From global think tanks
The analyses published here do not necessarily reflect the strategic thinking of The Global Eye
Today’s about : Africa, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, China-Saudi Arabia, China-Taiwan, China-US, Indonesia, Japan-Malaysia-Indonesia-ASEAN, Koreas-US, Lebanon, Middle East, Moldova-Europe, Russia-Iran, Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine, UK-China, US-Mexico, US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, US-Pacific, Global Risks
Africa
(Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson – Institute for the Study of War)
Sudan. The SAF recaptured Wad Madani from the RSF on January 11, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan that will help to set conditions for the SAF to achieve its strategic objective of retaking the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The capture of Wad Madani is part of the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) effort to encircle the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum and ultimately dislodge the RSF from the capital. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The SAF capture of Khartoum could affect external support for the SAF and RSF from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, respectively.
Mali. The Canadian gold mining company Barrick Gold temporarily suspended mining operations in Mali, and Russia is poised to fill any potential void. Barrick’s decision is the result of a multiyear Russian-supported campaign to pressure Western gold mining companies out of Mali. Russia used this same strategy to secure access to uranium sites in neighboring Niger after the Nigerien junta pressured Western companies to suspend operations. Increased Russian access to mining in the Sahel will boost the Russian economy and mitigate Western efforts to economically isolate Russia.
Benin. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM carried out its deadliest-ever attack against Beninese forces in early January. The attack highlights the challenges Beninese forces face given the strong insurgent support zones across the border in Burkina Faso and Niger that enable major attacks in northern Benin. The growing strength of Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) in Benin challenges US efforts in the Gulf of Guinea to contain the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency.
DRC. The Congolese army and government-aligned forces have launched a counteroffensive against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels to reverse M23 advances toward two district capitals and regain control over key mineral-rich areas and supply lines in eastern DRC. Rwanda has continued to insist that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) negotiate with M23, a nonstarter demand that will continue to hinder peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda. – Africa File, January 16, 2025: SAF Advances in Central Sudan en Route to Khartoum; Canadian Gold Mining Company Leaves Mali with Russia on Standby; JNIM’s Deadliest-Ever Attack in Benin; DRC Launches Counteroffensive Against Rwandan-backed M23 | Institute for the Study of War
Armenia – Azerbaijan
(Onnik James Krikorian – The Jamestown Foundation)
Russia’s Federal Security Service border guards left Armenia’s border checkpoint with Iran on December 30. Even though Russian guards will remain elsewhere on the entire stretch of the Armenia-Iran border, it represents further diversification away from Moscow.
The European Union Mission Armenia (EUMA) is set to complete its initial two-year deployment next month. The European Union and Yerevan hope to extend the observation mission deployed in early 2023, but Baku demands that it be withdrawn.
In response, Armenia has offered to withdraw EUMA from the demarcated parts of the shared border with Azerbaijan. Baku has not responded, though it continues to warn that extending EUMA could disrupt the fledgling demarcation process. – Azerbaijan Seeks End to EU Mission in Armenia as Pashinyan Offers Border Compromise – Jamestown
Belarus
(Yauheni Preiherman – The Jamestown Foundation)
The upcoming Belarusian presidential election on January 26, 2025 will occur facing the aftershocks of the contested 2020 election, which disrupted domestic liberalization trends and triggered a geopolitical shift toward closer Belarusian-Russian integration.
The election has garnered little international attention, with Western governments deeming it unfair. Minsk remains indifferent to criticism, prioritizing internal control and deepening its strategic alignment with Russia.
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s campaign highlights dialogue and reconciliation with the opposition, but skepticism remains among opposition forces and Western governments regarding the implementation of these promises. – Belarus Prepares for a Transitional Election – Jamestown
China
(Bill Sweetman – ASPI The Strategist)
Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group’s J-36 scooped up most of the publicity around China’s late-December revelations, but a second combat type, one from Shenyang Aircraft and referred to for now as J-XX, was revealed at the same time. It was smaller, and the pictures of it were less clear, so it got some attention. But it deserves plenty, as the other half of an unprecedented double revelation and a complementary part of China’s future air combat system. – China’s other new combat aircraft: a crewed fighter, maybe for aircraft carriers | The Strategist
(Sunny Cheung, Cheryl Yu – The Jamestown Foundation)
Taiwan has suffered an annual average of 7–8 undersea cable disruptions over the past three years, most of which it attributes to vessels from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Undersea cables carry 95 percent of global internet traffic.
Recent PRC research and patented technologies includes tools to locate and sever undersea cables. Ostensibly for civilian use, these tools have clear dual-use potential, and could be deployed in military applications in contested waters like the Taiwan Strait.
Military universities, “Sevens Sons of National Defense” universities, and companies that are part of the PRC’s defense industrial base are behind much of this research and development. – Creative Destruction: PRC Undersea Cable Technology – Jamestown
China – Saudi Arabia
(Md. Muddassir Quamar – Observer Research Foundation) Iran and Saudi Arabia resumed bilateral relations in March 2023, following a deal brokered by China and ending a hiatus of seven years. The diplomatic breakthrough underlined Beijing’s political inroads into the Middle East. Indeed, China’s relations with Iran have grown in recent years due to an alignment in their geopolitical interests, while China-Saudi Arabia relations have also notably strengthened. The deepening of the strategic partnership is based on strong energy and economic ties. It underlines the centrality Beijing and Riyadh attach to their developmental agenda, reflected in their decision to align China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vision 2030’ programme. – China and Saudi Arabia: A Deepening Strategic Partnership
China – Taiwan
(Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe – Institute for the Study of War)
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed opposition-backed amendments to the Constitutional Court after a Cabinet-mandated second review. The amendments will paralyze the Constitutional Court until the LY approves nominees to fill some of its vacant seats, and will make it temporarily impossible for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to block opposition-sponsored legislation.
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) released a report on January 12 highlighting organized crime and religious communities as infiltration channels to recruit agents and conduct espionage within Taiwan.
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reported that 50,000 people attended its protest decrying the detention of TPP founder Ko Wen-je on corruption charges, which the TPP claims to be politically motivated. The content of these protests and the amount of support they have received have been the focus of PRC coverage, aligning with previous anti-DPP narratives within PRC-backed media.
The PRC is building a fleet of barges with extendable piers that are likely designed to facilitate amphibious landings.
The South Korean authorities discovered a 164-foot tall and wide steel framework installed by the PRC within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea in December 2024. This installation is part of the PRC’s ongoing efforts to assert territorial control over the disputed waters, taking advantage of the leadership vacuum in South Korea amid its internal political turmoil following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s martial law declaration on December 3, 2024. – China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 16, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War
China – US
(Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan – ASPI The Strategist)
After disappearing from debate over the last couple of decades, nuclear politics are set to return with a vengeance. China has begun an unexpected and secretive nuclear force buildup. This presents a major challenge for Donald Trump’s new administration, which will want to maintain US nuclear advantage over China. China’s shifting nuclear posture, the secrecy surrounding it, and the low likelihood of Chinese cooperation on arms control threaten stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. – China’s secretive build-up presents Trump with a difficult nuclear challenge | The Strategist
Indonesia
(Erin Cook – Lowy The Interpreter)
One of the great questions that lingered after former army general Prabowo Subianto won Indonesia’s presidential election with a landslide last February was: what kind of president would this man be? As Indonesia’s notoriously long gap between election and inauguration dragged on and cabinet positions were debated, little became clearer. This weekend marks 100 days since Prabowo was inaugurated to great fanfare in Jakarta, and a series of early missteps, snubs and a new multilateral membership card gives a mixed report card. – The scorecard for Prabowo’s first 100 days? “Confused” | Lowy Institute
(Gurjit Singh – Observer Research Foundation) Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s inauguration on 20 October marked a smooth transition from his position as defence minister in Joko Widodo’s—popularly known as Jokowi—second administration.
