Geostrategic magazine (9 August 2025)

Complex research (by Marco Emanuele):

Distinzioni fondamentali / Fundamental distinctions | The Global Eye

L’assoluto della sicurezza lineare / Absolute linear security | The Global Eye

Disumanità / Inhumanity | The Global Eye

From global think tanks

The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye.

Today’s about: Afghanistan; ASEAN-China-Climate Change; Australia; Australia-New Zealand-Pacific; Belarus; Cameroon; China; China-Taiwan; China-US; Climate Change-International Court of Justice; Europe; Europe-North Korea; Hong Kong; Israel-Gaza; Israel-Saudi Arabia-Middle East; Japan-Northern Australia; Landlocked Developing Economies; Lebanon-UNIFIL-Hizbollah; Middle East; North Korea; Poland; Russia-Ukraine; Somalia; Sudan; Sudan-US-China; UK (Cyber Strategy); United Arab Emirates-Abraham Accords; US; US-Russia

Afghanistan

(UN News) Millions of people returning to Afghanistan from neighbouring countries are receiving humanitarian support at the border, but they will need more help to rebuild their lives, according to UN-Habitat, the agency that advocates for sustainable communities. “The real challenge is still ahead of us,” Stephanie Loose, Programme Manager in Afghanistan, told journalists in Geneva on Friday. “We’re speaking about the reintegration of people who’ve lost their homes, who’ve lost their assets and also their hope.” – ‘The real challenge is still ahead’: UN warns on Afghan returnees | UN News

ASEAN – China – Climate Change

(Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat – Lowy The Interpreter) As the next round of annual global talks on climate change approaches, the European Union and China last month jointly issued a climate declaration underscoring their commitment to submit 2035 emissions targets, accelerate green technologies, and uphold the principles of multilateral climate governance set out in the 2015 Paris agreement. Such commitments should not be the preserve of only two major powers. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China should also issue a joint climate compact – concretely mapped, collectively designed, and Paris‑aligned. China and ASEAN already share a well‑established corpus of cooperation, from clean energy to climate resilience. In their joint strategic statements, they reaffirm commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and embrace the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, including support for capacity building, technology transfer, and finance for mitigation and adaptation. China has pledged to back the ASEAN Centre for Climate Change and launch projects on low‑carbon community development and climate‑resilient cities. – ASEAN and China need their own climate compact | Lowy Institute

Australia

(Peter Layton – ASPI The Strategist) The Royal Australian Navy’s force structure of small numbers of warships and submarines is ill-suited to major wars. These vessels simply take far too long to build. For the RAN to stay relevant to major warfighting, it will need to become hybrid, mixing big and costly crewed ships with uncrewed ones and ground-launched missiles. This simpler equipment can be built in numbers and, if necessary, at speed. There are grim warnings of a possible major conflict in the Indo-Pacific that could include Australia. The RAN may be involved, but probably only briefly. Its combat power would diminish if ships were lost, since replacements would be unavailable. The greatest weakness of modern navies is that they are being designed around highly sophisticated warships and submarines that, if lost in combat, cannot be replaced for years. For example, the US Navy’s Virginia-class nuclear submarines take seven to eight years to build. While building conventionally powered submarines is quicker, even the best-of-breed submarine builders, Japan’s, take four years. – Australian navy should go hybrid to outlast a big war | The Strategist

Australia – New Zealand – Pacific 

(Hansley Gumbaketi – Lowy The Interpreter) The non-alignment style of diplomacy adopted by the Pacific Islands has proven to be a pragmatic approach to securing their interests. Dealing with all partners – be it China or the United States – has delivered tangible benefits. However, the approach has heightened the anxieties of Australia and New Zealand over regional security. Australia’s $190 million security assistance package to Solomon Islands announced last year was as much about staving off China in the Pacific neighbour as it was about local security capabilities. In a similar vein, Papua New Guinea and Nauru have also benefited from Australia’s attention. PNG elevated its bilateral security arrangement with Australia to include a defence treaty while Nauru gained a financing deal for its critical infrastructure and finance sector. New Zealand may not have the same sized purse as Australia, but it is experimenting with expanding its influence through visa waiver arrangements for Pacific Island Forum member states. – Australia and New Zealand’s Pacific approach diverges | Lowy Institute

