 billion) are not. The shift of U.S. forces to less expensive munitions and the steep decline of Iranian drone and missile launches will drive costs down. However, future costs will depend mostly on the intensity of operations and the effectiveness of Iranian retaliation. – $3.7 Billion: Estimated Cost of Epic Fury’s First 100 Hours
(Clara Gillispie – Council on Foreign Relations) On the morning of February 28, the United States woke up to the news that U.S. and Israeli forces had launched a bombing campaign against Iran. In the days that followed, President Donald Trump and senior Cabinet officials offered competing casus belli, including, variously, the need to forestall expected retaliation for an imminent Israeli attack on Iran; Tehran’s decades-long history of malign activities in the region; and the danger from its apparently not-obliterated nuclear program. Whatever the rationale, the sudden conflict has imperiled a major trade route through the Persian Gulf, scrambling oil and gas flows and raising benchmark prices in major markets. The longer that the conflict goes on, the greater the threat to both global prices and individual countries reliant on Gulf supplies. Any hopes the administration may have harbored of a Venezuela-style re-capitation exercise seem to have collapsed, as it is now talking about a conflict not of days but weeks or months. – Strait-jacket: Global Energy Flows and the War with Iran | Council on Foreign Relations
Iran – China
(John Calabrese – Middle East Institute) The launch of large-scale US and Israeli strikes against Iran starting on February 28 — framed by President Donald Trump’s objectives of degrading Tehran’s military capabilities and potentially precipitating regime change — places Beijing in a strategically uncomfortable position. This campaign is the most significant US military operation since the Iraq War, unfolding across a region central to China’s energy security and commercial ambitions. China formally opposes regime change and externally engineered political transitions as a matter of doctrine, viewing them as contrary to principles it treats as protective of both Iranian sovereignty and its own domestic and territorial sensitivities. That doctrinal stance shaped Beijing’s early response, as it joined Moscow in requesting an emergency United Nations Security Council session, put out a statement saying it is “highly concerned,” and urged respect for Iran’s territorial integrity and a cessation of hostilities. On March 4, China called for protecting shipping through the Straits of Hormuz and announced plans to dispatch a special envoy to mediate — a move that may enhance its diplomatic profile but is unlikely to gain traction in Washington absent a search for an off-ramp. – China in the crossfire: Calculated moves amid the US-Iran showdown – Middle East Institute
Iran – Russia
(Anna Borshchevskaya – The Washington Institute) If anyone was worried that Russia was going to intervene on behalf of its ally Iran in the new Middle East conflict, they need not be. Vladimir Putin’s response to the massive U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran—and even the Israeli strike that killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s longtime Supreme Leader—was at best bland. He called the U.S. and Israeli strikes “cynical” and murderous but issued neither threats, nor red lines, nor commitments to help Iran. To understand Putin’s restraint, consider his larger strategy. The Russian leader sees no benefit to a futile challenge to the U.S. or Israeli militaries. And he has other priorities. This is not to say that there aren’t clear advantages to Putin’s patience. The ongoing crisis presents opportunities we know he will try to exploit. – In the Middle East, Chaos Is Putin’s New Ally | The Washington Institute
(The Soufan Center) Operation Epic Fury has reaffirmed the nature of the Tehran-Moscow partnership as opportunistic and somewhat limited. Nevertheless, Russia likely regards the removal of Khamenei as unacceptable on principle, potentially leading to stronger involvement than in the 12-Day War. The conflict in the Middle East presents both a further weakening of Moscow’s strategy in the region, but also presents a potential economic and military windfall if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed and U.S. assets are rerouted away from Ukraine. In the face of the Trump Administration’s relatively unpredictable foreign policy style, Russia is unable to sufficiently help deter conflict from its partners — either diplomatically or by shows of force. – The Iranian-Russian Partnership in the Aftermath of Operation Epic Fury – The Soufan Center
Russia
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) Moscow’s plans for new rail routes in the Russian North, needed to support the Northern Sea Route, expand trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and exploit mineral reserves in a region poorly served by transport infrastructure, have been dashed yet again. Budgetary stringencies, the difficulties of construction in a region threatened by melting permafrost, and the fact that most routes will not be useful until they are completed have resulted in a spate of further delays and even the likely cancellation of many. Unless that changes, possibly through an influx of PRC funding that would come with strings attached, Moscow will not be able to maintain, let alone expand, its production of many mineral reserves or complete Russian President Vladimir Putin’s much-ballyhooed “turn to the east.” – Moscow’s Plans to Build New Rail Routes in North Falling Through – Jamestown
Russia – Abkhazia
(Irakli Laitadze – The Jamestown Foundation) In early February, the Kremlin suspended the issuance of internal Russian passports inside Abkhazia, a breakaway territory of Georgia, after concerns from local authorities about sovereignty, relocating the offices to nearby Sochi, Russia. The move highlights tensions surrounding Moscow’s long-running “passportization” campaign in Abkhazia, where 80 percent of residents are dual citizens of Abkhazia and Russia. Since Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, Moscow has steadily integrated Abkhazia through security cooperation, financial systems integration, infrastructure investments, and legal harmonization. These mechanisms embed the territory within Russian systems—direct financial transfers from Russia constituted 30 percent of Abkhazia’s 2025 budget, for example—without pursuing formal annexation. Russia is continually hollowing out Abkhazia’s genuine sovereignty while maintaining its nominal independence. This incremental integration strengthens Moscow’s leverage in the South Caucasus and entrenches long-term Russian control over Georgia’s breakaway territory. – Kremlin Suspends Internal Russian Passport Issuance in Abkhazia – Jamestown
US
(Bruce Hoffman – Council on Foreign Relations) For Iran, state-sponsorship of terrorism has been a critical instrument of its force projection and foreign policy since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The pivotal event in this long-sustained campaign was the November 1979 seizure of fifty-two American hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran by a group of militant Iranian “students.”. For 444 days, these so-called students—who claimed to have acted independently, without government support or encouragement—held the world’s most powerful country at bay. Throughout that protracted episode, they earned unparalleled worldwide media attention for their anti-American cause, ultimately costing an American president his reelection to office. As events would later show, this incident was only the beginning of an increasingly serious and extensive state-sponsored terrorism campaign directed by the Iranian regime of the then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini against the United States as well as other Western countries. The suicide truck bombings of the U.S. embassies in Beirut and Kuwait in 1983, of the new Beirut embassy in 1984, of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks at Beirut International Airport in 1983, and of the U.S. Air Force Khobar barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 can all be traced back to Iran’s training and arming of local terrorists. – What the Strikes on Iran Could Mean for U.S. Homeland Security | Council on Foreign Relations
