Geostrategic magazine (15 February 2025)

From global think tanks

The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye

Today’s about : BRICS-Japan, China, China-India, China-Russia, Europe-China-Russia’s War on Ukraine, Germany, India, India-US, Japan, Munich Security Conference 2025, Pakistan, Ukraine, US, US-Europe, US-North Korea

BRICS – Japan

(Bryan Tan Jia Yang – East Asia Forum) BRICS membership applications from four ASEAN nations highlight the region’s limited options between Western institutions and China-led alternatives. Japan, consistently ranked as ASEAN’s most trusted partner, could provide a vital third option. With strong credentials in regional leadership and commitment to international law, Japan has the potential to build an informal coalition that allows Indo-Pacific nations to maintain neutrality while supporting the rules-based order. This approach becomes increasingly urgent as US-China tensions rise. – BRICS expansion and Japan’s latent leadership in a torn Indo-Pacific | East Asia Forum

China

(Zi Yang – The Jamestown Foundation) The year 2024 witnessed sudden removals of high-level People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commanders, a continuation of the purge of 15 defense industry leaders and military commanders in 2023. Xi Jinping’s possible motivations include combating corruption, managing factional conflicts, asserting dominance as an aging autocrat, overcoming limited military service experience, and following successful historical precedents for control. The leadership disruption is expected to result in loyalty-based appointments, impair the PLA’s combat effectiveness, and generate insecurity among officers, weakening morale and operational readiness. – Five Key Factors Behind Irregular Leadership Changes in the People’s Liberation Army – Jamestown

(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation) New measures to control online information related to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be an indicator of imminent military operations, further purges, or other military activity. The measures are drafted by 10 military and state bodies, indicating that Beijing places enormous importance on information security and continues to pursue high-level military-civil integration. Possible motivations for the measures include recent leaks of sensitive information, online content that has reduced support for the military, and growing disinformation that has included spoofs of official websites. This compounds ongoing problems in the military, such as corruption. Beijing sees regime security and stability as downstream of controlling information flows, as well as dependent on building sophisticated regulatory and institutional capacity. The new measures also support both these aims. – Military Content Restrictions Could Indicate Trouble Ahead – Jamestown

China – India

(Ayjaz Wani – Observer Research Foundation) In a tactical move to reduce the travel time between northern and southern Xinjiang from seven hours to three hours while protecting goods from harsh winter conditions, China completed excavating the world’s longest roadway tunnel in the Tianshan Mountains of Xinjiang in December 2024. The 22.13 km tunnel, set to open in 2025, is crucial to China’s ambitious 319.72 km Urumqi-Yuli Expressway. Around the same time, China’s Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCCP) and State Council approved the creation of two new counties, He’an and Hekang, in the Aksai Chin region of India, which was unlawfully ceded to China by Pakistan through a border agreement in 1963. The illegal creation of new counties in the Aksai Chin region, close on the heels of the recent rapprochement with India, shows Beijing’s colonial mentality, adding to the complexities of Sino-India bilateral relations. – China’s LAC infrastructure in Xinjiang: A colonial perspective

China – Russia

(John Dotson – The Jamestown Foundation) Recent suspicious activities conducted by the merchant vessels Shunxing-39 and Vasili Shukshin in the vicinity of Taiwan in early 2025 suggest possible collaboration between Chinese and Russian merchant ships related to the reconnaissance and sabotage of undersea communications cables that connect Taiwan to the outside world. Such activities follow from suspected undersea infrastructure sabotage operations conducted by Chinese merchant vessels in the Baltic Sea in 2023–2024, with strong indications of Russian assistance and coordination. Taken as a whole, this string of incidents suggests an increasing willingness by Moscow and Beijing to collaborate on maritime sabotage operations—include on attacks on third-party targets. – Strangers on a Seabed: Sino-Russian Collaboration on Undersea Cable Sabotage Operations – Jamestown

Europe – China – Russia’s War on Ukraine 

(Ben Forney – The Jamestown Foundation) Research collaboration between European and Chinese universities could be indirectly supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine. Over 20 agreements, partnerships, or newly published research articles have been announced between “Seven Sons of National Defense” universities and European entities between December 2024 and January 2025. These followed delegations from the universities to France, Austria, and Spain. The “Seven Sons” universities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have a history of military collaboration, intellectual property theft, and, crucially, growing ties with Russia. They also have been implicated in talent recruitment programs that incentivize foreign experts to collaborate with PRC institutions, sometimes unknowingly contributing to military research. Unchecked research collaboration with the “Seven Sons” universities presents a real security threat. To date, the balance in Europe between scientific openness and national security tips toward the former. The longer the PRC continues to exploit this approach, the more that very openness will be put at risk. – Europe Could Be Supporting Russia’s War via ‘Seven Sons’ Partnerships – Jamestown

Germany

(Sudha David-Wilp – German Marshall Fund of the United States) Germans are heading to the polls with a recent spate of violent attacks by migrants and a weak economy on their minds. The next government in Berlin must respond to these concerns and make next-generation decisions that will alter the trajectory and face of Europe’s largest economy. – Waiting for GroKo? | German Marshall Fund of the United States

India

(PK Khup Hangzo – Vivekananda International Foundation) The shift to clean energy has significantly increased the demand for critical materials. Technologies such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicle batteries require far more minerals than traditional fossil fuel-based systems, making the clean energy sector the primary driver behind the rising demand for these essential resources. From 2017 to 2022, the energy sector contributed to a 300% increase in lithium demand, a 70% rise in cobalt demand, and a 40% surge in nickel demand. By 2022, clean energy accounted for 56% of global lithium demand, 40% of cobalt demand, and 16% of nickel demand. The World Bank forecasts that by 2050, production of graphite, lithium, and cobalt will need to rise by over 450% from 2018 levels to meet growing energy storage demands. – National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM): A Strategic Approach to Strengthening India’s Mineral Security | Vivekananda International Foundation

India – US

(Richard M. Rossow – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Washington, D.C., this week and met President Donald Trump on February 13. The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of this blossoming strategic relationship and hinted at important new ways they plan to operationalize the partnership. Most significantly, the two leaders stated their shared intention to negotiate a bilateral trade initiative (BTI) with a plan to conclude a first phase later this year. In the area of defense cooperation, there was a reaffirmation of equipment sales, exercises, and promises of relaxing U.S. export controls—including for fifth-generation fighter planes and undersea systems. The leaders also hinted that we may see significant new steps in military interoperability. – U.S.-India Summit: A Productive Trip and a Busy Year Ahead

(Harsh V. Pant, Vivek Mishra – Observer Research Foundation) Since Donald Trump’s political campaign for a second presidency gained traction, a deep sense of uncertainty has plagued Washington’s relations with its allies, partners, and friends alike. This uncertainty has intensified sharply in the weeks following his inauguration on January 20 this year. Despite this flux which now characterises the second Donald Trump administration’s foreign policy, a few pockets of certainty have emerged. The early scramble from Trump and his team suggests that Washington’s approach to India may not be very disruptive. Yet, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to the US early in the second Trump administration underscores the conviction that challenges remain. – Navigating Trump’s America

Japan

(Neville LaiI – East Asia Forum) In 2025, Japan will commemorate the 80th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki amid the controversial release of treated Fukushima wastewater. Despite backlash from neighbouring countries, diplomatic developments show potential for improved relations. Japan has an opportunity to lead in nuclear safety and disaster resilience, drawing from its history and expertise in disaster management. By fostering regional cooperation, transparency and public trust, Japan could strengthen its role in shaping sustainable energy solutions and addressing shared environmental challenges in East Asia. – Turning Japan’s nuclear challenges into opportunities | East Asia Forum

Munich Security Conference 2025

(Michael Froman – Council on Foreign Relations) A dispatch from the Munich Security Conference, where dark clouds hovered over the discussions on Europe’s security and recent events in Germany. The war in Ukraine dominated, with uncertainty about the U.S. role and Trump’s approach. Topics like climate change and AI also took center stage. – The Mood in Munich | Council on Foreign Relations

Pakistan

(Anchita Borthakur – Vivekananda International Foundation) Kurram, a strategically located district in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, has garnered significant media attention in recent months, though unfortunately, not for the right reasons. The year 2024 remained yet another violent year for the Kurram Valley, claiming arguably more than 200 lives in the district of Kurram which witnessed significant conflict over the past few decades. While the new year began with a sense of hope for the residents of the Kurram district, it appeared that the optimism faded sooner rather than later. At the beginning of this year, a fragile peace accord was signed, with representatives from the warring Alizai and Bagan tribes entering into a 14-point agreement for resolving the ongoing cycles of violence. However, the outcome of this agreement has been largely unproductive. Reportedly, more than 100 villages in both upper and lower Kurram, including the district headquarters of Parachinar, have been under siege time and again for over last four months due to the closure of the main Thal-Parachinar Road, a crucial route linking Kurram to the rest of Pakistan. – Escalating Tensions: The Ongoing Conflict in Kurram | Vivekananda International Foundation

Ukraine

(Romina Bandura – Center for Strategic & International Studies) Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had an immense human cost, producing a level of physical destruction, human suffering, and displacement not seen in Europe since World War II. Since the war began, a large share of Ukraine’s workforce has emigrated or relocated within the country, enlisted in the military, or tragically become a casualty of the violence. In addition, unpredictable changes to the conscription and mobilization of men have significantly compressed the labor supply. – Ukraine’s Future Rests on Its People

US

(Philip Luck, Evan Brown – Center for Strategic & International Studies) On February 10, President Trump announced plans to impose a 25 percent tariff on all steel and aluminum imports, set to take effect on March 12. Sound familiar? If these tariffs actually go into place, they would be a reboot—and an expansion—of the policies Trump first implemented in 2018. Over the past seven years, those 2018 tariffs have been dialed back. Trump initially granted exemptions to allies like Mexico and Canada, while Biden later brokered deals with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan in 2021. And yet, here we are again, at the doorstep of imposing steep tariffs on partners and competitors alike. This raises two key questions: Why are we doing this? And is there a better way? We argue that while these proposed unilateral tariffs on steel and aluminum seek to address a real challenge—nonmarket policies by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and others that distort global markets, artificially increasing the supply of pollution-intensive metals—they will not solve the underlying problem. In addition, these tariffs would impose significant costs on domestic consumers, producers, and exporters and strain relations with partners, whose help we need to tackle this challenge. Instead, any sustainable solution must include U.S. partners and allies working together to provide the PRC with the incentive to reform its industrial policy strategy. – U.S. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Won’t Solve the Chinese Dumping Problem

(Shannon K. O’Neil, Julia Huesa – Council on Foreign Relations) On February 10, President Donald Trump imposed 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from all U.S. trade partners, effective March 12. Trump cast the tariffs as a crackdown on subsidized Chinese metal that is flooding global markets and—he argues—putting U.S. producers out of business. It is not yet clear whether the new taxes will be added on top of all existing duties, though a White House official said this would be the case for Canada. The tariffs will likely raise costs for industries that rely on steel and aluminum, bringing higher prices for consumers and job losses in downstream sectors. – What Trump’s Aluminum and Steel Tariffs Will Mean, in Six Charts | Council on Foreign Relations

(Jonathan Katz, Eric Urby – Brookings) In the days before the Trump administration took office, we recognized, as did many others, the imminent threats of autocracy to the United States. That is why we published the 2025 edition of the Democracy Playbook. We outline seven pillars essential to defending democratic governance, freedoms, and the rights of every citizen in the U.S. and around the world. Our concerns about how some of the early actions of the new administration might impact U.S. democracy are not mere speculations now—they are happening. – Dangerous cracks in US democracy pillars Dangerous Cracks in U.S. Democracy Pillars

US – Europe

(Max Bergmann – Center for Strategic & International Studies) The United States and Europe are on a collision course that will fundamentally alter and transform transatlantic relations. It is not just one issue that will trigger a clash but seemingly every issue. From NATO to Ukraine, climate to trade, tech regulations to China, the United States and Europe will likely clash, repeatedly and continuously. The impact of these collisions will be transformative for transatlantic relations and will reshape the transatlantic alliance. Europe is now staring at the beginning of a new post-American age. Since the end of World War II, Europe has been inextricably tied to the United States. While there have occasionally been rifts in the transatlantic fabric, these were always mendable. But the clashes that are coming may not be, and they may forever change the nature of transatlantic relations. Europe is now reckoning with a potential future where it may have to chart its own course. – The Transatlantic Alliance in the Age of Trump: The Coming Collisions

US – North Korea

(Ranjit Kumar Dhawan – Manohar Parrikar Institute) The Donald Trump administration after coming to power on 20 January 2025 expressed its desire to improve relations with the Kim dynasty regime in North Korea. Notably, on the day after his inauguration as the 47th President of the United States, Trump termed North Korea a “nuclear power” state, which caused apprehensions in South Korea. However, during his meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba on 7 February 2025, Trump called for “complete denuclearisation” of North Korea. On the other hand, the North Korean regime has not yet responded to Trump’s gesture for restarting dialogue between the two countries. In the backdrop of the newly inaugurated second Trump administration, the Kim regime has been bolstering its nuclear weapons programme and has tested a more sophisticated cruise missile system. According to some analysts, Pyongyang will remain hostile towards the United States in 2025. Also, contrary to the expectations of President Trump, North Korea would probably not give up its nuclear weapons programme. – Donald Trump and North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme – MP-IDSA

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