Belarus

(Dmitry Bolkunets – The Jamestown Foundation) In the five years since Belarus’s 2020 protest movement, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime has become characterized by systematic, violent repression of dissent. The country, isolated from the West, became a military foothold for Russia and fell into political, economic, and informational dependence on the Kremlin. Western sanctions in response to Lukashenka’s human rights abuses and support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine failed to stop Minsk’s repressive tactics. Sanctions deepened Belarus’s dependence on Russia, strengthened authoritarianism, and harmed average citizens. The Belarusian opposition cannot influence the situation inside the country; it remains fragmented and financially dependent on Western donors. The distribution of Western aid to Belarusian pro-democracy groups inside the country and in exile is often opaque, ineffective, inefficient, and prone to corruption. The change of power in Belarus will likely occur either under Kremlin pressure or when Lukashenka passes away. – Belarus 2020–2025: Domestic Repression and Russian Influence – Jamestown

Cameroon 

(Crisis Group) Cameroon’s October presidential election will be a stress test for the country’s stability. Frustrations with the incumbent and ruling party, constraints on dissent, armed conflict and ethnic tensions all pose dangers. Yaoundé should start taking steps now to make the vote as credible as possible. – Preventing Unrest in the Run-up to Cameroon’s Presidential Poll | International Crisis Group

China

(Matthew Johnson – The Jamestown Foundation) Beijing views control over the platforms, standards, and data flows of the Internet of Things (IoT) era as a source of lasting structural leverage, and has spent more than a decade positioning itself at the center of this emerging system. The PRC’s share of global smart home device shipments is projected to reach 20–30 percent by 2028, driven by a domestic environment of sustained policy support, coordinated investment, and state-managed access to capital. Massive state-led investment in broadband, 5G, and next-generation network infrastructure—deployed by major state-owned telecom operators—has given PRC firms a decisive first-mover advantage in developing, refining, and exporting advanced IoT technologies. Beijing’s active role in shaping international standards signals that its ambitions extend beyond manufacturing scale, aiming to embed Chinese technical protocols, governance norms, and data practices into the global connected-device ecosystem. Looking ahead, the spread of PRC IoT platforms points toward a fully integrated digital environment in which everyday devices are linked to AI, cloud, and edge systems under Chinese influence—raising long-term risks of technological dependence, data capture, and reduced autonomy for foreign governments and industries. – Smart Device Empire, Part 2: Policy Underpins PRC’s Global IoT Ambitions – Jamestown

China – Taiwan

(Institute for the Study of War) PRC. The PLA has conducted shows of strength in recent days in celebration of its 98th anniversary. The PLA debuted a new amphibious assault ship and published a five-part documentary meant to intimidate foreign adversaries and rally public support for the PLA. – China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 8, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War

China – US

(Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan – ASPI The Strategist) Cyberattacks on any critical infrastructure should be alarming, but attacks on nuclear infrastructure are all the more so due to the potential consequences, including radiation leaks. A China-sponsored hacker attacked the US National Nuclear Security Administration in July. The organisation is responsible for building and managing the US nuclear stockpile as well as the nuclear power plants on US warships and submarines. Like other critical infrastructure, nuclear facilities and installations rely heavily on digital systems for a variety of functions. These include nuclear-reactor controls, safety and security systems within a nuclear facility, transportation of nuclear material, and emergency response protocols. Effective cybersecurity protocols and cyber-hygiene measures are important to prevent intentional attacks and accidents in a nuclear establishment. – Chinese cyberattack on US nuclear agency highlights importance of cyber hygiene | The Strategist

Climate Change – International Court of Justice 

(Melanie Pill, Meg Keen – Lowy The Interpreter) After months of anticipation, the International Court of Justice ICJ) has delivered an advisory opinion on climate change – confirming the obligation of countries to act decisively in response to the environmental consequences or they would commit “an internationally wrongful act”. So, what’s next? The ICJ case was championed and driven by Pacific Island countries. The advisory opinion opens the door for vulnerable states to seek compensation from those dodging climate action. Critically, the court’s finding extends state responsibility for emissions beyond the burning of fossil fuels to the subsidisation of the industries involved, as well as extraction. This result also steps up pressure on polluters, dismissing the need to prove a full causal link between action and damage in cases where existing scientific evidence is deemed sufficient. – The world court tightens the tap on fossil fuels | Lowy Institute

