From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about: Australia, Australia-China, Australia-East and Southeast Asia, Australia-South Korea, Australia-US, Azerbaijan-Israel-US, Central Asia, Gaza-Hamas, Iran, Philippines-China, Russia, Russia-Azerbaijan, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond), Southeast Asia, Türkiye, US, US-Greenland, US-Houthis
Australia
(Justin Bassi – The Strategist) The Independent Intelligence Review, publicly released last Friday, was inoffensive and largely supported the intelligence community status quo. But it was also largely quiet on the challenges facing the broader national security community in an increasingly dangerous world, in which traditional intelligence is just one tool of statecraft and national power. After the January discovery of a caravan laden with explosives in Dural, Sydney, confusion emerged around what federal and state governments knew and when. The review was completed before the caravan was discovered, and the plot was likely beyond the review’s scope. However, government responses to the event should prompt a discussion about Australia’s national security architecture. – Australia’s security architecture must evolve, not regress | The Strategist
(Dougal Robertson – ASPI The Strategist) If the Chinese navy’s task group sailing around Australia a few weeks ago showed us anything, it’s that Australia has a deterrence gap so large you can drive a ship through it. Waiting for AUKUS or hoping Australia’s troubled shipbuilding program will deliver—in the 2030s—is a recipe for annual panic about grey zone coercion as Chinese deployments become routine. Boosting our air combat capability is the fastest way to address Australia’s deterrence gap. That requires two things: more combat aircraft and more airborne tankers. – More F-35s, more tankers: a reliable way to strengthen Australian deterrence | The Strategist
Australia – China
(Euan Graham – The Strategist) Last month’s circumnavigation by a potent Chinese naval flotilla sent a powerful signal to Canberra about Beijing’s intent. It also demonstrated China’s increasing ability to threaten Australia’s maritime communications, as well as the entirety of its eastern and southern seaboards, where the major population centres and critical infrastructure are concentrated. In a major war, our civilian infrastructure is likely to be targeted, not just military bases. The deployment further highlighted national resilience vulnerabilities that go well beyond the need to strengthen the Australian Defence Force’s capabilities, overdue and critical though this task undoubtedly is. – China’s warships reveal more than a need to strengthen the ADF | The Strategist
Australia – East and Southeast Asia
(Joe Keary – The Strategist) This week ASPI launched Pressure Points, an interactive website that analyses the Chinese military’s use of air and maritime coercion to enforce Beijing’s excessive territorial claims and advance its security interests in the Indo-Pacific. The project highlights and analyses open-source data, military imagery, satellite footage, official government responses and other resources to provide the public with a reliable and accurate account of Chinese regional activity, from its intercept tactics to its excessive claims. It analyses China’s unsafe military interactions with a range of countries, and looks at the way countries use (or don’t use) their military forces to challenge China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea. – Pressure Points: The importance of Australia’s military presence in East and Southeast Asia | The Strategist
Australia – South Korea
(Gabriela Bernal – The Interpreter) Seoul and Canberra have long shared close diplomatic relations, with Australia being the second country to send forces to support South Korea during the Korean War. Some experts even go as far as calling Australia South Korea’s “most important strategic partner aside from its alliance with the United States”. Since the Korean War, Australia has played a strong role in South Korean defence, remaining an important member of the United Nations Command, providing an Australian Defence Force contribution to support the inter-Korean peace process through Operation Linesman. – How far can Canberra and Seoul’s partnership stretch? | Lowy Institute
Australia – US
(Henry Campbell – The Strategist) US President Donald Trump is certainly not afraid of an executive order, signing 97 since his inauguration on 20 January. In minerals and energy, Trump has declared a national emergency; committed to unleashing US (particularly Alaskan) resource potential; and established the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC), granting it considerable executive powers. His latest minerals order, titled ‘Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production’, aims to overhaul US domestic production and reshape domestic and international critical mineral supply chains. It could derail Australia’s efforts for greater domestic production in the process. – Trump’s critical minerals order may harm Australian interests | The Strategist
Azerbaijan – Israel – US
