(‘Pillola’ SIOI) In un’analisi recente su quattro decenni di andamenti climatici, la Banca Asiatica di Sviluppo (ADB) lancia un allarme sull’accelerazione della ritirata dei ghiacciai in Asia centrale e nel Caucaso. Il rapporto, intitolato Glaciers to Farms Climate Risk and Capacity Assessment, ha valutato ghiacciai e modelli di utilizzo idrico in tre bacini fluviali: il Naryn e il Pyanj in Asia centrale, e il Kura nel Caucaso. Basandosi su dati storici, l’ADB ha prodotto «basin-specific projections focused on glacier, snow, and permafrost areas, resulting in a realistic basis for understanding future climate impact».
Il documento rileva che i ghiacciai del Caucaso sono quelli in ritirata più rapida, e avverte che le temperature medie potrebbero risultare fino a 5 gradi superiori rispetto alle attuali in entrambe le regioni entro il 2085. «Models project accelerated glacier loss and near-total disappearance of small Caucasus glaciers by 2100 under high emissions, alongside permafrost degradation, altered river flows, and reduced long-term natural water storage», si legge nella valutazione. L’impatto indiretto è vasto: il rapporto evidenzia rischi crescenti di siccità, frane e alluvioni da esondazione di laghi glaciali, aggiungendo che la capacità di monitorare tali fenomeni è attualmente limitata.
Anche i volumi e la disponibilità idrica sono destinati a mutare in profondità. «Although some areas may see higher winter precipitation, overall water availability will decline as glacier-fed runoff diminishes», prosegue l’analisi, secondo cui i mutamenti in corso «will erode water security, hydropower, and agricultural productivity by reducing the reliability of glacier-fed rivers and increasing flood-related infrastructure damage». Il rapporto ADB formula raccomandazioni di ampio respiro: rafforzamento delle capacità di monitoraggio e allerta precoce, miglioramento dei sistemi di gestione idrica, sviluppo di colture resistenti al clima e pratiche agricole più efficienti.
Il perimetro della vulnerabilità è duplice. A sud, il bacino Kura-Aras — che copre l’intero territorio armeno, circa l’80 per cento dell’Azerbaigian e metà della Georgia, ed è cruciale per Turchia e Iran — registra dal 2000 incrementi dei prelievi idrici del 32 per cento in Armenia, 22 per cento in Georgia e 10 per cento in Azerbaigian, con un ricorso alle falde cresciuto del 100 per cento in Armenia e di quasi il 400 per cento in Azerbaigian. «Water security in the region is under threat due to climate change, the impact of which is worsened by the limited cooperation between the riparian states», osserva il policy paper della Planetary Security Initiative, che rileva l’assenza di un quadro multilaterale e l’affidamento a intese bilaterali ereditate dall’epoca sovietica.
A est, l’Asia centrale presenta una dipendenza strutturale: oltre l’80 per cento delle risorse idriche uzbeke proviene dall’estero; il Tagikistan custodisce circa 14.000 ghiacciai, con oltre un terzo della superficie glaciale perduta; il Kirghizistan ne conta più di 8.000, con oltre il 25 per cento di copertura scomparsa e il rischio di perdere un ulteriore terzo della massa entro il 2040. Oltre metà del deflusso fluviale regionale nasce da neve e ghiaccio. La pressione sui suoli è già misurabile: tra il 40 e il 60 per cento dei seminativi irrigati della regione è colpito da salinizzazione secondaria, mentre il fondo prosciugato del lago d’Aral — oltre 5,5 milioni di ettari, di cui 3,2 in Uzbekistan — alimenta ogni anno tempeste di sabbia e sale che trasportano decine di milioni di tonnellate di particelle.
Sul piano diplomatico, i capi di Stato centroasiatici hanno firmato ad Astana la dichiarazione «Ecological Solidarity of Central Asia», a margine di un vertice che ha prodotto 17 accordi per oltre 2,3 miliardi di dollari, in gran parte destinati a energia rinnovabile, gestione dei rifiuti e decarbonizzazione industriale. Il presidente kazako Kassym-Jomart Tokayev ha avvertito che dal deserto dell’Aralkum «Tens of millions of tonnes of salt, sand and chemical particles are lifted into the atmosphere each year from this area», aggiungendo che le temperature estive della regione sono salite in media di 2-2,5 gradi e che «Within a radius of 100 kilometers, precipitation has significantly decreased». Il primo segretario generale della Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Kairat Sarybay, ha posto la questione istituzionale: «Global governance on water is fragmented and increasingly ineffective. There is no single institution capable of dealing with the complexity of water management», aggiungendo che «The idea of creating one dedicated international body for water is not just relevant. It’s necessary».
Il nodo, sul piano regionale, è la capacità di enforcement: l’International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) e la Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) non dispongono di meccanismi vincolanti. «I like the idea of a Central Asian Commission on Water Resources, but I don’t think it will be the key to resolving water issues in Central Asia unless the Commission can ensure that governments carry out its recommendations», osserva Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, presidente di Second Floor Strategies. Da Washington, la Banca Eurasiatica di Sviluppo stima carenze croniche entro cinque anni. Sul fronte dei grandi attori, un’analisi separata di Eurasianet raccoglie il rilievo dell’analista Arayssi: «If Beijing is truly a strategic partner for Kazakhstan, Chinese officials should demonstrate more openness in seeking a compromise solution on the water-use issue».