Europe

(Linus Terhorst – RUSI) As far as naming missiles go, Greek mythology has been a thankful source for inspiration: the British Trident missiles allude to Poseidon’s weapon of choice, and the Aegis missile defence system invokes the shield of Zeus, to name but a few examples. In 2023, a new system joined the family: the ‘Typhon’ is a container-like trailer from which the US Army launches cruise missiles, Tomahawks, and ballistic missiles, SM-6s. Seeing the system in action, the namesake, a Greek monster, seems like an obvious choice. Ancient tragedian Aeschylus described Typhon as a ‘destructive monster of a hundred heads, impetuous . . . hissing out terror with horrid jaws, while from his eyes lightened a hideous glare.’ The Lockheed Martin produced Typhon has capacity for 4 missiles, though their warheads should be more destructive than the monster’s 100. A battery of the system consists of four such launchers, a trailer-based Battery Operations Centre, as well as a trailer for reloading missiles. The missiles that Typhon launches have significant reach. The Typhon-adapted Tomahawk cruise missile has a range of up to 1500 km, while the SM-6 can reach targets of up to 320 km. Europe badly needs a capability such as the one provided by Typhon. Under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the US had agreed with Russia not to station intermediate range ground-launched missiles in Europe. The withdrawal of Russia and the US from the treaty in 2019 left Europe unprepared. It had not the capability to answer the significant build-up of intermediate range capabilities near its eastern flank. – Typhon, European Deterrence and Industrial Ambition for Deep Precision Strike | Royal United Services Institute

Europe – North Korea

(Saeme Kim – RUSI) Europe’s approach to North Korea has stagnated into strategic irrelevance. Initiated with optimism in the early 2000s, the EU’s policy of ‘critical engagement’ aimed to reduce tensions, uphold non-proliferation norms, and promote human rights. While the essence of critical engagement remains sound in principle, the policy in its current form is outdated and fails to reflect the developments North Korea has undergone over the past two decades. There is a pressing need for a Critical Engagement 2.0 – an updated strategy that takes into account North Korea’s evolving threat posture and its integration into authoritarian networks. – Europe Needs to Update its North Korea Policy | Royal United Services Institute

Hong Kong 

(Matthew Fulco – The Jamestown Foundation) Hong Kong launched a new stablecoin regime on August 1, continuing its cautious embrace of emerging financial products nearly three years after declaring its intention to become a digital assets hub. In anticipation of the new regime, July saw a flurry of fundraising activity by listed fintech companies, indicating that the city’s repressive political environment is unlikely to stifle the growth of the digital assets sector. The eventual success of Hong Kong’s current experiment will depend on both Beijing’s permissiveness and on global competition. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is also promoting similar digital token and stablecoin regimes, while the U.S. government is keen to establish its own leadership in the sector. – Hong Kong’s Crypto Bet Is Starting To Pay Off – Jamestown

Israel – Gaza

(Alex Plitsas – Atlantic Council) By approving a decision to clear and take control of Gaza City later this year, Israel appears to be making a high-stakes bet—militarily, diplomatically, and politically. After nearly two years of brutal conflict following the Hamas-led October 7 attacks, Israel is preparing for a deeper push into the heart of Gaza’s largest population center. But this isn’t simply about eliminating Hamas strongholds or reasserting deterrence. The decision to delay the occupation, or the holding of territory, until the war’s two-year mark suggests a broader strategy: to change the strategic calculus of Hamas and force serious negotiations. Yet the risks are immense, and the aftermath could lead to an entrenched insurgency if mismanaged. Hamas has refused to release all remaining hostages unless Israel ends the war entirely, leaving Hamas with a postwar role in Gaza. This is a nonstarter for Israel, which now appears to be trying a new approach. Israeli leaders say it is not a long-term play. “We don’t want to keep it,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday. But if the war ends and no credible alternative is ready, then the burden to run Gaza may fall—by design or default—on Israel itself. – Israel’s gamble in Gaza City signals a push toward negotiation—but risks a long insurgency – Atlantic Council

