The key to success was surprise. If the enemy knew when and where the attack would strike, their defenders would be ready and the attacking forces faced a greater chance of defeat. So the attackers turned to deception—to mask their plans, mislead the enemy commanders, and misdirect enemy resources. As troops moved into place under camouflage or cover stories, the enemy’s attention was steered elsewhere through trickery: false electronic chatter, thousands of multi-domain decoys that simulated soldiers and units where there were none. The effect was to simultaneously create and decrease ambiguity, and create cognitive overload, leading to both confusion and the confirmation of the enemy commander’s prior biases. When the attack came, the enemy’s forces were out of position and their defenses unprepared. The above could be a description of Operations Fortitude and Operation Bodyguard (aptly named for wrapping the truth in a bodyguard of lies), the effort to mislead the Germans about the timing and location of the D-Day invasion. The incredibly successful deception campaign used everything from radio signals to inflatable tanks to trick the Germans into preparing to defend Pas de Calais instead of Normandy. But it could also be a description of the Ukrainian attacks into Kursk in 2024, which used novel tools such as social-media misdirection as well as strategic misdirection about offensive capabilities and limitations.
Ukraine and the future of deception in (Mick Ryan, Peter W. Singer – Defense One)
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