From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Australia, China, China-Taiwan, GCC-Iran, Germany, India-Afghanistan, Middle East, Philippines, Russia-Syria, Türkiye-Syria, US, US-Asia, US-Europe-China, US-Greenland, US-Russia
Australia
(Eli Hayes – East Asia Forum)
Despite government commitments and proposed pricing solutions, Australia’s rare earth sector has faltered in 2024 amid low prices, uncertainty over Chinese market manipulation and a lack of viable non-Chinese offtake agreements. Companies like Lynas have cut production while new projects struggle to secure financing as Western government lenders demand contracts excluding Chinese firms, despite Chinese companies often being the only early-stage customers. Iluka Resources’ proposed ‘cap and floor’ pricing system has failed to gain traction and industry participants argue that purely expanding mine supply without broader supply chain support will not solve the problem of low prices and entrenched Chinese dominance in the sector. – Australia’s rare earth policy and pricing misaligned | East Asia Forum
China
(Yifei Li – East Asia Forum)
China’s electric vehicle industry has grown from producing 13,000 units in 2012 to 1.2 million in 2024, capturing 76 per cent of the global market. But as batteries reach end-of-life, the country faces major recycling challenges. While China’s market scale and regulatory potential offer advantages, success requires addressing weak oversight, underdeveloped standards and shadow operators in the recycling sector. – China’s EV success faces a battery recycling problem | East Asia Forum
(Sense Hofstede – The Jamestown Foundation)
Many so-called “Global South” countries feel it is time to do away with what they regard as the double standards of rich countries and are open to alternatives. However, Beijing’s offer comes with a catch: it involves exporting the controlling logic of its party state.
There are two main steps in the operation of the Leninist party state. First is the organization of targets by enmeshing them in various threads which each have their own logic. These threads only come together in the Party Centre. Second is the mobilization of the targets. This is done by leveraging these ties through the invocation of the language of ideology.
The Community of Common Destiny for Mankind is the international developmentalist counterpart to the domestic ideology of nationalism. By getting tied up in the three Global Initiatives, developing countries are organized into the “Leninist leash” at various political, economic, and social levels.
The consequence is an international system that risks becoming more closed off. Widespread verbal compliance creates a collective action problem, while leaders of target countries need to keep in mind the possibility of pushback from all levels at home and abroad. – The Leninist Leash: How Beijing’s Answer to Global Demand for Choice Makes the World More Closed off – Jamestown
(Willy Wo-Lap Lam – The Jamestown Foundation)
Xi Jinping faces challenges to his authority from four main groups: retired party elders such as Li Ruihuan and Wen Jiabao; princelings, especially those based overseas; military leaders, such as Zhang Youxia; and parts of the middle and entrepreneurial classes who are voicing their discontent.
Xi is unlikely to be overthrown or face a coup, but his ability to force through his agenda may be reduced.
Indicators that Xi is embattled include his absence from chairing two recent high-level meetings, references to “collective leadership” the PLA Daily newspaper, and an adjustment to PRC diplomacy to a more conciliatory approach, especially toward the United States.
This apparent reduction in power could be a result of the country’s bleak economic situation, which Xi’s policies from last year have not resolved. – The Four Main Groups Challenging Xi Jinping – Jamestown
(Kenneth Allen – The Jamestown Foundation)
The size and scope of the Central Military Commission (CMC) has reduced dramatically since 2004, and the makeup of the military leadership is expected to change completely by the end of the decade. It is not clear what impact this turnover will have on the PLA’s ability to conduct war if needed.
Retirement norms indicate that only one of the two CMC vice chairmen will remain in position along with a new director of the CMC Political Work Department after the 21st Party Congress in 2027, while nine of the current 23 PLA leaders will change. The 11 other leaders will likely retire within one or two years of the congress.
The current CMC only has five people, due to the removal of director of the Political Work Department Miao Hua for corruption and the continued absence of the defense minister from the CMC.
Defense minister Dong Jun represents an apparent demotion for the defense ministry. His reduced ability to advocate for military affairs within the State Council and during national policy-setting could complicate the military-to-military relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. – Assessment of PLA Leaders at the End of 2024 – Jamestown
(Arran Hope – The Jamestown Foundation)
Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China.
The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment.
Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized.
Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems. – Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech – Jamestown
China – Taiwan
(Cheng-kun Ma, K. Tristan Tang – The Jamestown Foundation)
In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023.
While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level.
The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan.
Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025. – Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024 – Jamestown
GCC – Iran
(Abdulaziz Alghashian – Observer Research Foundation)
The start of 2025 has been marked by a series of shocks, especially in the Middle East. The effects of the Gaza war continue to reverberate across the region, while Lebanon witnessed widespread devastation due to Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah. Syria, too, entered a new post-Assad era—one fraught with hope and uncertainty. Against this backdrop, the shifting international landscape, especially with the incoming Trump administration, will further influence regional and global dynamics. While reconstruction efforts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria demand global attention, the broader process of regional rapprochement should be a central focus in 2025. Driven by international, regional, and domestic dynamics, 2025 will present both challenges and opportunities for the continuation of regional rapprochement efforts. – GCC-Iran Rapprochement: Challenges and Opportunities in 2025
Germany
(James (J.D.) Bindenagel, Karsten Jung – German Marshall Fund of the United States)
Almost three years to the day after the start of the Russian attack on the whole of Ukraine, Germans will elect a new parliament. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, they will do so under the impression of a concrete threat to their national security. In the East, Russia’s war of aggression has thrown the European security order into disarray. In the West, Donald Trump’s electoral victory has deprived it of the foundational US security guarantee. As they confront the most significant crisis since the end of the Cold War, Europeans find themselves increasingly on their own, and their central power seems leaderless and disoriented. The upcoming federal election on February 23, will determine how serious Germany is about its response to the Zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” brought about by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Can Germans be convinced to write off the “peace dividend” and make the necessary investments to effectively deter Russian aggression even without an unconditional American security guarantee? – Germany’s Turning-Point Election | German Marshall Fund of the United States
India – Afghanistan
(Harsh V. Pant, Shivam Shekhawat – Observer Research Foundation)
On January 8, Vikram Misri, the foreign secretary of India, held a meeting with the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s (IEA) Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Dubai. Marking the most high-level meeting between India and representatives from the IEA, the very act of the senior-most Indian diplomat meeting a Taliban leader and its timing in the aftermath of Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan and India’s strongly worded statement in support of the latter led to debates about an apparent “pivot” and “shift” in how India is engaging with Afghanistan. Three-and-a-half years after the Taliban usurped power in Kabul and orchestrated the fall of the then republic government, New Delhi’s approach towards the country has indeed been evolving. – Back to Kabul
Middle East
(UN Security Council)
On Monday (20 January), the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ). Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Attaf will chair the meeting. UN Secretary-General António Guterres is the expected briefer. – The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question: Quarterly Open Debate : What’s In Blue : Security Council Report
(Kabir Taneja – Observer Research Foundation)
Just days before the swearing-in of United States President-elect Donald Trump, and a few hours before outgoing President Joe Biden gave his final address to the American people on January 15, 2025, Israel and Hamas announced that the long-elusive ceasefire agreement over Gaza had been struck. The state of Qatar, long stuck in between as a mediator, said the deal was to take effect from January 19, 2025, a day before Mr. Trump takes charge. An exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners is at the centre of this arrangement. – The multiple layers of the Gaza ceasefire
Philippines
(Jenny Balboa – East Asia Forum)
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election provoked anxiety for the Philippines. Should Trump pursue a more isolationist US foreign policy, the Philippines may be left to defend its territory against Chinese aggression on its own. Fierce debate over how to navigate ever increasing US–China tensions has contributed to domestic political turmoil. The relationship between President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and Vice President Sara Duterte was marked by increasing hostility throughout 2024. For Marcos Jr, 2025 will be a decisive year as his political future depends on how he navigates domestic and foreign pressures. – The Philippines under the shadow of great powers | East Asia Forum
Russia – Syria
(Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash – Observer Research Foundation)