(Vasif Huseynov – The Jamestown Foundation) Israel announced on March 6 that it is in discussions with the United States to establish trilateral cooperation with Azerbaijan, deepening long-standing ties between Israel and Azerbaijan in security, energy, and diplomacy. This trilateral initiative positions Azerbaijan as a bridge between the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the West, following high-level visits and growing cooperation in energy and counterterrorism between Azerbaijan and Israel. The proposed trilateral format may strengthen Azerbaijan-U.S. relations, particularly under the new U.S. administration, and support Azerbaijan’s potential candidacy for inclusion in the Abraham Accords and counterbalance regional threats, especially from Iran. – Azerbaijan, Israel, and United States Seek Trilateral Cooperation Format – Jamestown
Central Asia
(Annette Bohr – Chatham House) The leaderships of the Central Asian states have been refining a multi-vectoring foreign policy stance since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – painting one picture to Russian counterparts and another to officials from Europe and the United States. In dealings with Moscow, Central Asian leaders invariably emphasize the threat they face from Western secondary sanctions. In their discussions with Western leaders, they push for exemptions from those sanctions, particularly in the energy sphere – pointing to the pressure exerted on them by Moscow to align with Russia’s policies. This approach has proven effective so far, allowing Central Asian countries to retain their sovereignty, avoid secondary sanctions and attract a wide array of international economic partners. – Playing both sides: Central Asia between Russia and the West | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank
Gaza – Hamas
(Neomi Neumann, Nikhil Samuel – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) This week, protests against Hamas have intensified in the Gaza Strip, with many residents taking to the streets and demanding that the group relinquish power, leave the area, and cease hostilities with Israel. Although definitive numbers on the scope of the demonstrations are not yet available, videos suggest several hundred participants at each protest site, indicating that several thousand people may be participating in total. So far, the main protest hubs are in Gaza City and the northern part of the Strip—areas where the current war’s devastation is most apparent and from which the Israel Defense Forces has instructed civilians to evacuate amid renewed combat. Yet the unrest appears to be spreading to the central and southern regions as well. The movement likely erupted spontaneously, with various actors stepping in after the fact to organize and drive further demonstrations, including local clan leaders, Fatah-affiliated elements inside and outside Gaza, and figures associated with prominent Fatah exile Mohammad Dahlan. – Gaza Protests Can Contribute to Outside Pressure on Hamas | The Washington Institute
Iran
(Alex Vatanka – Middle East Institute) President Masoud Pezeshkian might be the loneliest man in Iran. Just eight months into his term in office, he is already losing the support of those who once championed him. Some sympathy is warranted. In the Islamic Republic, the presidency is a thankless job — powerless in substance, yet held accountable for the nation’s crises. Real authority lies with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while the president serves more as a scapegoat than a statesman. Still, Pezeshkian is not helping his own case. Elected on promises of reform, he has spent most of his time retreating. Rather than challenging the small but vocal group of hardliners, he has folded — again and again. – President Pezeshkian: Already a lost cause? | Middle East Institute
Philippines – China
(Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope – Lowy The Interpreter) At last week’s Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, the Philippines’ Armed Forces Chief didn’t mince words, calling on India and South Korea to join an Indo-Pacific “Squad” to push back against China’s aggressive tactics in the South China Sea. But while Manila hardens its security posture, it’s also receiving more development money from Beijing than ever before. So, what gives? For most of the past decade, the Philippines has been one of Southeast Asia’s most cautious players when it comes to Chinese development finance, even as its infrastructure, education, and healthcare sectors cry out for investment. – The Philippines walks a tightrope with Chinese aid | Lowy Institute
Russia
(Luke Rodeheffer – The Jamestown Foundation) Russian information security companies are expanding their operations in Russia’s near abroad despite facing limitations caused by Western sanctions, as other states increasingly view internet freedom as a threat to their sovereignty. Russian contractors are also working alongside the Kremlin to draw on Iran’s experience with internet censorship and surveillance as Russia develops its own “sovereign internet” project. Countries that lack the budget for more expensive information security solutions from Western countries may turn to Russia’s domestic solutions, solidifying Russia’s influence over their information spaces. – Russia’s Information Security Industry Expands International Footprint – Jamestown
Russia – Azerbaijan