(UN News) The UN’s top human rights official insisted on Friday that the Israeli Government must not pursue a complete military takeover of the Gaza Strip, beginning with full control of Gaza City. “A complete military takeover of the occupied Gaza Strip must be immediately halted,” insisted Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, after the Israeli security cabinet approved a plan which portends a full-scale Israeli military takeover in the battered enclave. The development runs contrary to international law, Mr. Türk continued, referring to a ruling of the International Court of Justice that Israel must end its occupation and achieve a two-State solution giving Palestinians the right to self-determination. Any further escalation of the conflict between Hamas and Israel that has devastated Gaza and killed tens of thousands “will result in more massive forced displacement, more killing, more unbearable suffering, senseless destruction and atrocity crimes”, the UN rights chief said. – Israeli plan to take military control of Gaza must stop now, says UN rights chief | UN News

Israel – Saudi Arabia – Middle East

(John Calabrese – Middle East Institute) The Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, shattered Israel’s long-standing security paradigm, replacing limited deterrence with an ambitious campaign aimed at dismantling Hamas, confronting Hizballah and other Iranian proxies, and directly targeting Iran’s nuclear program with the support of the United States. In stark contrast, Saudi Arabia has prioritized regional stability and de-escalation, restoring relations with Iran, and focusing on its Vision 2030 economic transformation. These divergent paths — Israel’s military maximalism versus Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of stability — have frozen normalization talks and complicated US diplomacy. – Post-Oct. 7 divergent paths: Israel’s military maximalism and Saudi Arabia’s strategic de-escalation | Middle East Institute

Japan – Northern Australia

(John Coyne – ASPI The Strategist) Northern Australia holds the key to unlocking a new era of defence cooperation and regional development. Just as Singapore has successfully established a long-term training presence in Queensland backed by a $2.25 billion infrastructure investment, Japan can now follow a similar path. Policymakers in Canberra and Tokyo should take the next step and Defence and Northern Territory leaders should turn this strategic opportunity into a lasting partnership on the ground. The logic is simple. The Japan Self-Defense Forces need space to train, operate and grow as a regional security contributor. Australia has space in abundance, as well as political will, a mature alliance framework and some of the Indo-Pacific’s most challenging and realistic training environments. The potential benefits are profound. For Japan, it offers access to world-class training areas and the opportunity to deepen interoperability with trusted partners. For Australia, and especially the Northern Territory, it offers a new source of economic development, regional infrastructure investment and strategic uplift. – Exercise together, build together: Japan should train in northern Australia | The Strategist

Landlocked Developing Economies

(UN News) The Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries wrapped up earlier Friday in Awaza, Turkmenistan, with delegates adopting a landmark political declaration aimed at speeding up sustainable development and boosting resilience in 32 nations that lack direct access to the sea. – Landlocked but not left behind: UN summit in Turkmenistan wraps with bold new roadmap | UN News

Lebanon – UNIFIL – Hizbollah

(Middle East Institute) With its new government at the half-year mark and the UNIFIL international peacekeeping force’s mandate due for reauthorization at month’s end, Lebanon stands at a pivotal moment. In this episode of Middle East Focus, hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Fadi Nicholas Nassar to evaluate whether the Lebanese state can reclaim its sovereignty, starting with the disarmament of Hizballah and the enforcement of a cease-fire. Nassar examines UNIFIL’s evolving mandate for action, the force’s operational limits and posture, and the Lebanese prime minister’s Aug. 5 demand for a plan to disarm all non-state militias by the end of the year. – Lebanon and the UNIFIL Mandate: Disarming Hizballah and Reclaiming Sovereignty | Middle East Institute

Middle East

(Institute for the Study of War) Hezbollah supporters held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah. Public support for Hezbollah presents a significant obstacle to decreasing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon in the short term. – State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki told Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati during a phone call on August 8 that Iraq will not allow the United States or Israel to disarm the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). – Iran Update, August 8, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War

North Korea

(The Project Anthracite Team – RUSI) This report on Hungnam Fertiliser Complex is the fourth Project Anthracite site profile exploring different chemical production facilities throughout North Korea. The paper provides an assessment of both the chemicals produced on site for their relevance to a potential chemical weapons programme, and whether and how the site would be declarable under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – Hungnam Fertiliser Complex: DPRK’s Chemical Facilities: Site Profile 4 | Royal United Services Institute

