China – Batanes Islands
(Hsi-Ting Pai – The Strategist) Now China is going after the Batanes Islands, a strategically crucial Philippine territory in the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan. An assertion by a group of scholars in June that the Batanes belong to China is a familiar opening move in Beijing’s territorial narrative-building playbook. Their declaration was followed by contrived media amplification to test foreign reactions, which also usually happens. If Beijing deems the timing right, it may eventually move to official foreign ministry statements to solidify a previously non-existent territorial claim. The ultimate goal is not necessarily the physical seizure of the islands. For the moment, the manufactured claim may serve only as a flexible diplomatic and legal pressure point to advance immediate objectives: disrupting Japan–Philippines maritime boundary talks and escalating cognitive warfare against Taiwan. – A new claim on the Batanes, from an old Chinese playbook | The Strategist
Pacific Islands Forum
(John Hennessey-Niland – The Strategist) The focus for this year’s annual gathering of Pacific leaders and partners was always going to be about China. With the 55th annual meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) taking place last week in Palau, one of only 12 nations in the world that recognise Taiwan, there was always going to be the potential for mischief by China. As the leaders meeting came only a short time after a Chinese missile test in the Pacific, everyone was waiting to see the final communique or if there would even be one. China certainly tried every trick in the book to disrupt the meeting and to discredit the host Palau and its president, Surangel Whipps Jr. – Postcard from PIF: Hardly divided, leaders took a stand on China test | The Strategist
Vietnam
(Thang Nam Do – Lowy The Interpreter) Vietnam wants to become a strong maritime nation. Its new strategy makes clear that getting there will require more than ports and ships. It will also require institutions capable of deciding who can use an increasingly crowded sea, where, and on what terms. Resolution 20(Opens in new window), adopted in July 2026, marks an important shift in how Vietnam thinks about the sea. It calls for a move from exploiting marine resources towards modern marine governance, and from sector-by-sector management towards integrated governance of national marine space. Institutional reform is identified as a strategic breakthrough, together with science, technology, and high-quality human resources. The economic stakes are considerable. With over 3,200 kilometres of coastline, Vietnam’s economic geography is already heavily maritime. Resolution 20 sets an ambitious target: for coastal provinces and cities to account for more than 70% of national GDP by 2030. The strategy also aims for 6–10 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2030. But every turbine raises questions about access to marine space, interactions with fishing and shipping, transmission infrastructure, environmental impacts, and coastal communities. These competing claims are not hypothetical: Vietnam exported a record US$11.3 billion of seafood(Opens in new window) in 2025, while preparing for a potentially large offshore wind industry(Opens in new window). Investment alone cannot resolve these trade-offs. The resolution acknowledges institutional challenges. Marine governance has not kept pace with development. Responsibilities overlap, inter-sectoral and inter-regional coordination remains weak, and marine science and human resources do not yet meet development needs. – Vietnam’s blue economy needs more than ports and ships | Lowy Institute
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