(Fabrizio Minniti and Giangiuseppe Pili – RUSI) Adaptation dominated over innovation across most of military history. Byzantine commanders, First World War staffs, and Second World War armies all adjusted doctrine under fire and forced by the opponent’s opposition. Russia’s experience in Ukraine is no exception. What distinguishes the Russian case is not adaptation per se, but its pattern; that is, rapid at the tactical and technological level, terribly slow at the organisational. Indeed, Russia operates according to a logic fundamentally different from Western military doctrine. Western planning often assumes, and it is based on the principle, that superiority in precision, speed and coordination will produce decisive outcomes. The Russian model suggests otherwise. It is organised around endurance, mass and the willingness to absorb losses over time. Understanding this distinction is the prerequisite for any honest analysis of Russian adaptation which, usually, lags behind a Western-oriented analytical framework, which in turn can skew objective understanding of the Russian ‘model’, if there is one. Zapad exercises offer a particularly useful lens to sift through the noise and mirror imaging. Conducted on a roughly four-year rotation and focused westward, these are not merely rehearsals. They are diagnostic moments for the Russian Ministry of Defence to stress-test doctrine and signal intent. Scrutinised in sequence, they reveal not linear modernisation, but an uneven process shaped by battlefield experience, political constraint and bureaucratic and institutional inertia.
The Global Eye è in partnership con SIOI – Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale
