From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Central Asia-Russia; China; Egypt-Gaza; Egypt-Saudi Arabia; Georgia-Italy; Israel-Gaza-US; Kazakhstan; Russia; US; US-Israel; US-Ukraine
Central Asia – Russia
(Paul Goble – The Jamestown Foundation) Water shortages in Central Asia are becoming a problem for Russia as the drought and its effects spread into Russian territories, and Central Asians call for Moscow to send water from Siberian rivers or face massive immigration. Russians overwhelmingly oppose the revival of Siberian river diversion because of their own water needs and because Central Asia cannot pay as much as the People’s Republic of China could for water. Tensions between Moscow and Central Asia are growing over water disputes, as is the prospect of large and uncontrolled Central Asian migration into Russia. – Central Asia’s Water Crisis Becoming Russia’s Problem – Jamestown
China
(Tsaiying Lu, Athena Tong – The Jamestown Foundation) Beijing is promoting cross-border power transmission projects, deploying its leading producers of submarine electric cables to deepen integration with other countries’ critical infrastructure. Orient Cables, a national champion firm that has received generous government subsidies and has achieved several technical breakthroughs, is now expanding overseas. It is involved in the One Belt One Road initiative and Beijing’s Global Energy Interconnection Strategy, as well as a project that will link power generation in Morocco with demand for electricity in the United Kingdom. Reliance on strategic rivals for critical infrastructure opens recipient states to vulnerabilities that those rivals can exploit. Previous examples include Germany’s reliance on energy supplied by Russia’s Nord Stream 1 pipeline and various countries’ reliance on Huawei to provide critical telecommunications infrastructure. – PRC Seeks Dominance in Submarine Power Cable Infrastructure – Jamestown
(Peter Mattis, Arran Hope, Matthew Johnson, Peace Ajirotutu – The Jamestown Foundation) Speculation is growing about a power struggle at the top of the Party. An announcement of new regulations for influential decision-making and coordinating bodies is a clear sign of change in how the leadership makes policy. Its implications for Xi Jinping’s power remain unclear. One interpretation sees the regulations as evidence of Xi enhancing his vertical control over the system, while another reading sees him being constrained by the rest of the leadership. If Xi’s power remains supreme, the new regulations signal tighter control, allowing him to more effectively drive his agenda and giving more formal authority to Cai Qi. If the regulations are an attempt to bind Xi to formal mechanisms, the move to institutionalize the organizations through which he has driven the Party-state system could signal that other parts of the leadership are wresting some power from Xi and forcing him to abide by bureaucratic procedure. – Divergent Implications for Xi’s Power From New Party Regulations – Jamestown
Egypt – Gaza
(Amr Salah Mohamed – Atlantic Council) In early 2023, Egypt’s deeply constrained public sphere showed tentative signs of political opening. Confronted with an economic crisis, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who has maintained tight control over the country since 2014, initiated a package of economic and political reforms. Pushed to the margins for years, opposition voices cautiously hoped that the 2023 presidential and August 2025 parliamentary elections might open limited new space of political participation for secular groups after years of political constraints. Then came the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack inside Israel. With the launch of Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza, followed by escalation with Hezbollah and Iran, harrowing images from the strip, and fears of Palestinian displacement to Egypt—Egyptian anxiety is elevated, and the national debate has shifted from reform to national security. By the end of 2023, al-Sisi had secured a third term without a meaningful electoral contestation amid calls for national unity. It’s clear that the post-October 7 era has not only devastated the Gaza strip, it has also influenced Egypt’s economy and domestic political dynamics—and the impacts extend beyond the ballot box. This includes deepening ideological fractures among Egypt’s intellectuals and secular opposition, further discrediting their democratic narrative while lending credibility to conspiracy theories, and restoring the battered image of Egypt’s military as the nation’s ultimate protector. – How the war in Gaza diminished dreams of political reform in Egypt – Atlantic Council
Egypt – Saudi Arabia
(Mirette F. Mabrouk – Middle East Institute) It is a particularly exhausting time to be an Arab foreign minister. On June 21, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reiterated his country’s condemnation of the State of Israel’s “blatant aggression” against the Islamic Republic of Iran during the opening session of the 51st Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Istanbul. He called the attacks “a breach of international laws and norms” and said they risked escalating an already incendiary situation. Later that day, his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdel Atty, laid out his country’s almost identical position. Abdel Atty also met with the Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and emphasized the need for de-escalation and the pursuit of all diplomatic avenues to tamp down the spiraling violence. When the Egyptian and Saudi foreign ministers met later on the sidelines of the conference, they appeared to present a largely unified stance. And two days later, when Iran struck Al-Udeid Airbase in Qatar — the United States’ largest military base in the Middle East and home to US Central Command’s forward headquarters — both countries again made nearly identical announcements, calling it an “unacceptable aggression” and condemning the “violation of Qatar’s sovereignty.” – Egypt and Saudi Arabia: Any good relationship needs work | Middle East Institute
Georgia – Italy
(Dario Cristiani – The Jamestown Foundation) Italy’s increased bilateral engagement with the Georgian Dream government sharply contrasts with broader EU skepticism toward Tbilisi’s democratic backsliding. Rome’s approach is shaped by historical, cordial ties with Russia and its proxies; energy interests; and a sovereigntist outlook that downplays regime type in foreign policy. Tbilisi Mayor Kakhaber Kaladze’s deep connections to Italy—rooted in his soccer career and political links to Forza Italia—help explain the warm ties between Georgia and Italy. – Italy’s Approach to Georgia Stirs Controversy – Jamestown
Israel – Gaza – US