Prabowo has committed to upholding Indonesia’s long-standing, “free and active” foreign policy, emphasising a non-aligned approach and national autonomy. While this aligns with past Indonesian policies, Prabowo is expected to be a more internationally focused president than Jokowi was during his decade-long tenure. Prabowo appointed his party ally, Sugiono, as Foreign Minister, signalling a shift in foreign policy leadership from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Istana Palace. This appointment contrasts with the quiet yet impactful role that former Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, had carved out for herself during Jokowi’s administration. Sugiono’s appointment marks the first time in 15 years that a non-career diplomat has held the position. – Foreign policy under President Prabowo: Shaping Indonesia’s global role
Japan – Malaysia – Indonesia – ASEAN
(Economist Intelligence Unit) The Japanese prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, paid an official visit to Malaysia and Indonesia from January 9th-12th. The choice of Malaysia and Indonesia as Mr Ishiba’s first bilateral overseas visits reflects the significance of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries for Japan during the time of rising anxiety over geopolitical changes regarding the US and China. – Japan PM visit to Malaysia and Indonesia shows ASEAN pivot – Economist Intelligence Unit
Koreas – US
(Syed Ali Zia Jaffery – Lowy The Interpreter)
Amid unprecedented political turmoil in South Korea, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this month visited Seoul, expressing confidence in both the South’s democratic credentials and the strength of the US-ROK alliance. This visit, Blinken’s last as Washington’s top diplomat, coincided with two successive missile tests by the Kim Jong-un regime in Pyongyang. Blinken’s references to the alliance and the North’s missile tests are important with regard to their timing. While Blinken’s remarks are meant to assuage Seoul’s fears about the future of the alliance under the incoming Trump administration, Kim’s missile gambit is an effort to exacerbate those. During Trump’s second term, such attempts by Kim, coupled with his focus on building tactical nuclear weapons, will precipitously increase South Korea’s security concerns. – Why South Korea might go nuclear in Trump’s term | Lowy Institute
Lebanon
(David Schenker – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
On January 13, former academic, diplomat, and jurist Nawaf Salam was named Lebanon’s next prime minister, replacing three-time premier and incumbent billionaire Najib Mikati. Four days earlier, parliament selected Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander Joseph Aoun as president, filling an office vacant since October 2022. Many in Lebanon and abroad are hailing this new team as a welcome break from the dysfunctional status quo and the beginning of the end of Lebanon’s long national nightmare. For example, U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein described Aoun’s appointment as a “step toward peace, security, and stability,” while French president Emmanuel Macron said it will pave the way “for reform and the restoration of Lebanon’s sovereignty and prosperity.”. Aoun and Salam do indeed represent a departure from business as usual. Yet the challenges facing Lebanon remain considerable, and the real test for both leaders will be translating the enthusiasm of the moment into practical, lasting reforms. – Will Lebanon’s New Leaders Walk the Walk? | The Washington Institute
Middle East
(Brian Katulis – Middle East Institute)
The cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas announced on Jan. 15 took more than a year to reach and almost certainly will take much longer to fully realize than the four-plus months outlined in the framework. Like many things in life, this agreement was hard to build and will be easy to tear down. Indeed, the deal has already run into issues even before it is set to take effect on Jan. 19, with a dispute within the Israeli cabinet delaying a vote on it until Jan. 17. – Gaza cease-fire: A first step on a very long road ahead | Middle East Institute
(Dennis Ross – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general and military theorist, famously noted that war is an instrument, not an end in itself. Only in circumstances in which one is fighting a war of survival can military means be said to overshadow political considerations. After the Hamas onslaught on Oct. 7, 2023, with the country and its leadership and military in a state of shock, Israelis found themselves fighting a war of survival. They would frequently say that without destroying Hamas’s military and guaranteeing that it no longer controls Gaza, Israel could not survive in its own neighborhood. Politics was not top of mind. – How Trump Can Remake the Middle East | The Washington Institute
(Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braveman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter – Institute for the Study of War)
Gaza Strip Ceasefire Deal: The Israeli cabinet will vote on the ceasefire-hostage agreement on January 17 after it postponed its vote due to delays in Hamas approving an unresolved issue. Both sides resolved the issue.
Military Implications for Ceasefire: Hamas will likely use the first phase to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli aerial observation. Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period, however. The limited and inadequate regeneration and reorganization Hamas may be able to undertake will almost certainly be wholly insufficient to seriously impede the IDF from achieving any tactical mission it must complete, such as reoccupying the Netzarim Corridor, if the ceasefire collapses.
Kurdish Coordination: The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appears to be trying to pressure the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to avoid a full-scale conflict with Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Barzani and Abdi also reportedly discussed ways to distance the SDF from the PKK in their meeting on January 16.
Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the SDF: A PKK official told Reuters that PKK forces would withdraw from Syria if the SDF had joint or solo control of northeastern Syria. The difference in how the SDF and Turkey define the PKK and its role in the SDF makes a ceasefire in northern Syria difficult to obtain. Turkey may define SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a Syrian and former PKK member, as an active member of the PKK, for example, due to his role within the YPG and SDF. Abdi and the SDF are unlikely to hold the same view.
Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Israel: Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power. Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly went further than Shara and said that Syria must ”defend our country and our people.” Shara and Shaibani’s statements were very likely spurred by an IDF Air Force strike on an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border on January 15 that killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons. – Iran Update, January 16, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
Moldova – Europe
(Thomas de Waal – Carnegie) Russia is using Transnistria to destabilize Moldova and derail its EU accession process. While helping Chișinău tackle its energy crisis, Brussels should directly engage with Transnistria and factor it into its enlargement and economic policies. – Moldova’s Gas Crisis Is Europe’s Headache | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Russia – Iran
(Paul Globe – The Jamestown Foundation)
Since becoming the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin has made developing a north-south trade corridor a centerpiece of his geoeconomic and geopolitical program. This would counter the impact of east-west routes and align the global south against the West.
He has now declared this corridor the foundation of a new strategic alliance with Iran, one designed to help him with his war against Ukraine, which disturbed many in the West as a sign that he will be able to end-run sanctions and overturn the current global order.
The much-ballyhooed plans for a trade corridor between Russia and Iran face many problems. They are unlikely to be realized until the next decade unless Western sanctions end and outside investment flows in to fund this project. – Moscow’s Plans for Trade Corridor with Iran Faces Ever More Problems – Jamestown
Russia’s War of Aggression on Ukraine
(Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros – Institute for the Study of War)
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark “Centennial Partnership Agreement” on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states’ permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka. – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025 | Institute for the Study of War
UK – China
(Economist Intelligence Unit) On January 11th-13th the UK chancellor of the exchequer, Rachel Reeves, made a three-day visit to China. She and China’s vice-premier, He Lifeng, co-hosted the UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue, which was revived after a five-year hiatus. – UK-China relations are set for a pragmatic restart – Economist Intelligence Unit
US – Mexico
(Rene Dominguez Castro – Atlantic Council) What will the US-Mexico relationship look like in 2025? As he takes office, President-elect Donald Trump’s priorities and initial decisions could have profound impacts on the agendas for the two countries and on the wider region, including in the critical areas of security, migration, trade, and economic investment. But how Mexico reacts to the incoming US administration’s policies can also increase or constrain the expected results of Trump’s strategies. – How Sheinbaum can strengthen US-Mexico ties in Trump’s first 100 days – Atlantic Council
US – Mexico – Canada Agreement
(Sophia Busch – Atlantic Council) On July 19, 2026, MetLife Stadium in New Jersey will host the finals of the first-ever tri-country FIFA men’s World Cup, hosted by Mexico, Canada, and the United States. That same month, trade policy watchers will be following a different matchup for this North American trio: the joint review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The incoming Trump administration will need to take advantage of the USMCA’s renewal process to address strategic objectives, without putting the agreement itself at risk. Any downgrade in trade relations from new tariffs will have serious impacts on the North American economy—including on US exporters. – Trump has an advantage in upcoming USMCA trade talks. Here’s how his team can use it. – Atlantic Council
US – Pacific
(Oliver Sinclair – Lowy The Interpreter)
Donald Trump’s loud promises to “drill, baby, drill” and a suggested exit from the Paris Climate Accords will hamstring US efforts to be seen as a genuine partner in and of the Pacific. Trump’s emphatic win in the American election had a strong climate mandate. That is, to pull out of the Paris Agreement, a possible withdrawal from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, a halt to offshore-wind projects on “Day 1” and a repeal of the Biden administration’s successful Inflation Reduction Act, which has seen billions of dollars in tax credits flow to clean energy technologies, electric vehicle incentives and carbon reduction initiatives. – Trump’s climate retreat will cost America influence in the Pacific | Lowy Institute
Global Risks
(Eurasia Group) Top Risks is Eurasia Group’s annual forecast of the political risks that are most likely to play out over the course of the year. This year’s report was published on 6 January 2025. – Eurasia Group | The Top Risks of 2025