La partita che si apre oltre il dato idrologico non è tecnica ma di architettura istituzionale: l’ADB misura la velocità dei fenomeni e l’inadeguatezza della strumentazione, mentre la dimensione geopolitica — dalla competizione sulle risorse transfrontaliere all’interesse di Stati Uniti e Unione Europea su minerali critici, dati e settori idroesigenti — resta affidata, allo stato, a cornici bilaterali. Chi saprà offrire un quadro multilaterale credibile darà un contributo importante all’ordine regionale del prossimo decennio.
(English version)
In a recent analysis of four decades of climate patterns, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) raises the alarm over the accelerating retreat of glaciers in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The report, titled Glaciers to Farms Climate Risk and Capacity Assessment, assessed glaciers and water-use patterns across three river basins: the Naryn and the Pyanj in Central Asia, and the Kura in the Caucasus. Drawing on historical data, the ADB produced “basin-specific projections focused on glacier, snow, and permafrost areas, resulting in a realistic basis for understanding future climate impact.”
The document finds that Caucasus glaciers are receding at the fastest pace, and warns that average temperatures could be up to 5 degrees higher across both regions by 2085 than at present. “Models project accelerated glacier loss and near-total disappearance of small Caucasus glaciers by 2100 under high emissions, alongside permafrost degradation, altered river flows, and reduced long-term natural water storage,” the assessment states. The knock-on impact is wide-ranging: the report highlights growing risks of drought, landslides and glacial lake outburst floods, adding that the capacity to monitor such risks is presently limited.
Water quantities and availability patterns are also set to shift profoundly. “Although some areas may see higher winter precipitation, overall water availability will decline as glacier-fed runoff diminishes,” the analysis continues, warning that the changes under way “will erode water security, hydropower, and agricultural productivity by reducing the reliability of glacier-fed rivers and increasing flood-related infrastructure damage.” The ADB report issues wide-ranging recommendations: strengthening monitoring and early-warning capabilities, improving water-management systems, developing climate-resilient crops and more efficient agricultural practices.
The perimeter of vulnerability is twofold. To the south, the Kura-Aras basin — which covers the whole of Armenia, roughly 80 per cent of Azerbaijan and half of Georgia, and is crucial to Turkey and Iran — has seen water withdrawals since 2000 rise by 32 per cent in Armenia, 22 per cent in Georgia and 10 per cent in Azerbaijan, with groundwater reliance up 100 per cent in Armenia and by nearly 400 per cent in Azerbaijan. “Water security in the region is under threat due to climate change, the impact of which is worsened by the limited cooperation between the riparian states,” notes a policy paper by the Planetary Security Initiative, which points to the absence of a multilateral framework and a reliance on bilateral arrangements inherited from the Soviet era.
To the east, Central Asia displays structural dependence: more than 80 per cent of Uzbekistan’s water resources come from outside the country; Tajikistan holds some 14,000 glaciers, having lost more than a third of its glacier surface; Kyrgyzstan has more than 8,000, with over 25 per cent of coverage gone and the risk of losing a further third of its mass by 2040. More than half of the region’s river runoff is generated by snow and ice. Pressure on soils is already measurable: between 40 and 60 per cent of the region’s irrigated farmland is affected by secondary salinization, while the dried bed of the Aral Sea — over 5.5 million hectares, of which 3.2 million in Uzbekistan — feeds annual sand-and-salt storms carrying tens of millions of tonnes of particles.
On the diplomatic front, Central Asian heads of state signed the “Ecological Solidarity of Central Asia” declaration in Astana, on the sidelines of a summit that produced 17 agreements worth more than $2.3 billion, largely directed at renewable energy, waste management and industrial decarbonisation. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev warned that from the Aralkum desert “Tens of millions of tonnes of salt, sand and chemical particles are lifted into the atmosphere each year from this area,” adding that summer temperatures in the region have risen by an average of 2-2.5 degrees and that “Within a radius of 100 kilometers, precipitation has significantly decreased.” The first Secretary General of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Kairat Sarybay, raised the institutional question: “Global governance on water is fragmented and increasingly ineffective. There is no single institution capable of dealing with the complexity of water management,” adding that “The idea of creating one dedicated international body for water is not just relevant. It’s necessary.”
The crux, at regional level, is enforcement capacity: the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) have no binding mechanisms at their disposal. “I like the idea of a Central Asian Commission on Water Resources, but I don’t think it will be the key to resolving water issues in Central Asia unless the Commission can ensure that governments carry out its recommendations,” observes Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, president of Second Floor Strategies. From Washington, the Eurasian Development Bank estimates chronic shortages within five years. On the major-power front, a separate Eurasianet analysis carries the assessment of analyst Arayssi: “If Beijing is truly a strategic partner for Kazakhstan, Chinese officials should demonstrate more openness in seeking a compromise solution on the water-use issue.”
The contest opening up beyond the hydrological data is not technical but one of institutional architecture: the ADB measures the speed of events and the inadequacy of the instrumentation, while the geopolitical dimension — from competition over transboundary resources to the interest of the United States and the European Union in critical minerals, data and water-intensive sectors — remains entrusted, as things stand, to bilateral frameworks. Whoever can offer a credible multilateral framework will make an important contribution to the regional order of the next decade.
Eurasianet, Central Asia and Caucasus confront rising water-security threats, 13 novembre 2026
