Le ‘linee rosse’ non vanno superate, soprattutto laddove occorra tendere a una sostenibilità politico-strategica del mondo.
Occorre complessità nella critica e la competizione tra USA e Cina è un laboratorio assai interessante nel quale ripensare le relazioni internazionali e, soprattutto, un pensiero strategico adeguato ai tempi.
Joseph S. Nye, in una riflessione per Project-Syndicate (Buying time to avoid war over Taiwan) non risparmia critiche all’evoluzione autoritaria del sistema cinese ma, come occorre fare in un approccio intelligente, si ferma sulla soglia della ‘linea rossa’ (Taiwan).
Così scrive Nye in conclusione: In the absence of the Taiwan issue, the US–China relationship fits the model of what former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd calls ‘managed strategic competition’. Neither country poses a threat to the other in the way that Hitler’s Germany did in the 1930s or Stalin’s Soviet Union did in the 1950s. Neither is out to conquer the other, nor could they. But a failure to manage the Taiwan issue could turn the conflict into an existential one. The US should continue to discourage formal Taiwanese independence, while helping Taiwan become a difficult-to-swallow ‘porcupine’. Washington should also work with allies to strengthen naval deterrence in the region. But it must avoid openly provocative actions and visits that might cause China to accelerate any plans for an invasion. As Nixon and Mao recognised long ago, there is much to be said for strategies and diplomatic arrangements that buy time.
Più volte abbiamo sottolineato l’importanza di guardare alla Cina non come a un nemico (certe posizioni sono più reazionarie che conservatrici) ma come a un competitore strategico. Gestire diplomaticamente e politicamente tale competizione è la sfida con la quale fare i conti. Tante, infatti, sono le interrelazioni di cui occorre tenere conto e nulla può essere gestito con la linearità e con le provocazioni reciproche. Acquistare tempo su Taiwan non significa attendere gli eventi: non dobbiamo lasciarci trarre in inganno dalla superficialità ma occorre invocare negoziati e diplomazia. La cronaca non ci aiuta a costruire la storia ma, molto spesso, a radicalizzare le posizioni e a peggiorare l’insostenibilità strategica nella quale ci troviamo.
English version
The ‘red lines’ must not be crossed, especially where there is a need to strive for a political-strategic sustainability of the world.
Critical complexity is needed, and the competition between the US and China is a very interesting laboratory in which to rethink international relations and, above all, strategic thinking appropriate to the times.
Joseph S. Nye, in a reflection for Project-Syndicate (Buying time to avoid war over Taiwan) does not spare criticism of the authoritarian evolution of the Chinese system but, as is necessary in an intelligent approach, stops at the threshold of the ‘red line’ (Taiwan).
Nye writes in conclusion: In the absence of the Taiwan issue, the US-China relationship fits the model of what former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd calls ‘‘managed strategic competition’. Neither country poses a threat to the other in the way that Hitler’s Germany did in the 1930s or Stalin’s Soviet Union did in the 1950s. Neither is out to conquer the other, nor could they. But a failure to manage the Taiwan issue could turn the conflict into an existential one. The US should continue to discourage formal Taiwanese independence, while helping Taiwan become a difficult-to-swallow ‘porcupine’. Washington should also work with allies to strengthen naval deterrence in the region. But it must avoid openly provocative actions and visits that might cause China to accelerate any plans for an invasion. As Nixon and Mao recognised long ago, there is much to be said for strategies and diplomatic arrangements that buy time.
We have repeatedly stressed the importance of looking at China not as an enemy (certain positions are more reactionary than conservative) but as a strategic competitor. Managing this competition diplomatically and politically is the challenge to be reckoned with. There are so many interrelationships that need to be taken into account and nothing can be managed with linearity and mutual provocation. Buying time on Taiwan does not mean waiting for events: we must not allow ourselves to be misled by superficiality but must call for negotiations and diplomacy. The chronicle does not help us build history but, very often, radicalises positions and worsens the strategic unsustainability in which we find ourselves.