(The Soufan Center) Trump’s foreign policy team wants to exploit the momentum it believes it gained from brokering the Iran-Israeli ceasefire to overcome longstanding obstacles to a resolution of the Gaza conflict. U.S. and Israeli leaders perceived that the damage they wrought on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs has increased pressure on Hamas to accept settlement terms it previously rejected. A new U.S.-Israel ceasefire plan provides for Arab states to secure Gaza on an interim basis, but it underestimates Arab objections to assuming the task of disarming Hamas. Hamas’ initial rejection of the proposal indicates it believes U.S., global, and domestic pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will force Israel to end the war on terms acceptable to Hamas leaders. – Trump Pushes Israel to End Gaza War – The Soufan Center
Kazakhstan
(Fuad Shahbazov – The Jamestown Foundation) In response to shifting regional dynamics primarily driven by Russia’s war against Ukraine, Kazakhstan is reshaping its security posture by reducing military dependence on Moscow and prioritizing self-reliance, regional partnerships, and defense modernization. Astana is focusing on its role as a “middle power,” allowing Kazakhstan to exert greater regional and global influence through integration into multilateral organizations, expanded participation in international initiatives, and diversified defense imports. Kazakhstan has pursued diverse international military collaborations, particularly through joint exercises, weapons co-production, and strategic coordination with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, enabling it to adopt a more independent defense strategy. – Kazakhstan Aims to Modernize Military Through Multivector Diplomacy – Jamestown
Russia
(Richard Arnold – The Jamestown Foundation) The Russian Ministry of Defense and the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO) drafted an agreement in June that would formally establish a Cossack mobilization reserve. Cossack forces are already active in Russia’s Combat Army Reserve (BARS) system, with about 25,000 Cossacks in 18 battalions. Recent expansions suggest that the Kremlin is deepening ties between Cossack organizations and military infrastructure. The Kremlin continues to use the Cossack identity as a political tool, promoting a state-controlled, inclusive “registered Cossack” framework to boost military manpower and suppress independent cultural or ethnic Cossack identity. – Kremlin Formalizing Cossack Mobilization Reserve – Jamestown
US
(Atlantic Council) What is the biggest threat to the United States—and what should the military do about it? Where should the United States position its forces around the world? How should the US military adapt to the age of artificial intelligence (AI) and the weaponization of space? These are just some of the questions that must be addressed in the next National Defense Strategy (NDS), the foundational document through which any new administration articulates its vision for US defense policy. Published by the Department of Defense (DoD), it establishes the principles that guide US military force design, capability development, global posture, operational planning, and resource allocation. – The National Defense Strategy Project – Atlantic Council
(Atlantic Council) The Republican legislative package known as the “big, beautiful bill” powered through Congress this week, with the House, then the Senate, then the House again passing it. It next heads to President Donald Trump’s desk for an expected Independence Day signing ceremony. During this process, the mega-legislation has seen several major provisions pertaining to US energy added, others removed, and some refined. – What does Trump’s ‘big, beautiful bill’ do for US energy dominance? – Atlantic Council
(Rebecca Patterson – Council on Foreign Relations) Financial market reactions to President Donald Trump’s so-called Liberation Day tariffs on April 2 and their subsequent ninety-day pause have raised questions among policymakers and economists about some fundamental macroeconomic assumptions; specifically, will the dollar continue as the world’s reserve currency, and can Treasury bonds provide reliable portfolio diversification going forward? It is too soon to have definitive answers to those questions. After all, U.S. trade policy continues to evolve. Moreover, financial market outlooks incorporate a myriad of factors—ranging from fiscal and monetary policy trends to technological innovation, asset valuations, and investor positioning—along with trade. – Lessons From Financial Markets Since Liberation Day | Council on Foreign Relations
(Frederick Kempe – Atlantic Council) On this Fourth of July, with the Stars and Stripes waving proudly across our great nation, spare a moment of concern for that other iconic symbol of American influence and power: the US dollar. That’s not because the US currency is about to collapse or be dethroned. Quite the contrary. However, it is being diminished in ways that are both cumulative and new, and in a manner that should concern every American patriot. – An Independence Day warning about the US dollar – Atlantic Council
US – Israel
(Dana Stroul, Robert Satloff – Washington Institute for Near East Policy) On July 7, President Trump hosts Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for their third Oval Office meeting in the past six months. Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the subsequent ceasefire, the visit is a crucial opportunity for the two leaders to set the table and transition from military action to political outcomes, capitalizing on Iran’s unprecedented weakness to advance U.S. interests. – An Opportunity Not to Be Missed: Agenda for the Trump-Netanyahu Meeting | The Washington Institute
US – Ukraine
(John E. Herbst – Atlantic Council) The title question is prompted by the news that the Department of Defense has precipitously halted the supply to Ukraine of desperately needed weapons that can help thwart Russia’s unprecedented magnitude of attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine. Among the systems halted, according to reports, are vital interceptors for Patriot air defense systems, precision artillery rounds, and the Hellfire and other missiles that Ukraine launches from its F-16 fighters and drones. According to a statement from the White House Press Office, the decision was taken by the Pentagon after a review of munitions stockpiles and US supplies to other nations. Included in this list of weapons that the Pentagon has stopped from going to Ukraine are systems that have not been deployed by the US military in decades, nor have they been deployed by other close allies. By any calculation, the limited number of munitions ready to cross the Polish border into Ukraine will not even begin to fix the munitions procurement and stockpile process, which has been broken for decades. – Does the Trump administration have a coherent policy to establish a stable peace in Ukraine? – Atlantic Council