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation) When an Azerbaijani airliner was shot down over Russian territory last December, chilled relations between Baku and Moscow caused some analysts to expect a collapse in ties and attempts by Moscow to regain its former influence. Neither outcome is likely. Azerbaijani-Russian relations are becoming increasingly balanced and pragmatic, despite the confrontation over the downing of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243, likely due to the mutual benefits both Russia and Azerbaijan derive from their relationship. Other states in the region may view Azerbaijan’s assertiveness toward Russia as a means to challenge Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aspirations to dominate that space. This, in turn, could prompt Moscow to pursue ever more radical and aggressive moves elsewhere before this trend spreads. – Moscow’s Ties with Post-Soviet States Possibly Transforming in Fallout of Azeri Airlines Flight Downing – Jamestown
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine (and beyond)
(Richard Arnold – The Jamestown Foundation) On February 3, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) targeted paramilitary leader Armen Sarkisian in Moscow, illustrating Ukraine’s strategy to actualize the war for the removed Russians. Through assassinations, the operation into Kursk oblast, and drone warfare, Ukraine alarmed everyday citizens who until that point were able to disassociate themselves from the atrocities happening across their borders. By spreading panic and frustration, the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime increasingly faces the risk of instability within Russia. – Ukraine Brings War Home to Russia – Jamestown
Southeast Asia
(The Soufan Group) Kinetic measures alone will prove insufficient, absent an incentive structure to neutralize a terrorist threat. It is necessary to pair a kinetic “hard” approach with an incentive-based “soft” approach. While “soft approach” programs may be funded by international donors and national or provincial governments, they should be designed and implemented locally by civil society organizations and local governments in order to account for variations in needs and conditions on the ground. Leadership and organizational differences must be considered in devising the appropriate strategy to facilitate the demobilization of a terrorist group; there is no one size fits all solution. Former extremists have an important role to play in the design, development, and implementation of disengagement, reintegration, and deradicalization programming. – How Terrorism Ends: Lessons From Southeast Asia – The Soufan Center
Türkiye
(The Soufan Center) Tens of thousands of people across Türkiye – including in Istanbul and the capital city Ankara – have been protesting the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, a prominent opposition leader and key political rival of Turkish President Recep Erdogan. The terrorism charges against Imamoglu exemplify Erdogan’s broader strategy of leveraging anti-terrorism charges to suppress opposition, particularly due to the CHP’s alliance with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy DEM party, amid Türkiye’s ongoing conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization. Amidst the crackdown on the opposition, Erdogan may be setting the stage for early elections that would allow him to legally run again for president, despite the two-term limit set by the constitution. Although Türkiye seems to be following Tunisia’s authoritarian playbook, issues such as security, migration, and perceived U.S. retrenchment will likely result in a similarly muted response from European partners and continued cooperation on priorities. – Civilians Take to the Streets in Türkiye to Protest Erdogan’s Latest Crackdown – The Soufan Center
US
(Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Tate Nurkin – Atlantic Council) A profoundly transformed global security environment presents the United States with its most significant geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges since the Cold War—and perhaps since World War II. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—together a new “axis of aggressors”—are increasingly collaborating to support their revisionist geopolitical goals and challenge global stability. Meanwhile, US domestic constraints—such as relative-to-inflation flat defense budgets, military recruitment and talent shortfalls, byzantine acquisition processes, and inadequate industrial capacity—severely limit the US ability to adequately deter and address these threats at speed and scale. During World War II, US industrial strength and manufacturing capacity decisively factored into the Allies’ victory. Today, however, US defense production capacity falls short of potential wartime demands. In contrast, China’s industrial policies, manufacturing prowess, and strategic focus on software-defined technologies—including artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and development, security, and operations (DevSecOps)—have propelled Beijing to rapidly advance its defense capabilities. Maintaining the Department of Defense (DoD) status quo—anchored to a defense acquisition system ill-suited to the rapid tempo of modern technological innovation—places the United States at significant risk. This approach undermines the nation’s ability to effectively deter near-peer adversaries in the short term and jeopardizes its capacity to prevail in a major conflict. Addressing these systemic challenges demands a sustained, long-term effort. Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for near-term, high-impact initiatives to bridge existing capability gaps and reestablish an advantage. That is what this report’s concept of software-defined warfare presents. – Atlantic Council Commission on Software-Defined Warfare: Final report – Atlantic Council
