Sources: Atlantic Council; Council on Foreign Relations; RUSI; The Jamestown Foundation; The Soufan Center
2026 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes
(Atlantic Council) The global environment has become more uncertain and, as such, more dangerous in many ways. The war in Ukraine has brought large-scale conflict back to Europe and forced governments to rethink security, energy, and industrial policy. The war in the Middle East has added another source of instability to global markets and international diplomacy. At the same time, great-power competition between the United States and China and other factors are reshaping trade and investment decisions, with tariffs, industrial policy, and supply-chain restrictions becoming more common. These developments are not external to the story of freedom and prosperity. They are precisely the kind of pressures that test the strength of institutions. The data in the 2026 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes—which measure levels of political freedom, economic freedom and adherence to rule of law in one Index and levels of wealth and human development in the other–illustrate this pressure. At first glance, the aggregate Freedom Index remains relatively stable, but the deeper picture is more fragile. The data show political freedom, measured under the Political Subindex, continues to decline across much of the world and while economic freedom, measured under the Economic Subindex, remains higher now than in the 1990s, its recent progress is weaker than the headline index suggests. This is especially clear when the data you separate the women’s economic freedom component from the rest of the Economic Subindex. We can see that core economic freedom such as properity rights protection, trade and investment freedom has been largely flat in recent years, which is consistent when open markets are no longer advancing with the same force as before. Economic freedom has long helped offset political decline in the aggregate Freedom Index; but if core economic freedom stalls, the overall freedom picture becomes more fragile. – 2026 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes: The legal foundations that enable prosperity are rapidly eroding – Atlantic Council
Russia
(Maksym Beznosiuk – The Jamestown Foundation) The Kremlin has integrated Russian youth organizations such as Yunarmia, the Movement of the First, and VOIN into a militarization system that channels children from patriotic education to military training and, ultimately, service in Russia’s armed forces and security institutions. Yunarmia (Youth Army, Юнармия), founded by the Ministry of Defense in 2016, and the Movement of the First, created by President Vladimir Putin in 2022, provide mass patriotic education and youth engagement, with the latter serving as the umbrella organization coordinating Russia’s broader youth policy. VOIN (Warrior, Воин), established by Putin in December 2022, serves as the youth system’s specialized military training arm, providing firearms, drone, engineering, tactical medicine, and other combat-oriented instruction while rapidly expanding across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Russia’s youth militarization ecosystem is likely to pose long-term security risks for Ukraine and the West by shaping future generations via military training, wartime ideology, and fostering hostility towards Ukraine and the West. – Russia Expands Youth Militarization (Part Two) – Jamestown
Russia – Afghanistan
(Syed Fazl-e-Haider – The Jamestown Foundation) Russia and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a military cooperation agreement on May 27 in Moscow, one year after the Kremlin removed the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist organizations and became the first and only country to recognize the Taliban government. The undisclosed pact—framed by Moscow as covering the repair of Russian-made equipment—signals a broader strategy to integrate Afghanistan into Russia’s sphere of influence as a transit hub linking Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. Deepening Russian–Taliban ties risk unsettling Pakistan, which is engaged in open conflict with the Taliban regime, alarming Central Asian states such as Tajikistan, and undermining the position of the People’s Republic of China, Afghanistan’s largest foreign investor. – Russia and Afghanistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement – Jamestown
Russia – Ukraine
(Sunny Cheung – The Jamestown Foundation) Chinese analysts have closely followed Russia’s cyber offensive against Ukraine, drawing a series of lessons about how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can better prepare for cyber warfare. Analysts blame Russia’s underwhelming cyber campaign at the outset of its invasion on institutional flaws. This contrasts with analysts in the West who suggest that cyber capabilities are not a decisive factor in contemporary warfare. In response, Chinese analysts advocate for a more unified command structure and enhanced civil-military fusion. Research on cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in Ukraine and, more recently, by the United States in Venezuela underscore the need to improve domestic resilience and defenses for critical infrastructure. Developing “independent and controllable” technologies and reducing dependence on those controlled by adversaries is a key theme of this literature. Some scholars also advocate using international governance institutions to shape global cyberspace regulation in favorable ways. – Cyber Lessons From Russia’s War in Ukraine – Jamestown