Poland

(Philip Bednarczyk – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Poland entered a new political era when Karol Nawrocki, a newcomer to politics, was sworn in as president on August 6. Like his predecessor, outgoing President Andrzej Duda, Nawrocki was supported by the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) during his campaign. The political “cohabitation” between the ruling centrist coalition (Civic Coalition, KO) led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the conservative presidential palace has not changed. Indeed, despite divisive domestic politics, Poland has emerged as a leading political and economic power in Europe and NATO with especially good ties to today’s Washington. With the political playing field set until parliamentary elections are held at the latest in fall 2027, here are three interrelated issues to watch going forward. – Poland’s New Political Chapter | German Marshall Fund of the United States

Russia – Ukraine 

(Institute for the Study of War) Kremlin officials are reportedly demanding that Ukraine cede to Russia strategically vital unoccupied territory in Donetsk Oblast and freeze the frontline in other areas as part of a ceasefire agreement. – The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their attacks on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for the ground. Conceding such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its “fortress belt,” the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting will not resume. – Russia’s failure to seize Slovyansk in 2022 and ongoing struggles to envelop the fortress belt underscore the success of Ukraine’s long-term efforts to reinforce the fortress belt cities. – Russian forces are currently still attempting to envelop the fortress belt from the southwest and are engaged in an effort to seize it that would likely take several years to complete. – Ceding Ukrainian-held parts of Donetsk Oblast will place Russian forces on the borders of Donetsk Oblast, a position that is significantly less defensible than the current line. – Russian positions along the Donetsk-Kharkiv and Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border areas would provide a more advantageous launching point for a future Russian offensive into nearby areas of Kharkiv or Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will almost certainly violate any future ceasefire or peace agreement and renew military aggression against Ukraine in the future unless a peace agreement includes robust monitoring mechanisms and security guarantees for Ukraine. – Putin’s reported proposal once again underscores that he maintains his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s capitulation and remains disinterested in good-faith negotiations. – The Kremlin does not appear to be setting the domestic information conditions necessary for the Russian people to accept a settlement short of full victory in Ukraine. – Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk. Russian forces advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War

Somalia 

(Emirates Policy Center) In mid-June, the Somali government convened the first-ever National Consultative Forum, which Mogadishu promoted as a platform to foster national consensus and break the current political deadlock. Despite its significance, the forum was boycotted by key actors – including the Puntland and Jubaland states – and several prominent opposition figures. While the forum offered some opportunities and was viewed as a tentative sign of government openness – pending further validation – and a potential step toward consensus and reconciliation, its overall outcomes, coupled with the absence key stakeholders, underscored the gravity of Somalia’s ongoing political crisis. This raised concerns about the potential for deepening divisions, growing mistrust and heightened uncertainty across the country. The Mogadishu forum failed to receive the level of regional or international endorsement the Somali government had anticipated. However, international partners may still view it as a foundational step toward an inclusive political process. They are likely to continue encouraging Somali stakeholders to engage in dialogue and work toward consensus through a comprehensive and participatory framework. – Emirates Policy Center | The National Consultative Forum and the Future of Somalia’s Political Landscape

Sudan 

(UN News) Help is needed urgently to halt a deadly cholera outbreak that is sweeping across Sudan, UN agencies said on Friday, while warning that communities continue to be terrorised by parties to the conflict even as they flee violence. “People told me multiple times that when they were fleeing from Zamzam [displacement camp], armed people would threaten them while they were in flight, saying sure, ‘Flee, go to that place, run here, run there, we will follow you, we will find you’,” said Jocelyn Elizabeth Knight, a Protection Officer for the UN refugee agency, UNHCR. Briefing journalists in Geneva, Ms. Knight described speaking to one traumatized child at a UNHCR shelter, whose experience mirrors that of countless other youngsters across the nation. “A tiny boy told me, ‘You know, during the day things are okay here, but I’m afraid to go to sleep at night in case the place where we’re living is attacked again’.” – Sudan: You can run – but we will find you, militias warn terrified civilians | UN News