(Atlantic Council) Welcome to the group chat. On Monday, the Atlantic published an article by its editor in chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, revealing that senior Trump administration officials had added him, apparently accidentally, to a sensitive discussion on the encrypted messaging service Signal about upcoming strikes on the Houthis in Yemen. On Wednesday, Goldberg released more messages that gave a fuller sense of the discussion. The still-unfolding revelations, which have sparked heated debates in Washington and dominated the news this week, offer perhaps the clearest picture yet of how President Donald Trump’s top officials are thinking about US foreign policy—and well beyond Yemen. – Our experts separate Signal from noise in the Trump team’s messages about bombing the Houthis – Atlantic Council
US – Greenland
(Brent Hardt – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Since his reelection, US President Donald Trump has asserted with almost obsessive persistence that American “ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity” for international safety and security. Beyond saying that the US “needs” the world’s largest island and that “we’re going to get it”, Trump has not articulated any specific strategic justification for his desire to control this Danish territory. The recent announcement of a proposed journey there by US Second Lady Usha Vance and National Security Council Advisor Michael Waltz, billed as a cultural visit to dogsled races, reinforces the administration’s Greenland obsession. – Does the US Really “Need to Get” Greenland? | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US – Houthis
(Elizabeth Dent – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Last week, reports emerged that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had extended the USS Harry S. Truman in the Middle East for an additional month while simultaneously ordering the USS Carl Vinson to head to the region. The decision to have two carrier strike groups in the Middle East at the same time comes amid the March 15 announcement of renewed military strikes against the Houthis—the Iran-backed Yemeni group that the Trump administration recently re-designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The campaign’s stated goal is to restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Despite his oft-repeated pledge to end “forever wars” in the Middle East, President Trump has made clear that the United States will not tolerate the Houthi threat to global commercial shipping and American naval vessels in local waterways. He also warned that Washington would hold Iran accountable for “every shot fired by the Houthis.” – Two Carriers in the Middle East: Implications for the Houthis, Iran, and U.S. Force Readiness | The Washington Institute
(Jon B. Alterman – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On March 15, the United States launched a wave of attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen. The Trump administration had pledged to step up efforts initiated by President Biden to combat what has been almost 18 months of Houthi assaults on international shipping lanes in the Red Sea, and it redesignated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization soon after returning to office. A conversation between senior U.S. government officials on the encrypted messaging app, Signal, preceded the strikes and has gotten extensive attention, but it is worth understanding more about why the United States was attacking the Houthis in the first place. – Trump Takes on the Houthis
(The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Following renewed Houthi pledges to target Israeli and Western vessels once the Gaza ceasefire expired, the Trump administration initiated another U.S. military campaign against the Yemeni group. With Red Sea transits declining sharply since 2023, Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that the administration was “doing the entire world a favor by getting rid of these guys and their ability to strike global shipping,” while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated, “We don’t want a long, limited war in the Middle East. We don’t care what happens in the Yemeni civil war. This is about stopping the shooting at assets in that critical waterway to reopen freedom of navigation.”. How does the new campaign differ from previous U.S. attacks on the Houthis? Can it remove the threat, or are broader U.S. policy efforts in Yemen necessary? And how will the international community, the global shipping industry, and the Houthis’ chief patrons in Iran respond to Trump’s approach? – Assessing the U.S. Military Campaign against the Houthis | The Washington Institute