Syria
(The Soufan Center) Syria marked an important political milestone on Sunday when its newly formed People’s Assembly convened for the first time, approximately one and a half years after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. While the new Syrian administration is seeking to make progress on several political reforms and attract foreign engagement and investment, a recent change in Islamic State behavior has served as a ‘black cloud’ over recent initiatives. A recent string of Islamic State attacks has sought to exacerbate grievances with Syria’s government and highlight its inability to prevent security incidents. While a recent Islamic State attack failed to halt a French state visit to Syria’s capital, the recent string of terrorist incidents raises questions about the momentum of foreign engagement with the nascent Syrian administration as well as new concerns about the trajectory of groups like the Islamic State. – Syria’s Transition Advances Amid Persistent Security Challenges – The Soufan Center
US – Iran – Middle East – Gulf
(Mariel Ferragamo – Council on Foreign Relations) The Strait of Hormuz remains a focal point of U.S.-Iran conflict following the collapse of a sixty-day ceasefire negotiated in mid-June 2026. After resuming tit-for-tat strikes, the two countries are once again locked in a struggle for control over the Mideast waterway, considered a major maritime choke point for global energy supplies. – The Strait of Hormuz: A U.S.-Iran Maritime Flash Point | Council on Foreign Relations
Uzbekistan – Azerbaijan – Georgia
(Roza Bayramli – The Jamestown Foundation) Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s July 2–3 state visit to Georgia elevated bilateral relations to a strategic partnership centered on transport connectivity, with agreements on digital permits, customs cooperation, and expanded railway discounts along the Middle Corridor. Tashkent signaled interest in a permanent logistics presence on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, including possible participation in the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, which Tbilisi will now develop under a state-led landlord model open to multiple foreign operators. Mirziyoyev’s proposal to link the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway with the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars line would keep Azerbaijan central to the trans-Caspian chain and could help transform the Middle Corridor from a collection of national projects into a cohesive east-west network. – Uzbekistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia Partnership Advances Middle Corridor Integration – Jamestown
Wars in Ukraine and Iran and Western defence systems
(Andreas Urbanski – RUSI) Two wars are teaching the same lesson. Western defence budgets and procurement priorities leave serious capability gaps when they are confronted with the asymmetry of today’s conflicts. In Ukraine, Russia – with a far larger pre-war army and a 2026 defence budget four times Ukraine’s – has failed to achieve its objectives for more than four years. In the 2026 Iran war, the US and Israel established air superiority within days, yet could not eliminate Iran’s retaliatory capability, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, or force the political outcomes they sought. In both cases, a superpower’s overwhelming advantage in troops and platforms failed to deliver decisive results. The weaker party imposed disproportionate costs on the stronger side’s munitions stocks, its economy and – in the case of the US – its political will. The two wars carry opposite signs: in Ukraine, a young democracy attacked by an authoritarian superpower fielding a post-Soviet military; in Iran, an authoritarian regime struck by a superpower fielding the most advanced forces in the world. Yet for Europe’s budget planners and procurement officials, they yield one coherent set of lessons. Neither Iran nor Ukraine found a way to defeat a superpower’s forces decisively on the battlefield. Both found ways to make a superpower’s victory expensive – and potentially unaffordable – by shifting the contest into domains where the Western alliance has under-invested: the economics of munitions, the protection of infrastructure far behind the front line, commercial risk, and the public’s confidence in everyday security. The vulnerability at the heart of Europe is rooted in two decades of procurement choices: exquisite platforms bought in small numbers, acquisition concentrated in a few large and often slow-moving prime contractors, a deficit of innovation and chronic neglect of precisely those civilian systems and infrastructure that adversaries now treat as the primary battlespace. – Cheap Attack, Expensive Defence: NATO 5% Pledge Following Iran and Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute
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