Sudan – US – China

(Matteo Boccia – Lowy The Interpreter) On 22 May, the US State Department announced a determination that the Sudanese army had used chemical weapons in the current civil war. The announcement came with no details about which chemical agents were used by the army, or where and at what scale, except that such weapons were deployed in 2024. This is not the first time that allegations of chemical weapons usage in Sudan have been raised. Amnesty International disclosed that brutal military attacks have destroyed or devastated more than 170 villages in the isolated Jebel Marra area of Darfur since the beginning of 2016. At least 30 of these attacks allegedly included chemical weapons. – On Sudan: America and China take very different tacks | Lowy Institute

UK (Cyber Strategy) 

(Joseph Jarnecki and Jamie MacColl – RUSI) The UK’s cyber strategy has lost momentum. While in many ways the UK continues to invest in and operate as a ‘cyber power’, successive governments’ approach to national cyber resilience has struggled to keep pace with technological and political shifts and the threat posed by state and criminal actors. Many officials in the UK system recognise the nature of the challenges the country faces and the need for change. However, they have found it difficult to translate their own understanding of the problem into the kind of actions that could raise the bar for cyber security and resilience at sufficient scale. The result is that the UK’s approach continues to largely rely on market forces to fix systemic technological and cyber security challenges. This is no longer sustainable when ransomware gangs repeatedly hold our essential services and flagship businesses to ransom. – A Crossroads for UK Cyber Strategy | Royal United Services Institute

United Arab Emirates – Abraham Accords

(Marwan Al-Bloush – Emirates Policy Center) The UAE has put forward an ambitious vision to address the region’s deep-rooted “structural failures.” This vision encompasses the establishment of a regional security framework that includes Arab states, Israel and Iran; the launch of a comprehensive economic and investment integration initiative; strategic efforts to stabilize Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq; the resolution of outstanding border disputes through final settlements; and the creation of a viable Palestinian state. The failure of negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration may push Arab countries to continue engaging with Iran to de-escalate the situation. However, this would likely leave Israel and Iran locked in persistent conflict – undermining regional stability and the future of the Abraham Accords. The Palestinian issue must remain at the heart of any effort to broaden the Abraham Accords. Achieving meaningful progress requires coordinated Emirati, Arab and American efforts – while ensuring that this objective is not derailed by internal Palestinian divisions or constrained by the narrow calculations of the Israeli political establishment. – Emirates Policy Center | Toward a New Regional Order: An Ambitious Emirati Vision to Address Regional ‘Structural Failures’ and Expand the Abraham Accords

US

(Roger W. Ferguson Jr. and Maximilian Hippold – Council on Foreign Relations) President Donald Trump has long been a critic of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, whom he appointed in 2018. Since beginning his second term, Trump has continued to call for lower interest rates and has repeatedly expressed frustration with Powell’s resistance. In recent weeks, however, Trump’s public criticism has reached new heights, threatening the independence of the Federal Reserve and demonstrating a remarkable willingness to risk the role of the United States as the bedrock of global financial stability. – The Importance of Fed Independence | Council on Foreign Relations

US – Russia

(Atlantic Council) The face-off is set. US President Donald Trump announced Friday that he would meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 15 in Alaska. It’s the first meeting between US and Russian heads of state since before Russian forces launched their full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Also on Friday, the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia has floated a cease-fire proposal that would allow for significant territorial concessions in eastern Ukraine to Russia, as well as US assistance toward international recognition of those areas as Russian. – Trump and Putin just announced a meeting in Alaska. What does that mean for the war in Ukraine?  – Atlantic Council

(Heather Williams – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Social media is again the preferred platform for nuclear signaling. On August 1, Trump announced in a social media post that he was ordering two U.S. nuclear submarines “to be positioned in the appropriate regions” in response to former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s “inflammatory statements.” Medvedev had taken to X in the preceding weeks to mock U.S. “ultimatums” for Moscow to end the war in Ukraine. Days later, on August 4, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it “no longer considers itself bound” by the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Moscow announced it would suspend participation in the treaty in 2019 after the U.S. withdrawal but claimed to continue to observe a unilateral moratorium. Hours after the announcement, Medvedev posted on X, “This is a new reality all our opponents will have to reckon with. Expect further steps.” How seriously should we take these online barbs, and what do Trump’s announcement about submarine deployments and Russia’s breakout from the INF Treaty mean for risks of escalation? – What Trump’s Submarine Threat and Russia’s INF Exit Really Mean