Former Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad was Russia’s crucial ally in West Asia, with Russia taking an active role in regional geopolitics since the Syrian civil war began in 2011. In 2015, when Assad’s forces were on the brink of collapse, Moscow intervened and provided critical air support to Syrian and Iranian-backed forces, re-consolidating Assad’s hold over the country. This was also Russia’s first military intervention abroad. However, since 2020, Assad’s reluctance to engage with other factions inside Syria fighting against his regime, coupled with the weakening of the Syrian economy post-COVID, and a devastating earthquake in northern Syria in the summer of 2024, has led to growing discontent. This was exacerbated with Russia being focused on its Ukrainian campaign since 2022, and Hezbollah directing its attention towards countering Israel since last year, which further impacted the morale within the regime’s forces. All these factors resulted in Assad’s hold on power weakening, leading to the Türkiye-backed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) making considerable territorial gains, capturing Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. By 7 December, rebel forces had encircled Damascus. On 8 December, Assad fled to Moscow, marking the end of his 24-year-long rule. Russia’s approach to these recent developments has been pragmatic, with Moscow reaching out to the HTS in hopes of retaining its interests in the region. – Russia’s role in a post-Assad Syria
Türkiye – Syria
(Dario Cristiani – German Marshall Fund of the United States)
On January 9, 2025, one month after the end of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the foreign ministers of the Transatlantic Quint (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany) met to discuss the situation. The Quint agreed to closely coordinate efforts to pursue the goals of the return of refugees—Europe’s primary concern—the lifting of sanctions, preservation of territorial unity, and a peaceful and inclusive transition. The end of the Al-Assad dynastic power clearly represented a victory for Türkiye. Ankara’s intervention—directly supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA) by providing sanctuary, training, money, and medical treatment, and by coordinating and indirectly backing also the Jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—meant that the country played a crucial role. – Success, With Caveats | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US
(Rachael Dean Wilson – German Marshall Fund of the United States)
Just before their 2024 presidential election, 58% of American voters said that the US political system needs a major overhaul. Another survey revealed that only 4% described the system as working “very well” or “extremely well”, and fewer than a quarter said “somewhat well”. Trust in US institutions has long been in a steady decline. Americans voted last year for change, and all signs indicate that Donald Trump is focused on delivering it. – US Democracy: Confronting A New Information Age | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US – Asia
(Michael Beckley – Foreign Policy Research Institute)
Donald Trump’s inauguration as president signals the start of a new chapter in U.S. policy toward Asia, particularly in its approach to China and regional allies. With a focus on reasserting American strength, his administration is likely to emphasize economic decoupling, military modernization, and alliance burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific. This shift could redefine the strategic balance in the region and intensify competition with Beijing. – Trump’s Second Term: Charting a New Path in Asia – Foreign Policy Research Institute
US – Europe – China
(Andrew Small, Bonnie S. Glaser – German Marshall Fund of the United States)
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. – China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US – Greenland
(Brent Hardt – German Marshall Fund of the United States)
President-elect Donald Trump’s recent claim that US “ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity” for national and economic security, alongside his refusal to rule out using “military or economic coercion” to acquire the world’s largest island, has sparked sharp reactions and widespread controversy on both sides of the Atlantic. Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, quickly rejected Trump’s remarks, asserting that “Greenland is ours. We are not for sale and will never be for sale. We must not lose our long struggle for freedom.” Reflecting the broader threat to transatlantic relations posed by the threat of military force, France and Germany stepped forward to affirm that Europe would not “let other nations of the world attack its sovereign borders”. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pointedly added that “the principle of the inviolability of borders applies to every country.” – Advancing US Interests in Greenland | German Marshall Fund of the United States
US – Russia
(David Salvo – German Marshall Fund of the United States)
Russian President Vladimir Putin is counting on the incoming US administration to do his bidding by pushing for a settlement to the Ukraine war largely on the Kremlin’s terms, even if this does not happen, as Donald Trump has promised, on his first day in office. Trump’s stated objective to end the war is noble, but Putin will accept little beyond capitulation to his demands. A change to the bleak status quo in the US-Russian relationship is, therefore, unlikely unless the United States throws Ukraine to the wolves, turns a blind eye to a Russian sphere of influence along its periphery, removes sanctions on Russian individuals and entities, and accepts a loss of leadership in Europe. For accepting those terms, the United States would receive little benefit except marginal savings to taxpayer resources. Washington would also damage its national security. The second Trump administration should accept that, under wartime conditions or with an unjust peace, salvaging the relationship with Russia is neither possible nor desirable. Instead, it should use all instruments of state power to counter Russian aggression. – Russia: Stand Firm or Capitulate | German Marshall Fund of the United States
